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To my mother, Cherie Lee Burkett 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From 1755 on, there are two central questions in Kant's metaphysics.  First, 
how can things (bodies, substances) form one world, not solely in the 
representations of thinking monads, but really and materially, that is, as a 
world constituted by universal physical interaction?  Second, on what 
principles does our knowledge of such a world rest. 
 
     —Burkhard Tuschling 
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ABSTRACT  
 
 
 
The Cognitive Significance of Kant’s Third Critique 
 
By 
 
Michael Joseph Fletcher 
 
 
The aim is to motivate Kant’s third Critique (Critique of the Power of 
Judgment) in terms of the theoretical objectives of the Critique of Pure Reason.  To 
that end, I construct an interpretative framework in which the third Critique’s major 
philosophical doctrines and innovations can be seen to have a cognitive significance.  
Specifically, the aim is to show that the third Critique’s interest in natural teleology, 
objective purposiveness, and physicoteleology is linked to the first Critique’s interest 
in cognitive systematicity.  However, while other cognition-oriented approaches to 
the third Critique draw mainly from the first Critique’s Transcendental Analytic, my 
interpretative framework draws largely from the Transcendental Dialectic, 
specifically its discussions of the “ideas of pure reason.”    
The investigation is guided by two preliminary issues:   
(1) Do the ideas of pure reason (IPRs) play some important role within our 
representational systems? That is, do IPRs serve some cognitive function 
 x
in Kant’s Representationalist Theory of Mind? If so, what representational 
function do IPRs perform?  
(2) If the three types of IPR—self, cosmos, God—can be assigned separate 
and nonredundant cognitive functions, do these functions operate 
independently of the other, or is there some higher-order representational 
objective that links their operation?   
Under my analysis, IPRs can be assigned differential representational 
functions under a specification of theoretical reason’s highest-order cognitive aim of 
representing the material universe as one all-inclusive super-object.  The 
representation of the material universe as a single super-object is functionally 
equivalent to the representation of all natural products as parts of one integrated 
whole—one whose internal composition Kant models globally on that of natural 
organisms.  Representing nature as a organized whole can be functionally 
decomposed into the representation of its component parts (= substances), interactive 
structure, and a system for ordering multiple interactive structures hierarchically.  By 
functioning as a program of a priori cognitive directives that contribute jointly to the 
mind’s representation of nature as a multi-level system of interactive structure, IPRs 
subserve reason’s highest-order cognitive end of representing all natural products as 
parts of a single super-object.   
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION:  MOTIVATING KANT'S THIRD CRITIQUE 
Every formal system in philosophy must be “motivated,” and the informal 
task of providing that motivation typically contributes more philosophical 
illumination (or at least doctrine) than the system for which it paves the way.  
There is always more than one candidate system or perspective crying out for 
philosophical exploration and development, and in such an unruly arena of 
thought, tactical considerations play an unusually important role. 
 
     —Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance 
 
1.0 Why Is There A Third Critique?   
For many philosophers interested in Kant's work the third critique is a dark 
horse.  A brief sample of the attitudes of some professional philosophers (some of 
whom are well-known Kant specialists) toward the third critique confirms this:  
The Critique of Judgment is a work of great complexity as well as obscurity.1 
That the [third] Critique is difficult enough to be in need of exposition will 
not be questioned by anyone.  For my part I found it difficult enough at the 
beginning to grasp even the main lines of Kant's argument, and still more 
difficult to understand the details.2 
 
 Commentators who do overcome (to some extent) the (notorious) obscurity of the 
third critique's philosophical theses (to say nothing of the structure of its arguments) 
subsequently face the further difficulty of assimilating these various theses into the 
larger architectonic framework of Kant's thought.    
Philosophers have always considered Kant's third and last Critique, the 
Critique of Judgment, a somewhat puzzling book, although for different 
reasons.  Those who view Kant primarily as a descriptive metaphysician 
                                                          
1
 Paul Guyer, Kant's System of Nature and Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2005), Preface.   
 
2
 H.W. Cassirer, A Commentary On Kant's Critique of Judgment (Barnes and Noble, 1974), 
Preface.  
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trying to establish the conceptual foundations of our knowledge of the world 
have found it difficult to reconcile the basic results of Kant's first Critique 
with central statements of the last Critique -- for example, those concerning 
causality and mechanical explanations.3   
 
Paul Guyer, who has developed a substantive interpretation of the third critique, one 
where he assigns it the job of "bridging the gulf" between nature and freedom, 
acknowledges the apparent obsolescence of a third critique.  Thus Guyer himself 
asks:  
But what problem about the efficacy of the laws of freedom in the realm of 
nature could remain to be solved after the first two Critiques?4   
 
Evidently, the third critique is puzzling along multiple Kant-internal dimensions.  
Rolf-Peter Horstmann elaborates on the puzzlement surrounding the third critique:   
This criticism ranges from the suspicion of artificiality via the accusation of 
arbitrariness to the supposition that Kant had no guiding conception at all in 
conceiving the third Critique. … The problems mentioned so far originate in 
obscurities accompanying the principles by which Kant's systematic 
intentions are constructed.  Yet another group of problems arises when the 
third Critique is viewed as a body of propositions concerning the mental 
faculty of judgment, the beautiful, and organisms. Here, complaints about 
difficulty in discerning exactly what Kant claims about these three topics 
alternate with very definite statements concerning what is wrong with Kantian 
faculty psychology, what is ill-conceived within his aesthetic theory, or, 
finally, what are the shortcomings of his views on teleology.5 
 
From these various problems, whether they concern the pinning-down of what Kant 
actually says, or whether the claims he makes in the other two critiques are 
                                                          
3
 Rolf-Peter Horstmann, "Why There Must Be a Transcendental Deduction In Kant's Critique 
of Judgment," in Kant’s Transcendental Deductions, ed. Eckart Forster (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1989), 156.   
 
4Paul Guyer, "Bridging the Gulf: Kant’s Project in the Third Critique," in A Companion To 
Kant, ed. Graham Bird (Wiley Blackwell, 2009), 424.   
 
5
 Horstmann, 158. 
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compatible with those he makes in the first critique, the single tributary into which 
these issues flow is why, under what motivation, Kant wrote the third critique.  
Indeed, Horstmann concludes:  
He obviously did not succeed in giving unambiguous indications about the 
function and the results of the third Critique.  In other words, his treatise on 
judgment lacks explicit and intelligible answers to some very elementary 
questions -- the most elementary being the question of why the third Critique 
was ever written at all.6   
 
Paul Guyer seems to corroborate (in a somewhat less aggressive tone) Horstmann's 
impression concerning the unclarity of Kant's motivation for writing the third 
critique.  As Guyer observes,  
Kant does not immediately reveal a profound motivation for the new book in 
either the first draft of its Introduction, the so-called First Introduction of 1789 
(20:193-251), or in the Preface or first section of the published Introduction as 
well as several subsequent sections.7 
 
Nevertheless Guyer, like other commentators, believes that the third critique was 
guided by a "deeper motivation" (Guyer's phrase), one which will explain why that 
work is composed of its two major treatises and, in addition, how their combination 
can be viewed to subserve larger philosophical aims that link the entire work 
architectonically to Kant's thought.8 
This aim of the present chapter is largely cartographical.  In it I draft a map of 
the secondary literature concerning the third critique (noting some of the main 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
6
 Horstmann, 158-59. 
 
7
 Guyer, “Bridging the Gulf,” 424. 
 
8
 As Donald Crawford points out, Kant does reveal a higher motivation in his letters, for 
example in his letter to Reinhold, 31 Dec 1787.  
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approaches to it) with the intention of locating my own view within the suggested 
cartography.  However, before launching into a discussion of the various motivations 
commentators have proposed for Kant's third critique, some minimal background on 
its internal structure should be provided.   
 
1.1 Concise Anatomy of the Third Critique  
Kant's third critique, the Critique of the Power of Judgment, is a work 
composed of two halves -- the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment (APJ, for 
short) and the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment (TPJ, for short).9  To 
perform a judgment is, essentially, to perform an act of subsumption; therefore, as we 
will see below, the power of judgment is conceptualized in terms of that operation.  
The fact that the third critique is a single treatise composed of two halves implies, I 
think, that (in Kant's mind) there is one power that either has multiple dimensions or 
is variously used.10   
Kant wrote two introductions to the third critique, only the second of which 
was originally published, both of which however contain philosophically substantive 
material; while there are some redundancies or overlap in topical discussion, there are 
nontrivial differences in emphases and content.  In the literature, these introductions 
                                                          
 
9
 Each of these halves, as you might expect, contains considerable internal complexity.  For 
instance, each contains, like the first critique, an Antinomy and a Dialectic.    
 
10
 Evidently, Kant holds this same view about the faculty of reason.  On this issue, see 
Sebastian Gardener's, "The Primacy of Practical Reason," in A Companion To Kant, ed. by Graham 
Bird. 
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are sometimes referred to (sensibly enough) as the First Introduction (FI) and the 
Second (or published) Introduction (SI).  I will follow the First/Second convention.  
This concludes the structural anatomy of the third critique.  Next, the aim is to 
introduce the third critique's main topics.   
As remarked (in the Guyer quote above), the third critique introduces (and 
develops) what Kant calls a "reflecting" (as contrasted with "determining") 
judgment.11  Kant's official formulation of the difference is not particularly 
illuminating.  According to Kant the difference between the two types of judgment is 
to be explicated in terms of which direction an act of a subsumption proceeds:  either 
from the universal to the particular or from the particular to the universal; if the 
former, then the judgment is of the "determining" sort ; if the latter, then the 
judgment is of the "reflecting" sort.   
My aim is not to provide a detailed analysis of the difference between these 
two types of judgment.  Some clarification may, however, be useful here.  In the 
Jasche Logic, Kant distinguishes between logical determination and logical 
abstraction; the former is a case of specialization (where a judgment is made from 
higher abstraction to a lower one): bird => gull.  In the latter case, members of a 
given subtype are considered in respect of some supertype (and its more abstract 
features):  gull => bird.  When Kant describes the exercise of judgment as  
                                                          
11
 Under Kant's generic account of reflecting judgment, Guyer (2003) distinguishes five 
different types of reflecting judgment: The reflecting judgment of the system of scientific concepts, the 
reflecting judgments of beauty (aesthetic judgment), the reflecting judgment of the sublime (aesthetic 
judgment), the reflecting judgment of particular organisms (teleological judgment), the reflecting 
judgment of nature as a whole (teleological judgment). 
 6
"determining," he seems to view concept-users to be making a subsumption whereby 
a given subtype (or subclass) of entity is subsumed under a supertype (or superclass) 
of entity; in doing so, the supertype conceptually inherits the subtype (as part of its 
extension) and the members of the subtype inherit the features or characteristics of 
the supertype.  Consequently, by making a determining judgment concept-users 
specialise the supertype in relation to its subtype.  A certain sort of conceptual unity 
(as well as ontological unity) is the result.  (I discuss this in somewhat more detail in 
1.4.) 
If determining judgments are modeled on logical determination, then (given 
Kant's formulation two paragraphs up) one might naturally suppose that reflecting 
judgments are to be modeled on the reverse procedure of logical abstraction.  
Unfortunately, this supposition doesn't square so well with the formulation Kant 
gives of reflecting judgments, one where there is an "unknown" universal to be 
determined by the reflecting judgment.  In the case of logical abstraction, which may 
occur within an operative system of concepts, supertypes would presumably already 
be determined and set up hierarchically.  At any rate, whatever cognitive operations 
are involved in making a reflecting judgment, it seems clear that Kant intends 
judgments of this type to figure prominently in an account of (empirical) concept-
formation, not merely conceptual abstraction.12   
                                                          
 
12
 What kind of empirical concepts is the principle (of systematicity) supposed to be a 
condition of?  On this point, Henry Allison's writes:  "The key to the answer lies in Kant's expression 
"determined empirically," which I take it means being determined by underlying, empirically real 
features of things rather than merely superficial features, which reflect the contingencies of the way in 
which we happen to encounter these things in experience.  In other words, Kant's claim is not that 
 7
In the literature there is disagreement over how to explicate the precise 
structure of the reflecting judgment. It's clear, however, that it occupies centerstage in 
Kant's third critique.  Reflecting judgment is a generic type under which Kant 
distinguishes two judgment subtypes, namely, the aesthetic and teleological 
judgment.  (See Diagram below.) Suffice to say that an analyses of each type of 
reflecting judgment is given a separate treatment in the book and affiliated with a 
corresponding type of subject matter.  The first half (the Critique of the Aesthetic 
Power of Judgment, or CAPJ, for short) consists of an analysis of our judgments 
concerning beauty (natural or artefactual).13  In this work, Kant presents two models, 
namely, a model of (what he calls) the "judgment of taste" and of the judgments of 
the "sublime."  Again, in the present context we need not know the details about 
Kant's models for these judgments.  Suffice it to say that judgments of taste are about 
beauty, whereas judgments of sublime are, for instance, about the "immense" or 
"powerful."   
                                                                                                                                                                     
systematicity is a condition of the possibility of forming any empirical concepts, since any common 
features would provide reflective judgment with something to compare; it is rather a condition of 
forming empirical concepts that are cognitively significant, that "carve nature at its joints" if you will." 
Henry Allison, "Is the Critique of Judgment ‘Post-Critical’"?” In The Reception of Kant's Critical 
Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, ed. by Sally Sedgwick (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
85.    
 
13
 Kant distinguishes between two types of beauty, one that he calls "free beauty," the other 
"dependent beauty."  This "thorny" distinction is surrounded by controversy.  As Donald Crawford 
(1974) observes, since the aim of the Analytic of the Beautiful is to provide an analysis of the 
judgment of taste, the free/dependent beauty distinction should be understood first and foremost as a 
difference in the type of judgment (and its affiliated use-conditions).  Judgments of free beauty are 
pure because they are disinterested and nonconceptual, whereas judgments of dependent beauty are 
"impure" because they presuppose the concept of an end or function (of what the thing is supposed to 
be).  Crawford's well-known account of dependent beauty emphasizes (and aims to accommodate) the 
normative dimension of aesthetic evaluation, where judging a thing's beauty requires taking into 
consideration what type of thing it is supposed to be (e.g., 'That is a beautiful woman' as opposed to 
'That is a beautiful cathedral' ).      
 8
Diagram 1.1:  Two Main Uses of Reflecting Judgment 
Judgment-Type _____        Subject Matter________                       Location________  
Aesthetic Judgments           The Beautiful, The Sublime                  First Half (APJ) 
Teleological Judgments       Natural Teleology (Organisms)            Second Half (TPJ) 
                                                
In the second half of the third critique (the Critique of the Teleological Power of 
Judgment, or TPJ for short), Kant introduces his concept of "objective material 
purposiveness," as exhibited by the phenomena of natural organisms.  Natural 
teleology is the focus of Kant's interest in the TPJ.   
In the present work, my aim will be to motivate only the second half of Kant's 
third critique (TPJ).14  The TPJ is divided into three main components:  the Analytic 
of Teleological Judgment, the Dialectic of Teleological Judgment and the Appendix.  
Below is a partial list of some of the main theses to be found in the Analytic of 
Teleological Judgment, either all or some subset of which are thought to characterize 
Kant's attitude toward natural teleology and/or naturally-occurring material 
organization:  
a)  That material nature in toto is to be conceptualized on the model of an 
(individual) organism: nature in its entirety is consists in one (necessarily 
unified) integrated whole, one with a universally organized structure of parts 
(see §§66-67).  
 
                                                          
 
14
 The first half will, I hope, be the project of a future work.  I am a unified field theorist 
(UFT) concerning Kant's third critique (see 1.2 on the meaning of that term), but there is only so much 
one can accomplish in a single dissertation.   
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b)  That natural organisms must (in some sense of 'must') be explained in 
teleological terms (see §§64-65); in other words, such natural phenomena 
cannot be understood (actually, they cannot be made "intelligible," a technical 
term for Kant) except when conceptualized as products of intentional 
causation (by analogy with ourselves).  
c)  That human beings are members of the class of natural organisms.  
Moreover, because we, as rational agents, are capable of practical 
intentionality, we consequently introduce agent causation into nature (via our 
membership in the class of natural organisms).  
d)  That natural organisms model a form of "reciprocal causality" in propria 
persona (see §64).    
As a group, there is limited consensus on (a)-(d).15  Regarding theses (a)-(c) there is 
agreement among Paul Guyer (2003), Robert Wicks (2007), Henry Allison (2003), 
and Andrew Ward (2006).  Regarding (d), which turns out to be of considerable 
importance in the present work, there is some acknowledgement (Guyer (2000, 
2003), Wicks (2007), and Rachel Zuckert (2007)).  Nay-sayers about (b) include 
Hannah Ginsborg (2006) and, I think, Zuckert (2007), both of whom read Kant as 
advocating a non-intentional type of teleological explanation (one that does not  
 
 
                                                          
15
 This data is also limited by my investigative methodology.  In my research, I have relied 
exclusively on Kant scholarship written in English.  I therefore restrict the accuracy of the consensus 
to a subset of major (relatively high-profile) Kant specialists who have written on the third critique's 
second half in English (or had their work translated into same).   
 10 
explanatorily rely on reference to an intention).   
 
1.2 Is There A Deeper Motivation For Kant's Third Critique? 
In 1.1 we noted that the third critique has two major parts, the APJ and the 
TPJ. Kant's third critique provides a theory of the beautiful and of the sublime (what 
is known now as philosophical aesthetics) and, in addition, an analysis of natural 
teleology (what is known now as the philosophy of biology).  So, the question is this:  
Is the philosophical significance of Kant's third critique to be cashed out in separatist 
terms, ones which are domain-specific, so that there is an aesthetic significance on 
the one hand and a teleological significance on the other but no overarching (or, to 
switch the metaphor, underlying) set of Kant-internal aims or objectives that 
coherently link these two (apparently unrelated) foci of concern?  Or is there instead 
some adoptable architectonic standpoint in Kant's work (the equivalent of a Unified 
Field Theory for the third critique), one where its two major parts could be 
conceptually linked and viewed as co-contributors to a shared set of philosophical 
objectives?   
Those who answer 'yes' to the first question (and 'no' to the second) I shall 
refer to as separatists16; those who answer 'no' to the first question (and 'yes' to the 
                                                          
 
16
 Horstmann registers the attitude of (what I'm calling) the separatists:  "There has been 
much criticism of Kant's bringing together into a comprehensive theory of reflective judgment such 
widely separated disciplines as aesthetics or philosophy of the beautiful on the one hand, and 
philosophical biology on the other, connecting them by claiming a common conceptual basis in the 
concepts of purpose and/or purposiveness.  This criticism ranges from the suspicion of artificiality via 
the accusation of arbitrariness to the supposition that Kant had no guiding conception at all in 
conceiving the third Critique” (Horstmann, 158, emp added). 
 11 
second) I shall refer to as unified field theorists (UFTs, for short) concerning the third 
critique.  Of course not every interpretation of the third critique on the market to date 
reflects a field theorist's attitude.  Yet, in my (limited) review of the literature, I have 
not encountered any commentator who set out to argue a separatist position on the 
third critique.  Rather readings of or about the third critique that reflect a "separatist" 
view (by its narrow concerns or treatment) seem to be the result of commentators' 
operating under more narrowly defined research agendas (say, art-historical or those 
concerned with the philosophy of biology).   
Paul Guyer (2006), who is not known for speculative readings of Kant's work 
but rather for his solid philosophical reporting and careful textual analyses, is a 
reputable example of the field theory attitude toward the third critique:   
It seems that the main task of the third Critique will be to introduce a 
conception of a new class of judgments or new sense of the power of 
judgment, "reflecting" (reflecktirend) judgment, which will subsume the 
aesthetic and teleological judgment and demonstrate both their affinities with, 
and differences from, the theoretical judgments analyzed and grounded in the 
first Critique and the moral judgments treated in the second.  Many 
interpretations of the unity behind Kant's puzzling connection of aesthetic and 
teleological judgment have focused on the introduction of the concept of 
"reflecting" judgment into Kant's system.  Without downplaying the 
importance of this concept, however, I will argue that Kant was driven to 
connect the aesthetic and teleological judgment by a much more profound and 
powerful motivation than that of mere systematic housekeeping.17 
 
For many commentators on the third critique there is what might be described as a 
first-order level, where Kant is expounding and formulating his various philosophical 
                                                          
 
17
 Guyer, “Bridging the Gulf,” 423-24.    
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theses and providing argument for those theses.  However, for many readers of Kant's 
third critique, there is another level of philosophical activity, one that makes use of 
Kant's first-order philosophical achievements for its own objectives; in other words, 
what I'm suggesting is that, in the case of the third critique, the first-order consists in 
acknowledging and conceptualizing certain data relative to the second-order of 
philosophical activity.  The suggestion is that, for many commentators, getting clear 
on what Kant actually says, in terms of the many theses he puts forward (and the 
arguments he makes in support of those theses) isn't enough; the attitude is that there 
is some second-order level of philosophical activity, one that is mostly implicit, 
which is motivating what Kant does on the first-order level.  And if we are going to 
grasp what Kant is really up to in the third critique, then this underlying motivation 
must be made explicit.   
Let me further clarify what I'm not saying.  First, understand that I'm not 
making the familiar distinction about pre-theoretic (or pre-analytic or pre-
philosophical) data on the one hand and philosophical theory on the other; because at 
the first-order level, Kant is certainly introducing empirical data (the phenomena of 
natural organisms, for instance) and, in addition, conceptualizing that data.  The first-
order level is therefore a level of philosophical theorizing; it isn't theory-free.  
Theorizing about the second-order level, saying what its content is, is in effect 
theorizing about the point—the philosophical point—of all the theorizing Kant does 
at the first level.   
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Second, in the second half of Kant's third critique (where the focus is on 
natural teleology), some commentators read Kant as presented a multi-level 
explanatory framework, one where the "sensible" world (governed exclusively by 
mechanical laws) constitutes the phenomenal superstructure relative to a another 
noumenal domain, one which Kant characterizes as "the supersensible substrate of 
nature" (viewed as a system of ends).  This two-tiered explanatory structure is a 
substantive part of Kant's first-order theorizing and so it is not to be confused with 
the first/second-order levels of philosophical activity that I’m referring to; rather the 
two-tiered sensible/supersensible framework is itself part of the first-order theorizing 
that our analyses should be seeking to motivate.   
What I try to accomplish in this dissertation is to set up an interpretative 
framework, one which will specify Kant's motivation for writing the third critique.  It 
should therefore provide a set of concerns and/or issues that can plausibly be 
attributed to Kant; moreover, the interpretation that emerges (from within my 
interpretative framework) should be plausibly linked to what Kant says in the third 
critique (i.e., should be linked to first-order fairly noncontraversial philosophical data 
concerning the first critique).  What I hope has emerged from my research on the 
third critique is an interpretative framework which, when adopted, illuminates Kant's 
text and allows us to view what Kant is up to in the third critique from a standpoint 
where what he is doing there may be convincingly linked to other key philosophical 
aims that are recognized as legitimately Kantian.     
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What is distinctive about my research on the third critique? What does my 
research bring to the table that has not already been introduced?  In order to answer 
these questions, I need to set up a basic taxonomy of the various types of 
interpretative frameworks that have been offered so far and then situate myself within 
it.  The chief benefit of doing so is that it will provide a superstructure in which to 
locate my project and, by that means, give the reader beneficial access to an aerial 
view of some rather complicated terrain.  Doing so will, in addition, allow me to 
introduce, in broad strokes, the terms in which I conceptualize the motivation for 
Kant's third critique.   
 
1.3 A Map of Interpretative Frameworks Concerning Kant's Third Critique 
The results of aerial reconnaissance often reveal structures that, like Peruvian 
geoglyphs, cannot be recognized from the surface.  So, if reconnoiterers are to 
understand what they're encountering on the ground, it's useful for them to know 
what the terrain looks like from the air.  The aim of this section is to provide a 
picture, taken from high-altitude, of the terrain of secondary literature concerning 
Kant's third critique.     
Implicit in the literature to date on the third critique there appear to be at 
least18 three broadly different sorts of interpretative frameworks, one which is 
science-oriented, another which is morality-oriented, and a third which is cognition-
                                                          
18
 This taxonomy is not intended to be exhaustive.  I have left out, for instance, approaches of 
the third critique that are implemented by nonphilosophers, such as art-historical approaches or literary 
and/or critical theory-type approaches (which are usually conceptually nonrigorous and rather opaque).   
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oriented.  (See Table 1.3 below.)  Under a science-oriented reading, the philosophical 
significance of the third critique is viewed in terms that reflect issues or concerns 
pertaining to the philosophy of science or, more specifically, to what is now known as 
the philosophy of biology.  Under morality-oriented readings, the third critique's 
philosophical significance is explicated in moral terms, ones that reflect Kant's 
concern over how to conceptualize the relation between nature and freedom.  Under 
cognition-oriented readings, the third critique's philosophical significance is 
explicated in more epistemological terms, which reflects the view that the third 
critique is, in some way, an extension of the first critique's model of "experiential 
cognition."  Let me briefly elaborate on each of these three types of interpretative 
framework.   
Under a science-oriented reading (which seems to be accompanied by a 
general view of Kant as a reactant to Hume), the third critique is an extension of 
Kant's first critique concerns with causality in nature.  However, in the third critique, 
the concern is not over justifying objective validity of the concept of causality per se 
(since that is an objective of the first critique) but rather to develop a 
conceptualization of nature as a domain of causal necessity (a causal nexus), one that 
incorporates both mechanistic and teleological explanatory norms.  Kant's remarks on 
nomic systematicity (nature as a system of empirical laws) appear to be very salient 
under the science-oriented reading, and these remarks are viewed to express Kant's 
interest in articulating the theoretical (or transcendental) presuppositions of natural 
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science.  Representatives of the science-oriented reading of the third critique are Gerd 
Buchdahl (1992) and, in a qualified way, Paul Guyer19 (2001).   
Also, there are similar sorts of readings of the TPJ which reflect the narrower 
concerns of the philosophy of biology, viewing Kant's interest in natural teleology as 
an expression of pre-Darwinian biology.  Usually, these science-oriented 
interpretative frameworks, approach the third critique from the angle of the history of 
natural science, or they do so from the standpoint of the philosophy of biology.  
Concerning the former, these narrower readings of the third critique do not reflect a 
field theorist attitude toward the third critique; moreover, if they do attempt to link 
the third critique (TPJ) architectonically to the first, it is done under the assumption 
that Kant is primarily a philosopher of science, one who is interested in vindicating 
the practice and methods of natural science by vindicating a view of material nature 
as a domain of causal necessity.   
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 Guyer reports on the role of the TPJ:  "Kant's idea is that it is precisely a systematic 
explanation of all the phenomena of nature by some single, coherent sets of laws, presumably one 
conforming to the regulative ideal for a systematic cognition of nature subsequently outlined in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, that is the only basis for a successful inference from features of nature to the 
existence of God, who demonstrates both his wisdom and his power precisely by being able to 
accomplish all of his rational ends through the uniform and unified laws he has legislated for nature.  
Such a view would then suggest a model for the resolution between the regulative ideal of the unity of 
science on the one hand and the teleological view of the world as a whole to which we are led by our 
experience of organisms on the other." Paul Guyer, “Organisms and the Unity of Science,” in Kant and 
the Sciences, ed. Eric Watkins (Oxford University Press, 2001), 262.    
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Table 1.3a:  A Map of Interpretative Frameworks Concerning the Third Critique                          
 
                                           
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As for the philosopher of biology, the third critique (the TPJ) reflects Kant's concerns 
over how to explanatorily cope with a large class of natural phenomena (organisms), 
one that potentially threatens a purely mechanistic conception of nature.  The 
significance of natural organism, within this narrower type of science-oriented 
framework, is that they induce a sort of explanatory crisis.  Kant's physicoteleology 
would be viewed, by contemporary biologists, as an (outdated) pre-Darwinian 
solution to the explanatory crisis induced by the acknowledgement of naturally-
occurring material organization.  Representing the philosophy and/or history of 
The Philosophical Significance 
of Kant's Third Critique 
Science-Oriented 
Interpretations  
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Interpretations  
Cognition-Oriented  
Interpretations  
Cognitive Significance explicated 
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critique's Transcendental Analytic 
Cognitive Significance explicated 
largely in terms given by the first 
critique's Transcendental Dialectic 
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biology-oriented readings are Peter McLaughlin (2003, 1990) and John McFarland 
(1970).   
Typically, under a science-oriented reading, the focus is on either the third 
critique's First/Second Introductions and on its second half, but the APJ is often 
excluded from consideration.  Because of this, science-oriented readings tend not to 
reflect a field theorist attitude toward the third critique.  But this should not be taken 
to imply that science-oriented readings reject the view that the third critique can be 
absorbed architectonically into Kant's work.  Exactly how the third critique is to be 
absorbed into Kant's thought depends in fact on which model of Kant you are 
operating under, whether, say, Kant is viewed as a philosopher primarily interested in 
vindicating natural science or as a philosopher primarily interested in vindicating 
morality.     
It should come as no surprise that, under a morality-oriented reading, Kant is 
viewed as a philosopher primarily interested in vindicating morality.  Unlike science-
oriented readings of the third critique, morality-oriented interpretative frameworks 
tend to treat the third critique more holistically.  Guyer exemplifies this procedure 
(rather vividly) in his "function-analytic"20 model of the third critique, where its two 
major halves work together like the parts of a machine:   
Ultimately, Kant hints that the two motors of aesthetics and teleology 
[referring to the first and second halves of the third critique] must be wired 
together in the single system of both nature and freedom that is the ultimate 
                                                          
20
 The term is not Guyer's; rather the characterization is mine.  A "function-analytic" model is 
one in which an item is conceived as a whole consisting of multiple parts all of which are functionally 
integrated for the sake of some shared (apical) highest-order function (a final end).   
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object of his philosophical vision--a vision of which the Critique of Judgment 
taken as a whole is Kant's grandest and fullest statement.21   
 
The two halves of the third critique are viewed as providing complementary sets of 
enabling conditions for moral enactment.  (I say more about this later.)  Representing 
this interpretative framework are Paul Guyer22 (1997, 2003, 2006), Donald 
Crawford23 (2003), Burleigh Wilkins24 (cit ref.), Robert Wicks25 (2007), and Andrew 
                                                          
 
21
 Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste (Cambridge University Press, 1997), xiv. 
 
22
 See the footnote at the end of this paragraph.   
 
23
 In "Kant's Theory of Creative Imagination," Crawford’s aim is to link Kant's philosophy of 
art to his philosophy of mathematics.  However, in providing Kant's answer to the issue over "the 
ultimate significance of art and the aesthetic experience" (158), Crawford fairly clearly locates himself 
in the morality-oriented reading: "Through the exercise of creative imagination in both the creation 
and experience of the beautiful, we seem to rise above the world of sensibility and empirical laws to 
the realm where our supersensible powers seem to be effective of our purposes.  The beautiful pleases 
ultimately because it is the symbol of morality, that is, because it symbolizes our supersensible 
freedom from nature and our supersensible dominion over it, whereby our will can reign supreme." 
Donald Crawford, “Kant’s Theory of Creative Imagination,” in Kant’s Critique of the Power of 
Judgment: Critical Essays, ed. Paul Guyer (Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 166.  Putting this aside, 
however, one could appreciate Crawford's approach from the standpoint of a cognition-oriented 
framework.  Crawford's investigation into the analogy between the philosophy of mathematics and that 
of art generates an analysis of a key component of Kant's transcendental psychology (namely, the 
productive imagination) as well as a discussion on schemata.  In aiming to articulate the dimensions 
along which mathematics and art are analogous, Crawford's analyses bring clarity to Kant's discussions 
of the (intuitive, aesthetic) elements of empirical cognition.  
 
24
 Wilkins' position, which acknowledges Kant's multidimensionality, appears nevertheless to 
endorse a morality-oriented reading:  "We must, I think, recognize that Kant as a teleologist may be 
playing any of three roles; the fact that he may be playing them separately or together adds to our 
difficulties.  In speaking of ends, he may be speaking as a moralist, as a philosopher of science (or 
history), or as a scientist (or historian).  Generally, in his first and third capacities he seems to be 
saying, roughly, the same thing, namely that the end of human history is a federation of states.  As 
moralist, he considers this to be a final end, and as moralist he is immune from Popper-like criticisms.  
As historian, he considers this kind of organization to be a natural end of an organized being such as 
man ... ". (Burleigh Wilkins, “Teleology in Kant’s Philosophy of History” in History and Theory 5, 
No. 2 (1966), 184.  In the third critique, Kant draws a distinction between an "ultimate" and an 
"absolute" final end of nature (UFE and AFE, for short).  The AFE is specified as "the highest good in 
the world," which is freedom or rational autonomy.  The UFE, which subserves the AFE, is specified 
as the formation of a civilized state, one in which citizens learn to subject their sensuous natures to 
civic laws, thereby furthering the ends of morality by promoting the development of norm-governed 
self-regulation.    
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Ward (2006) 26.  Not only does a morality-oriented framework, such as Guyer's, link 
the two parts of Kant's third critique under a single guiding motivation (of enabling 
moral enactment in nature), it does so by linking the third critique architectonically to 
the first and second critiques.  Since, on Guyer's view, Kant's entire philosophical 
system acknowledges the "primacy" of practical reason, the motivation for the third 
critique is to be explicated accordingly in terms that reflect the interests of practical 
reason.27 
Some recent (post-millennial) scholarship on Kant's third critique indicates, 
however, an interesting shift in interpretative frameworks.  In addition to the science-
oriented and morality-oriented interpretative frameworks, there is (what I call) the 
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 In his recent commentary on Kant's third critique, Robert Wicks writes:  "The leading idea 
is to show while remaining focused on Kant's third Critique, how it fits into his primary philosophical 
project of coordinating his theory of scientific knowledge with this theory of moral behavior, for it is 
clear that Kant's primary philosophical interest is in philosophically coordinating what scientifically 
happens to be, with what morally ought to be."  Robert Wicks, Kant on Judgment, (Routledge Press, 
2007), x-xi.    
 
26
 Ward states:  "The Critique of Judgment (or Third Critique) has as its overall aim to show 
that the two realms that were discussed in the First and Second Critiques -- namely, those of nature 
and freedom (or morality) -- can be bridged by means of the faculty of judgment." Andrew Ward, 
Kant: The Three Critiques (Polity Press, 2006), 183.  Evidently, Kant's interest in, and analyses of, 
natural teleology (and his physicoteleology) does not, on Ward's view, contribute much (or at all) to 
effecting the bridge between nature and freedom.  Unlike Guyer, Ward thinks "of these two [the APJ 
and the TPJ], it is mainly in the first part [APJ] that Kant seeks to link the realms of nature and 
freedom via the faculty of judgment" (Ibid., 183).  But if that's true, then we are left, under Ward's 
interpretation, with the puzzle about why Kant combines the APJ and the TPJ into one work.  On 
Ward's interpretation, it appears that only the APJ is motivated, not the TPJ.   
 
27
 Guyer states: "And the moral significance of both natural and artistic beauty depends on 
preserving the freedom of the imagination in aesthetic experience while adding content to art or seeing 
freedom of aesthetic experience itself as a symbol of the freedom that is the heart of Kantian morality.  
Finally, the teleological judgment of natural organisms and systems also turns out to be required more 
by moral than by scientific concerns, and works of Kant's final decade from the attempted essay on 
Real Progress of Metaphysics (1793?) to the Metaphysics of Morals (1797) make it clear that Kant's 
interest in our complex attitudes towards both art and nature must be fit into his overarching visions of 
the primacy of practical reason." Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste (Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), xv.  Guyer's more recent publications on the third critique (2003, 2006) demonstrate that 
his view has not changed.    
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cognition-oriented reading of the third critique.  Under this type of reading, Kant's 
motivation for writing the third critique is explicated as a response to issues deriving 
from either epistemology, the philosophy of mind, cognitive science (embodied 
cognition), or the philosophy of mental representation.  Within this interpretative 
framework, Kant's third critique is viewed architectonically as an extension of the 
first critique's concern with developing (some dimension of) his model of empirical 
cognition.  Hannah Ginsborg, whose dissertation (The Role of Taste in Kant's Theory 
of Cognition, 1990) attempts to link Kant's model of aesthetic judgments to Frege's 
work, is probably the one most responsible for pioneering the cognition-oriented 
interpretative framework.  More recent representatives of this type of reading are 
(again) Hannah Ginsborg (2006), Rachel Zuckert (2007), Fiona Hughes (2007) and 
probably also Henry Allison28 (2003).  Further evidence for, and acknowledgement 
of, this post-millennial shift in interpretative framework is to be found in the recent 
publication of  Aesthetics and Cognition (2007), a topic-oriented compilation of 
essays, edited by Rebecca Kukla, which offers discussions on issues concerning the 
                                                          
 
28
 Concerning the third critique, Henry Allison writes: "The basic problem, which is central to 
the Critique of Judgment, as a whole, is that the universal principles underdetermine the particulars 
falling under them.  Thus, on the one hand, cognition requires a harmony or fit between the universals 
and the particulars to be subsumed under them, while, on the other hand, when one goes beyond the 
transcendental conditions of experience to which particulars necessarily conform, this fit turns out to 
be a completely contingent matter." Henry Allison, “Kant’s Antinomy of Teleological Judgment,” in 
Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment: Critical Essays (Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 228. And 
elsewhere in that paper:  "Kant deals with this general problem in both versions of the introduction, 
providing what amounts to a transcendental deduction of the "formal purposiveness" of nature, that is, 
of the subjective necessity for judgment in its reflective capacity to presuppose that nature is specified 
in its empirical laws in a manner consonant with the requirements of the understanding" (Ibid., 228). 
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relation between Kant's third critique and various aspects of his epistemology or 
theory of cognition.29   
 
1.3.1 Two Types of Cognition-Oriented Interpretative Framework 
There appears, however, to be (at least) two subtypes of the cognition-
oriented reading. While both draw on Kant's first critique for the terms in which to 
state the cognitive significance of the third critique, one subtype draws on the 
Transcendental Analytic, the other largely on the Transcendental Dialectic.  The T-
Analytic-oriented readings attempt to link Kant's third critique (or some part of it) to 
his transcendental psychology or, more specifically, to his transcendental deductions 
(either the so-called subjective or objective deduction); under this subtype, Kant's 
third critique is viewed as an extension of the first critique's project to provide a 
complete set of a priori "conditions for the possibility of experience," conditions that 
operate largely subpersonally and are supposed to make a first-personally structured 
object-oriented phenomenal consciousness possible. Representing this subtype are 
Ginsborg (1990, 200630), Zuckert (2007), and Hughes (2007), the last offering 
probably the most developed statement in her Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology.31   
                                                          
 
29
  Interestingly, Guyer appears only as commentator on Allison's paper. 
 
30
 In a more recent paper focusing on the second half of the third critique (TPJ), Hannah 
Ginsborg states:  "If, as I have suggested, the possibility of bringing natural objects under empirical 
concepts depends on our being able to think of the cognitive activity elicited in us by those objects in 
normative terms, then the principle of nature's purposiveness for judgment amounts, in effect, to the 
principle that the relation between nature and our cognitive faculties is a normative one.  In other 
words, it is the principle that the perceptual and imaginative activity with which we respond to nature 
outside us, while itself part of nature broadly construed, can also be regarded as appropriate (and, on 
occasion, inappropriate) to the natural objects which elicit it through their effects on our sense-
 23 
One notable difference among the members of this subtype is that, while 
Hughes focuses fairly exclusively on the APJ (on Kant's theory of taste and the 
sublime), Ginsborg (2006) focuses on the TPJ (on the "philosophical significance" of 
natural teleology).  However, Zuckert (2007), however, who certainly exhibits a field 
theorist attitude, treats the entire third critique, under a reading where Kant is 
attempting to provide the conditions for the possibility of a temporally-extended (and 
object-oriented) apperceptive self-awareness.32   
                                                                                                                                                                     
organs.”  Hanna Ginsborg, “Kant’s Biological Teleology and Its Philosophical Significance,” in A 
Companian to Kant, ed. Graham Bird (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 466.  Further, she says:  "The idea of 
nature's purposiveness for judgment is the idea of a normative fit between nature outside of us, and the 
natural psychological processes through which we perceive and conceptualize it.  It is ultimately our 
need to recognize this relation of normative fit which underwrites our entitlement to regard natural 
objects -- now considered independently of these perceptual and cognitive processes -- in normative 
terms” (ibid., 466).  
 
31
 Hughes states:  "I argue that the subjective deduction is the necessary corollary of the 
objective deduction of the categories and that the full account of the subjective side of cognition can 
only be found in certain passages in the Critique of Judgment."  Fiona Hughes, Kant’s Aesthetic 
Epistemology (Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 5.  Elsewhere in her book Hughes writes:  "In this 
chapter [Chapter 5] I have shown how the cooperation of the faculties, identified as synthesis in 
process in the previous chapter, counts as the subjective side of the deduction.  In particular, I have 
argued that in Section 21 of the third Critique, Kant seeks to establish that the synthetic process 
displayed in aesthetic judgment is necessary for the legitimating of claims to objective knowledge" 
(ibid., 201).  More explicitly, Hughes argues:  "Aesthetic judgments reveal the subjective side of the 
deduction, as first outlined in the Preface to the A edition of the first Critique.  Moreover, they do so in 
such a way as to show that the subjective deduction is not to be understood hypothetically or 
genetically, but rather as part of the formal structure of validity in general, a validity that always has 
two sides, that of the subjective, but universal structure of judgment and that of the latter's application 
to an intentional object.  Put in this way, we can see that the subjective side of the deduction is an 
essential component of establishing objectivity.  Thus we can justify the suggestion I made in the 
previous chapter that aesthetic judgments contribute to the general transcendental project of 
establishing the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments, for they reveal the synthetic activity of the 
faculties necessary for any cognition" (ibid., 176).   
 
32
 Under Rachel Zuckert’s view, the third critique is responding to what she describes as the 
problem of the one and the many.  Zuckert attempts to link (as I do) the second half of the third 
critique (TPJ) with the concept of reciprocal interaction and the Third Analogy.  But although we draw 
on the same Kant-internal material (from the first critique) we do not develop and conceptualize these 
materials in the same ways.  
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But all three of these commentators draw largely on the first critique's 
Transcendental Analytic (primarily its transcendental and/or metaphysical 
deductions) for the terms in which to state the third critique's cognitive significance.  
Consequently, the third critique is, within their interpretative framework, to be 
motivated primarily from the standpoint of the Transcendental Analytic and its 
concerns with the understanding, that is, with providing the subpersonal conditions 
for (some dimension of) a first-personally structured (and categorially-determined) 
intentional consciousness.      
Among those commentators who think that there is a strong cognitive link 
between the first and third critiques, there is a difference in where the presumed link 
is to be located.  According to a second subtype of cognition-oriented reading, the 
third critique's connection to the Babylonic sprawl of the first critique is not so much 
with the Transcendental Analytic as with the Transcendental Dialectic.  Within this 
general port of entry it is the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic that is 
specified as the more precise point of contact between the first and third critique.  
(See Diagram 1.3b below.)  Generally, the transition from the Transcendental 
Analytic to the Dialectic marks a switch in focus from the faculty of the 
understanding to that of reason (and the role of "the ideas of pure reason").   
Yet it must be acknowledged that some commentators who are field theorists 
about Kant's third critique but who are not of the cognition-oriented type, also draw 
upon the resources of the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic for their 
interpretations.  Paul Guyer is a good example here.  Guyer links the third critique's 
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main innovation, namely, the model of "reflecting judgment" (thus its two subtypes, 
the aesthetic and teleological judgment), to Kant's concept of a regulative principle, 
thereby linking the third critique to the discussion in the Appendix.  So the question 
is, then, what characterizes this second subtype of cognition-oriented reading if not a 
distinctive exegetical methodology?   
 
1.3.2  The Second Type Focuses On Rational Structure  
I think that guiding conviction of this second type of cognitive reading on the 
third critique is an acknowledgement of two fundamentally different and orthogonal 
(nonredundant) types of cognitive structure, each type being derived from a different 
part of human representational systems.  On the one hand there are those types of 
cognitive structure that are understanding-derived (ones a priori category-guided 
transcendental syntheses can take credit for), while on the other there is a type of 
cognitive structure that is reason-derived. This difference between understanding and 
reason-derived cognitive structure is evidently the basis for the division between the 
Transcendental Analytic and the Dialectic.33 
Diagram 1.3b: 
System Affiliate         Type of Cognitive Structure_____Determinant/Ground_  ____ 
Understanding            Causal Structure (Efficient)          The Categories (Relational) 
Reason                         Systematicity (Purposiveness)     Teleology (Agent Causation) 
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 Reinhard Brandt (1989) makes this point persuasively (see 178-79).  
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It is not the aim of the present section to offer analyses either of the Transcendental 
Dialectic or its Appendix (either part).  (In fact the Appendix has two parts.)  Suffice 
it to say, however, that commentators interested in motivating the third critique and 
who do so using resources derived from the Appendix generally cite (at least) three 
main linkages.   
First, between the Transcendental Dialectic's Appendix (first part) and the 
third critique's First Introduction (FI), there is an overlapping concern with rational 
systematicity, where this is understood (partially) in terms of an Aristotelian 
classificatory hierarchy (genus, species, subspecies).  Systematicity appears to be the 
special (and exclusive) business of the faculty of reason.  Kant derives three separable 
concepts from this hierarchic representation of systematicity, namely, homogeneity, 
specification, and affinity.34  Second, the Appendix (second part) and the third 
critique's Introductions (and TPJ) share a predominant concern with (various forms 
of) purposiveness.35  Third, in the Appendix (first part) Kant introduces the 
distinction between two types of principle—"constitutive" and "regulative"—and, in 
                                                          
 
34
 Paul Abela (2002) and Reinhard Brandt (1989) both emphasize this hierarchically modeled 
systematicity in support of their readings of the third critique.  Brandt states: "The principles of reason 
are transcendental because they presuppose that the principles of unity, specification, and affinity, 
which are initially only logical or methodological, accord with nature itself (A653; cf. A661).  This 
guarantees the possible truth of our systematically structured empirical knowledge.” Reinhard Brandt, 
“The Deductions in the Critique of Judgment,” in Kant’s Transcendental Deductions, ed. Eckart 
Forster (Stanford University Press, 1989), 180.     
 
35
 Robert Wicks offers a useful taxonomy of Kant's concept of purposiveness (see Wicks, 
190).  The shared concern is with "objective material purposiveness" as displayed by individual natural 
organisms.  There is, in addition, what Kant refers to as "logical purposiveness."  I discuss this briefly 
below.  
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addition, argues that "the ideas of pure reason" (a.k.a., "transcendental ideas") have 
only a regulative (not constitutive) use.   
One common conviction guiding the second type of cognition-oriented 
reading seems to be that Kant's analyses of purposiveness in his third critique must 
somehow link up substantively with the discussions of the purposiveness of nature in 
the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic.  Furthermore, since in the Appendix 
the concern with nature's purposiveness occurs in a context where Kant's interests are 
to some extent cognitive (insofar as they pertain to the prescriptive role of the ideas of 
pure reason), the view is that his later third critique discussions of purposiveness (in 
its analyses of natural teleology and physicoteleology) are, in some philosophically 
interesting way, extensions of (or elaborations on) those very same cognitive 
concerns. Representing this subtype of cognition-oriented reading of the third critique 
are Rolf-Peter Horstmann (1989), Reinhard Brandt (1989), Paul Abela (2006) and 
myself.   
 
1.3.2.1  What Is the Transcendental Status of (Rational) Systematicity?  
Let us summarize the conceptual linkages mentioned in the preceding section 
as follows:   
rational structure => systematicity => purposiveness => natural teleology.  
Of the links just mentioned, rational systematicity is explicated by reference to a 
hierarchy of concepts, one that is apparently modeled on an Aristotelian (or 
Linnaean) system of taxonomy (genus, species, subspecies).  One issue here seems to 
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be that, since cognitive judgment involves the operation of subsumption (which, by 
the way, operates under canonical forms of syllogistic inference) and since, in 
addition, subsumption involves discursively thinking a subtype under a supertype, it 
looks like cognitive judgment generally requires setting up some sort of formal 
apparatus -- a hierarchical ordering of concepts -- one whose internal structure makes 
subsumptive cognitive activity possible. In both the Appendix to the Transcendental 
Dialectic and in the third critique's First Introduction, the formal apparatus of a 
hierarchy of concepts appears (rather ambiguously) to be assigned the status of a 
transcendental presupposition.     
In fact, it appears that it is only within this hierarchy of concepts that it is 
possible to cognitively perform (the various canonical forms) of syllogistic inference; 
consequently, it appears that the hierarchy of concepts functions as a presupposition 
of various types of inference structure (thus also of inferential performances).  And 
since the exercise of determining judgment appears to be modeled on the cognitive 
performance of various forms of syllogistic inference, it would therefore appear that a 
feasible model of determining judgment presupposes an operative hierarchy of 
concepts.  To put it another way, the hierarchy of concepts appears to be a formal 
apparatus or conceptual substrate on which a cognitive system's (specifically, 
reason's) inferential processes functionally depend.      
As remarked, one key Appendix/FI link is an overlapping concern with 
rational systematicity and purposiveness.  What, if any, is the link between rational 
systematicity (conceptualized on the model of a hierarchy of empirical concepts) and 
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purposiveness?  Kant observes that nature appears to present its discrete physical 
phenomena in a way that is amenable to monistic (all-inclusive) hierarchical 
structuring.  Since a hierarchy of concepts appears to be the condition under which 
(determining) judgment is possible at all, nature appears to present itself in a way that 
facilitates our cognitive consumption (= discursive representation) of its phenomena.  
The hierarchical ordering among a plurality of empirical concepts appears to be what 
Kant refers to as "logical" purposiveness.  Such appears to consist in certain types of 
structured intra-hierarchical conceptual relationships.  Since concepts have to be 
related as superclass to subclass in order for cognitive subsumption to be possible, 
the very idea of a hierarchical structure (of concepts/things) appears to be suited to 
our cognitive needs.36   
However, the question that both the Appendix and the First Introduction seem 
to be responding to is this:  What guarantees (or, more precisely, under what 
scenario could there be a guarantee such) that any empirical concept, or any 
                                                          
 
36
 In more contemporary terms, the sort of classificatory hierarchy Kant is concerned with is 
referred to as a "nested hierarchy," or a "containment hierarchy" of which there are two subtypes -- a 
subsumptive containment hierarchy and a compositional containment hierarchy.  In a hierarchy of the 
first sort, the relation between supertype and subtype (parent and child) is the "is-a" relation (bird/gull 
= gull is-a bird).  In the second type, the relation between supertype and subtype is defined as a 
mereological (part/whole) relation; subtypes are parts of a given supertype (subtype: hand; supertype: 
Arm).  It is an open question as to which type of nested hierarchy Kant might be referring to in either 
the Appendix (first part) or in FI.  Clearly, if Kant has the possibility conditions of (determining) 
judgment in mind, he must be conceptualizing the hierarchical system of concepts as a subsumptive 
containment hierarchy (defined by the 'is-a' relation).  However, in the third critique, where Kant 
conceptualizes the totality of nature as a universally organized world-whole, it appears he would need 
to use a hierarchic system of nested material wholes (with increasingly larger scalar properties), one 
which is analogous to Russian matryoshka dolls (or Chinese Boxes).  The 'is-a' relationship cannot be 
assimilated in all cases to the part-whole relationship. (E.g., A gull is a bird, but the hand/arm relation 
can't be similarly modeled on the is-a relation, unless you recast the 'is-a' relation as the 'is-a-part-of' 
relation.)  In my research on Kant, I have not encountered any acknowledgement of the ambiguity 
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empirical law, that experientially comes down the pike is (necessarily) going to be 
positionable within one nomic hierarchy?  What rules out the possibility that nature 
may get nomically squirrelly on us?  What guarantees that material nature will 
cooperate with our cognitive need for this kind of systematicity?  That such an 
ordering among our empirical concepts (of nature) must result is definitely not a 
proposition we can derive from experience; experience, Kant says, informs us only of 
what is, not what must be (or what ought to be). It appears to be a common issue (in 
both the Appendix and the First Introduction) how a presupposition concerning the 
possibility of cognitive judgment could also be viewed as a presupposition of the 
possibility of physical nature.  
This issue over the possibility of empirical judgment (thus also empirical 
cognition) appears to introduce the need for a "transcendental principle of the 
purposiveness of nature" (TPPN, for short).  Under the TPPN, nature is 
conceptualized as a "system of empirical cognition," (or of empirical laws), such that 
all laws of nature are specified so as to be positionable within the formal apparatus of 
a hierarchy (as required for cognitive judgment).37  Conceptualized under this 
principle, nature itself would have an internal structure such that the potentially 
infinite number of (heterogeneous) natural kinds would be nomically interconnected 
                                                                                                                                                                     
concerning the two different hierarchy models, let alone how this ambiguity could affect our construal 
of Kant's concept of rational systematicity and consequently our interpretation of the third critique.   
 
37
 See FI, sections V-VI.   
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in a way that made them amenable to hierarchical arrangement.38  Kant introduces 
another type of purposiveness, namely, that of "objective material purposiveness" (as  
exemplified both by individual natural organisms and their environmental systems).  
According to Kant the totality of nature's products constitute a world-whole, one 
conceptualized on the model of an individual organism (see §67).   
But in virtue of what would all of nature's forms be so suitably 
interconnected?  Here is where Kant's physicoteleology enters the story.  Kant claims 
that natural organisms cannot be made "intelligible" at all except in teleological 
terms, that is, as the effects of intentional causation.  Nature's suitability to the formal 
apparatus of a hierarchy depends on all natural forms being suitably interconnected; 
but a potentially infinite number of natural kinds would be so interconnected only 
under the hypothesis that they are parts of one integrated world-whole 
(conceptualized on the model of an individual organism).  Further, the entirety of 
nature's forms would constitute a part structure (amenable to systematic 
arrangement) only if there were some single system-goal—or, an "absolute final end 
of nature" (AFE, for short)—in relation to which all of nature's forms were integrated.  
But there is a further necessary condition.  Even assuming we can determine what the 
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 As Kant points out, to just assume that nature objectively conforms to our subjective 
cognitive needs amounts to making the following invalid inference:  
What we make of nature (what we need nature to be)  
What nature is. 
The instructive point of displaying this faulty inference would presumably be to serve as a corrective 
against projecting our cognitive needs onto physical nature.  This proves to be a controversial issue for 
textual reasons, one of which is that Kant himself uses the projective metaphor (in the Appendix). 
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AFE is, we would still need to hypothesize (or, rather, "postulate"39) the existence of 
a supreme intelligence, one that is powerful enough, smart enough, and motivated 
enough, to engineer and create the world-whole under the guidance of the AFE.     
From this sketch, in rather broad strokes, it would appear that Kant's 
physicoteleology can be plausibly linked to his concerns about the conditions of 
empirical judgment.  Let me summarize the main linkages made in this section so far:   
possibility of empirical judgment => nature's conformity to a hierarchy of 
concepts => objective purposiveness => physicoteleology.40  
 
Prima facie, then, the TPJ's main themes do appear to exhibit a Kant-internal 
significance that can be legitimately viewed as cognitive.  One major issue is whether 
purposiveness can retain this cognitive significance when viewed on the model of a 
regulative principle.    
 
1.3.2.2  Does Purposiveness Have a Transcendental Status?  
Because of the linkages mentioned above (see 1.3.2) and because of explicit 
statements Kant makes in the third critique (e.g., in §65), many commentators 
(notably, Paul Guyer) subsume the third critique's model of "reflecting judgment" 
under the concept of a regulative principle.  Moreover since Guyer subsumes both the 
aesthetic and teleological judgments under the one model of reflecting judgment, the  
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 In the Doctrine of Method, Kant distinguishes postulates from hypotheses.  
 
40
 Let occurrences of the symbol '=>' denote dependency relations, where the lexical item on 
the right flank is a necessary condition of the item on the left.   
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former are thereby conceptually subsumed under Kant's analysis of a regulative 
principle.  Under a widely held view of the constitutive/regulative distinction 
(personified in Paul Guyer), regulative principles do not perform any transcendental 
function on Kant's model of human cognition (but instead have merely a 
methodological or heuristic significance).  It follows (on this view) that the two main 
forms of reflecting judgment (the aesthetic and teleological) conceptually inherit that 
same methodological import.   
One major issue engaging the second type of commentators under present 
consideration is whether regulative principles have a transcendental status.  Do 
regulative principles perform any genuine transcendental function within our 
cognitive systems?  Kant identifies the ideas of pure reason as having only a 
regulative use.  But, as observed in the literature, both the Appendix to the 
Transcendental Dialectic and the third critique seem to give mixed messages on this 
issue.41  The issue does not appear, however, to be whether the ideas of pure reason 
are to count as regulative (Kant explicitly says they are); rather ambiguity surrounds 
the precise meaning-properties of that assertion.  Complicating the interpretative 
issue here is the coexistence of textual data that appear to make the prescriptive role 
assigned to the ideas of pure reason (as guide to the understanding) inconsistent with 
a "merely" regulative use.  As remarked, some hold that a regulative construct has 
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 Paul Abela (2002), Rolf-Peter Horstmann (1989), and Reinhard Brandt (1989) all make this 
observation.  Each presents a set of conflicting textual data regarding the functional role to be 
performed by the ideas of pure reason.   
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merely "methodological import," others argue for a conception of regulativity under 
which it retains some transcendental efficacy.42   
A common attitude among this second subtype of cognition-oriented reading 
seems to be a tendency to engage the third critique from an angle where it is viewed 
to contribute something affirmative in response to the debate about the transcendental 
status of a regulative principle.  Since rational systematicity depends on the use of 
"the ideas of pure reason" and since moreover these are characterized as regulative 
principles, the issue whether the latter can perform a genuine transcendental function 
seems to amount to whether rational structure is a genuine (or necessary) type of 
cognitive structure.  On this issue Paul Abela43 argues a claim in the affirmative.  
Others, like Rolf-Peter Horstmann44, who credits the third critique's concept of 
purposiveness neither to reason nor to the understanding but rather to the power of 
(reflecting) judgment, nevertheless affirms the transcendental status of purposiveness 
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 On this issue Henry Allison claims that "[t]his regulative function is not incompatible with 
its transcendental status.  The common view that it is stems from the erroneous assumption that 
“regulative" means something like "merely heuristic" or optional.  This is erroneous because the whole 
purpose of the Appendix is to argue for the indispensability of reason and its ideas with respect to the 
empirical use of the understanding.  To claim such indispensability is to claim a transcendental status, 
if not a constitutive function.  And that is why the analysis culminates in the transcendental deduction 
of the ideas, which supposedly will complete the critical work of pure reason’ (A670/B698)."  Henry 
Allison, “Is the Critique of Judgment ‘Post-Critical’?”, in The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 
ed. Sally Sedgwick, (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 82.   
 
43
 See Abela, 2002.  
 
44
 Subsequent to providing a brief description of how "the idea of the purposiveness of nature 
is introduced into the Critique of Judgment," Horstmann writes:  "All this description is intended to 
show is that Kant in the third Critique wants to convince us of two points.  The first is that the concept 
of purposiveness is a transcendental principle that, because it cannot be regarded as being a principle 
of either the understanding or reason, must be accepted as a transcendental principle of the mental 
faculty of judgment in its reflective use.  The second is that it is a necessary condition for the unity of 
our knowledge of experience as a system of empirical laws” (Horstmann, 164).   
 35 
and, in addition, acknowledges it as "a necessary condition for the unity of our 
knowledge of experience as a system of empirical laws."   
Reinhard Brandt acknowledges both that the ideas of pure reason are 
"indispensable elements of the possibility of experience,"45 and claims, in addition, 
that there is a continuity between the concepts of purposiveness found in the 
Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and those found in the third critique.46  
Like Horstmann, Brandt reads Kant as denying (in the third critique, anyway) that 
"the principle of suitability or purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculty" 
derives from reason.  Brandt seems to be saying that the purposiveness going under 
the name of rational structure (in the Appendix) undergoes a shift in the third critique 
such that what was formerly credited to reason is later credited to the power of 
"reflecting judgment."47  (Here I remain agnostic on the issue of such a shift.)48  At 
                                                          
 
45
  Brandt states: " The Critique begins with the transcendental deduction of the concepts of 
space and time, continues with the deduction of the categories and the proofs of their associated 
principles, and culminates in the deduction of the ideas (see also A702).  Intuition, concepts, and ideas 
[= the ideas of pure reason] are indispensable elements of the possibility of experience.  Without the 
last, the acts of the understanding lack unity and direction; they would -- if they came about at all --
"grope" around and scatter in arbitrary formations.  Without concepts, intuitions remain blind; without 
ideas, concepts are incoherent and useless” (Brandt, 178-79).   
 
46
 See Brandt, 184-86.  
 
47
 Brandt argues that the third critique's retrospective account of the program of the first 
critique in fact distorts the latter's Transcendental Dialectic.  Under that (inaccurate) retrospective 
account, only the Transcendental Analytic is recognized as providing the transcendental conditions of 
experience.    
 
48
 But in order to draw this conclusion, wouldn't the first and third critiques' conferral of 
transcendental status have to corefer? And in order for that to happen, wouldn't the cognitive structure 
which was credited to the power of (reflecting) judgment (in the third critique) have to be the same one 
that was credited to reason (in the first critique)?  (There may be a problem of referential opacity here.)  
If so, it would appear that the third critique's concern with nature's systematicity (and its conformity to 
our cognitive need for a hierarchy of concepts) is, in fact, a concern with rational structure but under a 
different name.   
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any rate, Brandt later concludes that both the first and the third critiques "grant the 
status of a transcendental principle to the principle of the suitability or purposiveness 
of nature for our cognitive faculty; thus in this there is no incompatibility of the two 
works calling for further interpretation" (187).49 
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 Brandt concludes: "I hope to have shown with these short remarks that the Critique of Pure 
Reason as well as the Critique of Judgment grant the status of a transcendental principle to the 
principle of suitability or purposiveness of nature for our cognitive faculty; thus in this there is no 
incompatibility of the two works calling for further interpretation.  Nevertheless there are, as we have 
seen, substantial shifts in the overall structure of the Kantian philosophy between 1781 and 1790 that 
lead to a far-reaching incongruence of some of its elements” (Brandt, 187). 
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Chapter Two 
THE FUNCTIONAL VALUE OF THE IDEAS OF PURE REASON 
The most plausible and generous reading of Kant makes concepts 
information-processing functions—rule-governed procedures for organizing 
information received from other sources. 
              —Donald Crawford50 
 
2.0 Introduction       
In the previous chapter my aim was, first, to map out some of the ways in 
which commentators have attempted to motivate Kant's third critique and, second, to 
locate myself within the proposed cartography.  As remarked, my own view is to be 
located under the second type of cognition-oriented reading, which draws on the first 
critique's Transcendental Dialectic for the terms in which to state the third critique's 
architectonic significance.  What is needed now, I think, is (what you might call) an 
"umbrella" chapter, one in which my own view is to be more fully developed and 
articulated and which provides a superstructure in which the various chapters of the 
present work can be contextualized.  In the present chapter, the aim will be to present 
an interpretative framework, one that qualifies as a variant of the second type of 
cognition-oriented reading and, in addition, provides the Kant-internal means for 
viewing the concerns of the individual chapters as elaborations on various aspects of 
that one framework.   
There is, however, a rather complicated set of issues to be discussed.  First 
there is the issue over how, in what ways, the transcendental ideas contribute to the 
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goal of object-oriented representation.  Under my analysis, the transcendental ideas 
operate as a system of cognitive ends, each of which contributing to the highest-order 
goal of representing a world-whole.  However for reasons that will become clearer 
later on, the transcendental ideas51 cannot perform their individual functions directly 
but rather require a mediating apparatus.  Under my analysis, the transcendental ideas 
are able to perform their functions via reason's pursuit of the unconditioned, 
specifically, in the context of reason's performing (what Kant calls) a "regressive 
synthesis."52   
          Kant's view seems to be that each of the transcendental ideas represents a 
nonredundant means to pursue the unconditioned:  the pursuit of a metaphysically 
simple substance (in the form of a transcendental self), the pursuit of the absolute 
boundary of the world, and finally the pursuit of the absolute completeness of all 
possible thought-content (thus all possible objects), considered as the underwriting 
ground of a kind of conceptual holism53--God, as a supreme intelligence, is the a 
priori postulate for an imponderable system of conceptual contents, one that 
underwrites the possibility of discursive thought and, in addition, acts as the 
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 Donald Crawford, "Kant's Theory of Creative Imagination," in Kant's Critique of the Power 
of Judgment: Critical Essays, ed. Paul Guyer (Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 152..   
 
51
 Or 't-ideas' for short.    
 
52
 Regressive syntheses are performed under two directives.  Here I use Michelle Grier's 
formulations:  “P1:  Find for the conditioned knowledge given through the understanding the 
unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion.  (A308/B364);” P2:  "If the condition is 
given, the whole series of conditions, subordinated to one another -- a series which is therefore itself 
unconditioned -- is likewise given, that is, is contained in the object and its connection.  (A208/B364).”  
Michelle Grier, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 119, 
122. 
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conceptual substrate for nature's nomic systematicity and all thinkable counterfactuals 
concerning nature.   
Performing regressive syntheses means implementing a (certain type of) 
explanatory structure, one that is (or so I will argue) ultimately teleological in 
character.  For present purposes, the basic idea seems to be that, in performing a 
regressive synthesis, concept-users undertake to think a rational relation between one 
object understood as the conditioned and another object (or set of objects) understood 
as the underwriting conditions for the former; in other words, the former is regarded 
as a given datum whereas the latter is regarded as a set of existence (or possibility) 
conditions.  (See Diagram below.) 
Diagram 2.0:  
Regressive Synthesis___    Computed As___________________________________                
"A Given Conditioned"      An empirical datum ("a given whole of intuition") 
"The Conditions"               A set of possibility conditions (a set of underwriting parts) 
 
Here a second issue arises.  It is the over how reason's pursuit of the unconditioned (= 
its performing regressive syntheses) can be plausibly linked to the goal of object-
oriented representation.  And since, under my analysis, the transcendental ideas 
perform their functional roles by means of (or in the context of) reason's regressive 
syntheses, a third issue arises over how to conceptualize the link between the t-ideas 
and regressive syntheses.  Here the concern is over how to model regressive 
syntheses in such a way so as to provide the terms in which the various functions of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
53
 Here I agree with Graham Bird's analysis, namely, that the function of the Transcendental 
Idea(l), the God-idea, is supposed to ground the possibility of non-analytic conceptual necessity.   
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the t-ideas can be plausibly explicated; moreover, since the functions of the t-ideas 
are conceived as broadly contributing to the goal of object-oriented representation, it 
follows that the model of regressive syntheses has to be conceived so as to provide a 
suitable field of operation, one in which the t-ideas can be seen to function in the way 
proposed.   
It would therefore appear that there are (at least) three different sorts of issue, 
which may be listed below as follows:  
Diagram 2.0a:  
Issue Set_____________________________________________________________ 
1)  How to link the transcendental ideas to the goal of object-oriented representation 
2)  How to link the goal of object-oriented representation to reason's pursuit of the  
      unconditioned (via performing regressive syntheses) 
3)  How to link the transcendental ideas to reason's pursuit of the unconditioned (and 
by that means illuminate their cognitive function) 
 
The ultimate aim is to motivate Kant's third critique and to do so within the 
conceptual framework proposed by the analyses of the issues listed above.  And 
since, under my analysis, the functional value of the transcendental ideas is both 
cognitively significant and, in addition, to be explicated largely in the terms provided 
by the first critique's Dialectic, each of the three issues listed above represents a 
separate but necessary phase of a much larger project.  However, due to the 
complexity of the subject matter, the focus of the present chapter is confined largely 
to an analysis of (1).  In the final chapter, I discuss phases (2) and (3).  But in order to 
get a feel for how these issues are linked conceptually, I offer a brief summary in the 
next section.       
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In the present chapter the aim is to show (or, at any rate, plausibly suggest) 
that the three classes of transcendental ideas present themselves as three orthogonal 
(nonredundant) means for achieving (theoretical) reason's highest-order end of 
representing a world.  To that end, the task is to set up an interpretative framework, 
one which is adequately textually sensitive, in which the three types of transcendental 
ideas can plausibly be seen to perform these functions.  This will require the analysis 
of a number of key texts in which Kant articulates his conception of (rational) 
systematicity and then showing how the transcendental ideas, as content-bearers of a 
rather unusual sort, can be conceptualized as the cognitive means reason uses to 
maximize systematicity.   
 
2.1  Motivating Kant's Third Critique:  The Mereocosmic54 Angle  
Kant's view seems to be that the transcendental ideas are to be used generally 
to promote rational systematicity.  Accordingly, each of the three types of 
transcendental idea is supposed to do its part in contributing to the goal of 
maximizing systematicity.  Furthermore if they are supposed to operate at the 
content-level of experience, then it seems to follow that they are supposed to 
contribute in some way to making the world's appearing (to our reason, anyway) as a 
systemic whole.  In other words, under the injunction to maximize systematicity, we 
are (to put the point crudely) required to view the world through these ideas.  Thus 
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 So far as I know, the term is my own.  Kant's cosmology seems to exhibit a mereological 
dimension: the world is one (all-inclusive) whole -- a "world-whole" made up of parts (substances) 
that are connected in a causal structure.  In order to capture this aspect of Kant's cosmology, I have 
renamed it 'mereocosmology'.   
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the transcendental ideas perform a cognitive function in that they are content-bearing 
entities whose function is to be intentionally directed at (or, at any rate, somehow 
brought to bear on) our representational field.   
Since, under my analysis, the function of the t-ideas, considered as a system, 
are to contribute to the end of representing a world-whole, I conceptualize the 
imperative to maximize systematicity as an imperative to maximize mereological 
structure of a rational sort.  (I say more about this later.)  Each type of transcendental 
idea may, I suggest, be seen to maximize mereological structure at either of three 
distinguishable levels:  
1)  the level of individual objects (conceptualized on the model of wholes) 
2)  the level of individual structural complexes (ones made up of objects) 
3)  the level of structural complexes (made up of other structural complexes) and so 
on. 
In all three levels (1-3) the objects of representation are to be modeled generally on 
the conceptualization of a whole-entity, one according to which a thing is 
semantically understood to be both a composite entity yet also a singular thing.  
Moreover, it is the object, considered as a whole-entity, that is subsequently 
identified as the end or target of composition, viz., that for the sake of which a set of 
underwriting parts are generated.   
Let me explain.  Reason needs a conceptual means by which to compute the 
difference between object and structural complex, even though all objects in 
empirical-phenomenal reality, being composites, will be constituted by structural 
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complexity.  The system computes something as an singular object if it computed as a 
component part of a larger whole; but since every component part of a larger material 
whole is itself a composite entity, a singular object must, in addition, be represented 
as a structural complex; which is to say it must be representationally computed as a 
material thing in its own right.  If the system55 aims to represent a singular object, it 
must do so by representing a material composite as one thing -- a whole.56  This is 
achieved however by reason's first being capable of viewing a material composite 
under a description (say, as an agent) where it (the material composite) can be 
semantically computed as a singular thing; second, reason must being able to think an 
explanatory relation between this single thing and a set of underwriting parts.  But in 
order to do that, reason has to view that whole-entity as something that prescribes 
itself as the target of composition, that is, as an natural end.57  According to Kant, 
reason can only grasp such a relation (between superstrate and substrate) in 
teleological terms, ones where a given whole-entity is viewed as the effect of agent 
causation.58    
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 The term 'system' will sometimes be short for 'human representational system'.  Where the 
context leaves uncertainty as to what I mean, I will generally not opt for the abbreviation.     
 
56
 In my research on Kant, I have found he acknowledges (at least) three possible ways to 
conceptualize a whole: 
 
Diagram:  Three Types of Whole 
 
Faculty Affiliate                       Operative Concept                                Conception of a Whole____   
1)  Sensible Intuition                Space (As Continuous Quantum)         A bounded region of space 
2)  Understanding                     Matter (As Discrete Quantum)             A mereological sum of parts  
3)  Reason                                End (As System-Goal)                          A systemic whole  
 
57
 As a relative final end to be precise.  The concept of a natural end is a major construct of 
the (second half) of Kant's third critique.  See §64-67 of the Analytic of Teleological Judgment.   
58
 Or, in Kant's terms final causality.   
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In this context, we can, I suggest, reasonably hypothesize that each of the t-
ideas performs some individual (and nonredundant) function for the sake of a shared 
system-goal.  What would that shared objective be?  I submit that (theoretical) 
reason's highest-order end is to represent a singular object, namely, the world.  
However since under Kant's analysis of the concept of a world in general, the world 
is a single all-inclusive whole, one consisting of a multitude of parts, reason's highest-
order objective is subserved by a number of subfunctions, one being the injunction to 
represent singular parts, another being to connect these entities in a causal structure 
(for the sake of constructing larger structural complexes).   
Here we see the functional value of a subset of the transcendental ideas, 
namely, the cosmological ideas.  I submit that the cosmological ideas, considered as a 
system, provide a common field of operation, one in reference to which the functional 
roles of other two transcendental ideas (of self and God) can be plausibly explicated.  
Briefly, the transcendental idea deriving from rational psychology (namely, the idea 
of a transcendental I or self) provides a model for what is to count as a singular 
individual -- a substance conceptualized on the model of an agent (by analogy with 
ourselves).  In doing so, it provides a rule for what is to count as one of the world's 
parts.  The God-idea's function may be similarly explicated in reference to the 
representation of a world-whole, namely, as the ultimate ground of its possibility.  
Under the hypothesis that the entirety of nature is the effect of an intentional cause (= 
God), nature may be viewed as a systemic whole.  Consequently, reason's speculative 
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interest in intraphenomenal systematicity may thereby be furthered for the sake of 
representing the world as one (necessarily unified) mereocosmic whole.   
Finally, under my analysis, the successful performance of regressive 
syntheses contributes to the goal of object-oriented representation in at least two 
ways.  First, regressive syntheses appear to stabilize (underwrite or ground) the 
cognitive representation59 of a boundary or limit in spatiomaterial continua.  
Moreover, since it is material objects that (theoretical) reason is interested in 
representing and since, in addition, Kant evidently holds that the notion of a boundary 
is required for the representation of singular individuals in space, it would therefore 
appear that regressive syntheses ground the representation of objects (considered as 
individual whole-entities).  Second, because reason is always under the "categorical 
intellectual imperative"60 to represent the world-whole, it is therefore always under 
the imperative to utilize the on-going but partial materials of the understanding in 
order to approximate its intellectual representation of a structured whole, one that can 
never be fully represented in any one perceptual episode or in any finite series of such 
episodes.  Thus, reason's regressive syntheses appear to provide (or, at any rate, 
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 This point seems to require some nuancing.  Since the notion of a (determinate) spatial 
boundary is a prior condition under which an singular object may be represented at all, the regressive 
syntheses appear to take the appearance of a bounded region of (matter-filled) space as a sort of 
cognitive (or perceptual) datum and then proceed to specify (in experiential cognition) the conditions 
under which this datum is possible.   
 
60
  The term is Henry Allison's (1983), one that is also co-opted by Michelle Grier (2001).  I'm 
adopting the term primarily because it seems to be an accurate general description of the 
transcendental ideas under the prescriptive use Kant assigns to them.  Beyond that, however, I do not 
claim any similarity between Allison's conceptualization of the transcendental ideas and my own.  As 
to why the ideas of pure reason are referred to as "intellectual" imperatives, Susan Neiman makes the 
point succulently:  "Reason (hence practice, reason's end) is reflective; its tasks require criticism and 
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reflect) the means for representing a cognitive structure, one that not only 
contextualizes the chronically partial perceptual episodes of our embodied cognitive 
systems but also guides the use of these episodes for the purpose of representing a 
hierarchic system of whole-objects.61   
 
2.2  Reason's "Interest" in the Antinomies of Pure Reason  
In the Antinomy of Pure Reason, Kant presents four antinomial conflicts of 
reason.  The First Antinomy concerns whether the world had a beginning in time or 
has a determinate boundary; the Second Antinomy concerns whether the extended 
matter has simple parts or whether there are none; the Third Antinomy concerns 
whether appearances can be adequately explained "in accordance with the laws of 
nature" or whether "it is also necessary to assume another causality through freedom 
in order to explain them;" the Fourth Antinomy concerns whether there exists an 
absolutely necessary being, either as part of the world or outside it.  In what follows I 
shall refer to each of these whether-formulations as an "antinomial issue," to 
distinguish them from the conflicting positions taken on them.   
In the Antinomy of Pure Reason's Third Section, entitled "On the interest of 
reason in these conflicts," Kant affiliates the thesis and the antithesis with two 
philosophical positions, namely, that of the dogmatists and the empiricists.  (See 
Diagram below.)   
                                                                                                                                                                     
introspection.  Reason is intellectual; its nature is to formulate ideas most distant from the senses." 
Susan Neiman, The Unity of Reason (Oxford University Press, 1994), 4-5.   
 
61
  I discuss this in some detail in Chapter 11. 
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Diagram: 
Standpoint          Asserts                Demo-Content______________________ 
Dogmatists         Thesis                  E.g., World has original cause (God) 
Empiricists         Antithesis            E.g., World does not have original cause  
 
The aim here is not to provide a detailed analysis of Kant's assessment of these 
positions.62  Suffice it to say that Kant discusses the advantages of dogmatism and 
empiricism in reference to the four antinomial conflicts, and his evaluation proceeds 
along two dimensions of reason's interest in these conflicts, one practical, the other 
speculative.  For instance Kant identifies reason's practical interest in the thesis as 
follows: 
First, a certain practical interest, in which every well-disposed person, once he 
understands its true advantage to him, heartily shares.  That the world has a 
beginning, that my thinking self is of a simple and therefore incorruptible 
nature, that this self is likewise free and elevated above natural compulsion in 
its voluntary actions, and finally, that the whole order of things constituting 
the world descends from an original being, from which it borrows all its unity 
and purposive connectedness -- these are so many cornerstones of morality 
and religion.  The antithesis robs us of all these supports, or at least seems to 
rob us of them.63   
 
Here Kant claims that, from the standpoint of reason's practical interests, human 
reason should assert the thesis position (in regards to the four antinomial conflicts).  
Then Kant identifies reason's speculative interest in taking a pro-attitude toward the 
thesis position (along the four antinomial issues).   
Second, a speculative interest of reason is expressed on this side too.  For if 
one assumes and employs the transcendental ideas in such a way, then one can 
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 For excellent analyses of the antinomies themselves see Michelle Grier (2001) and Graham 
Bird (2006). 
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 CPuR, A466/B494.  
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grasp the whole chain of conditions fully a priori and comprehend the 
derivation of the conditioned, starting with the unconditioned, which the 
antithesis cannot do; this gives it [empiricism] a bad recommendation, since it 
can given no answers to questions about the conditions of their synthesis that 
do not leave something out, and with its answers further questions without 
any end are always left over.64  
 
Kant's general aim the Third Section is to show that while, from a theoretical 
standpoint, reason has no more reason to accept the thesis than it does the antithesis, 
from a practical standpoint, it does.  Notice above (in A467/B495) that Kant 
characterizes one of reason's interests as "speculative."  It would seem that on the one 
hand the theses positions cannot legitimately to be regarded as possible objects of 
speculative cognition while on the other reason can evidently have a legitimate 
"speculative" interest in these positions.  What is Kant up to here?   
To use the theses positions for purposes of speculative cognition is to take the 
attitude concept-users have when operating under the intention to establish a truth-
relation between a propositional content and (objective) reality.  The general 
argument of the Antinomy of Pure Reason is however that the antinomial conflicts 
arise precisely because of the intention to establish a truth-relation between the 
representer and the represented (where the latter is explicated as mind-independent 
reality).  Kant's "solution" to the antinomial conflicts is, of course, the thesis of 
transcendental idealism.  So it must be, I suggest, in this context (not in a realist one) 
that it is okay for reason to have a "speculative interest" (in the theses) and is thus 
something to be legitimately taken under consideration.  But if that's so, then this 
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 CPuR, A467/B495, underscoring added.  
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would imply that the theses-positions were to be put to a use different from that of 
establishing their truth.  What could this be? 
In addition to the practical and the speculative dimensions of reason's interest 
in the antinomial issues, Kant appears to identify a third, namely, architectonic, 
dimension.   
Human reason is by nature architectonic, i.e., it considers all cognitions as 
belonging to a possible system, and hence it permits only such principles as at 
least do not render an intended cognition incapable of standing together with 
others in some system or other.  But the propositions of the antithesis are of a 
kind that they do render the completion of an edifice of cognitions entirely 
impossible.  According to them, beyond every state of the world there is 
another still older one; within every part there are always still more that are 
divisible; before every occurrence there was always another which was in turn 
generated by others; and in existence in general everything is always only 
conditioned, and no unconditioned or first existence is to be recognized.  Thus 
since the antithesis nowhere allows a first or a starting point that would serve 
absolutely as the foundation for its building, a completed edifice of cognition 
on such presuppositions is entirely impossible.  Hence the architectonic 
interest of reason (which is demanded not by empirical unity but by pure 
rational unity) carries with it a natural recommendation for the assertions of 
the thesis.65   
 
Evidently reason's architectonic interest leads it to take a pro-attitude toward the 
thesis position in regards to each of the antinomial issues because the antitheses 
"render the completion of an edifice of cognitions entirely impossible."   
I submit that the set of theses-positions constitutes a sort of cognitive 
program, one that is metaphysical (or speculative) in content but whose use is not; 
rather the use to which it is being put is clearly not to obtain speculative cognition.  
This metaphysical program can be summed up in Kant's physicoteleology, the idea  
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 CPuR, A474-75, underscoring added.  
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that the world is a single all-inclusive whole, one created by God, such that 
everything in it operates under natural laws and, finally, that human freedom is 
possible in nature because nature has intentionally been set up for the purpose66 of 
moral enactment.--All of these propositions jointly form a coherent standpoint, one 
which cannot be justified by theoretical reason (under the norms of truth) but can be 
adopted by practical reason (as necessary postulates which serve its interests).   
Even supposing all this is correct (or, at any rate, plausible), we still have not 
answered the real question, which is why reason would have a need for this cognitive 
program in the first place.  This is equivalent to asking what the functional value of 
Kant's physicoteleology is.  Kant's view seems to be that the propositional contents 
(of the theses) usefully provide a suitable conceptual framework, one in which 
reason's practical and architectonic interest in intraphenomenal systematicity can be 
served.  Below (see 2.4) I will show (or, at any rate, plausibly suggest) that there is an 
ineliminable mereological dimension to Kant's account of systematicity, and I will 
use this to explicate reason's interest in it.  Under my analysis reason's interest in 
systematicity amounts to an interest in maximizing mereological structure (of a 
certain sort).  And reason is interested in accomplishing this because it is under the 
imperative to represent the world as one whole.  (I discuss this in more detail in 2.5.)   
However, before I present my analysis of the principles that express reason's interest  
in systematicity, I want to first introduce the ideas whose use is to be guided by them.   
 
                                                          
66
 In the third critique Kant characterizes this end as the "absolute final end of nature."   
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2.3  Compiling A Dossier On the Transcendental Ideas 
In the first critique's Dialectic, Kant introduces a rather unusual set of content-
bearers, the "ideas of pure reason" (or "transcendental ideas").  There are three classes 
of these ideas.  For present purposes, it suffices to refer to them as the ideas of the 
self (the transcendental I), the world-whole, and God.  (See Diagram below).   
Diagram: [Support A397]  
Subject Matter        Type of Synthesis                                                                 Pseudo-Object  
1)  Psychology        The synthesis of the condition of thoughts in general          Self   
2)  Cosmology        The synthesis of the conditions of empirical thinking          World-Whole 
3)  Theology           The synthesis of the conditions of pure thinking                   God 
 
Kant claims that the transcendental ideas have both a negative and a positive use, or, 
more precisely, there is a right way and a wrong way for the ideas of pure reason to 
be used.   
The ideas of pure reason can never be dialectical in themselves; rather it is 
merely their misuse which brings it about that a deceptive illusion arises out 
of them .... Presumably, therefore, they have their good and purposive 
vocation in regard to the natural predisposition of our reason.67  
 
The misuse of the transcendental ideas consists in putting these ideas to work in our 
representational systems for the purpose of obtaining "speculative cognition."68  
Speculative cognition of a type that purports to designate "transcendent" entities 
(namely, the self, world-whole, God), and so these ideas therefore tend to lead  
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 A669/B697, CPuR.   
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 Kant writes: "A theoretical cognition is speculative if it pertains to an object or concepts of 
an object to which one cannot attain in any experience.  It is opposed to the cognition of nature, which 
pertains to no objects, or their predicates, except those that can be given in a possible experience" 
(CPuR, A635/B663). 
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cognitive consumers astray by getting them to think they can possess knowledge of 
objects that extend well beyond the limits of experiential cognition.  (See B353 on the 
transcendent/transcendental distinction.) According to Kant, when the ideas of pure 
reason are misused (to serve reason's speculative interests), a "transcendental 
illusion" is the result.   
Much has been said about the negative account of the ideas of pure reason.  
See, for instance, Graham Bird (2006) and, most notably, Michelle Grier (2001), who 
provide detailed analyses of the three types of transcendental idea and shows how 
their misuse lead to a transcendental illusion.  So I'm going to say next to nothing 
about the misuse of the transcendental ideas.  Instead, I want to discuss their positive 
function within our representational systems.  Here my own account has benefited 
significantly from the analyses of Michelle Grier and Susan Neiman. 
Kant says that the t-ideas have (indeed must have) a positive account, that 
they must play some important functional role in our representational life.   
Although we have to say of the transcendental concepts of reason, they are 
only ideas, we will by no means regard them as superfluous and nugatory.  
For even if no object can be determined through them, they can still, in a 
fundamental and unnoticed way, serve the understanding as a canon for its 
extended and self-consistent use, through which it cognizes no more object 
than it would cognize through its concepts, yet in this cognition it will be 
guided better and further.69   
 
Kant certainly thought that the t-ideas performed a function within our 
representational systems:  "They are not arbitrarily invented, but given as problems  
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by the nature of reason itself, and hence they relate necessarily to the entire use of the 
understanding" (cit ref).  In the Fourth Section (of the Antinomy of Pure Reason) 
Kant argues that, since we did not (and cannot) derive the t-ideas from experience 
(inductively, because that would grossly distort their aprioristic content), reason must 
create these ideas, or, at any rate, these ideas must be inherent or built into our 
rational faculty (see A482-4/B510).  Moreover, Kant argues that since there's no way 
concept-users could have derived these ideas experientially, these ideas must be 
inherent (or innate, but not exactly in the Cartesian sense).  (On this point see A484.) 
Furthermore, if these ideas pose a problem for reason (which they do, as the 
antinomial conflicts illustrate), reason must contain the resources in itself for a 
solution to their possible use in our cognitive systems.   
Kant evidently thinks that there not only is but there must be some assignable 
function to the t-ideas.70  
One cannot properly say that this idea the concept of an object, but only that 
of the thoroughgoing unity of these concepts, insofar as the idea serves the 
understanding as a rule.  Such concepts of reason are not created by nature, 
rather we question nature according to these  ideas, and we take our cognition 
to be defective as long as it is not adequate to them.71   
 
Kant says or implies in various places that the use of these ideas are not to be  
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 Kant states: "Now we can place the result of the entire Transcendental Dialectic clearly 
before our eyes, and precisely determine the final aim of the ideas of pure reason, which become 
dialectical only through misunderstanding and carelessness.  Pure reason is in fact concerned with 
nothing but itself, and it can have no other concern, because what is given to it is not objects to be 
unified for the concept of experience, but cognition of understanding to be unified for the concept of 
reason, i.e., to be connected in one principle" (CPuR, A680/B708).    
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modeled on the use concepts (or content-bearers) have when they are put to a 
cognitive use, that is, for purposes of subsuming objects under concepts (as their 
extension).72  Kant seems to be saying that the t-ideas have only a prescriptive use.  
On the general functional value of ideas Kant says that they  
"perform a wholly unique service, which goes unrecognized precisely because 
it is judged according to empirical rules, whose validity as principles should 
be cancelled by those very ideas.  For when we consider nature, experience 
provides us with the rule and is the source of truth; but with respect to moral 
laws, experience is (alas!) the mother of illusion, and it is most reprehensible 
to derive the laws concerning what I ought to do from what is done, or to want 
to limit it to that.73  
 
In first section of On Ideas In General, Kant acknowledges the merits of Platonic 
ideas, in the case of morality, and, in addition, says that the Platonic idea is one that 
"deserves respect and imitation."74  Kant's attitude toward Platonic ideas is evidently 
extended to the products of nature:   
But Plato was right to see clear proofs of an origin in ideas not only where 
human reason shows true causality, and where ideas become efficient causes 
(of actions and their objects), namely in morality, but also in regard to nature 
itself.  A plant, an animal, the regular arrangement of the world's structure 
(presumably thus also the whole order of nature) -- these show clearly that 
they are possible only according to ideas; although no individual creature, 
under the individual conditions of its existence, is congruent with the idea of 
what is most perfect of its species (as little as a human being is congruent with 
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 "By the idea of a necessary concept of reason, I understand one to which no congruent 
object can be given in the senses.  Thus the pure concepts of reason we have just examined are 
transcendental ideas.  They are concepts of pure reason; for they consider all experiential cognition 
as determined through an absolute totality of conditions” (CPuR).   
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 CPuR, A319 
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 Kant writes: "Plato noted very well that our power of cognition feels a far higher need than 
that of merely spelling out appearances according to a synthetic unity in order to be able to read them 
as experience, and that our reason naturally exalts itself to cognitions that go much too far for any 
object that experience can given ever to be congruent, but that nonetheless have their reality and are by 
no means merely figments of the brain" (CPuR, B371).   
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the idea of humanity that he bears in his soul as the archetype of his actions), 
nevertheless these ideas are in the highest understanding individual, 
unalterable, thoroughly determined, and the original causes of things, and 
only the whole of its combination in the totality of a world is fully adequate to 
its idea.  If we abstract from its exaggerated expression, then the philosopher's 
spiritual flight, which considers the physical copies in the world order, and 
then ascends to their architectonic connection according to ends, i.e., ideas, is 
an endeavor that deserves respect and imitation.75   
 
Natural systems such as organisms are evidently possible only on the basis of ideas.  
However, notice that it isn't just individual (types of) organisms, but "the regular 
arrangement of the world's structure (presumably thus also the whole order of 
nature)" that depend on the use of ideas.  Notice that Kant specifies, in this context, 
part of the content of an idea as "the idea of what is most perfect of its species."  Thus 
Kant says:  "A plant, an animal, the regular arrangement of the world's structure 
(presumably thus also the whole order of nature) -- these show clearly that they are 
possible only according to ideas."   
Kant, in addition, links the use of the transcendental ideas to reason's interest 
in the concept of a maximum: 
When we call something an idea, we are saying a great deal about its object 
(as an object of pure understanding), but just for this reason very little about 
the subject (i.e., in respect of its actuality under empirical conditions), since, 
as the concept of a maximum, nothing congruent to it can ever be given in 
concreto.76   
 
Let us summarize the items in the dossier so far compiled on the transcendental ideas:  
First, they are prescriptive (not descriptive); that, if the objects that they are applied to  
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(their referents) only approximately conform to the "object in the idea" (because no 
object of experience is ever "congruent" to them); second, the t-ideas seem to ground 
certain sorts of normative judgments (in morality, say).  Notice also that Kant thinks 
that the ideas of pure reason can have an application in natural science.  For instance, 
he seems to think that the grasping of natural organisms, as natural systems, requires 
the hypothesis of a corresponding idea, one that (in the third critique) functions as a 
"natural end."  Third, Kant's view seems to be that each t-idea expresses a conception 
of "perfection" (completeness) or, as we have seen, a particular way of 
conceptualizing a maximum.  In other places, Kant's seems to think that the three 
types of transcendental idea express three distinct ways of conceptualizing "absolute 
unity" (see A324-7, A334-5).      
 
2.4  Modeling the Use of the Transcendental Ideas on Practical Reason  
There is some consensus among commentators regarding Kant's positive 
account of the t-ideas, one according to which they play some functional role in our 
representational systems.  Most commentators seem to think that, whatever their 
function is, the t-ideas' functional role has to be explicated in a way that 
acknowledges both a subjective status as well as performing a prescriptive role, as 
opposed to the one that these ideas have when they are misused for the purposes of 
speculative cognition.  Susan Neiman (1994) is among the most explicit and 
articulate in recognizing the directive import of the t-ideas:   
The positing of an end is equivalent to a demand for its realization, and ideas 
of reason simply are ends.  This is what is meant by Kant's statement that they 
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are not items of knowledge but bearers of guidance (A827/B855).  Ideas do 
not first tell us about the world and then tell us what to do about it.  They do 
not tell us about the world at all but are purely subjective, concerning how we 
are to behave.77  
 
According to Neiman, the directive import of the transcendental ideas -- their 
operating as  "bearers of guidance" -- is a function of there being ends of reason.  
Neiman makes this somewhat more explicit elsewhere:  
An end is necessarily something beyond that which is already given.  In 
proposing ends, therefore, reason declares its right to make demands upon 
experience in a manner forbidden to the understanding.  The concepts of the 
understanding give order to experience; the principles of reason are the 
standard by which it is judged.  In a conflict between the two, it is not the 
principles which require revision, but experience which is inadequate to the 
principles of reason.78 
 
The basic idea here seems to be that, when conceptualized as an end or goal, the 
transcendental ideas function prescriptively and when they do they direct.  Sorting 
out who is the director and who the directee is however not my present concern 
(although it is implied here).79  The point is rather that the prescriptivity of the t-ideas 
seems to be a status derived from a conceptual framework that borrows essentially 
from the faculty of practical (not theoretical) reason; specifically, the normative 
content recognized in the t-ideas seems to derive from a conceptualization under 
which they are certain (very general sorts of) goal-representation; which is to say that 
their normative content appears to derive from the structure of an intentional system's 
goal-directedness.  By being intended, the intentional object of the agent's goal-
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 Reason is the director, understanding the directee.  I discuss this more in 11.1. 
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representation (which presumably represents a currently nonexistent object or state-
of-affairs) derives a normative status so that it is viewed as that which ought to be.   
Kant explicitly acknowledges that the transcendental ideas have a use (or 
"vocation") within human representational systems (see A669/B697).  However, 
since their use or function is not designative (meaning that they are not to be used for 
speculative cognition), these ideas are conceptualized in reference to practical, not 
theoretical, reason; which is to say that not only are these ideas to be viewed as 
prescriptive (not descriptive), they are also more importantly to be conceptualized in 
terms of the structure of practical reason, meaning that they are to be viewed as 
certain sorts of ends.  That is, if reason's use of the transcendental ideas is to be 
modeled on practical reason's use of its content-bearing entities (namely, as the 
agent's goal-representations), then it seems to follow that the transcendental ideas are 
to be similarly modeled as cognitive ends.   
This suggests a line on how to conceptualize the intentional object (what Kant 
calls the "object in the idea") of each of three types of transcendental ideas:  each may 
be viewed as the target of a type of object-oriented intentionality, which, because it is 
modeled after practical reason's, must be viewed as the goal of cognitive activity, one 
that the mind actively undertakes to realize.  Michelle Grier seems to be making a 
similar point:   
The position in the Critique seeks both to undermine the attempt to use pure, 
speculative reason as a source of a priori knowledge about objects, and yet 
also to establish its necessary subjective function in securing systematic unity 
and completion of knowledge.  Embedded in this view is the suggestion that 
what ultimately "counts" as knowledge is what conforms to the interests and 
goals posited by reason.  Each of these features of reason is successfully tied 
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together in Kant's characterization of the (subjectively necessary) ideas of 
reason as "focal points" posited as regulative devices for guiding the project 
of knowledge acquisition.80   
 
 
2.5 A Kantian Model of Rational Systematicity      
Above a dossier was compiled on the transcendental ideas, one according to 
which the t-ideas are viewed as cognitive ends.  Kant says that these ideas are to be 
used according to "regulative" principles, so the t-ideas must not be functionally 
equivalent to the principles that guide their use.  In this section, the aim is to show 
(or, at any rate, plausibly suggest) that Kant has an over-arching principle that he 
intends to guide the use of the t-ideas, one which sets reason the goal of maximizing 
systematicity (under a certain conception).  I want to suggest that this principle 
exhibits a dimension that is not sufficiently acknowledged or developed in the 
secondary literature.   
 
2.5.1 Rational Structure (Systematicity) Is Essentially Goal-Directed   
The essential characteristic of rational cognitive structure (or, 'rational 
structure', for short81) is systematicity.  Two questions arise here:  (1) What does 
rational systematicity consist in? (2)  Under some conceptualization of what it is, 
what grounds (or explanatorily underwrites) rational systematicity?   
With regard to the first question Kant appears to think conceive of rational 
systematicity in terms of mereological structure.  My claim is that there is a type of 
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regressive syntheses, one that reason performs in its use of the cosmological ideas, 
which is essentially mereological; moreover, because reason's interest in performing 
regressive syntheses is, at least in part, to maximize systematicity, there must be a 
conceptualization of systematicity that is functionally suited to mereologically-
oriented regressive syntheses.    
What makes mereological structure rational structure?  Mereological structure 
evidently counts as rational when the unity among a set of parts is conceptualized 
under, or on the condition of, the concept (and postulation of) an end or goal.82  In the 
Doctrine On Method Kant articulates his conception of rational systematicity most 
explicitly:  
Under the government of reason our cognitions cannot at all constitute a 
rhapsody but must constitute a system, in which alone they can support and 
advance its essential ends.  I understand by a system, however, the unity of 
the manifold cognitions under one idea.  This is the rational concept of the 
form of a whole, insofar as through this the domain of the manifold as well as 
the position of the parts with respect to each other is determined a priori.  The 
scientific rational concept thus contains the end and the form of the whole that 
is congruent with it.  The unity of the end, to which all parts are related and in 
the idea of which they are also related to each other, allows the absence of any 
part to be noticed in our knowledge of the rest, and there can be no contingent 
addition or undetermined magnitude of perfection that does not have its 
boundaries determined a priori.  The whole is therefore articulated 
(articulatio) and not heaped together (coacervatio); it can, to be sure, grow 
internally (per intus susceptionem [= from an internal cause]) but not 
externally (per appositionem [= by juxtaposition]), like an animal body, 
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  This is implied in the first part of the Appendix, where the principle of rational unity is 
formulated as maximizing mereological structure (among cognitions) for the sake of cognizing a 
whole—one where the parts are dependent on the whole (not the reverse).  This suggests that the parts 
are conceptualized in reference to some prior idea or conception of a whole (which is characteristic of 
Kant's model of intentional causation).   
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whose growth does not add a limb but rather makes each limb stronger and 
fitter for its end without any alteration of proportion.83   
 
In the Appendix (first part) systematicity deriving from the faculty of reason appears 
to be closely linked with the representation of integrated wholes.84  However, in the 
second part of the Appendix, the concern with systematicity (rational structure) 
occurs in a context where reason has been assigned the job of guiding the 
understanding in order to maximize its empirical use.  What does the maximization of 
the empirical use of reason consist in?  In the Appendix (second part) maximization 
appears to mean (or, at any rate, involve) discursively knitting together the individual 
cognitions of the understanding (here modeled on perceptual episodes) for the sake of 
representing a systemic whole.85   
  
2.5.2   Rational Systematicity As the Maximization of Mereological Structure 
In the Appendix (first part) to the Transcendental Dialectic Kant states:  
If we survey the cognitions of our understanding in their entire range, then we 
find that what reason quite uniquely prescribes and seeks to bring about 
concerning it is the systematic in cognition, i.e., its interconnection based on 
one principle.  This unity of reason always presupposes an idea, namely that 
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supposed to make possible are composed of de re elements or de dicto components; that is, it's 
ambiguous in the text whether the systemic wholes are composed of propositions and/or theories or 
whether they are composed of entities.  The disjunction is not exclusive, since presumably if rational 
structure yields de dicto unity (unity among our theoretical propositions or theories or cognitions), 
then, given that at least some of these have empirical reference relations, that rational structure could 
be extended to empirical objects.   
 
85
 In view of the fact that we may be talking about perceptual episodes (as the product of 
categorially-guided transcendental syntheses of the understanding), rational structure would seem to 
consist in being able to think mereological relations among the individual entities (presumably 
substances) that are presented in my perceptual experiences.  
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of the form of a whole of cognition, which precedes the determinate cognition 
of the parts and contains the conditions for determining a priori the place of 
each part and its relation to the others.  Accordingly, this idea postulates 
complete unity of the understanding's cognitions, through which this 
cognition comes to be not merely a contingent aggregate but a system 
interconnected with necessary laws.86    
 
There are a number of key points to make about this important text.  The first thing to 
note is the plurality of theoretical constructs Kant is implementing here.  The 
apparatus that Kant sets up in the Appendix (and elsewhere in the Transcendental 
Dialectic) includes only one principle and a plurality of "ideas" (the latter have 
technical meaning for Kant).  There is the single "principle" (which is being stated 
above) that prescribes a general (apical) system87-goal, namely, to maximize 
systematicity, where that means (or, at the very least, involves) the maximization of 
mereological structure.  For Kant, there are essentially two types of mereological 
structure, one where the whole is dependent on the parts (mere aggregative wholes) 
and one where the parts are dependent on the whole (which yields systematic part 
structure).  These two sorts of wholes, and their mode of construction, are affiliated 
with different cognitive faculties.  (See Diagram below.)   
Diagram 2.5A:  
Faculty Affiliate___  Mode of Construction         Causal Dependency        Whole-Type           
Understanding           From Parts to Whole            Whole-on-Part                Aggregative 
Reason                       From Whole to Parts            Part-On-Whole               Systemic  
 
                                                          
 
86
 CPuR, A645-6/B673-4. 
 
87
 The term ‘system’ is short for  'representational system' or 'cognitive system'. 
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Notice that the Appendix (A646) principle is prescribing (as a general system-goal)88, 
the maximization of mereological structure of the rational type, that is, of systemic 
wholes whose part structures exhibit part-on-whole dependency.   
Let me elaborate briefly on the difference between these two modes of 
composition.  In the (outer) empirical-phenomenal domain, objects are to be 
conceived as composite entities.  Viewed as such, the construction of an object 
always consists generally in endowing it with a part structure; furthermore this 
merelogically-conceived sort of cognitive construction can proceed in either of two 
distinct directions:  it can proceed from the parts up -- that is, from the parts to the 
concrete constructed whole, in which case you have a mere aggregation of parts (as 
opposed to a system); or it can proceed from the whole downwards to a determination 
(specification) of the parts.   
The former, a condition under which phenomenal objects are mathematizable, 
is in fact an a priori rule derived from the Axioms of Intuition (and is valid for all 
categorially-determined constructions performed by the understanding), whereas the 
latter procedure (which represents what I call part-on-whole dependency) is 
distinctive of intentional causation, (and is affiliated with reason, not with the 
understanding).  Under the latter procedure the production of a set of parts is guided 
by a prior idea or conception of the whole to be produced.89  Because the intended 
                                                          
 
88
 This implies that Kant views the human mind under a function-analytic model, which is to 
say that he views the various faculties of the human mind to constitute a system.  There are various 
texts where Kant explicitly models the mind's internal structure on the model of individual organisms 
(see A474-75 and most explicitly at A832-33).   
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whole is understood to be guided by a prior conception of what it is supposed to be 
(even where this is grasped in hyperabstract terms), the parts are to be viewed as a set 
of means, ones which were specifically created in order to realize a given end, 
namely, the one embodied in the structured whole.   
Now if we consider a material whole, as far as its form is concerned, as a 
product of the parts and of their forces and their capacity to combine by 
themselves (including as parts other materials that they add to themselves) we 
represent a mechanical kind of generation.  But from this there arises no 
concept of a whole as an end, whose internal possibility presupposes 
throughout the idea of a whole on which even the constitution and mode of 
action of the parts depends, which is just how must represent an organized 
body.90  
 
It is important, for understanding the role of the third critique, to acknowledge that 
part-on-whole dependency is a characteristic mark of intentional production.  I repeat:  
the feature of part-on-whole dependency (or whole priority) is, as it were, the 
signature (or indicant) of particular type of causality, namely, final causality.91  (See 
Diagram below.) 
Diagram 2.5B:  
Faculty Affiliate              Explanatory Norm____   Causality Type         Whole-Type                 
Understanding                 Mechanistic                      Efficient                   Aggregative 
Reason                             Teleological                     Final                         Systemic  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
89
 In OP Kant writes: "For, the possibility of an organic body (that is, a body each of whose 
parts is there for the sake of the other, or which is so formed that the possibility of the parts and the 
form of their inner relations emerge only from its concept -- a body which is thus only possible 
through purposes, which presupposes an immaterial principle which forms this substance either 
mediately or immediately) produces a teleological principle of the continuation of kinds and 
individuals [which] can be thought as all-governing and everlasting with respect to species [breaks 
off].”  
 
90
 CPJ, §77: 5:408-9, underscoring added. 
 
91
 Kant makes this most explicit in the third critique, specifically, §77.   
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According to Kant natural products that exhibit part-on-whole dependency (e.g., 
natural organisms) must be understood (= can be made "intelligible") only under the 
hypothesis that they are the effects of an intelligent cause.  What this means is that 
the parts themselves owe their identity and individuation to a prior idea or conception 
of the whole, one that was intended for production.  Because, on this hypothesis, the 
parts are causally dependent on a prior idea of a whole -- because, in other words, 
they were created for the sake of composing the whole represented in that idea -- the 
identity and individuation of the parts are conceptually dependent on that idea.  
Consequently, because the whole is the target (or scopus) of composition, the parts 
stand in a normative (read: functional) relation to the whole in that they, as parts, are 
supposed to make it possible.   
Natural organisms, for instance, appear to be rationally significant in that they 
appear to model the requirement of rational systematicity in propria persona:  
One may define it [concept of organic body], firstly, as follows: 'Such that 
each of its parts, within a whole, is there for the sake of the other,' and, in this 
case, the explanation clearly indicates purposes (causae finales).  Secondly, 
however, one can also give as its definition:  'An organic body is that, in 
which the idea of the whole precedes the possibility of its parts, with respect 
to its moving forces.' (causae efficientes).92   
 
Notice there is reference to an "idea" here. Viewing a set of parts to exhibit part-on-
whole dependency means computing those parts as integrated under a system of 
functional relationships, one whose highest-order goal is the composition of the 
                                                          
92
 OP: 22:548-59.   
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particular structured whole.  We should therefore expect the part structures of 
systemic wholes to exhibit purposiveness in their internal composition.93   
However in the present context, the important point is that the one principle (in 
A645/B673) is supposed to guide the use of all the transcendental ideas.  Moreover, 
in light of the principle's prescription to maximize systematicity, where that evidently 
means maximizing mereological structure, each of the three classes of transcendental 
ideas can therefore be understood to work together as three (nonredundant) ways of 
contributing to the general goal of constructing one systemic whole -- the world.   
 
2.6 Kant’s Precritical Cosmology And The Ideas of Pure Reason  
Kant is explicit in his characterization of the three classes of transcendental 
ideas (not merely the subset of cosmological ideas) as constituting a system.94  In 
what sense do the t-ideas constitute and operate as a system?  How does this system 
function and to what end or purpose? What is the system meant to do?  And what 
does this cognitive systematicity consist in?  The aim is now to present a conceptual 
framework, one in which the t-ideas can be brought to bear on our representational 
life and in terms of which they can be seen to play some plausible functional role.  
                                                          
93
 In OP, Kant writes: "There is no spontaneity in the organization of matter but only 
receptivity from an immaterial principle of the formation of matter into bodies, which indicates [geht 
auf] the universe, and contains a thoroughgoing relation of means to ends.  An understanding (which, 
however, is not a world-soul) [is] the principle of the system, not a principle of aggregation” (OP: 
22:78, italics added).   
 
94
 In the first critique, Kant writes: "Finally, we come to be aware that a certain connection 
and unity showing itself among the transcendental ideas themselves and that pure reason by means of 
it brings all its cognitions into a system.  To progress from the cognition of oneself (of the soul) to 
cognition of the world and, by means of this, to the original being, is so natural that this progression 
appears similar to the logical advance of reason from premises to a conclusion" (CPuR, B394-95). 
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Then, the task is to show, ultimately, how the third critique may be seen to introduce 
innovations that complement or enhances that framework.95   
Kant's precritical cosmology clearly exhibits a mereological dimension.  The 
mereological dimension of his cosmology is made most explicit in the Inaugural 
Dissertation ('ID', for short), specifically in his analysis of the concept of a world in 
general.  (See Diagram below.)  Under that analysis the concept of a world has three 
conceptual components.  The world is analyzed into matter (parts), form (relational 
structure), and absolute completeness.  Kant identifies the world's parts as substances.  
With regard to form, Kant distinguishes two types -- sensible and intelligible.  Under 
'sensible' form Kant subsumes space and time (which are subjective and ideal); under 
"intelligible" form, Kant subsumes a particular type of causal structure, namely, 
reciprocal interaction.   
Diagram 2.6A:  Kant's ID Analysis of the Concept of a World 
Terminology                                      Conceptual Components_______          
Matter                                                 Parts (Substances) 
Form                                                   Relational (Causal) Structure 
Entirety                                               Completeness (Absolute) 
 
In the first critique, particularly in its Transcendental Dialectic, Kant introduces what 
he calls "the ideas of pure reason," or the "transcendental ideas."96  There are three 
                                                          
95
  Allison writes: "The question is not whether there are any significant innovations or 
developments in the third Critique.  I think it obvious that there are. . . . At issue is only whether the 
Critique of Judgment contains something like an abandonment of the basic commitments and 
principles of the first Critique.  I shall argue that it does not and that in the third Critique Kant is best 
seen as building upon rather that attempting to reconstruct his original "critical" edifice."  Henry 
Allison, “Is the Critique of Judgment ‘Post-Critical’?”, in The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy 
(Cambridge University Press), 79.   
 
96
 Kant writes: "Now what is universal in every relation that our representation can have is 1) 
the relation to the subject, 2) the relation to objects, and indeed either as appearances, or as objects of 
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classes of transcendental idea, each referring to a corresponding subject matter:  
psychology, cosmology, and theology.97  Being content-bearing entities, each (class 
of) transcendental idea has its own characteristic intentional object (what the idea is 
an idea of).  (See Diagram 2.6B below.)  Notice the striking similarity between the ID 
analysis of the concept of a world in general and the three classes of transcendental 
idea.     
Diagram 2.6B: [Support A397]  
Subject Matter        Type of Synthesis                                                                 Pseudo-Object  
1)  Psychology        The synthesis of the condition of thoughts in general          Self   
2)  Cosmology        The synthesis of the conditions of empirical thinking         World-Whole 
3)  Theology           The synthesis of the conditions of pure thinking                  God  
 
Let me point out two important dimensions along which the ID analysis and the list 
of transcendental ideas are similar.  First, notice that the members of the two sets of 
items are very similar.  In the ID analysis, the world's parts are substances; moreover, 
it is clear that Kant very early on conceptualized substances on the model of agents 
and that he held that the idea of a substance was ultimately derived from our 
subjective experience of moral agency.  Notice, also, the reference to causal structure; 
                                                                                                                                                                     
thinking in general.  If we combine this subdivision with the above division, then all the relation of 
representations of which we can make either a concept or an idea are of three sorts:  1) the relation to 
the subject, 2) to the manifold of the object in appearances, and 3) to all things in general” (CPuR, 
A334/B391).  
 
97
 Kant writes: "Now all pure concepts have to do generally with the synthetic unity of 
representations, but concepts of pure reason (transcendental ideas) have to do with the unconditioned 
synthetic unity of all conditions in general.  Consequently, all transcendental ideas will be brought 
under three classes, of which the first contains the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking 
subject; the second the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance, the third the 
absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general” (CPuR, A334/B391). Elsewhere 
Kant states: "The thinking subject is the object of psychology, the sum total of all appearances (the 
world) is the object of cosmology, and the thing that contains the supreme condition of the possibility 
of everything that can be thought (the being of all beings) is the object of theology" (CPuR, 
A334/B391). 
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in ID this is conceptualized under the idea of "form" (either 'sensible' or 'intelligible'); 
in the first critique, the causal structure (as viewed by reason, anyway) is understood 
as a 'series of conditions'.  Reason is (according to Kant) chronically in pursuit of a 
set of conditions for an (empirically) given conditioned (see B436-39); consequently, 
the whole of nature is the sum total of these regressive syntheses (B438-39).   
Second, notice that both in the ID analysis and in the system of transcendental 
ideas, the members appear to differ with respect to their comparative scalar 
properties (the difference in "size" or magnitude).  In the ID analysis this is most easy 
to see, since substances are conceived as parts -- form as the causal structure that 
unites them, and absolute entirety the requirement that makes them all one single 
world.  Similarly with the set of transcendental ideas.  The list proceeds 
(quantitatively) from substances (psychology) to larger structural complexes 
(ultimately, the world's entire causal structure) to God (who personifies absolutely all 
reality, including but not limited to that of the world-whole).  Admittedly Kant's ID 
analysis of the concept of a world includes only parts, form, and absolute entirety; 
God is, however, not explicitly included in his ID analysans.  But God (as 
designer/creator) is very much present in ID's physicoteleology (see ID 's §16).  God, 
as underwriting ground, figures in ID's metaphysical explanation of the world-whole.   
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2.7 Instituting Representation:  Setting Up the Rules For What Counts As an 
       Object  
 
In the Appendix (second part) Kant notes that each of the three types of 
transcendental idea contains an 'object' (what he calls the 'object in the idea').98  In 
more contemporary terms, 'the object in the idea' would refer to the "intentional 
object."  But, as Robert Brandom notes, the term 'intentional object' is ambiguous in 
that it can be understood to have either an intensional or extensional meaning.99  
Understood intensionally, the intentional object of an idea is the object that the idea is 
an idea of (what it purports to represent, even though there may in fact be no existing 
referent corresponding to this idea).  Understood extensionally, however, 'intentional 
object' refers to the objective referent of the idea.   
Kant goes to considerable trouble to show that these ideas cannot be used for 
the purpose of obtaining speculative knowledge.  Since according to Kant no objects 
of experiential cognition are ever "congruent" with a transcendental idea (since, in 
other words, no object of experience can be viewed as a concrete instance of these 
ideas), Kant's interest in the intentional object ('the object in the idea') of the 
transcendental ideas must express an interest in their intentional objects not in the 
extensional but rather in the intensional sense.  In other words, Kant's epistemology 
                                                          
98
 In the Appendix (second part) Kant says:   "It makes a big difference whether something is 
given to my reason as an object absolutely or is given only as an object in the idea.  In the first case 
my concepts go as far as determining the object; but in the second, there is really only a schema for 
which no object is given, not even hypothetically, but which serves only to represent other objects to 
us, in accordance with their systematic unity, by means of the relation to this idea, hence to represent 
these objects indirectly" (CPuR, A671/B699). 
 
99
 Actually, Brandom puts the point by observing two senses of 'represents'.  Here he credits 
John Searle.  See Brandom's Making It Explicit (Harvard University Press), 70-71.   
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may rule out (in his own eyes) the possibility of obtaining speculative knowledge in 
regards to any one the t-ideas (self, world, God), but Kant's interest in the t-ideas 
seems predicated on the acknowledgement of their status as content-bearing entities 
(of a rather unique sort).  Moreover, in view of the fact that Kant's explicit intention 
in the Appendix (second part) is to provide a deduction for the t-ideas (one which he 
characterizes as transcendental100), there must be something about them (and their 
intentional objects) that Kant thinks is indispensable to the functioning of our 
representational systems.101   
Notice (in the diagram above) that 'absolute unity' is calibrated to each of 
these three ideas.  The transcendental ideas' intentional objects represent three distinct 
ways of conceiving absolute unity.  Each "object in the idea" (of self, world, God) 
represents a different way (and scale) for conceiving absolute unity.  In this way, I 
suggest, each of the three types of transcendental idea models what is to count as an 
'object' at that level.  For Kant absolute unity seems to be a way for human cognitive 
systems to conceive a thing's individuality or singularity.  Kant makes this fairly 
                                                          
 
100
 Kant states: "And this is the transcendental deduction of all the ideas of speculative reason, 
not as constitutive principles for the extension of cognition to more objects than experience can given, 
but as regulative principles for the systematic unity of the manifold of empirical cognition in general 
through which this cognition, within its boundaries, is cultivated and corrected more than could happen 
without such ideas, through the mere use of the principles of the understanding” (CPuR, A671/B699, 
emp. added).  
 
101
  On this point I agree with Henry Allison.  Allison claims that the "regulative function is 
not incompatible with its transcendental status.  The common view that it is stems from the erroneous 
assumption that "regulative" means something like "merely heuristic" or optional.  This is erroneous 
because the whole purpose of the Appendix is to argue for the indispensability of reason and its ideas 
with respect to the empirical use of the understanding.  To claim such indispensability is to claim a 
transcendental status, if not a constitutive function.  And that is why the analysis culminates in the 
transcendental deduction of the ideas, which supposedly "will complete the critical work of pure 
reason" (A670/B698)." Henry Allison, “Is Critique of Judgment ‘Post-Critical’?,” 82, emp. added.   
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explicit in his transcendental deductions (where the transcendental self is 
conceptualized as a 'necessary synthetic unity of apperception').  The transcendental 
subject of apperception is that in virtue of which a plurality of mental states can be 
viewed as the states of one subject, but the phenomenon for which it is the 
hypothesized ground is the empirical "me" considered as one temporally-successive 
but absolutely unified phenomenal consciousness.   
The idea of a transcendental subject (the I) appears to function as a principle 
of individuation.  Let me explain.  The transcendental I is not confined to any one of 
my representational states nor to any finite series of such states; it is the a priori 
presupposition under which successive mental states can be thought of as the states of 
one psychological subject (namely, me).  It is in virtue of the transcendental I (which 
is necessarily singular), that a series of internal states can nonetheless be viewed as 
one temporally extended phenomenal consciousness.  Phenomenal consciousness 
possesses absolute unity only on the condition that every state that is possible for me 
(every state that can count as mine) is also be a state to which I can attach the 'I 
think'.  In order for this condition to be met, we have to postulate that there is an 'I' 
and that it is a numerically singular entity.  Since the 'I' is necessarily singular, 
multiple states (of which I may be cross-temporally aware) are necessarily unified in 
virtue of a shared relation to this singular 'I'.  The result is a temporally extended (but 
necessarily unified) phenomenal consciousness. 
However in view of the fact that Kant denies the idea of a transcendental 
subject can be made to serve the interests of speculative cognition, Kant would 
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probably reject thinking of the awareness of the I's absolute unity in epistemic terms, 
namely, as knowledge of some real metaphysically simple entity (my noumenal-
transcendental substrate).  To block such a speculative use is the whole enterprise of 
the Paralogisms (which I cannot discuss here).  So it is light of this anti-speculative 
(or "critical") attitude that we must make sense of the functional value of the absolute 
unity exhibited in the three types of transcendental idea (and their three distinct types 
of intentional object).  Since the self-idea is not to be used for purposes of cognition, 
the point of its use is not to establish objective reference relations with an noumenal 
or "transcendent" referent; rather the point of the I-idea seem to be that it serves as 
the basis for how to compute or think of individuating psychological subjects (or 
substances, generally).    
The importance of absolute unity is not confined to its role in conceptualizing 
the object of inner sense (namely, the temporally-extended empirical "me"); rather its 
importance extends also to outer sense.  In a spatially interpreted representational 
field, one where every 'object' is minimally a bounded region of (matter-filled) space, 
an entity's individuality cannot be conceptualized in terms of absolute simplicity.  
Because our representational systems conceive externality as spatiality, anything that 
perceptually comes down the pike must likewise be a composite entity.  So it would 
therefore appear that the conditions of objecthood (in empirical-phenomenal reality) 
must be adapted to our cognitive systems, in particular to the conceptual constraints 
imposed by the necessarily spatial content of our representational field.  It would 
therefore appear that absolute unity (or necessary unity) functions as a sort of 
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surrogate formula under which our systems can compute a composite entity as one 
thing.  (See Diagram below.)  
Diagram 2.6C:   
Concept                Ontological Status        To Be Computed As          Conceptual Formula 
Substance              Non-Composite            Singular Object                  Absolutely Simple 
Whole-Entity        Composite                     Singular Object                  Necessarily Unified 
 
It is under this surrogate formula (of objecthood) that the transcendental ideas can be 
viewed as a "necessary maxim of reason" and, consequently, it is in light this formula 
that a 'transcendental deduction' of the t-ideas can be understood.   
As we shall see, it is in light of reason's need to implement object-
orientedness under this surrogate formula, that the developments and innovations of 
Kant's third critique can be motivated.  Let me explain.  Since (under Kant's analysis 
of the concept of a world in general) the fundamental parts of the world-whole are 
substances, the system now has a singular object to represent.  But, on Kant's 
epistemology, concept-users could never derive the concept of an absolutely simple 
entity from experiential cognition.  But a material composite (say, a monkey) may 
nevertheless model absolute unity in propria persona and consequently be regarded 
as a substance, but it may do so only when the whole-monkey is thought under the 
idea of an agent.  Yet when a whole-monkey is represented under the concept of an 
agent (the I), the system can do nothing but think of it as if it were an absolutely 
singular entity, even though in empirical-phenomenal reality everything is composite.  
And since the ground for its singularity cannot be located in physical matter, the 
system must recompute the monkey's substancehood (from simplicity to necessary 
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unity).  Once the whole-monkey is semantically up and running as a singular object, 
the system then has to ground its computation of a material composite as a singular 
thing; it must, in other words, explanatorily underwrite the whole-monkey's absolute 
unity (qua agent).102  
It would therefore appear that, when conceptualized as if it were a conscious 
subject (on the model of the transcendental subject), a whole-monkey (which is 
composite) inherits a necessary conceptual unity (and thus a singularity).  Qua agent, 
the whole-monkey is, necessarily, one thing: thinking of the whole-monkey as, 
necessarily, one thing is the rule concept-users put themselves under when they think 
of the whole-monkey as an agent.  However since nothing simple exists in nature, the 
only way to fulfill the conceptual requirement of singularity is by taking an alternate 
conceptual route, namely, that of conceiving singularity under the rule of necessary 
unity.  But -- and this is key -- in order to do that, the system has to make use of final 
causality; which is to say that reason must first identify the whole-monkey (qua 
agent) as the end (or target) of material composition.   
Let me link this account somewhat more explicitly to reason's pursuit of the 
unconditioned.  The idea of the transcendental I (of a psychological subject) is not 
merely a paradigmatic substance.  Rather Kant says that the idea of self-
consciousness is equivalent to the idea of the unconditioned (a variant thereof) (see 
A401-02).  When conceptualized under the psychological transcendental idea (the I), 
a given conditioned (= the whole-monkey) can be conceptualized as the 
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 See Chapter 11 for more discussion of this point. 
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unconditioned (the final end toward which reason should direct its regressive 
syntheses).  Viewed under the description of an agent, an organism represents (by 
analogy with ourselves) the unconditioned in propria persona because it is that for the 
sake of which a set of underwriting parts ought to exist; it contains in itself 
(comparative) totality of conditions.   
It is within this framework, I suggest, that the third critique can be seen to 
introduce an important conceptual innovation.  What this account evidently needs is a 
conceptualization under which something is both the cause and effect of itself -- an 
"effect" in the sense that it is a sum of physical parts; a "cause" in the sense that it 
prescribes itself (under some conceptualization of a whole-entity) as the end or target 
(scopus) of composition; in which case, it determines what the parts are (their 
identities and interrelations).  In fact, Kant has such a concept, which is introduced 
and developed in the third critique, one whose intensional content is articulated in 
precisely these terms.  It is the concept of a natural end.103 
However in order for this to work, the whole-monkey has to figure in the 
content of that prescription as something that is already one thing; otherwise, the 
teleological explanation would be circular:  it would prescribe the formation of a set 
of (very unmonkeylike) parts which did not add up to anything more than those very 
same parts (monkey guts).  But since the idea of a whole-monkey (qua necessarily 
singular agent) cannot have a referent in empirical-phenomenal reality, the ground of 
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 See §§64-67 of the third critique's Analytic of Teleological Judgment.  See Chapter 10 for 
a discussion of these sections.   
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such an entity must therefore be something supersensible.104  But since we are 
blocked from having cognition of such a ground, the need for it must reflect 
something internal to reason.  Since we cannot put the ideas of pure reason to use for 
the purpose of speculative cognition, the very idea of a supersensible ground must 
reflect the "interests" of pure reason.   
What I'm suggesting is this: the point of the I/self/agent ideas isn't to establish 
reference relations to a transcendent or supersensible or other-worldly object; that 
puts the buggy before the horse.  Rather, the point is that it is through this idea, one 
that cannot be derived from experience, that singular cognition is even possible.  It is 
by first thinking something under this psychological variant of the t-idea that 
concept-users instate a rule, one whose cognitive enactment establishes (or, rather, 
prescribes) that the phenomenal referent of one's thinking be necessarily singular.   
The major issue here is of course whether anything in empirical-phenomenal 
reality can extensionally live up to the intensional requirements imposed by the 
I/self/agent ideas.  We saw that nothing can, not, at any rate, from the standpoint of 
theoretical reason.  However, from the standpoint of practical reason, we, as pure 
                                                          
 
104
 Kant elaborates on this point in the third critique:  "For this concept [of a natural end] 
leads reason into an order of things entirely different from that of a mere mechanism of nature, which 
will here no longer satisfy us.  An idea has to ground the possibility of  the product of nature.  
However, since this is an absolute unity of the representation, while matter is a multitude of things, 
which by itself can provide no determinate unity of composition, if that unity of the idea is to even 
serve as the determining ground a priori of a natural law of the causality of such a form of the 
composite, then the end of nature must extend to everything that lies in its product.  For once we have 
related such an effect  in the whole to a supersensible determining ground beyond the blind mechanism 
of nature, we must also judge it entirely in accordance with this principle; and there is no ground for 
assuming that the form of such a thing is only partially dependent on the latter, for in such a case, in 
which heterogeneous principles are jumbled together, no secure rule for judging would remain at all" 
(CPJ, §66, 5:377).  
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moral consciousness, may have a line on how to empirically apply this idea.  We, as 
rational agents, are required to apply it first to ourselves, on aprioristic morally 
pragmatic grounds; when we do so we view ourselves as ends-in-themselves; 
however, since, as natural organisms, we are also products of nature, we therefore 
may view our physical bodies (the necessary instruments of causal efficacy and moral 
enactment) as ends or targets of composition, that is, as natural ends.  Then, being 
only one particular species of natural organism, we may generally apply the concept 
of a natural end to other kinds of organism (by analogy to ourselves).  And that, in a 
nutshell, is how teleology is introduced into nature.105   
It would appear that natural teleology (plus practical theology) assist 
theoretical reason in realizing its higher-order function, namely, that of object-
oriented representation.  Viewed as natural ends (targets of composition), organisms 
appear to be nature's way of indicating what concept-users are supposed to compute 
as singular individuals; in computing a whole-organism as a natural end, we compute 
it as a singular entity (an agent), one which a set of parts are "supposed to" compose.  
The representation of isolated objects is not, however, theoretical reason's highest-
order function; rather its highest-order function is to represent a world.  To that end, 
                                                          
 
105
 In OP Kant writes: "The idea of organic bodies is indirectly contained a priori in that of a 
composite of moving forces, in which the concept of a real whole necessarily precedes that of its parts 
-- which can only be thought by the concept of a combination according to purposes.  Regarded 
directly, it is a mechanism that can be known only empirically.  For, if experience did not provide us 
with such bodies, we would not be entitled to assume even their possibility.  How can we include such 
bodies with such moving forces in the general classification, according to a priori principles?  Because 
man is conscious of himself as a self-moving machine, without being able to further understand such a 
possibility, he can, and is entitled to, introduce a priori organic-moving forces of bodies into the 
classification of bodies in general -- although only indirectly, according to the analogy with the 
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reason needs a language to distinguish between thing and complex. Qua agent, a 
whole-organism may subsequently be viewed as an individual node of interactive 
structure, one capable of possessing (and exercising) causal powers. 
Kant seems to be getting at something that is conceptually prior to talk about 
object-oriented representation.  He seems to be operating at the deepest level of 
conceptual analysis, one where the concern is not over whether we can know objects 
at all (and if so on what grounds) but rather how to compute the very conditions of 
objecthood in the first place.  Under this analysis, reason does not consult experiential 
cognition in order to be informed of what counts as an object (since that is an 
undertaking it could make sense of only after it had set up the terms of what is to 
count as an object and what is to count as purporting an object).  And, considered as 
a system of content-bearing entities, ones which are supposed to work together, the 
transcendental ideas appear to me to be the innate (or, at any rate, internal) devices in 
whose terms our embodied representational systems semantically grasp what is to 
count as an on-going, chronically-partial, and temporally-extended representation of a 
world; moreover, they are meant to do so not in spite of the fact but rather because of 
the fact that the world, as a absolute whole, is never (for us, as embodied systems) an 
object of experiential cognition.106   
The whole, in an empirical signification, is always only comparative.  The 
absolute whole of magnitude (the world-whole), of division, of descent, of the 
conditions of existence in general, together with all the questions about 
whether these are to come about through a finite or an endlessly continuing 
                                                                                                                                                                     
moving force of a body as a machine.  He [must], however, generalize the concept of a vital force, and 
of the excitability of matter in his own self by the faculty of desire” (OP: 21:213, underscoring added). 
 
106
 See 11.1 for more discussion of this point.  
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synthesis, has nothing to do with any possible experience. . . . Appearances 
require to be explained only insofar as their conditions of explanation are 
given in perception, but everything that can ever be given in it, taken together 
is an absolute whole, is not itself any perception.  But it is really this whole 
for which an explanation is being demanded in the transcendental problems of 
reason.107   
 
2.8 The Transcendental Ideas As a Functional Architecture of the Mind 
Kant says of the transcendental ideas that "a deduction of them must 
definitely be possible," but denies that this deduction is like the one he has given for 
the categories of pure reason (see A670/B698).  So what is the deduction of the ideas 
of pure reason consist in?  Kant says:  
Now if one can show that although the three kinds of transcendental ideas 
(psychological, cosmological, and theological) cannot be referred directly to 
any object corresponding to them and to its determination, and nevertheless 
that all rules of the empirical use of reason under the presupposition of such 
an object in the idea lead to systematic unity, always extending the cognition 
of experience but never going contrary to it, then it is a necessary maxim of 
reason to proceed in accordance with these ideas.108     
 
On my reading, the Appendix (second part) constitutes a kind of brochure, one that 
details the three main types of cognitive systematicity to be derived by viewing the 
transcendental ideas in the recommended way, namely as, in some sense, functioning 
prescriptively as a guide for the empirical use of the understanding.  (It is, more 
precisely, not so much the understanding's activity as it is the guided combination of 
its products or materials.109)   
                                                          
107
 CPuR, A484/B512. 
 
108
 CPuR,  
 
109
 Grier observes this also.   
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The general idea advanced in the Appendix (especially in its second part) is clear 
enough: it is the claim that the ideas of reason serve some functional value within our 
cognitive systems.  But can we do anything to increase or sharpen the resolution of 
this very general picture?  I think we can, and do so with Kant-internal resources. 
          Notice that the transcendental deduction of the t-ideas consists essentially in 
showing that they are "necessary maxims of reason."  Maxims are generally rules or 
aims, ones that are subordinate to more general principles or higher-order goals; 
maxims are therefore rules whose necessity consists in prescribing the means to 
realize some superordinate end or goal.  In 2.5 I presented various Kantian texts, but 
one in particular seemed to represent (in Kant's mind) a highest-order principle (see 
A645-6/B673-4).  Recall, under my analysis, this uber-principle prescribes an apical 
goal, namely one that mandates the maximization of mereological structure of a 
rational kind (where the parts are dependent on an idea or conception of the whole).   
          My proposal is this.  We read Kant's general characterization of the deduction 
of the transcendental ideas as applying to each type of t-idea:  a deduction of each 
type of transcendental idea would therefore consist in showing how each of the three 
types could plausibly be viewed a "necessary maxim of reason."  And since the use of 
a maxim only makes sense in reference to some superordinate rule or higher-order 
goal, I suggest that we set up the uber-principle as stated in the first part of the 
Appendix (in A645/B673) as the principle in reference to which each of the t-ideas is 
to be viewed as a "necessary maxim of reason."  Under this analysis, then, each type 
of transcendental idea would be a necessary maxim of reason in that each idea 
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contributes (in some nonredundant way) to the general goal prescribed in A645's 
uber-principle, whatever that turns out to be.  Here we can usefully bring the results 
of our earlier analyses (see 2.5.2) to bear on the aim of the present section.  Under my 
analysis, the uber-principle stated in the Appendix (first part) prescribes the general 
mandate to maximize systematicity, where this is to be explicated as the 
maximization of mereological structure.  Consequently, each of the t-ideas' functional 
roles can be explicated in light of this general mandate.  Finally, in order to further 
specify the directive content of A645/B673's uber-principle, we can read it in light of 
Kant's ID analysis of the concept of a world in general (see 2.6).   
          My proposal is as follows: Theoretical reason's goal is to represent the world as 
a single, necessarily unified, whole.  In order to represent the world as a whole, 
theoretical reason must first be able to represent singular objects and, second, be able 
to connect them together so as to form structural complexes; these structural 
complexes must themselves be connected; to that end they must be conceptualized, in 
turn, as singular objects, ones that are elements of structural complexes of 
increasingly larger magnitudes.  Consequently, theoretical reason accomplishes its 
higher-order cognitive aims by representing component parts, then connecting them 
together so as to form larger structural complexes.  By such means, reason guides the 
construction of a multi-grade model of the world, one under which the world consists 
hierarchical order of structured wholes.    
I submit that the transcendental ideas can be viewed as a system of higher-
order cognitive functions, ones that guide our representational systems in respect of 
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three distinguishable levels of object-oriented representation.  Viewed as such each 
prescribes an abstract model for what the system's object-oriented construction is 
supposed to aim at.110  Functioning as guide to the empirical use of the 
understanding, each of the transcendental ideas contributes to the general goal of 
realizing (theoretical) reason's highest-order end, namely, of representing a world-
whole (a cognitive aim that a finite system can only approximate but never entirely 
fulfill).   
As remarked, the transcendental ideas are to be viewed as operational 
directives.  Viewed as a system of directives, ones that are supposed to guide the 
empirical use of the understanding, the entire set of transcendental ideas may be 
viewed as guides for the  coordination and structuring of the understanding's 
perceptual episodes (which are always partial) under the cognitive aim of 
representing a system of structured wholes. Reason coordinates the understanding's 
materials along three distinct levels:  
1)  the level of individual objects (on the model of whole-entities) 
2)  the level of individual structural complexes (ones made up of objects) 
3)  the level of structural complexes (made up of other structural complexes) and so 
on. 
I submit that each type of transcendental idea prescribes to the system what is to 
count as an 'object' on a different magnitude111 of object-oriented representation, be 
                                                          
110
 In this respect, the use Kant seems to intend for the transcendental ideas is similar to more 
contemporary teleosemantic accounts of meaning.   
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that of individual physical objects, structured arrays of such objects (ones embedded 
in interactive causal structures), or of objects on a larger cosmic level (that of 
galaxies, mega galaxies, etc).  (See Diagram below.)  By implementing the whole set 
of transcendental ideas (self, world, God) systematically, reason is able to guide the 
empirical use of the understanding so as to maximize the world's mereological 
structure; in doing so it seeks to realize its highest-order end of representing a 
world.112 
Diagram 2.8D:  
T-Idea          Object-Oriented Directive Content__________________________________ 
Self               Represent the world's parts on the model of individual agent-substances    
World           Connect the world's singular parts in structural complexes (causal structures) 
God              Connect all possible structural complexes under the idea of a world-whole 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
111
 In Kant's thought the term 'magnitude' has a technical use.  A magnitude is, according to 
Kant, a discrete quantum, meaning that it is composed of countable parts such that when these are 
counted (or measured in terms of some accepted standard of measure) the resulting magnitude can be 
identified with some determinate number.  For instance, the human hand is a discrete quantum (having 
five fingers).  Using this 'finger' as a unit of measurement (say the index finger of average person) we 
could construct a magnitude of the length of the Titanic (as n-many fingers long).  Obviously, the 
transcendental ideas (specifically the subset Kant calls "world concepts"), do not refer to objects, let 
alone do they prescribe objects under a determinate metrical conception (of how large, how big, etc.)  
They are metrically indeterminate, but they do function to introduce object-oriented construction on 
three distinct scales without specifying an answer to the question, "How big or how small?".   
 
112
  This suggests a view of substances as relationally constituted.  On this point Beatrice 
Longuenesse and I agree: "Kant explains, in the Amphiboly, his opposition to Leibniz's view 
according to which substances are individuated by their intrinsic determinations (determinations they 
have on their own, independently of any external relation to other substances).  According to Kant, on 
the contrary, substances, i.e., material things whose essential properties persist while their accidental 
properties change, are recognized under concepts of external relations (mutual causal determination).  
This means that the move from recognizing things as individuated in space and time, to thinking them 
under concepts of natural kinds, is a move from representing them in relations of universal mutual 
interaction, to thinking them under concepts of relational properties (cf. A274/B330-1, A283-4/B339-
40).”  Beatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the Human Standpoint (Princeton University Press, 2005), 197-
98. Later in chapters 7 and 8) I argue that, under Kant's model of interaction, substances must be 
capable of two types of self-activity and for this reason must be conceptualized on the model of causal 
agents.   
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Theoretical reason's highest-order end is to represent one all-inclusive object, namely, 
the world (conceptualized as an absolutely complete whole).  In order to realize this 
end, however, reason has to be able to represent the world's parts (individual 
substances) and, in addition, interconnect these parts in a causal structure, one in 
virtue of which a plurality of substances can constitute a world-whole.113  This is 
where the cosmological ideas (or "world concepts") perform their functional role.  
However providing a detailed analysis of the cosmological ideas and their role in 
furthering reason's pursuit of the unconditioned is not my present concern.114  Suffice 
it to say that, under my analysis, the cosmological ideas are supposed to help set up 
an "immanent"115 ontological framework, one in which the world is to be represented 
as a hierarchy of structured wholes.   
Finally, according to Kant a plurality of substances cannot constitute a world-
whole (or, at any rate, we cannot compute it as such) unless we view the entirety of 
                                                          
 
113
  This causal structure, as it turns out, is one that Kant conceptualizes in terms of reciprocal 
interaction, which, as we will see, gets encoded (in a first critique context) in the category of the 
understanding (viz., the category of community).  Until very recently the concept of reciprocal 
interaction (and Kant's use of it in the Third Analogy and elsewhere) has received little attention by 
Kant scholars.  Fortunately, that is now changing.  See recent work of Geoffrey Edwards (2007), 
Beatrice Longuenesse (2005) and Eric Watkins (2005), all of whom provide illuminating analyses of 
the Third Analogy.  My own view (which I cannot state here) is most similar to Longuenesse's:  "I 
intend to show that Kant's argument in the Third Analogy is meant to lay out just those acts of 
synthesis by way of which things are individuated in space and time.  According to Kant, those acts of 
synthesis are acts by means of which things are represented as being in relations of universal causal 
interaction.  Only insofar as they are so individuated can they also be thought under concepts of natural 
kinds (namely, under a universal scale of genera and species) ordered according to the form of 
discursive judgment and a system of such judgments" (197).   
  
114
  I discuss the functional role of the cosmological ideas in Chapter 11.  
 
115
 I read Kant's use of the term 'immanent' (or 'indigenous') to mean 'intraphenomenal', where 
this is to be further contrasted with what is transcendentally real.  Immanent ontology refers to the 
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nature to be the effect of intentional causation.  Susan Neiman (1994) similarly views 
Kant as making this point: 
To say ... that the world as a whole is the product of a conscious agent who, 
limited by the laws of logic, used means-end reasoning to produce what he 
took to be the best outcome is to say that the world is the sort of place we can 
understand.116   
 
And this is where the God-idea (and, generally, Kant's physicoteleology) performs its 
functional role.  God, as an intentional cause, represents an explanatory standpoint 
from which we, as human cognitive systems, are able to view the entirety of nature as 
thoroughly "intelligible"117 to reason.   
For reason to exist in the world, however, something further must take place:  
God must, as it were, put it there at the creation, by choosing to create the 
world in the right way.  To put the point another way: if there is one thing that 
is constitutive of the world, it is God's choice to create it, and that is, 
precisely, something teleological.118  
 
On the hypothesis that nature was created by God, concept-users can see themselves 
and their cognitive relation to nature as one where they are on the consumer's end of a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
objects of appearance, that is, to the world as it appears to phenomenal consciousness, not to an order 
of things that exists independently of human representational systems.   
116
 Neiman, 25. 
 
117
  This term is used often in the secondary literature, but few commentators officially 
acknowledge it as a technical term of Kant's (see A531/B559, A538/B566-A558/B586).  In fact it is a 
technical term, one that Kant inherits largely from Leibniz.  The basic idea is that rational intelligibility 
involves final causation, that is, causation that involves reference to ends (teleology).  See Susan 
Neiman (1994) illuminates this point:  "Leibniz's expressions of this anthropomorphism are often so 
crude as to obscure whatever is interesting about the idea; the spectacle of God as master watchmaker 
violates too many convictions of every discipline, including theology.  But Kant will develop the 
intuition that Leibniz found no means to express plausibly:  showing an event to be the necessary 
consequence of a series still leaves something to be explained.  Reason seeks comprehension of the 
world as a whole. . . . Where the statement of a series of efficient causes leaves no room for further 
questions, providing another one may still leave an investigator experiencing the event as mysterious 
or arbitrary.  At that point, only the statement of a final cause -- the end toward which an event is 
directed -- will satisfy human reason's demand for intelligibility” (Neiman, 25, underscoring added).   
 
118
 Neiman, 24. 
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superior someone's practical reason; which is to say, concept-users can view the 
whole of nature (with all of its countless parts) on the model of an artefactual object, 
one that was first engineered and then created under the guidance of an idea of a 
world-whole.119  It is under this presupposition that reason is able to intelligibly 
undertake (to make sense of) its highest-order mandate to maximize intraphenomenal 
systematicity.   
 
2.9 The Functional Value of Kant's Physicoteleology 
In the literature some commentators attempt to view Kant as arguing for a 
naturalized teleology, one which uses the concept of a 'function' in order to explain 
naturally-occurring organization (or system-structures in nature) and, in addition, 
claims it can do so without any explanatory use of the concept of an 'intention'.  
Ginsborg (2006) and Zuckert (2007) both say that Kant's concept of a natural end can 
be naturalized so as to eliminate any explanatory reference to an intention.  They, 
however, represent a minority view.  My own view is that Kant's position (in the 
CTPJ) isn't a form of naturalized teleology.  If Kant were an advocate of naturalized 
teleology, his position would be very difficult to reconcile with claims he makes 
about how natural organisms are to be accounted for (namely, as the effects of 
                                                          
 
119
  On this point Kant writes:  "Thus I say the concept of a highest intelligence is a mere idea, 
i.e., its objective reality is not to consist in the fact that it relates straightway to an object (for in such a 
signification we would not be able to justify its objective validity); rather, it is only a schema, ordered 
in accordance with the conditions of the greatest unity of reason, for the concept of a thing in general, 
which serves to preserve the greatest systematic unity in the empirical use of our reason, in that one 
derives the object of experience, as it were, from the imagined object of this idea as its ground or 
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intentional causation) and consequently make it very difficult to motivate his 
physicoteleology.   
Indeed there are a number of texts where Kant seems to be saying that the 
data (concerning natural organisms) cannot be understood (at all) except in terms that 
ultimately derive from our subjective experience of practical intentionality.120  Kant 
seems to think that the meaning of 'natural organism' (say, a monkey) is such that we 
cannot so much as semantically compute its referent independently of some vital 
reference to the subjective structures of our own intentional agency.  On this point 
Kant writes (in the third critique) that 
there is some intentional ground of its existence (as a contingent natural 
being), and this thought is difficult to separate from the concept of an 
organized being: for once we have had to base its internal possibility in a 
causality of final causes and an idea that underlies this, we also cannot 
conceive of the existence of this product otherwise than as an end.  For the 
represented effect, the representation of which is at the same time the 
determining ground of its production in an intelligently acting cause, is called 
an end.121  
 
According to Kant we cannot epistemically triangulate on the data (concerning 
natural organisms) in a way that would allow us to view these phenomena 
independently of the structures that constitute our practical intentionality, because it is 
these very structures that largely define the phenomena under consideration.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                     
cause.  Then it is said, e.g., that the things in the world must be considered as if they had gotten their 
existence from a highest intelligence" (CPuR, A671/B699).   
 
120
 In OP Kant writes: "Organized bodies (which are not just matter) indicate an immaterial 
principle, and, insofar as organization extends through all parts of the world (transforming bodies and 
replacing dead ones with new formations in their place) indicate an anima mundi.  The latter, however, 
may not be represented as a thinking being (spiritus), but, at most, as anima bruta; for, without this, 
purposive generation cannot, I will not say be explained, but be thought at all" (OP: 22:504, emp. 
added). 
121
 CPJ, 5:426, underscoring added.   
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natural explananda would therefore seem to be pre-conceptualized in a way that is 
already entrenched in a teleological explanatory framework.  The reasoning Kant 
formerly uses (in both New Eluc and ID) to draw realist conclusions about the 
ultimate ontological ground of nature is in the first and third critiques characterized as 
an anthropomorphic (or, at any rate, subjective) but nonetheless necessary mode of 
explanation.   
Since reason must be able to cognize the necessity in every form of a natural 
product if it would understand the conditions connected with its generation, 
the contingency of their form with respect to all empirical laws of nature in 
relation to reason is itself a ground for regarding their causality as if it were 
possible only through reason; but this is then the capacity for acting in 
accordance with ends (a will); and the object which is represented as possible 
only on this basis is represented as possible only as an end.122  
 
When Kant says of the transcendental ideas that they are "subjective" the tendency is, 
I think, to read Kant as making an epistemological point.  In fact, I don't think he is 
(or, at any rate, not only) making an epistemological point.  When Kant characterizes 
the use of the transcendental ideas as "subjective," he is making first and foremost a 
metaphysical point.  Kant is saying that the use or implementation of these content-
bearers reflects certain structures of agency, structures that can only be thought of as 
belonging to a conscious subject, one possessing the faculty of practical reason.  Such 
structures are not to be conceptualized on the model of objects existing "outside" our 
representational systems.  Structures of agency are therefore not "objective," like 
physical objects in the world are; or, if they do exist in the world, their inclusion in 
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 CPJ, 5:370, underscoring added.  
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our empirical ontology is parasitic on another sort of object, namely, that of an 
embodied personal (or, at any rate, intentional) agent.     
A number of issues arise here.  First, there is the issue over how to explicate 
these structures (answer seems to be in terms of final causality).  Second, given a 
satisfactory answer to this question, there is the issue over how the structures of 
agency (which are subjective in the sense explicated above) can be cognitively 
referred to nature.  How, in other words, are agency structures (primarily, the concept 
of an end) to be viewed as structures of nature, when we've just acknowledged them 
to be the constitutive structures of agents?123  Third, there is the issue over why it 
would be necessary to refer the structures of agency to nature in the first place. 
What's to be gained by doing this?  The answer to this last question seems to be that it 
furthers the end of maximizing systematicity (see 2.8).  Let us therefore focus on the 
second question.   
Organisms are a rather special natural kind in that many species are capable of 
self-locomotion and, more generally, goal-directed behavior.  Human beings are a 
subset of this natural class.  We are cognitive subjects, ones that are not only self-
aware but also causally efficacious physical beings.  We therefore experience 
ourselves as intentional agents; we, as rational agents, are self-aware, goal-directed 
beings who can exercise their causal powers for the sake of realizing their ends or 
                                                          
 
123
 Here I do not restrict the extension of 'agent' to personal agents but rather include 
nonhuman organisms as well as anything that we would want to conceptualize as having causal 
agency.  Kant conceptualizes substances in general on the model of agents, ones that possess (and 
exercise) causal powers.  See Eric Watkins' Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality (Cambridge 
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goals.  It would therefore seem that human beings (as interactants) introduce agency 
causation into nature, and they do so by the fact that they can generate a series of 
effects under a plan of action, one where effects are causally linked under an 
intention to realize a goal.  (How this is possible is in fact the whole aim of Kant's 
solution to the Third Antinomy.)  Moreover, as we have seen, Kant thinks that we can 
generalize the agency causation (which each of us knows in his or her own case) over 
the entire class of natural organisms, conceptualizing these entities as causal agents 
by analogy with ourselves.   
We've just seen how we can introduce agency structures into nature by 
acknowledging some natural kinds as agents.  Human beings (and generally the class 
of natural organisms) appear to be natural entities that Kant thinks must be thought of 
as agents.  But there is a second possibility.  In addition to recognizing some entities 
as the producers of a set of goal-directed effects, suppose we could acknowledge 
entities in nature as the effects of intentional causation.  We could, in other words, 
view some products of nature on the model of artefactual objects (what Kant refers to 
as "products of art").  Natural organisms exhibit purposiveness in their internal 
structure.  Organisms are natural systems; they prescribe themselves as the end or 
target of physical composition.  Such entities would, in the terminology of the third 
critique, be "natural ends." In more contemporary idiom, this suggests that their 
compositional properties can be understood only in "teleofunctional"124 terms, i.e., as 
                                                                                                                                                                     
University Press, 2005) for a detailed analysis of Kant’s model of causality, one that is based on the 
notion of a causal power.   
 
124
 Or in "function-analytic" terms.  I take these terms to be synonymous.   
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a set of parts conceptualized under a system of means/end relationships, one subject 
to a shared system-goal (namely, the one embodied by the whole-organism).   
Kant seems pretty explicit in claiming that it is only from within the 
standpoint of agent causation that such objective purposiveness can ultimately be 
"made intelligible."  And since we didn't create these phenomena (or else they 
wouldn't be products of nature), we must therefore hypothesize a suitable intentional 
agent, one other than ourselves (yet also on analogy with ourselves).  In doing so, 
reason must hypothesize a surrogate causal agent, one it can project (or cognitively 
refer) the required intentional standpoint to.  We do so in order to vicariously adopt a 
teleological standpoint on the whole of nature.  In the Appendix (second part) Kant 
says:  
Thus the transcendental and single determinate concept of God that merely 
speculative reason gives us is in the most precise sense deistic, i.e., reason 
does not furnish us with the objective validity of such a concept, but only with 
the idea on which all empirical reality grounds its highest and necessary unity, 
and which we cannot think except in accordance with the analogy of an actual 
substance that is the cause of all things according to laws of reason.125  
 
Evidently we are still supposed to assume a referent for the "object in the idea," in 
this case the "single determinate concept of God."  But we don't do so on speculative 
grounds, that is, because we have some theoretical warrant to posit reference relations 
for the God-concept.   
Now I can nevertheless assume such an incomprehensible being, the object of 
a mere idea, relative to the world of sense, though not in itself.  For if the 
greatest possible empirical use of my reason is grounded on an idea (that of 
systematic complete unity, about which I will have more to say presently), 
which in turn can never be presented adequately in experience, even though it 
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 CPuR, A675/B703, underscoring added. 
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is unavoidably necessary for approximating to the highest possible degree of 
empirical unity, then I am not only warranted but even compelled to realize 
this idea, i.e., to posit for it an actual object, but only as a Something in 
general with which I am not acquainted at all and to which, as ground of that 
systematic unity and in relation to that, I give such properties as are analogous 
to the concepts of the understanding in their empirical use.126  
 
What is of particular interest here is whether the idea's intentional object is being 
commandeered (being viewed as instrumental) not because the God-idea has any 
knowable (mind-independent) objective validity but rather for the sake of reason's 
interests or ends. 
Hence it happens that if I assume a divine being, I do not have the least 
concept either of the inner possibility of such a highest perfection or of the 
necessity of its existence; but then I can deal satisfactorily with all other 
questions concerning the contingent, and reason can obtain the most perfect 
satisfaction in regard to the greatest unity for which it is searching in its 
empirical use, but not in regard to the presupposition itself; this proves that it 
is reason's speculative interest and not its insight which justifies it in starting 
from a point lying so far beyond its sphere in order to consider objects in one 
complete whole.127   
 
Indeed, sometimes Kant actually says that the God-idea, although a regulative 
principle, is supposed to be viewed as if it were constitutive.   
The ideal of the highest being is, according to these considerations, nothing 
other than a regulative principle of reason, to regard all combination in the 
world as if it arose from an all-sufficient necessary cause, so as to ground on 
that cause the rule of a unity that is systematic and necessary according to 
universal laws; but it is not an assertion of an existence that is necessary in 
itself.  But at the same time it is unavoidable, by means of a transcendental 
subreption, to represent this formal principle to oneself as constitutive, and to 
think of this unity hypostatically.  For, just as with space, since it originally 
makes possible all forms which are merely limitations of it, even though it is 
only a principle of sensibility, it is necessarily held to be a Something 
subsisting in itself with absolute necessity and an a priori object given in 
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itself, so it also comes about entirely naturally that since the systematic unity 
of nature cannot be set up as a principle of the empirical use of reason except 
on the basis of the idea of a most real being as the supreme cause, this idea is 
thereby represented as an actual object, and this object again, because it is the 
supreme condition, is represented as necessary, so that a regulative principle 
is transformed into a constitutive one; this substitution reveals itself by the 
fact that if I now consider this supreme being, which was absolutely 
(unconditionally) necessary respective to the world, as a thing in itself, no 
concept is susceptible of this necessity; and thus it must have been 
encountered in my reason only as a formal condition of thought, and not as a 
material and hypostatic condition of existence.128  
 
On these occasions Kant seems to think that we are supposed to acknowledge the 
intentionality of the God-idea, not merely in the intensional (ontologically-neutral 
sense) but in the extensional sense of that term.  In the extensional sense, a content-
bearer's intentional object is the (objective) referent, not merely what the idea 
purports to be an idea of (whether or not there is a referent).  When Kant says that, 
just as space is to be treated as if it were a Something (a cosmic container of the 
world's objects), so God must also be considered an actual Something, he seems to be 
recommending that the referential dimension of the God-idea, as a content-bearer, be 
cognitively instated, not because we, as cognizers, have any justificatory entitlement 
for doing so but rather because it suits reason's interests.   
The pragmatic benefit of Kant's recommendation is made clearer in the 
Dialectic's Appendix (second part).  There, the payoff seems to be the perspective on 
the world (or the representation of empirical-phenomenal reality) that concept-users 
can adopt when they (extensionally) assume the "object in the idea" (in this case, 
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God).  The world is put under the perspective where it is not just a plurality (or 
aggregate) of different substances but a systemic whole:  
One mistakes the significance of this idea right away if one takes it to be the 
assertion, or even only the presupposition, of an actual thing to which one 
would think of ascribing the ground of the systematic constitution of the 
world; rather, one leaves it entirely open what sort of constitution in itself this 
ground, which eludes our concepts, might have, and posits an idea as a unique 
standpoint from which alone one can extend the unity that is so essential to 
reason and so salutary to the understanding; in a word, this transcendental 
thing is merely the schema of that regulative principle through which reason, 
as far as it can, extends systematic unity over all experience.129   
 
I think that the t-ideas, being content-bearing entities, represent an angle that one can 
take on the world; however, that this angle is so much as cognitively computable to 
us is owing to the fact that it reflects the structures of our rational agency.  The formal 
structures of our own agency -- that we can set up and realize ends (our goal-
directedness) -- introduce the terms in which to compute a corresponding new type of 
causality, namely, that of agency causation.  But since these agency structures are 
subjective, they cannot be referred to material nature, not one, at any rate, which is 
conceptualized exclusively in mechanistic terms.   
For it is quite certain that we can never adequately come to know the 
organized beings and their internal possibility in accordance with merely 
mechanical principles of nature, let alone explain them; and indeed this is so 
certain that we can boldly say that it would be absurd for humans even to 
make such an attempt or to hope that there may yet arise a Newton who could 
make comprehensible even the generation of a blade of grass according to 
natural laws that no intention has ordered; rather, we must absolutely deny 
this insight to human beings.130   
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However, under the scenario of physicoteleology it would be conceptually and 
explanatorily appropriate to take a teleological angle on nature since all of its 
products were created intentionally by God (who is a rational agent).  Under such a 
hypothesis, concept-users could therefore view their cognitive relation to these 
natural phenomena as one where they see themselves on the consumer's end of 
someone else's (a supreme intelligence's) practical intentionality, the ultimate ground 
of nature's systematicity.   
A machine is a solid body whose composition is only possible by the concept 
of a purpose, formed according to the analogy of a certain intentional motion.  
If this form is represented, not as actual, but merely as a thinkable intention, 
then such a body is a natural machine.  Organic bodies are, thus, natural 
machines.131   
 
Under this scenario the enterprise of explaining natural organisms' internal structures 
would involve something like the activity of reverse-engineering, where concept-
users begin with some prior (even provisional) conception of what the structured  
whole is supposed to be and then attempt to identify and individuate its parts under 
the presumption that each part makes some functional contribution to the whole.  It is 
under this presupposition that reason is able to intelligibly undertake (to make sense 
of) its highest-order mandate to maximize intraphenomenal object-oriented 
systematicity.132   
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Chapter Three 
SPACE, INTERACTION, AND THE APPEARANCE OF A WORLD-WHOLE 
 
3.0 Introduction     
In the previous chapter I presented an interpretative framework, one in which a 
mereological dimension to Kant's cosmology is acknowledged.  This "mereocosmic" 
framework co-opts certain pre-critical materials, specifically, Kant's analysis of the 
concept of a world in general.  Under that analysis, the concept of a world has three 
conceptual components -- substances, form, and absolute entirety.  Next, I proposed 
that the three conceptual components (of Kant's analysis of the concept of a world) be 
correlated with three types of transcendental idea (self, world, God).  And since the 
mereocosmic framework is intended to be of a cognition-oriented type (see 1.3), I 
proposed that the t-ideas be modeled as three nonredundant types of cognitive 
directive, ones that jointly serve reason's highest-order objective to represent a world-
whole.  In light of this proposal we might reasonably ask whether Kant acknowledged 
his analysis of the concept of a world to have a cognitive significance, that is, 
whether his attitude toward one or more of its components underwent a change from 
viewing them initially in realist terms to subsequently viewing them to perform some 
internal function within our cognitive systems.   
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A687/B715).  
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In the present chapter, the aim is largely to focus on one of those conceptual 
components, (namely, the world's "form") and to show how Kant's conceptualization 
of it underwent development, one that is characteristic of the transition from the so-
called "pre-critical" to the "critical" period.  In Kant's Inaugural Dissertation, the 
term 'form' appears to have a generic use (one where it refers to a relational structure 
in which entities are "coordinated") as well as two other meanings, one 'sensible', the 
other 'intelligible'.  Sensible form refers to space and time; intelligible form refers to 
the world's real causal structure (specifically, that of reciprocal interaction).  In this 
precritical context, the sensible/intelligible distinction corresponds to the 
subjective/objective distinction, where 'objective' can plausibly be understood to 
mean 'mind-independent'.  However, in a critical context, the meanings of these terms 
are altered.  The sensible/intelligible distinction still corresponds to the 
subjective/objective distinction, but the meanings of these terms is now complicated 
by the fact that Kant acknowledges both an empirical and a transcendental reality (see 
3.5-6).   
In this context, what we see, I think, is Kant making a transition concerning 
how he conceives intelligible form, one in which it is originally viewed as the world's 
real causal structure to being viewed as an a priori category of the understanding; 
which is to say, that reciprocal interaction undergoes a significant shift, one in which 
it is originally viewed as mind-independent ontological structure to being encoded in 
the category of community and subsequently viewed as the conceptual substrate of 
empirical space (see also 3.5 and 11.3).  Putting the point somewhat more generally, 
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we see items that were (in Kant's mind) originally objective in a realist sense 
nonetheless retaining their "objective" status in a post-Copernican133 
representationalist setting.  How do they manage to do so?  It is by being re-
conceptualized (in one way or other) as part of the mind's deep-structure—a 
cognitive architecture that determines how the world appears to cognitive subjects.   
The transition being described here is not however unique to the concept of 
reciprocal interaction; rather it is one that other metaphysical concepts undergo (e.g., 
substance and causality).  In addition, we have seen such metaphysical concepts as 
the transcendental self, the absolute boundary of the world, metaphysical simples, and 
the traditional concept of God undergo a similar transition in Kant's thought.  Instead 
of a wholesale chucking of speculative concepts (because each purports a 
"transcendent" referent), Kant acknowledges an intra-phenomenal use for these 
content-bearers, one that serves the interests of reason (see 2.2).  It would therefore 
appear that Kant's general way of coping with metaphysical concepts (ones whose 
referent is deemed to be epistemically out-of-range) is to re-conceptualize them as 
rules for our representational systems, rather than as norms governing extra-
representational reality.  It is in light of this general way of coping that I propose to 
view the evident change in how Kant conceives of the world's (intelligible) form.  
Such a transition may plausibly be seen as reflecting a general developmental trend, 
one that provides at least some Kant-internal inspiration (if but little explicit 
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extrapolatory support) for the mereocosmic interpretative framework I presented in 
chapter 2.   
3.1 Kant’s Analysis of the Concept of a World in General 
In the Herder transcript of Kant's lectures on metaphysics we find a concise (rather 
Tractatus-like134) statement of his ontology:    
     The world is a real whole <totum reale>: all things in it stand in real 
connection <in nexu reali>.   
     The world is a whole which is not part of another <totum quod non est 
pars alterius>: otherwise this would be only a piece of the world.   
     The world is therefore a (real) whole of actual things, which is not part of 
another <mundus ergo est totum (reale) actualium, quod non est pars 
alterius>.  
     357.  All things are in real connection <in realnexu>: they are connected in 
certain determinations, be they as they may.   
     358.  (In this world) the world is present, of which I am part.  There is a 
reciprocal connection, either mediately or immediately <(in hoc mundo) 
mundus praesens est, cujus sum pars ego.  Est nexus mutuus vel mediate vel 
immediate. 
     361.  (Cf. 354, as a proposition to be proven, should not be brought into the 
definition.) As parts, all parts of the whole are in real connection <in 
realnexu> with one another as component parts <compartibus>: because they 
are grounds of the whole, and the whole cannot subsist without them.  A part 
thus depends on some determinations of the others: consequently no part in 
the whole is independent -- the whole [is] not independent -- [but] 
contingent.135  
 
Later, in the Inaugural Dissertation136 Kant provides an analysis of "the concept of a 
world in general."  Under this ID analysis the concept of a world in general yields 
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three intensional components:  'matter', 'form' and 'entirety'.  (See Diagram A.)  The 
term 'matter' refers to the world's parts, which Kant identifies as substances; the term 
'form' refers to the 'connection' that these parts must have to each another in order to 
jointly constitute a single world.  In ID Kant distinguishes between two subtypes of 
form, sensible and intelligible and, in addition, further subdivides "sensible form" 
into two types, namely, space and time.  (I discuss this more below.)  Finally, the 
term 'entirety' refers to the conceptual requirement that for something to be a world, it 
cannot be a part of a larger whole; anything answering to the concept of a world 
would therefore have to be a single all-inclusive whole -- a "world-whole."137   
Diagram 3.1a:  Analysis of the Concept of a World 
Terminology                                        Conceptual Requirements_________          
Matter                                                   Parts (Substances) 
Form                                                     Relational Structure (Connection) 
Entirety                                                Completeness (Absolute) 
 
Comparing the ID analysis of the concept of a world in general against the statement 
of Kant's metaphysics (in the Herder transcript) yields an important difference (or 
rather an omission) between the two.  In the Herder transcript, all three components  
                                                                                                                                                                     
Practical Reason, CPJ = Critique of the Power of Judgment, NF = Kant's Notes and Fragments, LM = 
Kant's Lectures On Metaphysics.    
 
137
  One issue that arises here is over which subtype of sensible form, space or time, is more 
world-like.  Is there, in other words, some reason why an (exclusively) temporal relational structure is 
ruled out as a conceptualization of the world's form?  If so, then presumably there must be something 
about an exclusively temporal relational structure that conceptually negates one or more of the 
requirements imposed by the concept of a world in general.  This raises another closely related issue:  
Since Kant (as will be made clear in the present section) thinks that space (or, space-time) is the 
sensible form to be affiliated with the world's real form, the question arises as to how space is able to 
recommend itself (over time exclusively) as being the more world-like of the two.  What is it about 
space that makes this type of sensible form more amenable to being correlated with the world's form?  
(See 3.5-3.6 for related textual analyses.)  
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are represented:  the world's parts, the "real connection" that unites them so as to 
constitute a single world, and the entirety requirement ("the world is a whole which is 
not part of another").  But in the Herder transcript there is no explicit 
acknowledgement of the distinction between two subtypes of "form," sensible and 
intelligible as there is in the ID analysis; furthermore there is no explicit mention of 
the two subtypes of "sensible form," namely space and time, as there is in ID.   
In ID Kant says that the two subtypes of sensible form, space and time, are 
"subjective" and "ideal:"   
Time is not something objective and real, nor is it a substance, nor an 
accident, nor a relation.  Time is rather the subjective condition which is 
necessary, in virtue of the nature of the human mind, for the coordinating of 
all sensible things in accordance with a fixed law.  It is a pure intuition.  For it 
is only through the concept of time that we co-ordinate both substances and 
accidents, according to simultaneity and succession.  And, thus, the concept of 
time, as the principle of form, is prior to the concepts of substance and 
accident.138 
 
Space is not something objective and real, nor is it a substance, nor an 
accident, nor a relation; it is, rather, subjective and ideal; it issues from the 
nature of the mind in accordance with a stable law as a scheme, so to speak, 
for co-ordinating everything which is sensed externally.139 
 
A more detailed analysis of these texts will be provided later.  My present purpose is 
to draw attention to the differential between the Herder transcripts and ID's analysis 
of the concept of a world.  It is this: in the Herder transcript, Kant appears to be 
conceptualizing the world-whole from an exclusively ontological angle; there is no  
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reference to human representational systems making any contribution whatsoever to 
that conceptualization; whereas in ID there is:  space and time, as sensible forms, are 
subjective and ideal which appears to entail the acknowledgement that each is an 
"absolutely first formal principle of the sensible world:"  
Time, therefore, is an absolutely first formal principle of the sensible world.  
For all things which are in any way sensible can only be thought as either 
simultaneous or as placed after each other, and, thus, as enfolded, as it were, 
by a period of one single time, and as related to one another by a determinate 
position in time.  Thus, there of necessity arises as a result of this concept, 
which is primary in respect of everything sensitive, a formal whole which is 
not part of another whole; that is to say, there arises a phenomenal world.140  
 
Although the concept of space as some objective and real being or property be 
imaginary, nonetheless, relatively to all sensible things whatsoever, it is not 
only a concept which is in the highest degree true, it is also the foundation of 
all truth in outer sensibility.  For things cannot appear to the senses under any 
aspect at all except by the mediation of the power of the mind which co-
ordinates all sensations according to a law which is stable and which is 
inherent in the nature of the mind. ... Accordingly, space is an absolutely first 
formal principle of the sensible world, not only because it is only in virtue of 
this concept that the objects of the universe can be phenomena but above all 
for this reason, that by its essence space is nothing if not unique, embracing 
absolutely all things which are externally sensible; it thus constitutes a 
principle of entirety, that is to say, a principle of a whole which cannot be part 
of another whole.141  
 
In ID space and time reflect "actions of the mind," operations internal to human 
representational systems that "coordinate" sensory data.  My present concern is not to 
provide a detailed analysis of Kant's notion of "coordination."  Suffice it to say that it 
appears to be the condition under which representational systems are capable of 
cognitive reference to a world, either subjective or objective.  Kant's distinction 
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between two subtypes of sensible form certainly resemble the distinction he makes 
(in a first critique context) between inner sense and outer sense; and the similarity 
naturally encourages the view that ID's sensible forms are prototypes of the first 
critique's concepts of inner and outer sense.   
ID's analysis of sensible form includes, however, an additional (or, at any rate, 
a more explicit use of the) construct of "coordination," and this concept is used to 
explicate the difference between space and time as a difference in how represented 
entities are to be internally coordinated (or assigned positions) within what appears to 
be a norm-governed cognitively simulated relational structure, one that is either 
temporal or spatial.    
But each of these concepts has, without any doubt, been acquired, not, 
indeed, by abstraction from the sensing of objects (for sensation gives the 
matter and not the form of human cognition), but from the very action of the 
mind, which co-ordinates what is sensed by it, doing so in accordance with 
permanent laws.  Each of the concepts is like an immutable image, and, thus, 
each is to be cognized intuitively.  For sensations, while exciting this action of 
the mind, do not enter into and become part of the intuition.  Nor is there 
anything innate here except the law of the mind, according to which it joins 
together in a fixed manner the sense-impressions made by the presence of the 
object.142   
 
Inner sense, being conceptualized as an exclusively temporal relational structure, is 
the system's power to "coordinate" represented entities diachronically; whereas outer 
sense is the power to coordinate represented entities synchronically.143   
It's helpful to interpret Kant's use of the term 'coordination' to refer to a more  
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general cognitive operation, one that is form-neutral, that is, having a content that 
straddles the difference in subtypes of sensible form (or the inner/outer sense 
distinction).  The generic meaning is, I suggest, the idea of cognitive reference.  
Assuming that there is a generic meaning, context-sensitive uses of the term 
'coordination' would derive their meaning from the type of relational structure used 
by the system in order to refer its representational contents.  But whatever type it is 
would serve the system's need to cognitively refer entities to a relational structure.  
An exclusively temporal interpretation of the relational structure is (according to 
Kant) part of a system's cognitive simulation of internality (to that system), one 
where the aim is to represent an inner world of subjective phenomena.  Here the 
objects (introspectable system-states or "modifications of the subject") are assigned 
positions in an exclusively temporal order existing in the cognitive subject.   
The system's self-representation has two aspects, however.  In addition to the 
one intentionally directed at a first-personally structured domain of intentional 
awareness, there is the system's cognitive simulation of an external reality.  Space is 
(according to Kant) how human representational systems subjectively compute 
externality (to their systems).  Space is a relational structure that provides (better: 
imposes) the terms in which a representer can think a reference relation between 
himself (his system) and an external referent; he (or his system) can think a reference 
relation that is exclusively cross-temporal, in which case he thinks reference relations 
among his internal states, ones that are understood (by his system) to be staged and 
played out only intrapersonally; or, by contrast, a concept-users can think reference 
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relations of another sort, ones that link his intentional contents to a set of referents 
that exist synchronically.  In that case, the representer thinks reference relations to a 
set of referents that coexist "outside" his individual embodied representational system 
(in the simulated order of spatial relations).   
So far the aim of the present section has been to use the Herder transcript 
mostly as a foil for developing a contrast between its description of a world-whole 
and ID's intensional analysis of the concept of a world in general.  What exactly is the 
difference between the two?  The difference is that whereas both acknowledge a 
relational structure (of one sort or other) as a requirement for a plurality of entities to 
constitute a single world, only one (ID) explicitly acknowledges the contribution 
made by human representational systems to the conceptualization of the world's 
relational structure.  (See Diagram 3.0b.) 
Diagram 3.1b:  
Acknowledgement Of:_________     Herder Transcript                ID Analysis 
Relational Structure?                                     Yes                                      Yes  
Representational Component?                       No                                       Yes 
 
3.2 Specifying Intelligible Form As Reciprocal Interaction 
In ID it is sensible form (space and time) that Kant evidently regards as the 
contribution made by human representational systems to (the representation of) the 
world's form.  Further, Kant contrasts sensible form with intelligible form, saying that 
while the former are "subjective" and "ideal," the latter is "real" and "objective."  (See 
Diagram 3.2 below.)  What, exactly, is intelligible form?  Whereas we have been 
given a specification of sensible form (as space and time), there has as yet been no 
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specification of intelligible form.  Kant does not appear to be as explicit about what 
intelligible form is as he is about sensible form; however, there are a number of texts 
(internal to ID) that allow us to plausibly hypothesize a specification of it.  In the 
section entitled "On the principle of the form of the intelligible world," Kant says:  
Accordingly, a whole consisting of substances is a whole which consists of 
contingent beings, and the world, in its own essence, is composed of mere 
contingent beings.  Furthermore, no necessary substance is connected with the 
world unless it is connected with it in the way in which a cause is connected 
with what is caused.  It [= a necessary substance] is, accordingly, not 
connected with the world in the way in which a part is connected with its 
complementary parts to form a whole (for the connection of constituent parts 
is one of reciprocal dependence, and such dependence does not belong to a 
necessary being).  Therefore, the cause of the world is a being which exists 
outside the world, and thus it is not the soul of the world; its presence in the 
world is not local but virtual.144 
 
Here Kant argues that contingent substances (not necessary substances) can stand in 
the sort of relations required of them in order to constitute a single world-whole.  And 
we can use this argument to triangulate on the issue over how to specify the content 
of 'intelligible form'.  The background metaphysical issue here is over whether 
necessary substances can be connected to other substances in the way required to 
constitute a single world-whole.  Kant says no.  And the reason is this:  in order to 
constitute a single world-whole, a plurality of substances are required to stand in 
composition relations to each other; they must be interconnected in such a way so as 
to compose a whole.  Since Kant's claim is that no set of necessary (= independent 
stand-alone) substances could compose a whole, we can hypothesize that there's 
something about the composition relation that (in Kant's mind, anyway) threatens to 
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conceptually negate a substance's ontological necessity (= its ontological 
independence).  What would this be?  
In the citation Kant describes the connection by virtue of which a plurality of 
parts compose a world-whole as a "reciprocal dependency," which suggest that he is 
conceptualizing the composition relation as a causal relation.  Moreover, in view of 
the fact that Kant describes the dependency as "reciprocal," we can plausibly infer 
that this causal relation is a reciprocal causal dependency, one that Kant elsewhere 
refers to as "reciprocal interaction."  This interpretative move is supported by textual 
analyses of various parallel discussions of Kant's explanation of a world-whole.  (See 
4.1-2)  In other texts to be analyzed later (see 5.1), Kant explicitly maintains that 
there is some sort of logical inconsistency in conceptualizing a necessary substance 
(which depends on nothing for its existence or properties) as a part of a world-whole.  
In this context, a composition relation seems to be viewed as a threat to a substance's 
ontological status (as a necessary one) because in order to stand in such a relation 
with other substances, a substance would have to be causally dependent on other 
substances (see 5.1).  This threat would make sense under the interpretative 
hypothesis that (in Kant's mind, anyway) composition relations were to be explicated 
as a special sort of causal relation (namely, that of reciprocal interaction).    
Let's return now to the original issue, namely, the concern over specifying 
intelligible form.  If (in contrast with sensible form) intelligible form is real and 
objective, then intelligible form would have to be identified as the relational structure 
in virtue of which a plurality of substances constitutes a single world-whole; 
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furthermore, since, as we have just seen, it is a composition relation that a plurality of 
substances must stand in order to constitute a world-whole, one conceptualized in 
terms of reciprocal interaction, it would therefore appear that intelligible form can be 
plausibly specified as reciprocal interaction.  So we now have two relational 
structures (or, at any rate, two conceptualizations), one sensible, the other intelligible.  
(See Diagram 3.2 below.) 
Diagram 3.2:  
Form-Type       Relational Structure       Faculty Affiliate              Ontological Status               
Sensible             Spatial                           Sensitive                          Ideal (Subjective) 
Intelligible        Reciprocal Interaction    Understanding                 Real  (Objective)  
 
A number of important issues arise here.  One major issue is over how Kant 
conceptualizes the relation between sensible and intelligible form.  Another 
important issue concerns whether sensible form is to be included in the concept of a 
world in general as part of the latter's conceptual content.  My present focus is, 
however, on the first issue.  
That Kant thinks there is a relation between the two, indeed a rather intimate 
one, is not in question:  
Accordingly, the following question, which can only be solved by the 
understanding, remains untouched, namely:  what is the principle upon which 
this relation of all substances itself rests, and which, when seen intuitively, is 
called space?  The hinge, then, upon which the question about the principle of 
the form of the intelligible world turns in this:  to explain how it is possible 
that a plurality of substances should be in mutual interaction with each other, 
and in this way belong to the same whole, which is called a world.  We are 
not here contemplating the world in respect of its matter, that is to say, in 
respect of the natures of the substances of which it consists, whether they are 
material or immaterial.  We are contemplating the world in respect of its form, 
that is to say, in respect of how, in general, a connection between a plurality 
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of substances comes to be, and how a totality between them is brought 
about.145   
 
A detailed analysis of this text is offered later.  Here it suffices to observe that 
sensible form (space) and intelligible form (interaction) appear to be linked within an 
explanatory framework.  Shortly I will argue for an interpretative framework, one 
that makes the explanatory context of this text (and certain others to be analyzed 
later) more explicit; within this framework the relation between intelligible form (= 
reciprocal interaction) and sensible form (= space) consists (to use terminology of the 
period) in "the relation of ground to consequent."   
In the representation of the composite [e.g., space and/or time] the 
composition is always our own work.  Now we can say that the object 
corresponds with that.  Yet this correspondence cannot consist in the fact that 
the quality of the composition is similar to the composite, rather one must be 
the ground or the consequence of the other (the latter is the case if the object 
is mere appearance).146   
 
Under the proposed interpretation intelligible form is therefore to be viewed as the 
"determining ground" (Kant's term) of the sensible form of space.147  We may put the 
view (of the relation between intelligible and sensible form) in terms somewhat less 
Kant-internal by saying that reciprocal interaction explanatorily underwrites the 
empirical representation of space.  Stating the view in these somewhat less 
historically sensitive terms is, however, not intended to obscure Kant's interest in 
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147
  To complicate matters, the pre-Ccritical Kant distinguishes between two types of 
determining ground, the consequentially determining ground and the antecedently determining ground.   
This distinction is made in New Elucidations, where Kant's aim is to present his formulation of the 
"principle of the determining ground," (his version of the principle of sufficient reason).   
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(indeed reliance on) the principle of sufficient reason.  Acknowledging Kant's interest 
in applying the principle of sufficient reason (his version of it, at any rate) affords us 
an interpretative angle on his view of the link between intelligible and sensible form.  
It is as follows:  the empirical representation of space is itself a phenomenon (= 
datum) for which concept-users must hypothesize an underwriting determinant, one 
that is adequate for the datum to be explained.   
 
3.3 Methodological Considerations:  Period-Neutrality 
          It is my intention to offer (what I will refer to as a) period-neutral model of 
Kant's explanatory framework, one that derives its formulation and interpretation 
from Kantian texts deriving from both the pre-critical and critical periods of Kant's 
philosophical career, as well as from other less-acknowledged sources (e.g., 
transcripts of his lectures on metaphysics).  A period-neutral model would be one that 
is able to cross the precritical/critical interpretative barrier because, first, it has been 
based on Kantian texts deriving from both sub-periods and, second, because it has 
been conceptually developed at a level of abstractness so as to avoid any period-
specific changes in terminology and/or formulations.  This shouldn't, however, be 
taken to imply that the modeler has been historically insensitive; on the contrary, 
period-neutrality reflects a methodological orientation that acknowledges an 
intellectual continuity between the works Kant wrote during the period referred to as 
"pre-critical" and the works he wrote during the period referred to as "critical."  It 
means that theoretical constructs Kant developed in the pre-critical period are not (for 
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that reason alone) to be considered irrelevant to a substantive interpretation of his 
later critical works.   
Some Kant scholars share a similar methodological orientation.  Eric Watkins, 
a post-millennial Kant scholar, has provided a sustained defense of the kind of 
methodology I am describing.148  While he does not (to my knowledge) invoke the 
term "period-neutrality," Watkins does argue that in order to understand Kant's 
critical works (specifically, the CPuR), readers must understand Kant's precritical 
works (and the philosophers Kant is reacting to in these works).  Indeed Watkins' 
own book, which argues for a revised interpretation of Kant's account of causality, 
uses Kant's precritical texts as part of the bases for its revision.  Further, Watkins has 
recently published a companion book to the first critique, one that contains various 
background source materials which he thinks are necessary for understanding that 
major critical work.149  These materials include the works of Kant's contemporaries, 
philosophers like Crusius, Baumgartner, Wolff, and Leibniz.  Kant's precritical works 
are in one way or other reactions to these philosophers.  So if Watkins' contention is 
right, if grasping the works of these other philosophers is necessary (or, at any rate, 
highly useful) for understanding Kant's first critique, then we have as much or greater 
reason to think that Kant's precritical reactions to these philosophers is as necessary 
(or as useful) to understanding the later Kant!  
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  See the Introduction in Eric Watkins' Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005).   
 
149
 Eric Watkins, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source Materials (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
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          Another way of putting the point of period-neutrality:  Kant's explanatory 
model, as I construct it, is a single conceptual entity that has undergone development 
over the course of Kant's career; like a child developing over time, acquiring new 
characteristics and functional sophistication, Kant's explanatory model has undergone 
similar developmental change (some of which are explicit, some implicit), but the 
developee (the changeling) is, in my view, the single explanatory model.  (It is 
against the background of this developmental story concerning Kant's work that I will 
argue in Chapter 10 for the model's implicitness in the third critique.)  These are, 
however, methodological considerations whose correctness I cannot argue further for 
here.   
 
3.4 Toward Motivating the First Critique's "Schematism"  
The aim of the present section is to raise issue over whether sensible form is 
to be included as part of the conceptual content of the concept of a world in general.  
There appear to be two possible interpretations here, one where 'sensible form' is 
viewed as part of the conceptual content of the concept of a world in general, and one 
where it isn't.  Under the first interpretation, 'sensible form' is given an abstract 
content (one where it doesn't refer to space and time) and then it is conceptually 
subsumed under the 'form' component of the concept of a world in general.  Under 
the first interpretation, 'sensible form' need not refer to space and time (these being 
specific to human representational systems); no, the inclusion of sensible form as part 
of the analysans of the concept of a world (in general) would amount to 
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acknowledging that what a world is depends conceptually on certain facts about the 
representational system in which that world is to be represented.  Due to its hyper-
abstractness, the concept of a world in general may be indeterminate with respect to 
the specific type of representational system needed; in that case, it would therefore 
conceptually underdetermine the types of sensible form.  Under this interpretation, it 
would be part of the content of the concept of a world (in general) to prescribe that 
for something to be a world at all, there must be some representational system up to 
the job of representing its relational structure.   
But there is a snag here.  Under this interpretation, the concept of a world 
starts to look more like an epistemic concept, not an ontological one.  For how could 
it retain its status as the concept of a world in general if its conceptual content 
included some necessary reference to a representational system?   
This brings us to the alternative interpretation, according to which sensible 
form is not to be conceptually included among the intensional components of the 
world in general.  Under this second option the situation isn't much improved, 
however, because of a fundamental mismatch between the conceptual content of form 
(the notion to be included in the concept of a world in general) and of sensible form 
(the notion not to be included).  As remarked, sensible form isn't an ontological 
concept; it is an epistemic (or, at any rate, a cognitive) concept, one that refers to the 
internal operations of human representational systems and the cognitive processes 
used to represent a reality external (to the system).  If the reason for excluding 
'sensible form' from the concept of a world in general is that the former involves 
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necessary reference to a representational system, then in view of the fact that some 
notion of form must be included (in the concept of a world), it follows that there must 
be some conception of form that isn't contaminated by this objectionable reference; in 
that case, we could expect one of Kant's uses of the term 'form' to refer to a relational 
structure that is system-independent, one that refers to the "real connection" among a 
plurality of substances (not the merely 'ideal' one).   
Here's where the ID distinction between "sensible" and "intelligible" form 
relevantly comes in.  Whereas 'sensible' form (space and time) are merely ideal 
('ideal' meaning mental), intelligible form refers to something real and objective.   
The principle of the form of the universe is that which contains the ground of 
universal connection, in virtue of which all substances and their states belong 
to the same whole which is called a world.  The principle of the form of the 
sensible world, is that which contains the ground of the universal connection 
of all things, insofar as they are phenomena.  The form of the intelligible 
world recognizes an objective principle, that is to say, some cause in virtue of 
which there is a combining together of the things which exist in themselves.  
But the world, in so far as it is regarded as phenomenon, that is to say, the 
world in relation to the sensibility of the human mind, does not recognize any 
other principle of the form than a subjective one, that is to say, a fixed law of 
the mind, in virtue of which it is necessary that all the things which can be 
objects of the senses (though the qualities of those objects) are seen as 
necessarily belonging to the same whole.  Accordingly, whatever the principle 
of the form of the sensible world may, in the end, be, its embrace is limited to 
actual things, in so far as they are thought capable of falling under the 
senses.
150
   
 
Since form refers to the world's relational structure, it would appear that Kant's two 
conceptions of form are fundamentally different: sensible form is an epistemic 
concept referring to a system-dependent relational structure, whereas intelligible form  
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 116 
is the concept of a system-independent relational structure.  These concepts therefore 
seem to be about two different subject matters.  The first is about a necessary feature 
of (human) representational systems; the second is about the internal structure of the 
world.  As remarked, the first is essentially an epistemic concept, whereas the second 
is an ontological concept.  In that case, how could concept-users conceptually 
subsume the concept of sensible form under the concept of intelligible form?   
Cognitive judgment (= subsumption) requires a sameness relation between 
concept and instance.151  In view of this requirement the issue arises over whether 
there is any dimension along which sensible form (space) and intelligible form could 
stand in a sameness relation?  Suppose there wasn't.  So what?  For one thing sensible 
form could not be conceptually subsumed under 'form', in which case concept-users 
could not regard their system-dependent representation of space as an internal 
representation (or analog) of something external (namely, a world).  Concept-users 
would therefore be unable to regard their internal representation of empirical space as 
the system's attempt to represent an external order of world-constituting relations.  
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 According to Kant, cognitive judgment is to be explicated in terms of subsumption, where 
this involves concepts and intuitions.  The "form" of a concept is its universality (generality).  Kant 
appears to think that a concept's form (generality) requires (what he calls) "multiplicity." This latter 
concept can be explicated in terms of multiple instantiability.  Multiple instantiability, however, 
requires two things: "homogeneity" and "heterogeneity" (or sameness and difference).  In order to 
subsume Fido under the concept of a dog, Fido has to stand in a sameness relation to the intensional 
content of that concept (e.g., quadruped, carnivorous, domesticated, etc).  But in order to distinguish 
Fido from other entities similarly subsumable, Fido has to have features or characteristics that are not 
contained in the concept of a dog (e.g., Fido's location in space).  In order for 'dog' to be multiply 
instantiable, there has to be a multiplicity of singular individuals all of which belong to the extension 
of 'dog'.  But for that to be possible, these singular individuals cannot be the same in every respect; 
rather in addition to the feature they share as members of the extension of 'dog', members must have 
individually variant feature-sets (ones that are "heterogeneous") so that one dog-member can be 
distinguished from other similar (but nonidentical) dog-members belonging to the same extension.   
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While they would be able to conceptually subsume an order of spatial relations under 
the concept of sensible form, concept-users would not be able (= would not be 
entitled) to subsume sensible form under the concept of intelligible form.  Concept-
users would therefore be cognitively blocked from making this subsumption.  And 
since (under the current scenario) only intelligible form is to be included as part of 
the conceptual content of the concept of a world in general, it follows that an order of 
spatial relations would not be conceptually subsumable to the concept of the world's 
form.   
According to Kant cognitive judgment (whose propositional form is 
generically modeled by the predicative 'S is P'-type) is essentially a form of 
recognitional awareness.152  So concept-users who are unable to subsume sensible 
form under intelligible form would therefore appear to be unable to subjectively 
compute an internally represented order of spatial relations as the cognitive 
simulation of an external world.  Concept-users would not, in other words, be able to 
regard this subjectively represented order of spatial relations as a mental model of an 
external order of relations because that would involve thinking (or representing) that 
order of relations153 under the concept of a world.  Let us therefore call this a problem 
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  Concepts are therefore recognitional norms.  In an interesting paper Zeno Vendler argues 
for a linguistic classification of verbs which he calls "recognitives," ones where the 'is a' relation in 'S 
is a P' statement means 'as a', so that the statement 'S is a P' is understood to involve some (implicit) 
reference to an intentional system (a mind capable of judgment).  In the context of making a judgment, 
when is S subsumed under the general predicate P, S is thereby represented to the concept-user as a P.   
 
153
  In subsequent discussions the terms 'relational structure' and 'order of relations' are used 
synonymously.   
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of cognitive subsumption.  I submit that the problem of subsumption is what 
primarily motivated the first critique's Schematism.  (I discuss this more below.)    
 
3.5 The Empirical Representation of Space154 Requires An Underwriting 
Ground.   
According to Kant's analysis of the concept of a world in general, a world 
must have three features: parts (substances), form (relational structure) and it must be 
absolutely complete (not a part of a larger whole).  Kant does not, however agree 
(with Crusius, for instance) that the mere existence of a plurality of substances is 
sufficient to constitute a world.  (An analysis of Kant's attack on Crusius is deferred 
until later.)  In part IV (of ID) Kant's focus is on the world's form, the relational 
structure in virtue of which a plurality of substances can be connected to each other 
so as to jointly constitute a single world-whole (as opposed to a mere aggregate of 
unconnected entities).  The larger issue being addressed in this section (of ID) is the 
explanation of the existence of the world-whole.  In §16, however, the issue appears 
to be over which type of form, sensible (= space) or intelligible (= interaction), is 
most adequate to play the functional role of the world's "real relations," an objective 
relational structure, one in virtue of which a plurality of substance-parts may 
compose a whole; the second issue appears to be a concern with determining the 
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 The "empirical" representation of space is employed for the purposes of experiential 
cognition and is therefore is object-oriented (see 11.2).   
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relation between the sensible form and intelligible form.  My present focus is on the 
first issue; I discuss the second afterwards.     
It's clear that Kant thinks space is not adequate to be the world's real relational 
structure:  
Those who take space and time for some real and absolutely necessary bond, 
as it were, linking all possible substances and states, do not think that 
anything further is required in order to understand how a certain originary 
relation, as the fundamental condition of possible influences and the principle 
of the essential form of the universe, should belong to a plurality of existing 
things.  For, since whatever things exist are, in their opinion, necessarily 
somewhere, it appears superfluous to them to enquire why these same things 
are present to each other in a fixed manner.  For this, it seems to them, would 
be determined in itself by the entirety of space, which includes all things.  
But, apart from the fact that this concept, as has already been demonstrated, 
rather concerns the sensitive laws of the subject than the conditions of the 
objects themselves, even if you were to grant to this concept the greatest 
possible reality, it would still only signify the intuitively given possibility of 
universal co-ordination.155 
 
My interest in this text is in Kant's explicit acknowledgment of space's inadequacy to 
perform in the role of the world's relational structure, not in the reasons he gives for 
that acknowledgement.  As for its reasons, there appear to be three.  The world's real 
relational structure, the one in virtue of which substances are connected to form a 
world-whole, cannot be identified with space (or, at any rate, a spatially-interpreted 
relational structure) because, first, space is both "subjective" and "ideal;" therefore, it 
cannot be the world's "real" and "objective" relational structure.  But putting this 
(space's ideality) aside, there are two other considerations:  Viewing space as a mere 
cosmic container (a view Kant rejects) would not explain the diversity of norm- 
                                                          
155
 ID, §16. 
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governed relations, the multivariate patterns of nomic regularity, that obtain among 
all of the world's entities ("why they are present to each other in a fixed manner"); 
second, as Kant says, "it would still only signify the intuitively given possibility of 
universal co-ordination."   
Unfortunately, Kant does not elaborate on this last reason.  There are two 
issues here:  first, over what "co-ordination" precisely consists in and, second, how 
space's reality (its hypothesized objective existence) would imply (at best) only a 
possible sort of relation, namely, "universal co-ordination."  The basic idea appears to 
be that because space is necessarily singular, every determinate region of space is a 
part of one all-inclusive space; furthermore, in light of my earlier suggestion (to 
conceptualize co-ordination in terms of cognitive reference), we can interpret Kant as 
saying that, even if space were granted "the greatest possible reality," the most that 
could be derived is the possibility of cognitive cross-referencing among all the 
entities (substances) occupying positions in space.  As parts of one space, this cross-
referencing would (in principle) apply to all entities existing in space (hence it would 
be "universal").  Moreover, such cognitive cross-referencing (say, between any two 
entities x and y) would require x and y to coexist in the same (spatial) world.   
Here Kant does not, however, appear to be concerned with the conditions 
under which cognitive reference (coordination) is possible; rather the issue seems to 
be over what could explain (what could ground) the connection among a plurality of 
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entities (so as to form a world-whole).156  Since this appears to be the issue (in ID, 
§16) and since, in addition, space is rejected as inadequate in this context, we have 
reason to hypothesize, first, that there is something about space such that, even were 
it granted "the greatest possible reality," it would nevertheless still be inadequate (by 
itself) to constitute the world's relational structure.  It would therefore appear that 
while space is certainly that in which a plurality of entities may coexist, it cannot (for 
reasons not yet made clear) be that in virtue of which a plurality of substances are 
connected so as to form one world-whole.   
The significance of the text under analysis (cited above) does not consist in its 
list of reasons (or argumentation) for the ideality thesis concerning space (that space 
is "in us").  The locus classicus for Kant's reasons for the ideality of space (and time) 
is of course to be found in the first critique's Transcendental Aesthetic.  The 
uniqueness of this text is not due exclusively to its acknowledgement of space's 
inadequacy (to perform in the role of the world's real relational structure), however; 
rather it is due to the confluence of that acknowledgement with certain other 
contextual features, ones that indicate Kant's interest as being both explanatory and 
epistemological (or cognitive).   
How, specifically, are these to be combined?  As remarked, Kant holds (even 
in ID) that human representational systems mentally simulate externality (to their 
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  Here I do not mean to suggest that these two issues, the epistemological one concerning 
the possibility of coordination (cognitive reference) and the ontological one of grounding a world-
whole, are mutually exclusive.  Indeed, when considered in a first critique context, Kant's concern with 
grounding our empirical representation of space by reference to reciprocal causal structure and then a 
conception of substance can be interpreted as his giving the possibility conditions for cognitive 
reference, or, to use a phrase from Robert Brandom, as giving a "metaphysics of intentionality."   
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systems) in terms of space.  Kant uses this fact as a datum on which to hypothesize an 
underlying ground for the empirical representation of space.  (This suggests that the 
ground hypothesized is to stand in a representation relation to the empirical 
representation of space.)  In ID §16 Kant writes:  
Accordingly, the following question, which can only be solved by the 
understanding, remains untouched, namely:  what is the principle upon which 
this relation of all substances itself rests, and which, when seen intuitively, is 
called space?  The hinge, then, upon which the question about the principle of 
the form of the intelligible world turns in this:  to explain how it is possible 
that a plurality of substances should be in mutual interaction with each other, 
and in this way belong to the same whole, which is called a world.  We are 
not here contemplating the world in respect of its matter, that is to say, in 
respect of the natures of the substances of which it consists, whether they are 
material or immaterial.  We are contemplating the world in respect of its form, 
that is to say, in respect of how, in general, a connection between a plurality 
of substances comes to be, and how a totality between them is brought 
about.157   
 
There are a number of important observations to be made concerning this text.  First, 
notice that the larger issue at stake is identified (in the final sentence) as "how, in 
general, a connection between a plurality of substances comes to be, and how a 
totality between them is brought about."  The larger issue is explanatory, and the 
targeted explanandum is a spatially represented a world-whole composed of a 
multitude of substances all of which are 'connected'.  The special focus (within this 
explanatory context) is, however, the world's relational structure and how it is to be 
conceptualized:  "We are contemplating the world in respect of its form ...".   
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Notice, in addition, that there are two italicized statements in the text above.  
We can safely assume that each is of some importance to Kant.  I submit that each of 
these represents separate levels of explanation.  Consider the first italicized question: 
"what is the principle upon which this relation of all substances itself rests, and 
which, when seen intuitively, is called space?" As remarked, space is (in Kant's mind, 
anyway) inadequate to be regarded as that in virtue of which a plurality of substances 
constitute a world-whole.  It would therefore appear that what Kant is doing here is 
acknowledging space as a datum (one which applies, at any rate, to human 
representational systems) and is, in addition, using this datum as a basis on which to 
hypothesize an underlying determinant (or ground).  Kant seem to be asking 
something like this:  Given that space is a datum and that space is entirely inadequate 
to ground the connections needed among a plurality of entities to constitute a world, 
there must ('must' of hypothesis) be some other relational structure, one which is 
adequate to connect these entities (so as to form a world) and, in addition, is able to 
explanatorily underwrite the datum of space.   
The issue whether space can serve as the ground of the connection of multiple 
entities is decided (in Kant's mind, anyway): it cannot.  Kant maintains this view even 
in the critical period.  (See Diagram 3.5a below.)  And from the ID text under 
analysis it's pretty clear that space cannot ground the connection among a plurality of 
substances because it (the empirical representation of space) stands in need of a 
ground itself.  What isn't so clear, however, is why space requires a ground.  What is 
it about space that makes it explanatorily incapable of grounding the connection 
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among a plurality of entities in such a way as to be world-constituting?  Or, to pose 
the question from a slightly different angle, under what conceptualization of space 
would Kant draw the conclusion that it is explanatorily incapable of underwriting the 
connection among a plurality of substances?  I cannot pursue these issues here.  My 
present aim is to assume that space requires the hypothesis of a ground (a second 
relational structure) and to determine more precisely what this ground is and its 
relation to the datum.     
What could this other relational structure be? It has already been shown (or, at 
any rate, plausibly suggested) that intelligible form is to be specified as (the concept 
of) reciprocal interaction.  Notice also how Kant appears to be referring to intelligible 
form (explicated in terms of reciprocal interaction) as the world's real form.  This 
makes sense, since intelligible form was earlier contrasted with sensible form; 
whereas sensible form (space and time) is "subjective" and "ideal," intelligible form 
is "real" and "objective."  Assuming this is correct, then (to return to the 
consideration of the first italicized statement), Kant appears to be saying that the 
datum of space (our empirical representation of it) requires the hypothesis of a causal 
structure (one explicated in terms of reciprocal interaction); moreover, the 
implication seems to be that when a "real" and "objective" causal structure of this 
type is mentally simulated in/by a human representational system, the content of this 
simulation is identical to our empirical representation of space.   
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Diagram 3.5a:  
Dossier Concerning Space                                                                 Kant's Answer 
Whether space requires a ground?                                                          Yes 
Whether (some type of) causal structure is that ground?                        Yes 
Whether the type of causal structure is reciprocal interaction?               Yes 
 
So the first level of explanation establishes a link between the datum of space (as an 
internal representation of an external order of relations) on the one hand and 
interaction (as the world's real causal structure) on the other; since the former is the 
datum on which the latter is to be hypothesized, the latter must be amenable to 
explanatorily underwriting that datum's defining features and/or essential 
characteristics, simultaneity relations (coexistence) being foremost here.  Under the 
interpretation just given to the text (cited above), ID can be seen to stand in sameness 
relation to the first critique, specifically, to the Third Analogy:   
*The unity of the world-whole, in which all appearances are to be connected, 
is obviously a mere conclusion from the tacitly assumed principle of the 
community of all substances that are simultaneous:  for, were they isolated, 
they would not as parts constitute a world, and were their connection 
(interaction of the manifold) not already necessary on account of simultaneity, 
then one could not infer from the latter, as a merely ideal relation, to the 
former, as a real one.  Nevertheless we have shown, in its proper place [in the 
Third Analogy], that community is really the ground of the possibility of an 
empirical cognition of coexistence, and that one therefore really only infers 
from the latter back to the former, as its condition.158  
 
A more detailed analysis of this text is provided elsewhere (see 6.6).  For present 
purposes, it suffices here to acknowledge that Kant's view of the explanatory link 
between space and reciprocal interaction did not alter in the transition from the so-
called "pre-critical" period to the critical period.  (See Diagram 3.5b below.)  
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Whether it is conceptualized pre-Critically as "intelligible form" or in more post-
Copernican terms as a formal/schematized "category of the understanding," 
reciprocal interaction is clearly intended to explanatorily underwrite the empirical 
representation of space.  What's more, it is evident from the text (excerpted from the 
first critique) that this explanatory link is asserted in a context where the issue is 
similarly over showing how a world-whole is possible.    
Diagram 3.5b:    
Kantian Text          Interaction                       Status                       RelationTo Representer 
ID                           As Intelligible Form        Real/Objective         Mind-Independent 
CPuR                     As Category                     Real/Objective         Mind-Dependent     
 
As we have already seen, in ID the ideal/real distinction is mapped over the 
sensible/intelligible form distinction: sensible form (space and time) are ideal, 
whereas intelligible form (interaction) is real.  In ID, as it applies to intelligible form, 
the term 'real' appears to describe something which is genuinely mind-independent, a 
causal structure, one that is world-constituting; 'real' therefore describes something 
that exists independently of (or external to) human representational systems.  In the 
first critique, the situation is, however, more complicated.  In the next section, I 
elaborate briefly on various dimensions of Diagram 3.5b.    
 
3.6 The "Critical" Turn:  Interaction As Mind-Independent Causal Structure 
      To A Priori Category of the Understanding 
 
Although Kant continues to use the same terms, their meaning requires careful 
nuancing.  Space continues to be an 'ideal' relation and interaction a 'real' relation; 
however, the meaning of such terms of 'real' and 'objective' appears to be context-
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sensitive.  In the first critique the concept of reciprocal interaction is referred to under 
a different identity, namely, that of a "category of the understanding."  A categorial 
concept of the understanding can be either 'pure' (= formal) or "schematized."  I'll say 
more about this distinction in a moment.  A category of the understanding (whether 
formal or schematized) is an a priori concept that is conceptualized as a component 
part of the internal structure of human representational systems.159   
We have spoken in ontology of concepts of the understanding the use of 
which in experience is possible because they themselves make experience 
possible.160  
 
Or, in more contemporary (less Kant-internal) terminology, a category is a very basic 
conceptual norm, one that is included among a larger set of sub-personal conditions, 
ones that govern (and make possible) certain invariant structures of cognition.  (I 
realize this is pretty vague, but it will do for present purposes.)  The type of cognition 
whose invariant structures the categories of the understanding (jointly) determine is 
discursive cognition, where this can be taken to mean that the (set of) categories, 
considered as a formal cognitive architecture, are hypothesized as a determining 
ground, one that is intended to explain (certain invariant structures concerning) the 
subjective datum of our first-personally structured intentional awareness.   
Conceptualized as forming the basic structure of human representational 
systems, the categories would therefore appear to be a subjective determinant, so why  
                                                          
159
  Kant says:  "All human cognition on the side of the understanding is discursive, that is, it 
takes place through presentations that make what is common to several things the ground of cognition, 
thus through characteristics as such" (Logic, p. 63-64). 
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would Kant refer to the reciprocal interaction (which appears to be conceptually 
encoded in the category of community) as a "real relation?"  There are various Kant 
texts that do suggest that Kant thinks that the set of pure categories (ones that have no 
affiliation whatsoever to sensibility) are absolutely universal, meaning that this 
particular formal cognitive architecture is shared by every conceivable kind of 
cognitive subject, including God.161  The idea is that human beings are finite 
representational systems of a specific sort; space and time constitute species-relative 
features of our representational systems; however, the pure categories, when 
abstracted from their empirical application, are not species-specific.  For every alien 
cognitive subject, a counterpart Critique of Pure Reason could be written; but 
whereas its Transcendental Aesthetic would co-vary for every alien species (of 
representational system), the book's Table of Categories would be universally 
invariant.  
The formal/schematized distinction (concerning the categories) may do some 
clarificatory work here.  Kant never describes the formal categories as 'real' or 
'objective', not, at any rate, with the intention of implying that these concepts can be  
                                                          
 
161
  I am aware of at least two Kantian texts:  In the B Deduction (§§26-27), where Kant 
considers the possibility of 'intellectual' intuition; in the third critique, §§76-77, where Kant considers 
a supreme intelligence capable of direct intuition.  In §77 (of the third critique) Kant says that we can 
conceive of a intelligence superior to ours and claims, in addition, that the reason it would be 
cognitively superior is that it would not be restricted to a sensible intuition such as space and time.  It 
is the "sensible" (and species-relative feature) of our perceptual systems (of intuiting under the 
conditions of space and time) that renders human representational systems inferior to, say, God's, who 
is not so limited.  For a related discussion on the intuitive intellect see Dickerson's Kant On 
Representation and Objectivity (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 160.   
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used for the purpose of "speculative cognition."162  Indeed the first critique's chapter 
on the phenomena/noumena distinction is intended to be a corrective against just this 
sort of misunderstanding; there, Kant says that the formal categories, though they 
may have a logical content (Kant sometimes says "formal content"), they are "mere 
forms of thought," where the 'mere forms' seems intended to imply the absence of any 
reference relations.163  
The pure concepts of the understanding are related through the mere 
understanding to objects of intuition in general, without it being determined 
whether this intuition is our own or some other but still sensible one, but they 
are on this account mere forms of thought, through which no determinate 
object is yet cognized.164   
 
Hence it is also requisite for one to make an abstract concept sensible, i.e., 
display the object that corresponds to it in intuition, since without this the 
concept would remain (as one says) without sense, i.e., without significance. 
… That this is also the case with all categories, however, and the principles 
spun out from them, is obvious from this:  That we cannot even define a 
single one of them without immediately descending to conditions of 
sensibility, thus to the form of appearances, to which, as their sole objects, 
they must consequently be limited, since, if one removes this condition, all 
significance, i.e., relation to the object disappears, and one cannot grasp 
through an example what sort of thing is really intended by concepts of that 
sort.165   
 
                                                          
 
162
 Kant explicates the term as follows: "A theoretical cognition is speculative if it pertains to 
an object or concepts of an object to which one cannot attain in any experience.  It is opposed to the 
cognition of nature, which pertains to no objects, or their predicates, except those that can be given in a 
possible experience" (CPuR, A635/B663).  
  
163
  Notice here that I do not say 'empirical reference relations', since this might imply that, by 
contemplating the formal categories, concept-users can cognitively transcend the limits of their 
spatiotemporally bound representational systems, and gain cognitive access to a wholly different (= 
noumenal) domain of objects.  This is Plato, however; not Kant.   
 
164
 CPuR, B150. 
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 CPuR, A240-2. 
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By contrast, a schematized category appears to be one that has been linked to time 
and the a priori structures of time (e.g., successiveness, duration, simultaneity).  A 
detailed analysis of Kant's controversial notion of a schematism cannot be given here.  
Suffice it to say here that a schematized category is one that, by having been linked 
with one of time's three structures, acquires (the possibility of) empirical reference 
relations to objects.  To illustrate how this might be possible, consider the link 
between the category of community (CAT 3.3) and its affiliated schema:   
The schema of community (reciprocity), or of the reciprocal causality of 
substances with regard to their accidents, is the simultaneity of the 
determinations of the one with those of the other, in accordance with a general 
rule.166  
 
According to Kant) every intentional object, any mental entity capable of being 
presented to a cognitive subject as one of the system's content-bearing internal states,  
must be subject the system's cognitive simulation of internality (time exclusively) or 
its simulation of externality (space-time).   
So the basic idea motivating the schematism is that by linking a pure category 
to one of the formal (= a priori intuitional) structures (of time), the pure category is 
given the link it needs in order to have empirical reference relations to objects 
represented at the content-level of phenomenal experience, the level where cognitive 
judgment occurs (as opposed to the subpersonal level, which is precognitive).    
[T]he possibility of the category of community is not to be comprehended at 
all through mere reason, and thus it is not possible to have insight into the 
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objective reality of this concept without intuition, and indeed outer intuition in 
space.167   
 
The case concerning the category of community (= the concept of interaction) is 
however rather unique, because it is the intuitional structure of simultaneity that this 
category has been linked with.  Simultaneity relations are relations possible only for  
two or more entities existing in space.  Kant repeatedly says that two times can never 
be concurrent; every part of time is necessarily successive.  By contrast, every part of 
space is, necessarily, contemporaneous with every other part.  In ID, as we will see 
later, Kant selects space over time as the sensible form which is more world-like.  (A 
more extended analysis of space and time in a closely related context is offered later 
(see 6.6).)  True, the world is also subject to time, but it is space that Kant uses to 
conceptualize externality to our (individual) representational systems.  For Kant, if 
space were somehow conceptually negated from our representational life, there 
would consequently be no system/world barrier, or, at any rate, no way for us to 
cognitively simulate this barrier.   
If space is explanatorily underwritten by causal structure (interaction), then 
given Kant's ideality thesis (that space is "in us"), the question arises as to how the 
real world's causal structure is in a position to determine our system's internal 
cognitive simulation of an external order of relations?  Kant certainly does not think 
that there is some resemblance relation between on the one hand our cognitive 
simulation of a world (and its causal structure) and the real world's causal structure 
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on the other.  Kant certainly does not think, in other words, that we simply read off 
the concept of causal structure from our perceptual experience of the world.  This 
suggestion, however, could not be more unCopernican.   
The short answer (which is the only one I will give here) is this:  According to 
Kant our system's cognitive simulation of an order of spatial relations can be 
determined by the world's real causal structure only on the hypothesis that we have an 
a priori concept of that causal structure (the concept of reciprocal interaction), one 
that is in a position to conceptually determine the system's representation of an 
external world.  On the Kantian hypothesis, space (our system's cognitive simulation 
of externality) is conceptually underwritten by the a priori category of community, 
which belongs to a more inclusive set of sub-personal conditions governing our 
system's cognitive operations.  Since Kant conceptualizes the world's real form, as we 
have seen, in terms of interaction and since, in addition, interaction is (in the first 
critique) conceptually encoded in a category of the understanding (CAT 3.3), it 
appears that the world for which interaction is the "real" form is the phenomenal 
world -- the world insofar as it is cognitively simulated in our minds.   
The question of whether something is outside me is the same as if I asked 
whether I represent a real space. For this is something outside me.  But this 
does not mean that something exists in itself, but rather that objects 
correspond to such phaenomena.  For in the case of a phaenomeno we are 
never talking about absolute existence. Dreams are in analogy with 
wakefulness. Except for waking representations that are consistent with those 
of other people I have no marks of the object outside me; thus a phaenomenon 
outside me is that which can be cognized in accordance with the rules of the 
understanding. Yet how can one ask whether there are really external 
phaenomena? We are certainly not immediately conscious that they are 
external, i.e., not mere imaginings and dreams, but we are still conscious that 
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they are the originals for all imaginings, and are thus themselves not 
imaginings.168   
 
Space and time are indeed objective with respect to objects, i.e., they 
represent objects, but only as they are in appearance, but not as they are in 
themselves.169  
 
The meaning-properties of terms like 'real' and 'objective' appear to be context-
sensitive (dependent on the concept-user’s representational system).  Since the 
phenomenal domain is (for us) the only domain where cognitive reference can be 
staged, a concept’s instances (referents, extension) will have to be supplied by this 
domain; this seems to impose a corresponding constraint on the domain from which a 
concept’s semantic content may be derived.170  It would therefore appear that the 
meaning-properties of terms like ‘real’ and ‘objective’ would have to be explicated in 
terms of what does (or does not) occur in space-time.  (In fact, Kant appears to be 
doing this in Postulates of Empirical Thought.)  Since interaction is conceptually 
encoded in the category of community, the relational structure this concept refers to 
must be one Kant could legitimately subsume under the following principle:  
That whose connection with the actual is determined in accordance with 
general conditions of experience is (exists) necessarily.171 
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 NF, 18:172, underscoring added.  
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 LM, 29:977. 
 
170
 One issue that arises here is over whether Kant is committed to a verificationist semantics, 
where this is understood to mean that no concept can have any meaning at all which does not refer to 
something in space or time, a possible object of experience.  Unfortunately, in the Dialectic Kant 
clearly thinks that reason is capable of thinking content-bearing entities (ideals and ideas) neither of 
which can be instantiated (exemplified) in space (or time).  The point requires further discussion, but I 
will not pursue it here.   
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 CPuR, B266. See also B269. 
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When Kant uses these terms to describe the world’s causal structure (interaction), he 
is referring to that causal structure as a “general condition of experience,” a deep-
structural feature of our simulation of a world, one that is invariant for all human 
representational systems.   
 
3.7 Hypothesizing Relationally Constituted Substances From Interactive 
Structure 
 
It is my contention that there is an additional level of explanation being 
referred to (albeit somewhat more implicitly) in the ID text under analysis and, 
moreover, that this additional level is carried over into the critical period.  Consider 
the second italicized statement (of the ID text):   
The hinge, then, upon which the question about the principle of the form of 
the intelligible world turns in this:  to explain how it is possible that a 
plurality of substances should be in mutual interaction with each other, and in 
this way belong to the same whole, which is called a world.172 
 
This text is not as clear as one could wish.  There does, however, seem to be an illicit 
shift in the focus of explanation?  We began originally with the datum of space; then 
we acknowledged that space was entirely inadequate to ground the world-constituting 
connections among a plurality of entities.  That leads Kant to hypothesize a second 
(intelligible) relational structure, one explicated in terms of reciprocal interaction.  
Now, however, Kant appears to be asking for a further explanation, namely, of this 
causal structure; in addition, he suggests that obtaining this additional explanation is 
the "hinge ... upon which the question about the principle of the form of the 
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intelligible world turns ... ," thereby implying that the two explanatory enterprises are 
not independent of each other.  How do we incorporate these evident textual facts 
into the interpretation we are currently developing? We can do so by acknowledging 
a much larger explanatory framework, one that will be introduced in chapter 4 and 
later analyzed in somewhat more detail in chapter 5.    
The aim here is not to offer a detailed analysis of this explanatory framework; 
rather the aim is to provide a more compressed representation of this framework with 
the intention of displaying some of its main structural components.  One of the major 
structures of this explanatory framework is that it is a multi-grade framework.  To see 
what is meant by this, consider that reciprocal interaction is a causal relation and 
therefore a species of relation; since Kant believed that relations are ontologically 
derivative on their relata, no actual relation can exist independently of the actual 
entities that have (or, at any rate, stand in) those relations.  A causal structure, one 
explicated in terms of reciprocal interaction, makes heavy demands on its relata; 
these entities have to possess complementary causal powers (see 8.5-6).   
For Kant, only substances can possess (and exercise) causal powers.  It would 
therefore appear that the world's intelligible form (interactive structure) requires an 
operative conception of substances, one that is serviceable to the conceptualization of 
this type of causal structure.  This might turn out to require quite a sophisticated 
conception of substance, one that requires both a model of the substance's internal 
structure as well as a model of its external relations to other substances.  This 
operative conception of substance, however its precise content is to be determined, 
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will contribute significantly to the model of interaction.  (I develop Kant's model of 
interaction in chapters 7 and 8.)   
Making matters more complicated are the Kant-internal conceptual constraints 
under which these models must be constructed.  For instance, Kant holds self-activity 
to be essential to substancehood; so the models of a substance's interior and of its 
external relations have to square with our conceptions of causal agency, ones deriving 
in part from our subjective first-personally structured experience of rational agency 
(see Chapter 7).  And in view of the substance-concept's reliance on our subjective 
conceptions of agency, the issue arises over its empirical application and scope, 
particularly to nonhuman natural kinds.  This issue is amplified in light of the 
explanatory (or grounding) function that Kant intends reciprocal interaction to 
perform vis-à-vis the empirical representation of space.  Since if a conception of 
substance goes hand-in-glove with Kant's model of interaction and if, in addition, 
interaction is intended to explanatorily underwrite space (insofar as it contributes to 
the cognitive representation of the world-whole), then the content of this operative 
substance-concept (however subjective its source may be) would therefore appear to 
have a legitimate cognitive significance.  In foregoing chapters, the aim is to spell all 
this out in some detail.   
 
 
 
 137 
Chapter Four 
KANT'S RESPONSE TO CRUSIUS 
 
4.0 Introduction  
In chapter 3, we saw how Kant refers to reciprocal interaction as the causal 
structure that explanatorily underwrites the empirical representation of space.  This 
causal structure, which is intended as the ground of a community of substances, 
appears to go hand-in-glove with Kant's physicoteleology.  Kant claims that a 
community of substances is possible only under the hypothesis of a prior idea or 
conception of a whole as the ground of their causal interaction.  From this, Kant 
infers that a community of substances is possible only on the hypothesis that God 
exists as architect and creator of the world-whole.   
An examination of Kant's reaction to Crusius is useful because it provides us 
an angle from which to triangulate on Kant's model of interaction and, more 
specifically, his conception of substances.  Since, as we will see, it is the community 
(of multiple substances) that apparently grounds the hypothesis of an idea or 
conception (of a whole) and since, in addition, Kant explicates this community in 
terms of reciprocal interaction, the rational need for such a hypothesis must derive 
ultimately from his model of interaction and its operative substance concept.  As we 
will see, under the model of interaction what a substance is (or, at any rate, what it 
must be if it is to part of one common world) is determined by its interrelations with 
other substances.  And it must be this actual interdependency (one that could not have 
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been caused by any number finite substances themselves) that entitles reason to 
hypothesize God as the intentional ground of their interaction.   
The plan of the present chapter is as follows.  The common aim of the 
following sections is to examine various precritical texts bearing relevantly on Kant's 
response to Crusius with the intention of laying out his response in a general way.  
This will accomplish a number of things:  first, it will establish that the development 
of a larger explanatory framework is part of Kant's response and will, in addition, 
allow us to see how Kant uses; second, it will link reciprocal interaction to this larger 
explanatory framework; third, it will provide textual documentation for both of these 
linkages.  An initial examination of these precritical texts is therefore foundational to 
more detailed analyses both of the larger explanatory framework and of its subsidiary 
(the model of interaction), which are to be provided in subsequent chapters.   
 
4.1 Kant’s Attack On Crusius  
Kant appears to mention Crusius only infrequently, but it's clear that Crusius' 
work exerted considerable influence on much of Kant's precritical theorizing.173  
Crusius' influence can be seen in at least two of Kant's published precritical works, 
namely, New Elucidations (New Eluc) and Kant's Inaugural Dissertation (ID).  In 
transcripts of Kant's lectures on metaphysics, there are, in addition, various 
discussions concerning the conditions of worldhood.  Kant and Crusius formed a 
united front against those who (with Leibniz) would assert that a multitude of 
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monads, none of which are actually causally connected, constitutes a real world; they, 
by contrast, believed that in order for a multitude of entities to constitute a world, 
these entities must stand in some sort of "connection."   
Kant and Crusius appear to have differed, however, on the issue over how to 
this "connection" requirement (for worldhood) may be met.  According to Crusius the 
following inference is valid:   
There is a plurality of substances.__ 
 There is a community of substances. 
 
Crusius thinks that from the mere existence of multiple substances, concept-users can 
validly infer that these entities constitute a world.  Kant, however, does not agree.  By 
itself, the existence of multiple substances does not (says Kant) constitute a world-
whole (a "community") of substances.  What else is required?  As remarked, Kant's 
ID analysis of the concept of a world in general yields three conceptual components:  
parts (substances), form (relational structure), and absolute completeness.  Kant's 
disagreement with Crusius should, I suggest, be understood in light of this analysis.   
The issue over the logical correctness of Crusius' inference seems to turn in 
part on the differential in semantic content of the operative terms 'plurality' and 
'community'.  Clearly, for Kant the terms 'plurality' and 'community' are 
nonsynonymous terms.  The term 'community' sometimes appears in Kant's work to 
be used interchangeably with 'world-whole'; moreover, as we have seen, Kant 
affiliates 'community' with the concept of reciprocal interaction.  In this context, the 
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 And I do not mean to imply that the influence Crusius exerted Kant is restricted to Kant's 
pre-Critical works.  For a related discussion on the pre-Critical/critical barrier see section 1.2.    
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term 'community' is sometimes used to refer to a property (communality) that would 
only apply to multiple existing substances on the condition that they were in fact 
parts of a single causal structure.  By contrast, term 'plurality' is frequently used to 
refer to a (mathematizable) set of aggregated entities, one where none of the 
"members" has any "internal relation" to (thus no dependency on) any other member.   
In view of these semantic differences, it would appear that Crusius' inference 
purports to be both a priori and synthetic.  Crusius would appear to be asserting that 
the proposition 'multiple substances exist' analytically contains the proposition 
'multiple substances are connected (in community)'.  The implicit assumption in 
Crusius' inference appears to be this:  that the multiple substances whose existence is 
asserted are ones implicitly thought to exist (and be positioned in) one relational 
matrix, namely, space.  On this assumption, a "community" of substances appears to 
follow from the mere existence of a multiple substances because it is in one whole-
Space that these multiple entities exist.  Here's the inference made more explicit: 
There exists a plurality of substances  
(They all exist in one whole-Space) 
There exists a community of substances. 
 
On Kant's view Crusius thinks he can validly infer a community (of substances) from 
a mere plurality because the latter, first, assumes one absolute (and empty) whole-
Space and, second, he refers the plurality of existing entities to this domain.  The 
result is that it looks like the resulting community (of substances) is derived from the 
multiple existences of its members.   
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Under this account of Crusius' inference, he is not using 'existence' in an 
ontologically-neutral way but rather is using it more narrowly to mean 'existence-in-
one-space'.  On this reconstruction, Crusius seems to be taking the existence of space 
entirely for granted and, in addition, appears to conceptualize it as a sort of mind-
independent cosmic container.  But as we have seen (see 1.4) Kant does not think that 
space is mind-independent, nor does he think that space is explanatorily adequate to 
ground the connection among a plurality of substances.  Indeed, he thinks that space 
is a datum to be explained (explanandum), one that requires hypothesizing 
"intelligible form" (interaction) as a prior ground.  Maybe there is, however, another 
reconstruction under which Crusius inference would be valid.  If so, it appears that it 
would have to trade on a conception of space as an emergent matrix, one that is 
entirely contingent on the existence of its relata (= the multiple substances).   
Here there seem to be a sort of dilemma, both horns of which constitute 
violations of the principle of sufficient reason.  The first horn of this dilemma is this:  
Suppose that space is an order of non-intrinsic relations among a plurality of entities.  
Then conceptually it would be possible for these entities to exist independently of 
that relational structure.  In that case, having any connection to other entities would 
not appear to be essential to what these entities are.  From this we could infer that 
each is an independent stand-alone type of entity.  The issue (under this scenario) 
would therefore be why an order of relations would come into existence as part of the 
bargain of positing the existence of these multiple metaphysically independent 
entities.  There seems to be no explanation why a relational structure should burst 
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forth into existence along with these multiple entities.  Why should the existence of 
multiple (independent stand-alone) entities imply two items: a number of those 
entities plus something else, a matrix of relations?  Under the current scenario there 
would seem to be no answer, which is a violation of the principle of sufficient reason.   
Suppose (on the other hand) that hypothesizing these multiple entities does 
inferentially (= analytically) result in the desired package deal, viz., the multiple 
entities plus something else (= an order of relations).  Kant's point seems to be that 
this "something else" must have been implicitly entailed in the conceptualization of 
those same entities.  In that case, concept-users would not be explaining the 
connection of multiple substances by reference to their mere existences because the 
community-making feature would have already been contained in the operative 
conception of substance (one that implies that they are not independent stand-alone 
substances).  So if the inference follows merely from the existence of the multiple 
substances, that can only be because these entities already exist in some connection; 
in which case you don't succeed in explaining (noncircularly) the datum (=their 
connection) in terms of their multiple existences.   
Kant's explanatory model is intended as an alternative, one that would not be 
tautological if the connection among a plurality of substances could be referred to 
under two nonsynonymous descriptions, namely, one spatial the other causal.  As we 
have seen, Kant views space as an internal cognitive representation of an external 
order of relations; this external order of relations is referred to under the description 
of a (two-way) causal structure, one Kant describes as reciprocal interaction.  Kant 
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therefore explains the datum of space (a spatial order of relations) by reference to a 
second order of relations (a causal structure).  The first is subjective and ideal; the 
second is objective and real.  But, as we will see, membership in a causal structure 
imposes its own demands on its relata:  they cannot be metaphysically independent 
entities.  Moreover, in order for substances to be capable of in a reciprocal 
interaction, their individual causal powers must be coordinated and harmonized, a 
condition that Kant thinks can only be met by hypothesizing a prior determinant, 
namely, God.   
 
4.2 Kant’s Response To Crusius 
By a 'response to Crusius' I am referring to a more inclusive body of Kant's 
writing (of issues and concerns) than those that are concerned primarily with his 
negative attitude toward Crusius' inference (see prior section).  These include any 
constructive effort Kant makes to solve the problems both he and Crusius were 
concerned with, namely, with conceptualizing the conditions under which a real (as 
opposed to merely ideal) world is possible.  As remarked, Kant claims that in order 
for a plurality of existing substances to constitute a world, there must be some form (a 
relational structure) in which these entities can be connected.  For Kant, this 
relational structure is to be explicated in terms of reciprocal interaction.  In his earlier 
precritical work New Elucidations, Kant says:      
I think that I am the first to have established, by means of reasons which are 
in the highest degree certain, that the coexistence of the substances of the 
universe is not sufficient to establish a connection between them.  There is 
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required, in addition, a certain community of origin and, arising therefrom, an 
harmonious dependence.174   
 
Kant appears to argue for (what I have referred to as) a second order of explanation, 
one directed at explaining the world-constituting interaction among a plurality of 
substances.  Later, in ID, Kant says:    
If a plurality of substances is given, the principle of a possible interaction 
between them does not consist in their existence alone, but something else is 
required in addition, by means of which their reciprocal relations may be 
understood.  For they do not necessarily related to anything else simply in 
virtue of their subsistence, unless, perhaps, they relate to their cause.  But the 
relation of caused to cause is not interaction but dependence.  Therefore, if 
any interaction should occur between them and outer things, a special ground, 
which determines this interaction precisely, will be needed.175   
 
There is considerable cross-textual agreement on this issue.  Kant maintains 
essentially the same position in his lectures on metaphysics.  For example, in the 
Herder transcript, Kant's argument is distilled as follows:                            
To the connection <nexu> of the things in the whole belong not merely the 
existences of the things. -- It is always asked with this whether they constitute 
a whole <totum>, since each could exist alone.  If they are many and 
coexistent, then they do not immediately have community on that account.  
Thus for a connection something special, reciprocal interaction <mutua 
actio>, is still required.  For it is not possible for two substances without 
connection <nexu> to effect one another. -- For without connection <nexu> 
nothing that takes place in A can have a consequence in B.  Thus if a 
substance in its existence does not depend upon another:  then substances 
could exist without connection: when two substances effect each other: then A 
and B must necessarily depend upon C, otherwise nothing in existence could 
follow in B from A: but from that, that their existence depends upon a third: it 
does not yet follow that they must be in connection <in nexu>: their 
connection still requires a special ground: a special action still of the creator, 
since he connected them.  Thus, the state of diverse substances that each acts 
on and suffers from the others (interaction <commercium>) has a special 
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ground in God, who willed that they should depend on upon one another.176   
 
Because this text offers us a convenient (and somewhat less technical) access into 
Kant's argument, I'll start with it.  The aim is essentially to begin sketching a rough 
composite from various Kantian texts.  Each text provides a different angle on the 
argument Kant is giving, and it is illuminating to cross-examine them.  What is Kant's 
reasoning here?   
In order to constitute a world-whole, substances must stand in some sort of 
"connection."  Here (as elsewhere, for instance in ID) Kant explicates 'connection' in 
terms of reciprocal interaction, so that the additional requirement converting a mere 
aggregate of (otherwise metaphysically isolate) entities into a community (or whole) 
is reciprocal interaction.  But certain things must be true of substances in order to 
count as relata of a (two-way) causal structure.  In the case of interaction, substances 
must be mutually dependent on each other; moreover, they cannot exist 
independently of this connection.  Kant argues that, given substances are comembers 
of a relational structure (explicated in terms of reciprocal interaction), then some 
"third thing," is required:   
when two substances effect each other: then A and B must necessarily depend 
upon C, otherwise nothing in existence could follow in B from A. . . .177  
 
Kant says:  Some third thing (C) is the condition under which a multitude of 
substances stand in relations of reciprocal interaction.  Kant doesn't say why; yet he 
does seem to endorse the following inference:   
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Several substances stand in relations of reciprocal interaction. 
There exists some third thing (C) in virtue of which they do so.   
 
If we get a better grip on what this third thing, C, is we may be able to command a 
clearer view of why Kant thinks this inference goes through.  In this citation, there is 
no specification of what C is.  Kant moves directly onto yet another (and final) 
requirement.  It is this:  
but from that, that their existence depends upon a third: it does not yet follow 
that they must be in connection <in nexu>: their connection still requires a 
special ground: a special action still of the creator, since he connected them.178 
 
All we are told is that it the interaction is grounded on an intentional cause, God:   
Thus, the state of diverse substances that each acts on and suffers from the 
others (interaction <commercium>) has a special ground in God, who willed 
that they should depend on upon one another.179  
 
First and foremost we want to know why Kant thinks that from the fact that a 
plurality of substances stand in relations of reciprocal interaction concept-users can 
infer (or posit) "some third thing" as the condition under which substances can stand 
in causal relations of that sort.  And in order to know that, it could only help if we 
have a better grasp of what this third thing is.   
Then, in light of our specification of what this third thing (C) is, we could ask what it 
is about reciprocal interaction that requires concept-users to hypothesize this third 
thing.   
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4.3  "The Schema of the Divine Understanding"   
In New Elucidations, Kant presents his "Demonstration" for "The Principle of 
Coexistence."  It is cited in full in order to exhibit the similarity Kant's concerns:  
Demonstration.  Individual substances, of which none is the cause of the 
existence of the other, have a separate existence, that is to say, an existence 
which can be completely understood independently of all other substances.  If, 
therefore, the existence of some substance or other is posited simply, there is 
nothing inhering in it which proves the existence of other substances distinct 
from itself.  But since a relation is a relative determination, that is to say, a 
determination which cannot be understood in a being considered absolutely, it 
follows that a relation and its determining ground can neither of them be 
understood in terms of the existence of a substance, when that existence is 
posited in itself.  If, therefore, nothing further than this were admitted, no 
substance would stand in relation to any other substance, and there would be 
no interaction at all between substances.  Since, therefore, in so far as each 
individual substance has an existence which is independent of other 
substances, no reciprocal connection occurs between them; and since it 
certainly does not fall to finite beings to be the causes of other substances, and 
since, nonetheless, all the things in the universe are found to be reciprocally 
connected with each other -- since all of this is the case, it has to be admitted 
that this relation depends on a communality of cause, namely on God, the 
universal principle of beings.  But it does not follow from the fact that God 
simply established the existence of things that there is also a reciprocal 
relation between those things, unless the self-same scheme of the divine 
understanding, which gives existence, also established the relations to things 
to each other, by conceiving their existences as correlated with each other. It 
is more clearly apparent from this that the universal interaction of all things is 
to be ascribed to the concept alone of this divine idea.180   
 
This Kantian text is very dense, and there are number of things to be extracted from 
it.  It can be divided into two parts, a negative and a positive.  The negative aspect of 
the argument consists in Kant's giving reasons why a plurality of substances isn't 
logically equivalent, or, at any rate, isn't logically sufficient, to posit an 
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interconnection among them.  The positive aspect of the argument is what's needed in 
order to be justified in positing that connection.   
Notice that in spite of any differences in actual premises or in the formulation 
of those premises, this text is strikingly similar to the Herder transcript in a number of 
respects.  In both Kant argues that from the mere existence of a plurality of 
substances, you cannot infer that they are connected.  More is required.  And both 
texts agree on what that is.  Both agree, that is, on how that connection is to be 
explicated, namely, in terms of reciprocal interaction and, in addition, in how the 
connection among substances is to be explained.  Both texts agree on the fact that 
God must be posited as a "ground" on which that reciprocal interaction is possible.  
But the New Elucidation text (and not in the Herder transcript) explicitly introduces 
something else:  "the universal interaction of all things is to be ascribed to the concept 
alone of this divine idea."   
The schema of the divine understanding, the origin of existences, is an 
enduring act (it is called preservation); and in that act, if any substances are 
conceived by God as existing in isolation and without any relational 
determinations, no connection between them and no reciprocal relation would 
come into being.  If, however, they are conceived as related in God's 
intelligence, their determinations would subsequently, in conformity with this 
idea, always relate to each other for as long as they continued to exist.181   
 
I submit that we have an answer to the first question of the preceding section, namely, 
what Kant means when he says some "third thing", C, is required in order for 
substances to stand in relations of reciprocal interaction.  It is the divine idea or 
schema.  In this context, the "divine schema" or "idea" is being hypothesized to 
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account for the plurality of substances that stand in relations of interaction.  But what 
is the idea an idea of?  In the present citation, Kant does not explicitly state that the 
divine idea is the idea of a whole.  Elsewhere, I present good textual evidence for the 
claim that Kant explicates (if not defines) the concept of a whole using the concept of 
reciprocal interaction.  (See 5.2)  Now we have additional textual evidence that we 
can use to triangulate on what Kant thinks the divine idea is an idea of:  it is the idea 
of a whole, one that is supposed to explain why a multitude of substances stand in 
relations of reciprocal interaction.   
 
4.4 Ontological Independence Or Embeddedness In Causal Structure (But Not 
Both)  
 
Kant's attack on Crusius' inference (below) seems to consist in showing that 
Crusius illicitly switches from one conception of substance to another (to one that is 
incompatible with the first) in order to make the inference from (1) to (2).  The 
switch, as I understand it, is from a conception of substance, where they are entirely 
independent stand-alone entities (which are united in space) to one where there are 
metaphysically interdependent entities, to such an extent that they owe their very 
identities to their relations with other substances.  The relation of metaphysical 
interdependence among a plurality of substance is conceptualized as a composition 
relation, one where the substances are reciprocally related as parts of one common 
whole (a "world-whole").      
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To begin with, I return to what I will refer to as the "negative" aspect of the 
New Elucidation's "Demonstration."  The first part argues the negative thesis that 
essentially denies this inference  
 (1) There exists a plurality of substances. 
 (2) There exists a community of substances. 
 
As observed, Kant denies that this inference is valid.  And in the New Eluc text, he 
appears to argue on grounds that go something like this:  If a substance can be 
completely understood independently of any other substance, that is without cognitive 
or semantic reference to any other existing entity, then positing a plurality of these 
stand-alone substances is equivalent to positing a plurality of independent stand-alone 
substances.  That is, if concept-users can understand, can conceptually grasp what the 
substance is, without reference to any other substance -- if what the substances is, its 
identity, does not depend on its having any relations to other substances -- then 
positing a plurality of these entities does not imply or entail that they stand in any 
connection.  So long as the conceptualization of a substance is that of an independent 
substance that does not depend on reference to any other to be "completely 
understood" as the substance it is, concept-users can multiply instantiate this concept 
until the cows come home and never end up with anything logically equivalent to a 
"community" or "world-whole;" because a world (according to Kant and Crusius) 
requires actual interconnection among substances.  But for that to be the case, I will 
offer an interpretation according to which Kant thinks that we have to alter our 
conceptualization of what a substance is and rethink the conditions of substancehood.   
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Further textual evidence for this interpretation on Kant's negative argument 
can be found within New Elucidations, where Kant provides his own gloss on the 
"Demonstration:" 
For, to repeat briefly the main line of demonstration:  If substance A exists, 
and if, in addition, B exists, then this latter can be considered as positing 
nothing in A.  For suppose that it contained in the ground of a determination 
C.  Since this is a kind of relative predicate and hence not intelligible unless A 
is present, in addition to B, it follows that substance B will, in virtue of those 
factors which are the reason of του C, presuppose the existence of substance 
A.  But since, if substance B existed alone, its existence would leave it 
completely indeterminate whether a certain substance A would have to exist 
or not, it will be impossible to understand from the existence of B alone that it 
posits anything in other substances distinct from itself.  Hence there is no 
relation and no interaction at all.182 
   
Kant appears to move from an epistemic situation -- i.e., our not being able to 
determine from substance B alone whether there are other existing substances -- to 
the metaphysical conclusion that "there is no relation or interaction at all."  For the 
moment, let us put this concern aside.  Instead I want to draw attention to Kant's 
emphasis on whether a substance be can be "completely understood" or "considered" 
as existing without any semantic or conceptual reference to another substance.  And 
Kant's answer seems to be that, if B is a substance of a sort that to understand what it 
is does not demand concept-users to posit another substance A, then it must be 
because B has no "relative predicates," in which case B can be understood as 
possessing an entirely independent stand-alone existence.  But if substance B has no 
relative predicates, how could it be thought of as connected to other substances?  
Would substance B be a substance of a sort that was capable of standing in relations 
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of reciprocal interaction?  If we read Kant as answering 'no' to this capability 
question, it would help to illuminate why he concludes:  "[h]ence there is no relation 
and no interaction at all."   
I think the argument being made goes something like this:  If we posit a 
plurality of substances under a conceptualization of substance according to which 
each is an independent stand-alone entity, one that can be "completely understood" 
without semantic or cognitive reference to another substance, then not only would 
there not be any relational structure connecting these substances as part of the bargain 
of positing them; there couldn't be any relational structure connecting the members of 
this plurality.  Since if a relational structure were included as part of the bargain of 
positing the mere existence of a plurality of substances, that would only show that the 
members of that plurality could not exist (or so much as be the substances they are) 
independently of that relational structure.  In that case, however, they could not be 
independent stand-alone substances.  So, one of Kant's points here seems to be that to 
think (1) implies (2) involves illicitly switching from a conceptualization of 
substances as independent stand-alone entities to one where they are not so 
independent.   
 
4.5 Semantic/Conceptual Dependency Among the World's Substance-Parts 
There is another interesting implication here.  As observed Kant seems to 
think that it is a mark of a substance's independence stand-alone status that it can be 
"completely understood" without semantic or cognitive reference to other substances.  
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So if concept-users want to think of a plurality of substances as members connected 
in a relational structure (as demanded the datum of sensory experience), the condition 
under which they may do so is to strip the members of that plurality of their 
ontological independence.  But in order do that they are required to switch from a 
conceptualization of substance under which a substance can be completely 
understood without presupposing the existence of any other substance to one under 
which individual substances do not enjoy that degree of semantic or conceptual 
independence from other substances.   
Later in ID Kant reiterates his earlier attack on Crusius' inference from a 
plurality of existent substances to the existence of a community of substances, except 
in ID Kant appears to argue the point in more semantic terms.  When concept-users 
assert the existence of a plurality of substances their assertion semantically unpacks 
(or rather refracts) into a plurality of singular propositions each one asserting the 
separate existence of a single independent stand-alone substance.  Repeatedly assert 
the existence of a single (but different) stand-alone substance as many times as you 
like: there is no implication that the singular referents thereby accumulated -- the 
independent stand-alone substances whose existences you have successively asserted 
-- stand in any relation at all, not one at any rate that would logically prevent us from 
thinking of the members of that plurality as so many (single resident) worlds.   
For by taking several things together, you achieve without difficulty a whole 
of representation but you do not, in virtue of that, arrive at the representation 
of a whole.  Accordingly, if there happened to be certain wholes consisting of 
substances, and if these wholes were not bound to one another by any 
connection, the bringing of these wholes together, a process by means of 
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which the mind forces the multiplicity into an ideal unity, would signify 
nothing more than a plurality of worlds held together in a single thought.183  
 
The basic idea here seems to be this:  Suppose a plurality of substances enjoyed an 
"ideal unity" in one mind, that they all existed in a single intentional consciousness.  
Or, to be more precise, suppose that there was one mind (God's, say) in which there 
existed a plurality of representational contents, each of which intentionally targeted 
an independent stand-alone substance.  Would a plurality of these singular 
representations count as the representation of a whole just by virtue of the fact that 
each is a representational content belonging to the same mind?  Kant's says no.  All 
you would have, says Kant, is a whole lot of singular representations united in one 
mind and that the things they are representations of -- the represented substances -- 
cannot be thought as standing in any metaphysical connection just because each is 
being represented in and by the same mind.   
I take Kant's point here to be semantic or conceptual, not epistemic.  The issue 
here isn't over whether a mind can trust its internal representational processes as a 
basis on which to make cognitive judgments about what a mind-independent reality is 
like.  No, the issue is over what it takes for a representational content to count as an 
intentional content directed at a whole (as opposed to a mere aggregate of 
unconnected entities).  Kant is making a conceptual clarification here.  If an 
exhaustive inventory of God's mind were undertaken and yielded only a whole lot of 
singular representations whose semantic referents were independent stand-alone 
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substances, you would not find in that mind any content-bearing state whose 
intentional object is that of a whole made up of those substances.   
The implication of the above ID text seems to be that in order to get a 
representational content to be the representation of a whole, the mind in question 
would have to cognitively refer to a plurality of substances in the right sort of way, 
one where the individual members were thought under a description in which they 
were already conceptualized as parts of a common whole.  But this demands that 
concept-users have a cognition (or, at any rate, an operative conception) of the real 
whole first, as a condition of cognizing its substance-parts.  In that case, concept-
users would have to assert the existence of a real whole and then subsequently make 
an inference to the existence of the substance-parts.  But, again, if the relational 
structure is part of the bargain of asserting the mere existence of a plurality of 
substances, that only shows they cannot be substances of the sort that they are 
independently of that relational structure.   
Kant seems to be saying that in order to conceptualize an entity as an 
independent stand-alone substance, concept-users must think of that entity as having 
no relative predicates, none, at any rate, that would require them to posit the existence 
of another substance, or that would matter to the substance's being what it essentially 
is.  Two issues arise here:  First, whether Kant thinks that were a substance to be 
conceptualized as a member of a reciprocal causal structure, whether this would this 
require the entity to have relative predicates (answer is obviously yes) and, second, 
whether these relative predicates (ones a substance derives from its membership in a 
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causal structure) would make a significant conceptual contribution to what a 
substance fundamentally is (answer also seems to be yes, but less obviously so).  (A 
detailed analysis of these issues comes later.)   
Without intended to Kant has, in effect, indirectly explicated his concept of 
reciprocal interaction.  Membership in a reciprocal causal structure appears to require 
that the relata forfeit their ontological independence.  (As we will see shortly, Kant 
makes this more explicit in the Vigilantius transcript.)  If the members of the plurality 
are required to forfeit their status as ontologically independent stand-alone substances 
in order to be comembers of a single relational structure (thereby constituting one 
world-whole), then this would tell us something about what the relational structure 
must be like.  It would imply that the relational structure, one, at any rate, able to 
constitute a world, imposes conceptual demands on the entities that are to be parts of 
it.   
 
4.6 Larger Architectonic Issues:  Natural Organisms As Models of Relational 
Structure      
 
It is interesting to point out that later, in a first critique context (specifically, in 
the Clue, Schematism, and the Third Analogy), the concept of reciprocal interaction 
is listed among "the categories of the understanding." There, however, the concept of 
reciprocal interaction is referred to under a different name, viz., "the category of 
community" (CAT 3.3).  The mere fact that the concept of reciprocal interaction is, in 
a first critique context, elevated to the status of a (pure/schematized) category of the 
understanding indicates that Kant intends it to be part of his account of the a priori 
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conditions under which cognition is possible.  It's inclusion among the a priori 
categorial concepts of the understanding therefore constitutes (at the very least) prima 
facie evidence for the suggestion that the role Kant intends for the concept of 
reciprocal interaction is a cognitive one.   
One key issue that arises here is whether the model of interaction (as I 
reconstruct it) is conceptually encoded in the first critique's category of community 
and, if so, whether that model can be used to illuminate the philosophical point of the 
Third Analogy.  Supposing the model of interaction to be encoded in the category of 
community, another issue is over whether there are any empirical objects (= 
phenomenal contents) able to meet its conceptual requirements.       
If it turns out that for something to be a substance at all it must stand in 
relations of reciprocal interaction and if, in addition, comembership in relational 
structure of this sort required that the causal efficacy of its members were 
metaphysically interdependent, then it would do a good deal toward explaining why 
natural organisms come to predominate in the third critique (and later in the Opus 
Postumum) as a "special class" of natural product.  Natural organisms are material 
wholes of a special sort: on the one hand each is a composite entity, whose 
ontological status is, like every material composite, dependent on the prior existence 
of its parts; on the other hand, each whole-organism is a singular individual, made up 
of substance-parts whose individual causal powers and functioning cannot be 
determined except by reference to the other parts and to the specific whole-organism 
(of which they are parts).  Natural organisms have uniquely systematic material 
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infrastructures, ones in which these norm-governed parts are functionally 
interdependent.  This would appear to make them especially amenable to the concept 
of reciprocal interaction.    
Indeed it may be that natural organisms are (in Kant's mind, anyway) entities 
of a unique sort, ones uniquely capable of meeting the requirements imposed by a 
relational structure that is explicated in terms of reciprocal interaction.  If that's true, 
there may be an illuminating angle to take on why (in the third critique, for example) 
natural organisms do in fact possess such significance for Kant.  We may be able to 
view the significance these phenomena have for Kant as a cognitive one.  Suppose 
that natural organisms constitute a unique class of entities such that each member of 
this class is an individual whole-organism whose internal composition is capable of 
modeling (in empirical-phenomenal reality) the very same relational structure Kant 
uses to conceptualize a world-whole, namely, one explicated in terms of reciprocal 
interaction.184  Every object would (under this hypothesis) have to be a structural 
complex (to some extent); every intuited185 (ever substance) would therefore be a 
singular individual yet also a composite entity.  Being a singular individual would 
consist in modeling a particular sort of structural complex, one that is to be explicated 
as a plurality of entities whose interrelations are conceptualized under the model of 
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interaction.  Individual objects (substances) would therefore be required to model in 
propria persona the type of causal structure described by that model.   
On this assumption, one dimension of Kant's interest in natural organisms (in 
the Opus and particularly in the third critique) could therefore be seen to derive from 
the fact that these phenomena succeed (in his mind, at any rate) in empirically 
instantiating the concept of reciprocal interaction.  Under this assumption, Kant's 
interest in natural organisms would therefore be due to a perceived discursive link 
between a concept (=that of reciprocal interaction) and a set of empirical objects 
(=organisms), such that the link between the two is seen as the relation of universal to 
the particular (concept and instance).  Under the (plausible) assumption that the 
model of interaction is conceptually encoded in the category of community, the 
significance attaching to the class of natural organisms would therefore be a cognitive 
one, because members of this class would uniquely represent cases where the concept 
of reciprocal interaction (= the category of community) had succeeded in being 
empirically applied.   
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Chapter Five 
KANT'S PHYSICOTELEOLOGY:  AN EXPLANATORY MODEL 
 
5.0 The Forfeiture of a Substance's Ontological Independence  
Does membership in the world's relational structure (in Kant's mind, anyway) 
require the forfeiture of substance's status as an independent stand-alone substance?  
The conceptual advantage of this forfeiture would appear to be that it logically frees 
substances up to be conceptualized as integral parts of a common whole.  Once 
substances are conceptually stripped of their ontological independence they can 
thereby be imputed with "natures" that are functionally interdependent.  According to 
Kant it is in the general nature of a substance to be an active sort of entity, the 
possessor of causal powers.  The forfeiture of a substance's ontological independence 
would therefore imply that the exercise of its own causal powers is functionally 
dependent on the basic structure and causal powers of other substances.   
The aim of the present chapter is to examine textual evidence in order to 
determine, first, whether Kant thinks substances do indeed have to forfeit their 
ontological independence in order to be parts of one world-whole (the answer seems 
to be yes) and, second, to determine whether his reasons for thinking this can be 
plausibly linked to the concept of reciprocal interaction (the answer also seems to be 
yes).  As we will see shortly, Kant's remarks about the ontological status of 
"necessary substances" occur within a larger context in which the aim is to develop 
an explanatory framework, one in which the datum (= the empirical representation of 
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space) is to be explained by, first, hypothesizing a community of substances (all of 
whom stand in relations of reciprocal interaction) and, second, by hypothesizing an 
ultimate ground for their interaction.  The aim now is to show how each of these 
hypotheses is linked to Kant's physicoteleology.   
 
5.1 Why Is The Forfeiture of a Substance's Ontological Independence 
Necessary?   
 
In ID the issue concerning a substance's ontological status is introduced as an 
issue over whether substances, either necessary or contingent, can be parts of a 
whole.  Kant says necessary substances cannot be parts of a whole; so they cannot 
stand in composition relations with other substances.     
A whole consisting of necessary substances is impossible.  For the existence 
of each substance is fully established without appealing to any dependence on 
anything else whatsoever, for such dependence does not belong to necessary 
things at all.  And, thus, it is clear that not only does the interaction of 
substances (that is to say, the reciprocal dependence of their states) not follow 
from their existence, it cannot belong to them as necessary substances at all.186   
 
In the Vigilantius transcript of Kant's lectures on metaphysics, this issue comes up 
again, but the larger explanatory context in which the issue arises is made more 
explicit.  Kant states:  
The substances in the world must have a reciprocal influence on each other, 
i.e., stand in real connection <in nexu reali>, which can take place only 
through a reciprocal action on each other.  This real connection through 
interaction <nexu realis per commercium> would not be possible to assume 
among the things if one thinks them though the understanding as existing in 
themselves.  The substances would exist each for themselves without any 
relation and connection among one another.  Therefore a real whole <totum 
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reale> of necessary substances cannot be thought at all.  For then none is 
dependent on another with respect to its being, each exists for itself because 
each has its necessary adequate ground of its existence in itself:  many 
necessary substances would thus have no connection among themselves, each 
can be only a world for itself and the basic cause of a world, but it could not 
stand in the slightest connection with another world and the things in it, e.g., 
many gods.  All such substances would thus be unconditioned and determined 
by themselves, but each isolated by its absolute necessity.  Since accordingly 
their connection among themselves cannot be assumed directly, and without 
hindering their necessity, then one can do nothing else, in order to think this, 
than to derive their existence from a general communal primordial source, 
which is the general power for the general effecting of all things.  But through 
this the latter become dependent on it, and contingent in themselves, they are 
connected with each other by this general cause, and therefore there arise a 
reciprocal connection and community with each other through the communal 
cause, since an action of a united being was necessary in order to produce 
them all, and in this manner the real connection <nexus realis> arises.187   
 
In both the ID text and the Vigilantius transcript Kant makes it clear that there 
couldn't be a whole (or "community") composed of necessary substances because if 
they are indeed necessary, they "could not stand in the slightest connection with 
another world and the things in it."  Notice that in the Vigilantius transcript Kant says 
that necessary substances cannot even be thought of as parts of a single whole.  To 
think of a plurality of substances as standing in 'connection' (explicated as reciprocal 
interaction) with other substances logically negates its status as a necessary 
substance.    
For then none is dependent on another with respect to its being, each exists for 
itself because each has its necessary adequate ground of its existence in itself:  
many necessary substances would thus have no connection among 
themselves, each can be only a world for itself and the basic cause of a world, 
but it could not stand in the slightest connection with another world and the 
things in it, e.g., many gods.  All such substances would thus be 
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unconditioned and determined by themselves, but each isolated by its absolute 
necessity.188   
 
Kant's reasoning is that a condition of being a member of a community of substances 
is for one member to be causally dependent on another; however, no necessary 
substance could be so dependent; therefore, only contingent substance could qualify 
as members of a reciprocal causal structure.  The basic idea here is that were any 
substance to be embedded in a causal structure of any sort (whether reciprocal or 
not), it would undergo a self-reduction; it would lose its godlike status because it 
would be causally dependent on other substances.   
Later in ID Kant comes to much the same conclusion:   
Accordingly, a whole consisting of substances is a whole which consists of 
contingent beings, and the world, in its own essence, is composed of mere 
contingent beings.  Furthermore, no necessary substance is connected with the 
world unless it is connected with it in the way in which a cause is connected 
with what is caused.  It is, accordingly, not connected with the world in the 
way in which a part is connected with its complementary parts to form a 
whole (for the connection of constituent parts is one of reciprocal dependence, 
and such dependence does not belong to a necessary being).  Therefore, the 
cause of the world is a being which exists outside the world, and thus it is not 
the soul of the world; its presence in the world is not local but virtual.189 
 
This text (in conjunction with the others) suggests that the transition from "necessary" 
to "contingent" substance is a metaphysical transition that requires the participating 
substance to forfeit its status as an independent stand-alone substance.  This is 
because a substance's "absolute necessity" appears to be purchased at the price of  
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causal isolation. Alternately metaphysical involvement with other substances –
coresidence in a single world-whole—appears to mean causal interaction (of a sort 
that is reciprocal).  But why, exactly, does this involvement cost the prospective 
independent substance its ontological independence?  
Here one might well ask whether there is some implicit assumption about 
what all is involved in a substance's being causally dependent on other substances.  
From the citation under current analysis, causal dependence appears to entail a kind 
of ontological dependence.  But from this citation, however, it isn't clear how a 
substance loses its ontological independence by being causally dependent on other 
substances.  Couldn't a substance have certain 'accidents' or (in more Kantian 
language) "determinations" by virtue of its standing in certain causal relations with 
other substances yet not owe its very existence to the fact that it stands in those causal 
relations?  For instance, I owe the fact that I am word-processing to the left of student 
so-and-so by virtue of so-and-so's existence; or, that my hair currently has a reddish 
tint to it because I'm sitting next to a bright lava-lamp could not be an accident 
inhering in me (considered as a substance) were it not for a certain causal relation 
obtaining between me and the lamp; but I can (at any time) terminate my causal 
connection to the lamp and go my separate way through the world independently of 
this connection.  So, we need further argument about why embeddedness in a 
reciprocal causal structure entails the negation of a substance's ontological 
independence.   
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To that end, notice (in ID §19) that when Kant denies "necessary" substances 
can stand in any connection with other substances, the sort of connection being 
denied to a necessary substance is explicated as "the way in which a part is connected 
with its complementary parts to form a whole" and, second, that this specifically 
mereological spin on 'connection' is further explicated in terms of "reciprocal 
dependence."  Kant is conceptualizing the relational structure in which a multitude of 
individual substances are 'connected' (to form a whole) in terms of part/part relations 
and by doing so he implies that composition relations are a sort of causal relation.  
(Later, in the first critique's Third Analogy Kant also conceptualizes composition 
relations explicitly in terms of reciprocal interaction.)  Suppose that composition 
relations are ultimately conceptualized on the model of a reciprocal interaction and, 
in addition, that the only eligible relata are substances defined as the possessors and 
exercisers of causal powers.  What we think something is depends a lot on what we 
think it can do, what its causal powers are.  Kant's concept of reciprocal interaction is 
such that, as relata in a reciprocal causal structure, substances are causally 
interdependent by virtue of the fact that their causal powers are made (engineered, 
designed) to coordinate and harmonize with the causal powers of other substances; 
consequently, these substances could not be the substances they are (i.e., possess the 
causal powers they do) independently of their embeddedness in that causal structure; 
which is to say that they could not be the substances they are independently of the 
whole of which they are parts.   
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5.2 The Forfeiture of Substance's Ontological Independence Occurs In 
Explanatory Context     
 
Why should it follow from the fact that a plurality of (contingent) substances 
stand in relations of reciprocal interaction that they jointly constitute a single whole?  
This is an important issue that will be raised shortly.  My present aim is to draw 
attention to the larger context in which the issue under discussion occurs.  As 
suggested both the Vigilantius transcript and in the ID text Kant views the issue over 
how a substance's metaphysical embeddedness in a relational structure affects its 
ontological status as one that occurs in a larger explanatory context:  
Since accordingly their connection among themselves cannot be assumed 
directly, and without hindering their necessity, then one can do nothing else, 
in order to think this, than to derive their existence from a general communal 
primordial source, which is the general power for the general effecting of all 
things. But through this the latter become dependent on it, and contingent in 
themselves, they are connected with each other by this general cause, and 
therefore there arise a reciprocal connection and community with each other 
through the communal cause, since an action of a united being was necessary 
in order to produce them all, and in this manner the real connection <nexus 
realis> arises.190   
 
Compare this text with what Kant says in ID:  
The substances which constitute the world are beings which derive from 
another being, though not from a number of different beings; they all derive 
from one being.  For suppose that they are caused by a number of necessary 
beings; the effects, of which the causes are free from any reciprocal relation, 
would not be in interaction.  Therefore, the UNITY in the conjunction of 
substances in the universe is a corollary of the dependence of all substances 
on one being.  Hence, the form of the universe is testimony to the cause of its 
matter, and only the unique cause of all things taken together is the cause of 
its entirety, and there is no architect of the world who is not also, at the same 
time, its Creator.191   
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We can, I suggest, compare these two texts in a number of ways but we are interested 
in explanatory considerations.  For example, we can ask for specifications of the 
explicanda and the explanans.  It's clear that the type of explanation is intentional 
(i.e., teleological).  Both texts suggest that in order to account for a given Datum 
(which is yet to be clearly specified) some "communal cause" or "one being" is 
required.  The explicandum (or Datum) appears to be a plurality of substances 
standing in "reciprocal connection."  In the Vigilantius transcript, Kant says that a 
plurality of (contingent) substances "are connected with each other by this general 
cause, and therefore there arise a reciprocal connection and community with each 
other through this communal cause."   
In the ID text, Kant argues that "substances which constitute the world are 
beings which derive from another being, though not from a number of different 
beings; they all derive from one being." In support of Kant reasons: 
[f]or suppose that they are caused by a number of necessary beings; the 
effects, of which the causes are free from any reciprocal relation, would not 
be in interaction.  Therefore, the UNITY in the conjunction of substances in 
the universe is a corollary of the dependence of substances on one being.192   
 
Here the explanandum appears to be characterized as a plurality of substances in 
"interaction" and, in addition, used as the datum on which to assert the existence of a 
unique cause of that datum, that "only the unique cause of all things taken together is 
the cause of its entirety."  On this view, Kant's use of 'entirety' (cited in the previous 
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sentence) seems to refer to a totality of substances under a description in which they 
are connected (as opposed to a plurality of independent stand-alone substances).   
Elsewhere in ID, Kant is somewhat more explicit about what he is targeting 
for explanation:  
Accordingly, the following question, which can only be solved by the 
understanding, remains untouched, namely:  what is the principle upon which 
this relation of all substances itself rests, and which, when seen intuitively, is 
called space?  The hinge, then, upon which the question about the principle of 
the form of the intelligible world turns in this:  to explain how it is possible 
that a plurality of substances should be in mutual interaction with each other, 
and in this way belong to the same whole, which is called a world.  We are 
not here contemplating the world in respect of its matter, that is to say, in 
respect of the natures of the substances of which it consists, whether they are 
material or immaterial.  We are contemplating the world in respect of its form, 
that is to say, in respect of how, in general, a connection between a plurality 
of substances comes to be, and how a totality between them is brought 
about.193   
 
In ID Kant distinguishes three essential conceptual components of the concept of a 
world: matter, form and entirety.  The "matter" of a world constitutes its parts, which 
are identified as substances; the "form" of a world is twofold, one specified as 
"sensible" (under which Kant subsumes both space and time) while the other is 
characterized as "intelligible" (which Kant appears to specify as reciprocal 
interaction); the entirety (or totality) condition is the condition that expresses the idea 
that a world is all-inclusive and not a part of something else larger than itself.  This 
text actually requires some important interpretative nuancing that cannot be usefully 
given until later.194  Suffice to say here that it is the world's "form" (as against its 
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intelligible form represent two ways of cognizing the same set of objects or entities; or whether each of 
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matter) that Kant targets as the datum to be explained and that, moreover, he appears 
to include the "intelligible form"—reciprocal interaction—as part of that datum:   
to explain how it is possible that a plurality of substances should be in mutual 
interaction with each other, and in that way belong to the same whole, which 
is called a world.195      
 
The explanation given in ID for the datum of reciprocal interaction among substances 
is strikingly similar to the one already given in New Eluc's "Demonstration:" 
If, therefore, nothing further than this were admitted, no substance would 
stand in relation to any other substance, and there would be no interaction at 
all between substances.  Since, therefore, in so far as each individual 
substance has an existence which is independent of other substances, no 
reciprocal connection occurs between them; and since it certainly does not fall 
to finite beings to be the causes of other substances, and since, nonetheless, all 
the things in the universe are found to be reciprocally connected with each 
other -- since all of this is the case, it has to be admitted that this relation 
depends on a communality of cause, namely on God, the universal principle 
of beings.196   
 
In both the ID and the New Eluc texts Kant appears to be arguing something like a 
reductio:  Since it is an empirical fact (one disclosed to us via perceptual intentional 
awareness) that there is only one world (in which everything is causally interactive)  
                                                                                                                                                                     
the two types of form corresponds to different sets of entities.  The first "epistemological" reading is 
advocated by Michelle Grier, the "ontological" reading by Paul Guyer.  I agree with Grier.  Under the 
epistemological reading, (which is my view)  the intelligible form (specified as reciprocal interaction) 
can be conceptualized as the underwriting ground for the representation of space.  The basic idea is 
that space (conceptualized as a subjective representational medium) is a sort of phenomenological 
counterpart to (or expression of) certain other structures (causal interaction) that can only be 
represented discursively (with the intellect, or understanding).  (Later Kant contrasts these two ways of 
knowing as intuitive and the discursive.)  Under my view, what is referred in ID to as  "intelligible 
form" (reciprocal interaction) is in the first critique given the status of a pure (and also schematized) 
category of the understanding, specifically, the relational category of community and is, in addition, 
used in the Third Analogy, where (again) it is affiliated with space (i.e., cognitions of simultaneity).     
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we can infer to the existence of a single (communal, unique) cause of this datum.  For 
if there were a plurality of causes—a plurality of Creators, say—then (huh-oh) there 
would be (contrary to fact) a bunch of separate and unconnected worlds, not just one 
world in which a totality of substances stand in relations of reciprocal interaction.  
And this brings us now to Kant's specification of the explanans.  In the Vigilantius 
transcript there is not much description of what the "communal cause" is, further than 
specifying its explanatory role.  However, when Kant says that "a united being was 
necessary in order to produce them all, and in this manner the real connection <nexus 
realis> arises," he suggests that the "communal cause" is capable of intentional 
action.  In the ID text Kant refers to this "one being" (which I take to be 
coextensional if not synonymous with his "communal cause") under the dual 
description of "architect" and "creator;" which is, in effect, to refer to the "general 
primordial source" as both an efficient and a final cause.   
In New Eluc Kant provides an additional specification of the unique cause of 
the world's unity as a "divine idea" or "schema of the divine understanding."  The 
multitude of the world's substances form a single unified world-whole by virtue of the 
fact that "they are conceived as related in God's intelligence" in accordance with 
some idea.    
The schema of the divine understanding, the origin of existences, is an 
enduring act (it is called preservation); and in that act, if any substances are 
conceived by God as existing in isolation and without any relational 
determinations, no connection between them and no reciprocal relation would 
come into being.  If, however, they are conceived as related in God's 
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intelligence, their determinations would subsequently, in conformity with this 
idea, always relate to each other for as long as they continued to exist.197   
 
Above it was suggested that, since Kant defines (or at any rate explicates) the 
ontological concept of a whole in terms of reciprocal interaction, we have indirect 
textual support for the specification of the "divine idea's" intensional content as the 
idea of a whole.  In the present context this interpretation derives more plausibility 
for two reasons: first, because Kant's Model is one in which the datum is to be 
explained in terms that are intentional and, second, because it is a structural feature of 
an explanatory model of this type to acknowledge that the datum owes its existence 
(and observed unity) to the prior activity of a rational agent (in the present case, 
God), one who is capable of producing effects under the guidance of some idea or 
conception of the effect to be produced.  Suppose that the acknowledged datum is an 
object of type F.  According to the Model, in order to account for the existence of the 
datum by reference to an intentional agent's productive activity, you would naturally 
suppose that the concept that had guided the agent causally responsible for the datum 
was the concept of F.  After all, it is the existence of an F, or Fs, that we intend to 
explain as the effect of the agent's concept-guided activity.  So since the effect to be 
produced is a whole (indeed a world-whole) and since Kant defines (or, at any rate, 
explicates) the ontological concept of a whole in terms of reciprocal interaction, you 
would naturally suppose that the agent whose concept-guided production is causally 
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responsible for the datum (= a whole) to be one who had been guided by the concept 
of a whole.   
 
5.3 Kant’s Explanatory Model:  Dual Directions of Inference  
Within the teleological explanatory framework in which it is hypothesized, it 
is clear Kant views the "divine schema" as a content-bearing entity.  However, the 
issue over how precisely to explicate its representational content within Kant's Model 
is not my present concern.  It is an important issue that will be raised later.  My 
present aim is to draw attention to two directions of inference within the explanatory 
framework under discussion.  In the citations just discussed it's clear Kant infers from 
the acknowledged datum (described as interaction among substances) to the existence 
of a single (communal, unique) cause of that datum.  We have specified this cause as 
an agent-guiding idea or conception.  But there appears to be another direction of 
inference occurring within the same explanatory framework, one that proceeds from 
the explanans (the divine idea or conception) to the datum.  Whereas in the texts 
previously analyzed the dual direction of inference is largely implicit (or at any rate 
overshadowed by Kant's emphasis on the inference to a unique cause), both directions 
of inference are given explicit acknowledgement in ID:  
Granted that the inference from a given world to the unique cause of all its 
parts is valid, then, if conversely, the argument proceeded in the same way 
from a given cause, which was common to all the parts, to the connection 
between them and, thus, to the form of the world (although I confess that this 
conclusion does not seem as clear to me), then the fundamental connection of 
substances would not be contingent but necessary, for all the substances are 
sustained by a common principle.  The harmony arising from their very 
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arise in accordance with common rules. ... Thus, if as a result of all substances 
being sustained by one being, the conjunction of all substances, in virtue of 
which they form a unity, were necessary, then there would be a universal 
interaction of substances by means of physical influence, and the world would 
be a real whole.198   
 
There are a number of important observations to be made in regard to this text.  First, 
it's evident that there are two directions of inference, one from the acknowledged 
datum to the cause (or ground) posited for it and, alternately, a second inference 
proceeding from the posited cause back to the datum.  (Notice also that Kant 
problematizes the second direction of inference in his parenthetical remark.  We will 
return to this later.)  I submit that these dual directions of inference are intended work 
in tandem within a single explanatory framework. (The dual directions of inference 
are represented in the diagram below.)   
Diagram (Kant's Intentional Explanatory Model):                  
                                                     (B)  
                          Inference to necessarily unified whole O       
                     ______________________________________ 
                    |                                                                            | 
                    |                                                                           \|/        
    O's Ideal Counterpart                                                      Datum O = A plurality of substances  
                   /|\                                                                           |    embedded in a relational     
                    |______________________________________|    structure  
 
                Hypothesis of a prior idea or conception of a whole 
 
                                                     (A) 
 
                                                          
198
 ID, §22, ID underscoring added 
 174 
That Kant thinks the two directions of inference work together in one explanatory 
framework is evident from the argument he gives in the text above:   
Reconstruction of ID §22: 
1)  If the conjunction of substances were necessary, then "there would be a universal 
interaction of substances by means of physical influence and the world would be a 
real whole."   
2)  The conjunction of all substances would be necessary under the hypothesis that 
they were all "sustained by a common principle."   
3) If the two directions of inference are both valid, then all the substances would be 
sustained by a common principle, in which case "the fundamental connection of 
substances would not be contingent but necessary ...".  As Kant states:   
Granted that the inference from a given world to the unique cause of all its 
parts is valid, then, if conversely, the argument proceeded in the same way 
from a given cause, which was common to all the parts, to the connection 
between them and, thus, to the form of the world (although I confess that this 
conclusion does not seem as clear to me), then the fundamental connection of 
substances would not be contingent but necessary, for all the substances are 
sustained by a common principle.199   
 
4)  So, given the two directions of inference we can (or, at any rate, are supposed to 
be able to) adequately explain "how, in general, a connection between a plurality of 
substances comes to be, and how a totality between them is brought about" (§16, ID).  
For expository clarity I will make a number of other observations concerning 
the text above and do so in reference to the explanatory Model as represented in the 
diagram.  Note the dual inferences are assigned the letter (A) and (B).  Note also that 
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the idea or conception of the datum (O) is referred to as its 'ideal counterpart' ('ideal' 
meaning 'mental').  The inference (A) proceeds from the datum O to its ground, 
which in the Model above is the idea or conception thought of as having guided an 
intentional agent's productive activity so as to produce that datum.  In the Model, the 
datum O is (rather neutrally) specified as a relational structure whose relata are a 
plurality of substances; however, I have already presented considerable textual 
evidence showing that Kant himself describes the datum (explanandum) in terms of 
reciprocal interaction.  So, it would appear that the inference to the datum's cause or 
ground is one that (in Kant's mind, anyway) proceeds from the acknowledgement of 
the datum—a plurality of substances embedded in a relational structure (explicated in 
terms of reciprocal interaction)—to the ground (understood as its ideal counterpart).  
If this were correct (and I will present more textual evidence for it shortly) then it 
would certainly implicate the concept of reciprocal interaction as an integral 
component of Kant's explanatory Model.   
Furthermore, if it can be shown (or, at any rate, plausibly suggested) that the 
use of this Model is implicit in Kant's third critique (particularly in sections §§64-66 
of the Analytic of Teleological Judgment, where in addressing an explanatory crisis 
Kant introduces the concept of a natural end), then the concept of reciprocal 
interaction would, in addition, be implicated as an interpretative construct useful in 
illuminating these crucial sections of the third critique.  And since, as already 
observed, Kant's concept of reciprocal interaction has been put to diverse theoretical 
uses over the course of its philosophical career, the fact that this concept is used in 
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the third critique to serve explanatory concerns introduces the possibility that its 
implementation in that third major post-Copernican work may also be motivated by 
other, say, more well-known epistemological aims deriving from Kant's first critique.  
For the present, let this be admitted as plausible conjecture. 
There is another vitally important observation to be made concerning the 
internal structure of the Model.  Given that the Ideal Counterpart expresses some idea 
or conception of a whole, the difference between the dual directions of inference can 
be explicated as follows:  whereas inference (A) proceeds from the parts and their 
interrelations to (a conception of) the whole, inference (B) proceeds from the 
(conception of a) whole to the parts.  For the present, my focus is on inference (A).  
In the Model, inference (A) implies that the interrelations among a set of parts are 
ones of a sort to require concept-users to hypothesize some prior idea or conception 
of a whole as the condition under which those parts (and their interrelations) can be 
thought (cognized, made intelligible) at all.  Let us call the dependency of the parts 
and their interrelations on some idea or conception of a whole 'part-on-whole 
dependency' (or whole priority).  Note that when a set of parts (and their 
interrelations) are said to be part-on-whole dependent, those parts are thought of as 
conceptually dependent on some prior idea of a whole as the condition under which 
they can be identified and individuated as the parts they are.    
Finally, notice that the necessary unity among the substances embedded in the 
relational structure (explicated in terms of reciprocal interaction) appears to be a 
modal status that attaches the substances' unity as a consequence of (B), the inference 
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from the Ideal Counterpart to Datum O.  (It is also this inference that Kant says he's 
less confident about.)  Notice that in Kant's argument (as reconstructed above) the 
conclusion that the world is a real whole is one that depends on whether the 
intersubstantial unity has the required modal status, namely, a necessary unity.  The 
interpretative question here is whether Kant intends there to be a differential in how 
the unity (of the substances) is to be modally assessed across the two directions of 
inference.  Is the unity supposed to undergo a modal upgrade?  Kant has argued that 
only contingent substances are eligible to be members in a relational structure (one, at 
any rate, explicated in terms of reciprocal interaction).  Are we supposed to think that 
because the members of the relational structure are themselves contingent entities that 
the unity among them is also contingent?  If so, how does a plurality of substances 
become necessarily unified as a consequence of making the inference from the Ideal 
Counterpart to the relational structure?  If no modal upgrade is intended, is this 
because the inference to O's ideal counterpart assumes that the members embedded in 
the relational structure are already necessarily unified?  If so, the issue arises over 
whether Kant's Model is explanatorily circular.  Given datum O is referred to under a 
description where a plurality of substances are already necessarily unified and given, 
in addition, that inference (B) depends on inference (A), and then Kant's Model 
would appear to beg the question.    
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5.3.1 Further Textual Support For Inference (A) As An Integral Part of Kant's 
Model 
 
Evaluative issues of the kind just acknowledged are not my present concern.  
They will be raised and discussed later.  The aim now is to show how the relational 
structure (explicated in terms of reciprocal interaction) is an integral part of Kant's 
explanatory Model.  Textual evidence has just been cited in support of the Model's 
dual inference processes, (A) and (B).  With regard to (A) the inference proceeds 
from the datum -- a plurality of substances embedded in a relational structure -- to the 
idea or conception of a whole.  Kant appears to think (as we will see shortly) that the 
inference to the idea or conception of a whole depends on explicating the relational 
structure in terms of reciprocal interaction.  If this were the case, then the construct of 
reciprocal interaction would have to be acknowledged as an indispensable component 
of Kant's Model.   
In the preceding analyses we examined essentially the same argument, 
variously permuted, across different Kantian texts.  In each of its different 
permutations, the argument was stated with one or more of its components 
emphasized over the others; sometimes a component was entirely omitted.  In one 
formulation of the argument, the emphasis seems directed at asserting the 
contingency of substances, while in an alternate formulation emphasis is on 
characterizing their cause (as "a primordial communal source" or "communal cause").  
In yet another of its permutations (in ID), the argument explicitly introduces a dual 
inference structure (not present in earlier formulations) and subsequently a new 
emphasis on a plurality of substances' necessary unity.  In an extended text from the 
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Herder transcript (cited below) Kant presents an argument that is essentially the same 
as the one we have already analyzed from New Eluc and ID; however, in the Herder 
transcript Kant's model of interaction is more explicitly developed than in these other 
texts.  Moreover, because the model of interaction is developed to a greater extent in 
a context where Kant is making an argument that is essentially the same as the one he 
makes in New Eluc and ID, increased development of that model can plausibly be 
taken as an indication of emphasis, one where the intention is to bring the model's 
contribution to the argument into focus.  
In the Herder transcript Kant states (or, at any rate, is on record as saying):  
If a substance suffers, then it must contain in itself by its own power the 
ground of the inherence of the accident, because otherwise the accident would 
not inhere in it.  But the ground of this must also be in the efficient power of 
the substance, because otherwise it would not act.  Consequently the powers 
of the substances are harmonious. In relation to the powers of the others one 
contains the ground of the inherence of the accident.  This body of doctrine is 
called established harmony <harmonia stabilita>, and since God willed it 
previously, preestablished <praestabilita>.   
 Synthetic preparation.  Each subject in which an accident inheres 
must itself contain a ground of its inherence.  For if, e.g., God could produce a 
thought in a soul merely by himself:  then God, but not a soul, would have the 
thought: because there would be no connection <nexus> between them.  Thus 
for the inherence of an accident in A its own power is required, and a merely 
external, not even a divine power, does not suffice.  Otherwise I could also 
produce thoughts in a mere wooden post, if it were possible by a mere 
external power.   
 If substances effect one another reciprocally <mutuo>:  then the 
suffering, the inherence of the accident, happens not merely by its own but 
rather also by external power: for otherwise it would not be a suffering.  E.g., 
I hear music:  that requires the external power of the music, and the distinct 
representation of the notes requires one's own power of hearing.   
 An accident thus inheres by its own power, which contains the 
sufficient inner ground of it yet also by external power, thus by an outer 
ground of inherence without which it would not have inhered.  Now properly 
no substance can contain the ground of the accident of the other, if it does not 
at the same time contain the ground of the substantial power and of the 
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existence of the other:  I cannot become the ground of a thought in another if I 
am not at the same time the ground of the power that produces the thoughts: 
in this manner God is the ground.  If two substances are in interaction <in 
commercio>, the two depend on a third, so their powers are harmonious with 
one another: they stand in connection and relation, on account of the third 
substance which is the ground of both, and has willed a connection <nexus>.  
E.g., the existence of the action of another does not depend simply one action 
and one power.  Thus all predicates must be produced by one's own power, 
but since an external power is also required externally: then a third must have 
willed this harmony (established harmony <harmonia stabilita>).  This 
connection <nexus> is between created beings, because the two in interaction 
<in commercio> must depend on a third.200   
 
A more detailed analysis of the metaphysical issues surrounding this extended 
Kantian text is offered in the next chapter.  Here I comment only briefly.  There are 
mainly three competing models of (what you might call) "the metaphysics of 
causality,"201 that is, a view of what causation is (or isn't) and an implied account of 
the way the world (and/or our minds) must be set up in support of that account of 
causation.  The three main models on the market at Kant's time were as follows:  
Metaphysic of Causality_________   Causal Relation                      Metaphysician___                                     
1)  Occasionalism                                Mediated (by God)                Malebranche  
2)  Pre-Established Harmony               Ideal                                      Leibniz 
3)  System of Physical Influence         Real                                       Kant  
 
Kant rejects (1) and (2).  As early as New Eluc, Kant's intention was to provide an 
alternative to these metaphysical accounts.  But this alternative is not without certain 
similarities to its competitors, namely, the Leibnizian view.  However, a comparison 
of these views is not my present aim.  Suffice it to say that the conclusion of the 
                                                          
200
 LM, Metaphysik Herder, 28:52.   
 
201
 I am acquainted with the term from Eric Watkin's book Kant and the Metaphysics of 
Causality.  However, my account of its meaning is not derived from his book.  In the portions I read, I 
didn't read any explicit explication of the term.  So the definition is my own.   
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extended Herder text (cited above) is in support of "the system of physical influence" 
(Kant's phrase).  In this Kantian vision of "connection," substances are actually 
causally efficacious (concerning other substances); they are capable of producing 
effects (accidents) in other substances.  Under (3) the causal connection among a 
plurality of substances is therefore "real," as opposed to merely "ideal" (here meaning 
'merely mental').  What Kant is doing in this citation is offering a comparatively more 
detailed account of (3), of how reciprocal interaction (transeunt causation or system 
of physical influence) among a plurality of substances works.   
Kant develops his model of interaction within the context of a more general 
argument that may be reconstructed as follows:   
1)  If a plurality of substances stand in relations of reciprocal interaction, then the 
causal powers of each of the substances would have to be coordinated and 
harmonized with each other.   (Notice the argument assumes the antecedent in (1), 
namely, that a plurality of substances do, in fact, stand in relations of reciprocal 
interaction.)   
2)  Since no (finite) substance is itself capable of arranging it so that its causal powers 
work harmoniously with the causal powers other substance nor able to cause other 
substances' causal powers to work harmoniously with it, some "third thing"—
something "external"—to all the members of the plurality of substances must be 
posited as the ground of their reciprocal interaction.  As Kant states: 
If two substances are in interaction <in commercio>, the two depend on a 
third, so their powers are harmonious with one another: they stand in 
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connection and relation, on account of the third substance which is the 
ground of both, and has willed a connection <nexus>.202 
 
Here it is clear that the inference Kant is making is one which proceeds from a datum 
(or at any rate an assumption) of a plurality of substances embedded in a relational 
structure to the proposition that there is some "third thing."  Ample textual evidence 
has already been given for the specification of some "third thing" as a divine idea or 
conception of a whole.  It is also clear that the inference proceeding from the 
relational structure to the existence of the idea or conception of a whole is one which 
involves reference to that relational structure under the description of reciprocal 
interaction.  This Herder transcript therefore explicitly supports the suggested 
hypothesis, namely that the concept of reciprocal interaction functions as an integral 
component of Kant's Model, specifically as the basis on which to make inference (A).   
The extended Herder text (cited above) is a very dense Kantian text, one that 
merits careful analysis.  As remarked, a more detailed analysis of this text is offered 
in the next chapter.  In the remainder of the present chapter, the aim is to elaborate on 
and clarify certain other aspects of the intentional structure of Kant's model.   
 
5.4 The Intentional Framework of Kant's Explanatory Model 
In ID God is dually subsumed under two important conceptualizations; first, 
as the creator; second, as the architect.  Kant insists that both are required.  God (as 
creator) plays the role of efficient cause; God (as architect, engineer, or designer) 
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plays the role of final cause.  Even here, however, it sometimes seems that God's 
importance seems derivative; as an explanatory postulate God is necessary only 
because, first, there has to be some mind suitable in which to impute the "divine 
schema." And who else's but a supreme being's mind could big enough and smart 
enough to "entertain" such an idea?  Second, there has to be some existent being 
capable of willing, or intending the idea or schema into material reality.   
In acknowledging the need to posit God under the description of creator and 
engineer or designer, Kant is doing two things:  First, he is viewing the existence of a 
plurality of substances standing in relations of reciprocal causal interaction as the 
intended effect (or end-product) of an act of intentional causation.  Second Kant 
acknowledges that, in order to conceptualize something as an end, some reference to 
an intentional agent is required: 
Ends have a direct relation to reason, whether this is that of another or our 
own.  But if we are to place them in the reason of another, then we must at 
least base this on our own as an analogue: because otherwise this cannot be 
represented at all.203   
 
Having posited an ideal counterpart of a given natural organism, we face the need to 
posit a suitable substance "in which" this Ideal Counterpart can be thought to exist.  
To that end, we must posit a cognitive subject, an intelligent cause.  If you want to 
give the reason why it is that a plurality of substances stand in relations of reciprocal 
interaction by reference to an idea or conception of a whole (for which they were 
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intended as parts), that idea must be conceptualized as operative in the motivational 
system of an intentional agent whose causal powers are capable of executing it.   
Under this conceptualization, the divine idea or "schema" resembles an action 
plan.  In that case, the divine idea has to be placed not merely in a intentional 
consciousness capable merely of representing reality -- the way the world actually is; 
rather, in order to perform its explanatory role in Kant's Model, the Ideal Counterpart 
must also be located in a cognitive being that can perform as rational agent, one 
capable of producing effects according to and under the guidance of a concept of the 
product to be produced or the action to be enacted. 
If one would define what an end is in accordance with its transcendental 
determinations (without presupposing anything empirical, such as the feeling 
of pleasure), then an end is the object of a concept insofar as the latter is 
regarded as the cause of the former (the real ground of its possibility); and the 
causality of the concept with regard to its object is purposiveness (forma 
finalis).  Thus where not merely the cognition of an object but the object itself 
(its form and existence) as an effect is thought of as possible only through a 
concept of the latter, there one thinks of an end.  The representation of the 
effect is here the determining ground of its cause, and precedes the latter.204   
 
According to Kant, conceptualizing anything as an 'end' involves some reference 
(even if only on analogy) to rational agency, whereby existing things—products or 
actions—are explained as the effects of prior concept-guided activity.   
The faculty of desire, insofar as it is determinable only though concepts, i.e., 
to act in accordance with the representation of an end, would be the will.  An 
object or state of mind or even an action, however, even if its possibility does 
not necessarily presuppose the representation of an end, is called purposive 
merely because its possibility can only be explained and conceived by us 
insofar as we assume as its ground a causality in accordance with ends, i.e., a 
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will that has arranged it so in accordance with the representation of a certain 
rule.205    
 
So the Ideal Counterpart has to be conceptualized within the framework of a faculty 
of desire, meaning that we (ultimately) must posit an intentional agent in whose mind  
the ideal counterpart is an object of intentional awareness. But there's also, the 
motivational component:  the cognitive subject must be motivated to actualize the 
idea.  What this means is that the Ideal Counterpart must be modeled on the 
intentional object of an agent's practical reason (or "faculty of desire").  For only 
when embedded within the agent's motivational system is the Ideal Counterpart able 
to be conceptualized on the model of an end.   
What is modally distinctive, according to Kant, about an agent's intentional 
awareness of an end is that the intentional object of such awareness is not regarded as 
that which already exists, as something correspondent with fact, but rather as what (in 
the agent's mind, anyway) is supposed to exist.  Evidently, the ground of this 
additional modal feature is the agent's will or intention.  Kant seems to think that it is 
constitutive of an agent's intention that he represents its intentional object both as one 
that does not currently exist but also as one that ought to.   
Now as an end in general is that the concept of which can be regarded as the 
ground of the possibility of the object itself, thus in order to represent an 
objective purposiveness in a thing the concept of what sort of thing it is 
supposed to be must come first; and the agreement of the manifold in the 
thing with this concept (which supplies the rule for the combination of the 
manifold in it) is the qualitative perfection of a thing.  Quantitative 
perfection, as the completeness of any thing in its own kind, is entirely 
distinct from this, and is a mere concept of magnitude (totality), in which 
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what the thing is supposed to be is thought of as already determined and it is 
only asked whether everything that is requisite for it exists.206  
 
Under the guidance of an idea or conception of the thing to be produced, an agent's 
intentional production targets the de re content of that guiding conception as that 
which ought to be.  What is produced is made normatively answerable to that prior 
conception and its "perfection" is evaluated by comparing the end-product with how 
well and to what extent it conforms to the conception that guided the agent's 
production of it.  Indeed, such normative comparisons are distinctive of a judgment of 
a particular type, specifically, the "teleological judgment of reflection:"  
A teleological judgment compares the concept of a product of nature as it is 
with one of what it ought to be.  Here the judging of its possibility is 
grounded in a concept (of the end) that precedes it a priori.  There is no 
difficulty in representing the possibility of products of art in such a way.  But 
to think of a product of nature that there is something that it ought to be and 
then to judge whether it really is so already presupposes a principle that could 
not be drawn from experience (which teaches only what things are).207 
 
Kant is acknowledging that some reference to an intentional (or motivational) system 
is part of the causal story he wants to tell about how a plurality of substances could 
form one necessarily unified whole, as opposed to a mere aggregate of stand-alone, 
metaphysically isolate, single-membered worlds.  A plurality of substances constitute 
a world-whole because they stand in relations of reciprocal interaction; and they can 
do so by virtue of the fact that they were brought into existence by God, considered  
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as a rational intentional agent, whose creation of the world was guided by an idea of 
the whole to be produced.   
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Chapter Six 
 
CONCEPTUALIZING A WORLD:  HOW TO EXPLICATE THE CONCEPT 
OF AN ENVIRONMENT 
 
The connection of substances constitutes what is essential in the concept of 
the world.  Reciprocal interaction is in the whole, and here a substance is 
acting <agens>; and so there must be a reciprocal interaction with every 
whole. 
 
   —Immanuel Kant208 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Kant's model is intended for use as part of a teleological explanation of the 
existence of the world-whole.  In order for a plurality of entities to constitute one 
world, they must be viewed as parts of a common whole, one that is necessarily 
unified.  According to Kant a plurality of substances could constitute parts of one 
necessarily unified world-whole only if they had been created according to a prior 
idea or conception of a whole, one in which each of those individual substance-parts 
were engineered and actualized for the sake of realizing that conception.  Within 
Kant's explanatory framework, a plurality of substances may therefore be viewed as 
constituting a world-whole so long as concept-users are able to view these entities as 
the end-product of a deity's (concept-guided) intentional production.  But if a 
plurality of substances is to be viewed as the effect of a deity's concept-guided 
intentional production, there presumably must be something about these entities (and 
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their interrelations) that could give concept-users a reason to hypothesize a prior idea 
or conception of a whole as the condition of their possibility: the reason is the fact of 
their interaction.     
Under the model of interaction entities (and their interrelations) are 
represented in such a way so as to induce concept-users to hypothesize a prior idea or 
conception of a whole.  One major constraint imposed on the model of interaction is 
therefore to show how concept-users would be justified in making (what I have 
called) inference (A) in Kant's Model.  If adequately conceptualized, the model of 
interaction should therefore provide an illuminating answer to the question, 'Under 
what conceptualization would a plurality of substances (and their interrelations) 
require concept-users to presuppose an idea or conception of a whole as a prior 
condition of their interaction?'209   
By examining various Kantian texts more closely, we can get clearer about 
why Kant thinks reciprocal interaction demands concept-users to posit some idea or 
conception of a whole.  Consequently, we can gain more insight into the precise role 
to be played by reciprocal interaction within Kant's Model.  Doing so will further 
support the contention that the model of interaction is an integral part of a larger 
explanatory framework.  What I propose to do therefore is to return to extended 
Herder transcript (excerpted below) and use it as an organizing hub around which to  
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set into orbit various other but closely related Kantian texts.  All of these texts, in one 
way or other, bear relevantly on the reconstruction of the model of interaction.  In the 
first section the aim is to get some initial textual analysis under our belt, so that we 
are put in a position to see how various key components of the Herder transcript, 
when corroborated and supplemented with other of Kant's texts, can be framed under 
larger metaphysical concerns.  By illuminating the motivation behind Kant's model of 
interaction, these concerns aid in the interpretation of it and, in turn, connect it more 
plausibly to the intentional explanatory framework of Kant's model.   
 
6.2 Brief Overview of Kant's Account of Substantial "Suffering" 
In the extended Herder transcript (cited below), a causal transaction (one, at 
any rate, that counts as reciprocal) appears to require that a substance have the 
capacity to "suffer" at the hands of another (perpetrating) substance.  Moreover, in 
this text, Kant's focus seems to be on the "suffering" substance, i.e., on the substance 
in which an accident is caused to inhere, rather than on the substance causally 
responsible for the accident's inherence.  But this should not be taken as incongruent 
with Kant's aim to articulate a model of reciprocal interaction.  As will become 
clearer, Kant thinks that any causal transaction between two or more substances 
requires "suffering" on the part of all substances party to that transaction.  Indeed 
whether one substance succeeds in causing an accident to inhere in another appears 
(in Kant's model) to be a joint enterprise, one which not only requires a causal 
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contribution from the acting substance but also from the substance on the sufferer's 
end of the causal interaction.   
If a substance suffers, then it must contain in itself by its own power the 
ground of the inherence of the accident, because otherwise the accident would 
not inhere in it.  But the ground of this must also be in the efficient power of 
the substance, because otherwise it would not act.  Consequently the powers 
of the substances are harmonious. In relation to the powers of the others one 
contains the ground of the inherence of the accident.  This body of doctrine is 
called established harmony <harmonia stabilita>, and since God willed it 
previously, preestablished <praestabilita>.   
 Synthetic preparation.  Each subject in which an accident inheres 
must itself contain a ground of its inherence.  For if, e.g., God could produce a 
thought in a soul merely by himself:  then God, but not a soul, would have the 
thought: because there would be no connection <nexus> between them.  Thus 
for the inherence of an accident in A its own power is required, and a merely 
external, not even a divine power, does not suffice.  Otherwise I could also 
produce thoughts in a mere wooden post, if it were possible by a mere 
external power.   
 If substances effect one another reciprocally <mutuo>:  then the 
suffering, the inherence of the accident, happens not merely by its own but 
rather also by external power: for otherwise it would not be a suffering.  E.g., 
I hear music:  that requires the external power of the music, and the distinct 
representation of the notes requires one's own power of hearing.   
 An accident thus inheres by its own power, which contains the 
sufficient inner ground of it yet also by external power, thus by an outer 
ground of inherence without which it would not have inhered.  Now properly 
no substance can contain the ground of the accident of the other, if it does not 
at the same time contain the ground of the substantial power and of the 
existence of the other:  I cannot become the ground of a thought in another if I 
am not at the same time the ground of the power that produces the thoughts: 
in this manner God is the ground.  If two substances are in interaction <in 
commercio>, the two depend on a third, so their powers are harmonious with 
one another: they stand in connection and relation, on account of the third 
substance which is the ground of both, and has willed a connection <nexus>.  
E.g., the existence of the action of another does not depend simply one action 
and one power.  Thus all predicates must be produced by one's own power, 
but since an external power is also required externally: then a third must have 
willed this harmony (established harmony <harmonia stabilita>).  This 
connection <nexus> is between created beings, because the two in interaction 
<in commercio> must depend on a third.210  
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What exactly does a substance's "suffering" consist in?  Kant states the condition of 
suffering (defined in terms of accident inherence) as follows:   
If a substance suffers, then it must contain in itself by its own power the 
ground of the inherence of the accident, because otherwise the accident would 
not inhere in it. But the ground of this must also be in the efficient power of 
the substance, because otherwise it would not act.  Consequently the powers 
of the substances are harmonious. In relation to the powers of the others one 
contains the ground of the inherence of the accident.211  
 
First, notice that Kant appears to conceptualize an 'effect' in the terms provided by the 
traditional Aristotelian substance-accident model.  That is, the production of an effect 
in a substance is understood in terms of a substance's coming to have an accident or 
property inhere in it (which it presumably didn't have prior to the causal transaction).  
Kant makes this point more explicit elsewhere:  
Acting and effecting can be assigned only to substances.  Action is the 
determination of the power of a substance as a cause of a certain accident 
<accidentis>.  Causality <causalitas> is the property of a substance insofar as 
it is considered as a cause of an accident <accidentis>.212 
 
Second, notice that a substance's suffering (understood as an accident's coming to 
inhere in it) depends, in addition, on the suffering-substance's containing "in itself" 
the ground of the accident's inherence.   So the (or, at any rate, a) condition under 
which a substance may suffer is that an accident comes to inhere in it by the exercise 
of a causal power that is internal to the suffering-substance.  Let us call this the 
internal agency condition on accident inherence, or the inherence condition.   
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However Kant's account of suffering is one he is developing with the larger 
aim of determining the conditions under which intersubstantial causation is possible; 
consequently, the account of suffering is (in Kant's mind) to be embedded within the 
larger model of interaction.  Kant makes this more explicit in the Metaphysik L 
transcript:   
Action <actio> is either inner or transeunt <immanens ... transiens>.  If an 
inner action <actio immanens; G: innere Handlung> is performed, then one 
says: the substances activates.  Transeunt action <actio transiens> is also 
called influence <influxus; G: Einfluss>.  Suffering obviously corresponds to 
influence <influxus>, but not to inner action.  Suffering is the inherence of an 
accident <accidentis> of a substance by a power that is outside it.  Interaction 
is the relation of substances with reciprocal influence <commercium est 
relatio substantiarum mutuo influxu>.213   
 
Kant's aim is therefore to indicate what needs to be added to his model of a suffering-
substance in order to be able to conceptualize that substance as an interactant in a 
relational structure with other substances -- one in virtue of which a plurality of 
substances may count as one real whole.   
In the Herder text (cited above) notice Kant says that "the ground of this must 
also be in the efficient power of the substance, because otherwise it would not act.  
Consequently, the powers of the substances are harmonious."  In the preceding 
sentence when Kant says, "the ground of this must also be ... ", what should we 
understand as the referent of the demonstrative 'this'?  I think a plausible answer to 
that question, given the context, is that the referent of 'this' is the suffering-substance, 
specifically its having and exercising the power to produce an accident in itself.  
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Under this interpretation, Kant is saying that the suffering-substance's power to 
produce an accident in itself is one that is grounded on "the efficient power" of  
 
a different substance, one that is external to the suffering substance.  Let us refer to 
this condition as the external activation requirement.   
In this brief overview of Kant's account of suffering, two conceptual 
requirements have been introduced, namely the inherence condition and the external 
activation requirement.  (Later, under a less superficial analysis of the Herder 
transcript in conjunction with other Kantian texts, other conditions will be 
introduced.)  In the next section, I motivate the two requirements just introduced 
within a larger interpretative framework, one where Kant's concern is over how to 
conceptualize a world.   
 
6.3 Framing Kant's Concerns: Models Of Metaphysical Involvement (Or 
Noninvolvement)  
 
The concept of a world is (in Kant's mind, anyway) to be analyzed into three 
intensional components:  parts (substances); form (both "sensible" and "intelligible") 
and entirety (absolute completeness).  A fuller analysis of what Kant means by 
"form" isn't necessary in the present context.  Here it suffices to say that Kant 
explicates "sensible form" as both space and time, and "intelligible form" as 
reciprocal interaction.  Under Kant's conceptualization of a world, the world is 
something composed of a multitude of parts; these parts are united by the world's 
"form"—a relational structure; finally, the world is a whole that is not itself a part of 
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another (more inclusive) whole.  Since the concept of a world is to be explicated as 
an absolute totality (a "world-whole") composed of a multitude of parts and since, in 
addition, these parts are substances, the trick is to conceptualize a relational 
structure, one in which a plurality of substances would count as constituent parts of a 
single world in virtue of their comembership in it.    
How metaphysically intimate would prospective members of a plurality of 
substances have to be in order to jointly constitute a single "world-whole?"  The basic 
structure of a substance can be conceptualized within a framework in which they are 
viewed to possess varying degrees of metaphysical involvement as a condition of 
comembership in a relational structure.  These varying degrees of metaphysical 
involvement indicate what the relational structure is like, what demands it imposes on 
its members.  Or the degree of metaphysical involvement can be so minimal (or null) 
that there isn't any relational structure at all.  In the latter case, there would be no 
single world composed of a plurality of substance-parts; instead, there would be a 
plurality of independent stand-alone substances, each one a world unto itself.   
We can, I suggest, conceptualize (at least) three different major positions along a 
continuum of involvement.  (See diagram below.)                                                                                                                                 
Model of Involvement                               Antidote________                                Desiderata 
1)  Metaphysical Engulfment                   the inherence condition                          Parts  
2)  Metaphysical Isolation                        the external activation requirement        Form 
3)  Kant's Alternative: Environment        the model of interaction                          Wholehood 
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To see this, each position may be assigned a metaphysical slogan representative of its 
position.  In each of the following, the concept of substance is explicated in terms of 
whether or not it possesses causal efficacy and, if so, to what extent:  
1)  Substances can produce effects neither internally nor externally; they can produce 
no effects of any kind whatsoever;   
2)  Substances can produce effects only in themselves; they can therefore neither 
produce effects in nor be affected by any substance distinct from themselves;   
3)  Substances can both produce effects in themselves and in other substances; they 
can both causally affect and be affected by other substances.   
Kant rejects (1) and (2).  He rejects (1) because it leads to (what I call) metaphysical 
engulfment.  (I discuss engulfment in the next section.)  Kant rejects (2) because it 
leads to metaphysical isolation.  Finally, slogan (3) roughly expresses Kant's view.   
A brief historical point may be useful here.  Slogan (2) roughly expresses 
Leibniz's view of monads.  As subjects capable both of intentional perceptual 
awareness and appetition, monads are nevertheless capable only of intramonadic, not 
intermonadic, causation (or, in the correlative scholastic idiom, they are capable of 
immanent, not transeunt, causation).  It takes an entity external to a multitude of 
monads—namely, God—to harmonize their individually self-contained 
representational lives so that the world represented in their perceptual states appears 
as one world, one in which other monads are represented to coexist.214  However, 
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there is no real causal structure uniting these independent stand-alone entities. 215  
Intermonadic unity is totally "ideal" (here meaning mental); it is a unity that 
characterizes only the individual monad's representation of the entities that appear in 
its perceptual states, not the entities themselves.  That the entities presented in a 
monad's intentional perceptual states so much as appear to be unified (in one 
environment) is God's doing. When considered independently of God's mind, 
intermonadic unity is, however, a sham, the mere appearance of a real objective 
unity.216   
For Leibniz, the world is constituted of active substances and their states.  
Relations -- and anything else imaginary -- are neither real nor intelligible.  
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  Although there is zero causal interaction among the monads, Leibniz does have a theory 
about how material bodies are possible, one that explains the cohesiveness of natural organisms by 
reference to a "dominant monad."  But, again, so far as I understand this theory, there is no actual 
intermonadic causation involved.  In the present context it would be contrary to my aim to haggle over 
how to interpret Leibniz's monadology.  Nevertheless I think slogan (2) is certainly Leibnizian in 
spirit, if not a precisely accurate statement of his own metaphysical position.       
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   One related issue that arises here concerns whether cognitive reference would be possible 
for the Leibnizian monad.  It seems that the unity (or interconnection) that entities presented in our 
perceptual states appear to have would be referable to a domain of existence, one that is presented as 
external to the representing monad.  But in view of the fact that perceptual content is recognized (by 
the representing monad) to be part of its internal simulation of an external reality, a simulation that he 
(the monad) knows (or, at any rate, believes) is being divinely coordinated with the mere simulations 
of vast numbers of other monads, it is difficult to see how reference relations could have any real 
epistemic role to play.  If the epistemic job normally assigned to reference relations is to provide 
linkage between intentional contents on the one hand and external referents on the other, then (under 
this scenario) reference relations are out of one.  Since if there is no extrarepresentational reality (not, 
at any rate, one that corresponds to the world as it is presented in perception), there isn't any set of 
mind-independent entities to be linked to internal perceptual states via these reference relations.  
Suppose, however, it is insisted that reference relations still play a cognitive role on this view.  Then 
the linkages they are assigned to forge would appear to be merely intrapersonal, ones linking one 
intentional content to another.  In that case, reference relations would therefore be unable to link an 
internal state (of the monad's representational system) to a referent that existed externally to that 
system.  The problem here, however, is the implication of a rather self-defeating picture of what a 
representational system is supposed to do (or be).  On this view, a representational system appears to 
be something that functions to represent its own internal workings and states rather than the entities 
and states of a world external to that system.   
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Aggregates also lack reality and intelligibility: an aggregate has no reality 
over and beyond the reality of the substances which constitute it.217 
 
The three positions, or models, above can be seen to differ in the degree to which 
they conceptually negate the content of Kant's concept of a world.  Under (1), there 
would be no plurality of substances.  (I explain why in the next section.)  Therefore, a 
world-whole wouldn't be possible either insofar as one requires a plurality of parts.  
Under (2) a plurality of substances would be possible; however, since these 
substance are causally isolated, there would be no "form" uniting them, that is, no 
relational structure in virtue of which (or, at any rate, in terms of which) substances 
could be conceptualized as parts.  Consequently, no world-whole is possible under 
this model, either.  Under (3), however, there would be both a plurality of substances 
and a relational structure in which they could be conceptualized as parts of one 
whole.  Notice, further, that models (1) and (2) have been affiliated with one of the 
two requirements derived from the previous overview of Kant's account of suffering.  
Each condition, which has been extracted from Kant's text, is motivated to rule out as 
conceptually impossible its corresponding model of involvement.  Think of models 
(1) and (2) as a threat, variously permuted, to Kant's concept of a world, one he averts 
by using the corresponding antidote. 
As remarked, Kant's Model is used to explain the existence and generation of 
a world-whole.  The aim is therefore to show how the model of interaction may be 
seen to derive its conceptual content from within a larger interpretative framework, 
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one where the overriding concern is to show how a plurality of entities may be 
conceptualized as one world.  In the sections that follow the aim is to interpret the 
extended Herder transcript (cited above) in light of the framework just provided.   
 
6.4 Internal Agency As The Antidote To Metaphysical Engulfment  
One major concern of Kant's is to conceptualize individual substances as 
causally efficacious.  Whatever else a substance is, it should be an entity capable of 
originating effects.  Recall that effects are (in Kant's mind, anyway) modeled on 
accident inherence and that the condition on inherence is that it can happens only if a 
substance has the internal causal power to produce effects in itself.  But it is within 
the larger context of his model of interaction that Kant imposes the inherence 
condition.  Hence Kant's concern seems to be over how to conceptualize two 
substances, x and y, as metaphysically distinct zones of ontological real estate and is, 
in addition, trying to short-circuit the implication that the substance in which the 
effect is produced is a (sort of) metaphysical extension of the producer-substance.  If 
x's domain of intrasubstantial reality engulfs y's, so that y's existence is a 
metaphysical extension of x's, then any effect x produces in y is one produced in a 
domain of existence that falls into x's intrasubstantial domain.  In that case, the causal 
'transaction' (really, a misnomer here) would be a case of intrasubstantial (or 
immanent) causation, not intersubstantial (or transeunt) causation.  The "transaction" 
would therefore not count as a genuine case of causal interaction.     
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It is this concern over metaphysical engulfment that Kant is expressing in the 
text cited from the Herder transcript:  
Each subject in which an accident inheres must itself contain a ground of its 
inherence.  For if, e.g., God could produce a thought in a soul merely by 
himself:  then God, but not a soul, would have the thought: because there 
would be no connection <nexus> between them.  Thus for the inherence of an 
accident in A its own power is required, and a merely external, not even a 
divine power, does not suffice.  Otherwise I could also produce thoughts in a 
mere wooden post, if it were possible by a mere external power.218  
 
This is a highly compressed Kantian text.  But it merits careful analysis.  Kant is 
concerned with the conditions under which interaction is possible.  Kant seems to be 
arguing something like the following:   
Show:  That "[e]ach subject in which an accident inheres must itself contain a ground 
of its inherence." 
1)  If God could produce thoughts in a soul by himself, where 'by himself' is 
explicated as his being able to do so without any causal contribution made by the soul 
in which the thoughts were produced, then God (not the soul-entity) would be the 
subject of those thoughts. 
2) But (uh-oh) if God (not the soul-entity) were the subject of the thoughts, then there 
would be no interaction because there wouldn't be a plurality of interactants.  
(Assuming there is interaction.)   
3) So, we must deny the consequent in (1). 
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 LM, Metaphysik Herder, 28:52.   
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4) Therefore [by MTP] even God could not produce thoughts in a soul by himself.  
As Kant says:  "Thus for the inherence of an accident in A its own power is required, 
and a merely external, not even a divine power, does not suffice."  
Under this reconstruction, Kant's argument works by viewing (1) as a threat to (the 
datum of) interaction.   
How exactly is God's being able to produce thoughts in a soul by himself a  
threat to the possibility of reciprocal interaction?  The production of thoughts is an 
effect of having exercised the capability to think.  So, if God produced thoughts in a 
soul by himself, where 'by himself' is understood to mean that the soul in which the 
thoughts were produced played absolutely no causal role in bringing those thoughts 
about, then the soul cannot be attributed with having exercised the causal powers that 
are necessary to bring about the production of those thoughts.  Because the soul is 
ruled out (as far as these thoughts are concerned) as the exerciser of the relevant 
causal powers (the capability to think), it must be God who exercised the relevant 
causal capacities.  The point here is not that the thoughts produced in the soul would 
count as God's because, say, the thoughts produced therein have exactly the same 
semantic (or propositional) content as the thoughts God aimed to produce; no, Kant 
isn't arguing for an intensional comparison (or sameness relation) between two 
content-bearing entities existing in different minds.  Rather the point is that the entity 
in which the thoughts are produced would not count as a conscious entity 
metaphysically distinct from God.  In such a case (were it possible), there would be 
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no causal interaction because the soul-entity's thoughts would be a mere extension of 
God's consciousness. 
Notice that the soul is being compared to a "wooden post."  Unlike souls, 
wooden posts are not agents.  They are not capable of activity, cognitive or otherwise.  
So when Kant compares the case in which God produces thoughts in a soul to the 
case of producing thoughts in a wooden post, he is implying that the reason the 
thoughts produced in the soul do not count as a case of divine thought control (and 
consequently not a case of intersubstantial causation) is that the 'soul' in which the 
thoughts would be produced is not being acknowledged as an entity doing any of the 
thinking.219  Because this soul is hypothesized as making zero causal contribution to 
the production of thoughts, the case we're imagining isn't a case in which God is 
producing thoughts in a separate stand-alone substance where there is a cognitive 
subject thinking thoughts that it didn't intend to think.  Rather, it is actually a case 
where we are attempting (unsuccessfully, says Kant) to relocate God's thinking 
activity in a substance that cannot think.  Since in the present case the soul is (like a 
wooden post) not acknowledged as the agent of any thinking activity, the distinction 
between which thought-effects are its own (i.e., one's to be attributed to its causal 
                                                          
219
  And an implicit premise here seems to be, first, that thinking entails a subject of thought 
and, second, that thoughts which are identified as "mine" are ones only I can think.  But this second 
claim has to be finessed properly.  Propositional (or conceptual) contents are not mine to possess; other 
minds besides mine can think them.  So what has to be claimed as mine exclusively is something that 
only I can do, presumably something that is constitutive of the first-personal structure of intentional 
awareness.  Frege distinguishes between Sinne and "ideas," the former belong to an objective, mind-
independent "third realm," the latter to the private domain of individual minds.  But Frege's distinction 
doesn't contribute to a model of the first-personal structure of intentional consciousness; it presupposes 
one.  Kant, however, at least attempts to provide such a model, one that conceptualizes intentional 
awareness as the effect of agential processes, some of which are to a certain extent under the agent's 
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efficacy) and which aren't (i.e., ones to be attributed to a cause external to it) 
collapses.    
I think Kant's reasoning is this:  in order for the production of a set of 
thoughts in a soul to count as ones God produced by himself alone (where that entails 
absolutely no causal contribution made on behalf of the soul in which the thoughts 
are to be produced), the soul must (temporarily) be conceptualized as a (sort of) 
empty receptacle.  Empty of what, exactly?  In the present case, the entity being 
imagined here is one of a sort where, having conceptually negated the component of 
any individual cognitive agency, all that is left is a sort of psychological shell, a 
metaphysical storage structure.  So with regard to the thoughts we want to imagine as 
having been produced in a soul by God alone, this 'soul' (really, a misnomer here) is 
conceptually equivalent to a totally thought-less brain-dead encephalic soul.  For 
there is no entity in it (distinguishable from God) that can take causal credit for any 
thinking and therefore as having engaged in any thinking activity.  Hence any 
thoughts produced in it would have to be God's.220  So, it appears that we are not 
imagining the soul-entity as a sort of separate (but psychologically influenceable) 
cognitive subject whose individually distinct thought processes are ones God has 
under his control.  Such a case of divine thought control would be a case of 
interaction.  But Kant is arguing that the present case isn't a case of interaction.  On 
                                                                                                                                                                     
voluntary control (attention, memory, etc.) whereas some are the effect of subpersonal processes 
governed by internal conceptual norms (the categories).   
 
220
   In "Thoughts" Frege makes a similar point.  He says that what can be psychologically 
owned by the subject isn't the thought (i.e., the propositional content) but the thinking of it:  cit 
forthcoming 
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the contrary, it is a threat to interaction.  What we are imagining instead is a case 
where God's thinking activity is being illegitimately relocated to and down-loaded in 
an empty vessel -- an encephalic 'soul' -- one where there is no cognitive agent that is 
metaphysically separate from God.   
Kant seems to be arguing that in order for the case under analysis to be a case 
of interaction, the soul would have to be capable of the activity of thinking and this 
capability, or causal power, would have to be essential to (or, at any rate, part of) 
what sort of entity it is, so that the thoughts produced in it would be thoughts it is 
thinking by the exercise of its own cognitive agency.221  The implicit premise seems 
to be this:  that in order for the thoughts God produced to count as effects produced in 
a different substance, the entity in which those thoughts were produced would have to 
be conceptualized on the model of an agent -- that is, as a possessor and exerciser of 
causal powers.   
It would not be the first time Kant appealed to the concept of an agent as a 
principle of individuation.  In Physical Monadology (PM), for instance, Kant 
introduces the idea of a "sphere of activity" and uses this construct in his precritical 
model of material unity.  In that work, a body's individuality is interpreted (in 
Cartesian geometrical terms) as a bounded region of (matter-filled) space.  A 
bounded region of space is conceptualized as a sphere of activity and not  
                                                          
221
   In that case, adjudicating between those cases of thought production which were cases of 
divine thought control from cases which aren't might be decided by noting mismatches along various 
dimensions, say, between actual thought-content on the one hand and the cognitive agent's intention to 
think p at t on the other; and, additionally, by noting matches between actual thought content and the 
content intended by a deity.  
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metaphysically identical to the agent whose activity it is; rather, the agent is an 
extensionless pointlike entity.  In PM spatial extension is the phenomenon to be 
explained by reference to this extensionless pointlike entity; which is to say (in more 
Kantian terms) that the ground of a material body's individuality is an underlying 
agent and its extension-underwriting activity.  The motivating idea behind the view is 
that whereas the extended matter enclosed in a sphere of activity is divisible (to 
infinity), the extensionless pointlike agent of that activity is invulnerable to such 
division.  The principle of individuation (evidently not equivalent to an body's 
individuality222) is therefore understood in agential terms.223   
It is the activity, or the exercise of agency, by the agent-entity that appears to 
determine whether a set of effects (accidents) belong to its domain of intrasubstantial 
reality.  This idea is made more explicit in the Mrongovius transcript:  
Action can be derived from power, and other things from both; corresponding 
to it is suffering <passio; G; Leiden>.  The possibility of acting is faculty 
<facultas>, the possibility of suffering is receptivity <receptivitas>.  A 
substance, insofar is it contains the ground of that which belongs to the being 
of one thing, acts <agirt; G: handelt>; insofar as the ground of that which 
belongs to its own being is contained in another substance, it suffers 
                                                          
222
   For this conceptual nuance I am indebted to J.J. E. Gracia (1988).  Gracia distinguishes 
between an account of what individuality consists in from an explanation of how an entity comes to be 
an individual.  When we ask, 'What is it for an entity to be an individual?' we are asking for a model 
(or interpretation) of what individuality is. When we ask, 'Given x is an individual (under some model 
of what individuality consists in), in virtue of what does x possess individuality?' we are asking for a 
principle of individuation.  In the present context, the substitution instance of x is a material body and 
the interpretation of x's individuality is a bounded region of space.  Matter does not (according to 
Kant) have the resources to individuate itself; therefore, that in virtue of which a material body is a 
singular individual is due to something else, the activity of a pointlike agent, which is not itself 
spatially extended.  (The view resembles a view held by Leibniz, but I cannot elaborate on this point 
here.)  
 
223
   Later, in a post-Copernican context, rather than conceptualize these individuating agents 
as extensionless pointlike entities, Kant will distinguish between two domains, phenomenal 
(spatiotemporal) and noumenal, and relocate rational agents to the latter domain, which is not subject 
to space-time.    
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passively.  Every substance acts, because the subject subsists.  The predicates 
inhere in each substance, the accidents (which we call merely that) cannot 
exist other than in the substance, thus it contains the ground of something 
which belongs to existence, thus it acts.224  
 
In order to cognitively refer a set of effects to the domain of a separate substance, 
those effects need to be ones the affected substance can take partial credit for 
producing.  Since, it is only when conceptualized as the effect of something it does, 
that the affected substance can claim that effect as one belonging to its 
intrasubstantial domain.  Thus it is only if a set of accidents can be explanatorily 
linked to the exercise of x's causal agency that those accidents can be referred to x's 
(as opposed to y's or z's) domain of intrasubstantial reality.  Intuitively, this is 
because that which exercises x's causal agency cannot be any other entity than the 
agent-entity, x.  (Again, this is the internal agency condition on inherence, or the 
inherence condition, for short.)225  
On Kant's account, the issue over whether an accident is one a substance can 
claim as its own depends on whether that accident is an effect that the substance can 
bring about through the exercise of its own causal powers.  Concept-users would 
therefore appear to have a ground for differential predication, for referring some 
properties to one substance but not to another.  Consequently, if a plurality of 
substances are posited, concept-users are then able to intelligibly raise the issue over 
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 LM, Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29:773. 
 
225
  It is interesting to note a connection with Locke's political account of personal property, 
namely, that by "mixing my labor" with resources in the Common Realm (say, apples on a tree), a 
bushel of apples undergo a political transition from being as a publically usable resource to becoming 
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whether an effect (accident) belongs to this or that substance and whether those same 
effects originated internally or externally to a given substance.  On this view, then, 
Kant's interest in modeling the inherence relation on the relation between an agent 
and its actions or activity seems motivated by the aim of determining a conceptual 
basis for thinking of substances as singular individuals.  This aim is certainly one we 
can motivate within the interpretative framework suggested in the preceding section.  
Kant's interest in determining a principle of individuation reflects a larger concern 
over how to conceptualize the basic components of a world-whole.  It appears that the 
basic parts of a world are (in Kant's mind, anyway) substances conceptualized on the 
model of agents.   
 
6.4.1 Self-Activity And Substancehood   
In his lectures on metaphysics Kant says (or, at any rate, is on record as 
saying) that in order for something to be a substance it must be capable of self-
activity:  
We can never be merely passive, but rather every passion is at the same time 
action.  The possibility of acting is [a] faculty <facultas>, and of suffering 
receptivity <receptivitas>.  The latter always presupposes the former. Every 
substance is self-active, otherwise it could not be a substance; it can be 
suffering in one relation <respectu>, but can also be active in the same.  A 
merely suffering substance is a contradiction <contradictio>; otherwise it 
could not have any accidents.226 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
my personal property.   Similarly, a property (i.e., accident) becomes the property of a given substance 
(i.e., its possession) iff it is the effect of that substance's internal activity.   
 
226
 Ibid., 29:823. 
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In the next chapter I offer a more detailed analysis of Kant's use of the active/passive 
distinction.  For the present notice that Kant says, "a merely suffering substance is a 
contradiction" and then says, "otherwise it could not have any accidents."  What's the 
argument here?  First, Kant says in various places that we cannot know substances 
directly; rather we hypothesize their existence by reference to their accidents.  This is, 
however, an epistemic argument.  Kant seems to be making a conceptual point above.  
What does Kant mean by a "merely suffering substance'?  And how does  
hypothesizing that a substance is a merely suffering substance lead to a contradiction?  
Should Kant's claim that "otherwise it could not have any accidents" be read as a 
consequence of the reductio he's arguing or is it to be read instead as a premise of that 
reductio?   
Suppose that by a "merely suffering substance" Kant meant one that had no 
active powers, one where the active relation a substance's has to a set of effects is 
conceptually negated.  Since Kant appears (in the text above) to be explicating the 
active dimension of a substance's relation to a set of effects in terms of its self-
activity, it follows that to conceptually negate this active dimension would be 
equivalent to conceptually negating a substance's self-activity.  But Kant has just 
asserted that self-activity is a condition of substancehood.  Hence it would appear that 
a contradiction results directly.  So it would appear that Kant's assertion that 
"otherwise it could not have any accidents" isn't necessary to generate the reductio 
after all.  Instead, it would appear to be a consequence of the reductio, one that can 
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evidently succeed independently of it.  So why include this additional assertion, when 
it would seem that generating a contradiction is sufficient?   
There might be a way of incorporating the "otherwise it could have no 
accidents" remark more centrally into the reductio, however.  We could read it as the 
logical consequence of negating (what I have called) the inherence condition.  Then 
we could infer from Kant's remark that the negation of a substance's self-activity 
entails the negation of this condition. 
We could further conclude that the inherence condition constitutes the terms 
in which Kant defines (or, at any rate, explicates) the active dimension of a 
substance's relation to a set of effects.  If the active dimension of a substance's 
relation to a set of effects is conceptually negated, then (under Kant's account of 
suffering) we are conceptually negating the conditions under which any effects can be 
produced in (and owned by) that substance; in which case, in view of the fact that 
Kant models effects on accident inherence and says, in addition, that an accident may 
inhere in a given substance only if it is the effect of its internal activity, it follows that 
the substance whose active relation to a set of effects is conceptually negated is also a 
substance that would not (and, more fatally, could not) have any accidents.  But since 
a substance's existence is hypothesized on the basis of real (existing) accidents, a 
substance that could have no accidents would be one we have no reason to 
hypothesize exists.   
This sheds a somewhat different light on what (in Kant's mind, anyway) the 
contradiction is supposed to be.  It puts a somewhat pragmatic twist on it by 
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suggesting that Kant's point isn't merely to generate a logical contradiction but rather 
to display a conflict in cognitive aims.  Concepts are instruments used for cognitive 
purposes.  Conceptually, substances are supposed to be that in which accidents 
(properties or features) inhere.  From a more formal point of view, they are supposed 
to be the metaphysical counterpart to a logical construct, namely, the "logical subject 
of predication."  Under a conceptualization where accident inherence depends on the 
self-activity of the substance, one capable of producing effects (accidents) in itself, it 
appears to be this self-activity that allows substances to perform their conceptual (and 
thus cognitive) role.  To conceptually negate the mechanism (of self-activity) that 
makes accident inherence (thus differential predication) possible would therefore be 
to strip a substance of what makes it able to perform its cognitive role.     
 
6.5 External Activation Presupposes Internal Active Processes 
In a parallel discussion of the Mrongovius transcript Kant is more explicit 
about the external causal connection to a substance's suffering:  
The inner actions <actiones immanentes> [are those] which a substance 
produces in itself, [the] transeunt <transientes> [are those which] act upon 
another substance or [have] influence <influxes>.  The substance being acted 
upon <substantia patiens> is acting in itself <eo ipso agens>, for the accident 
would not inhere if the substance had no power through which it inhered in it, 
hence it also acts; influence <influxus> is therefore an unfitting expression, it 
implies that the accident migrated out of a substance.  What then is genuine 
passivity <passio>?  The acting substance <substantia agens> determines the 
power of the substance being acted upon <substantiae patientis> in order to 
produce this accident, therefore all passivity <passio> is nothing more than 
the determination of the power of the suffering substance by an external 
power.227 
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 Ibid., 29:823. 
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Here Kant introduces a pair of substances -- the "acting substance" and "the substance 
being acted upon."  As already observed, Kant conceptualizes a substance's 
"passivity" or "suffering" as an internal activity performed by the suffering-
substance; however, in this text Kant says that a suffering-substance's power to 
produce an accident in itself is "determined by" the causal power of a substance that 
is external to it.  Let x and y play the opposing roles of acting substance and 
substance acted upon, respectively.  Then, Kant seems to be asserting a causal 
structure of the following sort:   
(ActR): y suffers only if there exists an x such that x activates y's causal 
power.   
 
Under this requirement, y produces accidents in itself but only under the condition 
that there exists some other substance, x, one that activates y's internal accident-
producing activity.  We might aptly name this the external activation requirement 
(ActR).228  Here, we could also suggest a further nuance, namely, that x should be 
endowed with causal powers of the relevant sort, ones in virtue of which x is able to 
have some effect on y's internal operations.  This suggests that, for interaction to be 
possible, x and y's causal powers must be to a certain extent complementary.  (This 
issue will be raised shortly.)   
There are a number of important points to be made about the external  
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
228
  Various texts in Kant's first critique imply (or, at any rate, strongly suggest) he continued 
to conceptualize substances under this requirement.  In the famous opening sentences of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, for instance, Kant suggests a picture of human representational systems 
whereby their internal cognitive operations are "awakened" into action by an external stimulus.   
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activation requirement.  Notice, first, that what's being activated or enabled is the 
substances' internal operations, ones whereby it is able to produce accidents in itself.  
The external activation requirement is therefore a necessary (but not individually 
sufficient) for producing an accident in the suffering-substance; rather, the additional 
condition is something internal to the suffering-substance, y, namely y's causal 
powers (to produce accidents in itself).  Indeed, Kant seems to think that in order to 
conceptualize these operations as internal to y, y has to be the sort of entity in which 
these operations (as effects) can be staged or played out.  In other words, in order for 
these operations to be internal to y, concept-users must be able to cognitively refer 
these operations (considered as effects) to y (as opposed to a different substance z).  
But in order for differential cognitive reference229 to be possible, y must show up 
ontologically (in the minds of concept-users) as a causal agent in its own right, one 
capable of taking credit for producing these (internal) effects.   
In a parallel discussion Kant acknowledges the necessity of conceptualizing 
the suffering-substance as an individual causal agent:  
Action can be derived from power, and other things from both; corresponding 
to it is suffering <passio; G; Leiden>.  The possibility of acting is faculty 
<facultas>, the possibility of suffering is receptivity <receptivitas>.  A 
substance, insofar is it contains the ground of that which belongs to the being 
of one thing, acts <agirt; G: handelt>; insofar as the ground of that which 
belongs to its own being is contained in another substance, it suffers 
passively.  Every substance acts, because the subject subsists.  The predicates  
inhere in each substance, the accidents (which we call merely that) cannot  
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   Due to the fact that Kant models effects on accidents, what I am referring to as 
differential cognitive reference is really differential predication.   
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exist other than in the substance, thus it contains the ground of something 
which belongs to existence, thus it acts.230 
 
Reading this text in light of the others just analyzed, Kant seems to be saying this:  
Since effects are modeled on accidents, and accidents can be predicated only of 
individual substances, conceptualizing certain (externally activated) operations as 
being internal to y is equivalent to predicating the performance of certain activities to 
y.  But for this to be possible, concept-users must first conceptualize y as the sort of 
entity capable of producing these internal performances, namely, as a possessor and 
exerciser of causal agency;231 furthermore, the conceptualization of these operations 
as internal to y (as opposed to some other substance z) requires that y be 
acknowledged as the unique causal agent of those same operations.  A substance 
numerically distinct from y could therefore not be referred to under the descriptor 'the 
performer of operations internal to y', because only y can perform operations that are 
internal to y.232  The number of permissible substitution instances of y in this case is  
                                                          
 
230
 Ibid., 29:773. 
 
231
   Kant does not reduce substances to causal powers, however:  "Concerning power, it is to 
be noted: the author defines it as that which contains the ground of the inherence of the accidents; 
since accidents inhere in each substance, he concludes that every substance is a power.  That is 
contrary to all rules of usage: I do not say that substance is a power but rather that it has power, power 
is the relation <respectus> of the substance to the accidents, insofar as it contains the ground of their 
actuality, e.g.: I cannot say that the faculty of thinking within us is the substance itself -- the faculty 
belongs to it -- nor even [that] an accident of the thoughts is the accident.  We thus have something 
that is not substance, yet also not accident."  [29:771, Metaphysik Mrongovius, LM]  
 
232
   Stating it this way makes the proposition the sentence expresses appear tautological.  
What is, after all, meant by the locution 'internal to y'?  Wouldn't the content of 'internal to y' be 
conceptually explicated as those operations that only y could perform?  It is difficult to suppress the 
impression that the proposition being asserted here is also the same, or very similar, to the proposition 
that Kant later asserts in his first critique deductions, specifically the B Deduction, section 16.  There 
Kant argues for the conditions under which a content can be claimed as one's own, one of which is the 
cognitive agent's use of the 'I think'.  Only I could apply the 'I think' to my contents; or, a content 
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therefore exactly one, namely, the unique causal agent that is y.   
An everyday illustration of this requirement should amplify its intuitiveness.  
Think of home computer.  It's capable of performing various functions and operations 
(on command), but it can do so only if activated electronically; in order to perform its 
internal operations, the unit has to be plugged in.  However, the computer doesn't 
derive the capacity to perform these operations from the electrical wall outlet (or, 
more precisely, the city generator).  (If that were the case, then you could word-
process and balance Excel sheets on your toaster-oven.)  Notice that the effects 
produced by plugging the computer in, by activating it, are ones staged and played 
out in the computer (screen lights up, then becomes responsive to keyboard 
commands, etc.)  The electric current isn't directly responsible for these effects.  
Electricity is dumb; it cannot produce in a computer effects of a sort only a computer 
could produce.  Causal credit for these internal effects is therefore due to the 
computer's internal capability.    
 
6.5.1   Interaction As Reciprocal Influence 
So far I explicated Kant's account of suffering in terms of external activation 
of a substance's internal agency:  When externally activated a substance is induced 
into performing certain internal operations.  In view of the fact that the account of  
                                                                                                                                                                     
belongs to my mind iff the 'I think' can be applied to that content.  Who but me could ever be in a 
position to do so?  There can, of course, be ghost-writers for novels, but there can't be a ghost-agent 
who applies the 'I think' to contents of my mind on my behalf.  I cannot sub-contract performances 
(applications) of the 'I think' to a foreign agent and expect that the content it gets affixed to will also 
count as an intentional object for me.   
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suffering is to be embedded in the larger model of interaction, the issue can be raised 
over how to conceptualize the reciprocal causality implied by that model.  Should we, 
in other words, conceptualize interaction as merely bidirectional suffering?  Kant 
says, "[s]uffering obviously corresponds to influence" and then defines (or, at any 
rate, explicates) interaction as "reciprocal influence:"   
Action <actio> is either inner or transeunt <immanens ... transiens>.  If an 
inner action <actio immanens; G: innere Handlung> is performed, then one 
says: the substances activates.  Transeunt action <actio transiens> is also 
called influence <influxus; G: Einfluss>.  Suffering obviously corresponds to 
influence <influxus>, but not to inner action.  Suffering is the inherence of an 
accident <accidentis> of a substance by a power that is outside it.  Interaction 
is the relation of substances with reciprocal influence <commercium est 
relatio substantiarum mutuo influxu>.233 
 
In the text (cited above) Kant seems to be arguing the following:  
1) Suffering corresponds to influence (the receiver's end of it, anyway). 
2) Interaction is "reciprocal influence." 
3) Reciprocal influence is therefore reciprocal (two-way, not one-way) suffering.  
Since, under my interpretation, suffering (or influence) is explicated in terms of one 
substance's external activation of another's internal agency, and since interaction is 
reciprocal influence, the emerging model of interaction appears to be one where two 
(or more) substances, x and y, reciprocally activate each other's internal agency.   
Given that by providing a model of interaction Kant's aim is to provide a 
model of intersubstantial causation, why should interaction be modeled on two-way 
(not one-way) external activation?  If interaction is Kant's model of intersubstantial  
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 LM, Metaphysik L, 28:565. 
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causation, why wouldn't one-way activation would be sufficient?  If interaction meant 
one-way activation, then only one substance acts, another suffers.  If, however, 
interaction meant two-way activation, then two substances act; two also suffer.  Both 
cases would, however, count as intersubstantial causation in that the causal relation 
consists in one substance acting on another.  We can therefore pose the question why 
Kant models interaction on reciprocal external activation if all he wants to do is offer 
an account of intersubstantial causation.  Is there some other aim the model of 
interaction is intended to serve?  Under the assumption that there is, we can pose the 
further question whether (in Kant's mind, anyway) there exists some threat that 
motivates him to build causality of a two-way sort into his model of interaction.   
 
6.6 Reciprocal Activation As Antidote To Metaphysical Isolation 
As already remarked, absolute entirety (completeness) is one of three major 
conceptual requirements of the generic concept of a world.  That is, the world is an 
absolute whole, one that is not a part of another whole.  Since (according to Kant) 
anything represented as a world stands under the requirement of absolute wholehood, 
and since the parts of a world are substances, the conceptualization of a plurality of 
substance-parts requires reference to a relational structure ("form").  This relational 
structure would, of course, have to make it possible for substances to be connected so 
as to meet the wholehood requirement imposed by the concept of a world in general.  
So one issue is under what conceptualization of the relational structure would its 
membering relata (a plurality of substances) count as constituent parts of a single 
 217 
whole.  But since the concern over how to interpret a relational structure reflects a 
concern over how to conceptualize its contribution to the constitution of a world, the 
issue is not a purely mereological one; rather it is also a cosmological issue.   
In ID Kant seems to be acutely concerned with the question, 'In which 
sensible form, space or time, would a multitude of entities be connected as parts in 
such a way that the whole they jointly constitute counts as a world?'  In other words, 
under which interpretation, temporal or spatial, would the relational structure relate a 
plurality of substances in such a way that constitutes a world-whole?  In ID Kant's 
answer is explicit:  the interpretation under which the relational structure would be 
most world-like is a spatial one.   
Everything that is simultaneous in reciprocal relations belongs to a whole: 
contra vacuum [crossed out: separans] interrumpens (vacuum terminans); 
from this follows continuity [breaks off].234  
 
There are at least two reasons for Kant's prejudice against an exclusively temporal 
conceptualization of the world's relational structure.  First, under such an 
interpretation, a plurality of substance-parts appears to be unable to meet the entirety 
requirement of the concept of a world in general.  Second, under an exclusively 
temporal interpretation of the relational structure substance-parts could not coexist.  
(See diagram below.)  
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Diagram: (Which Sensible Form Is The Most World-Like?)   
Relational Structure        Plurality-Type235         Entirety Requirement       Coexistence  
A)  Temporal                      Diachronic parts                   No                                         No 
B)  Spatial                          Synchronic parts                   Yes                                        Yes 
 
My present aim is to elaborate on Kant's ID argument for dimension (A) in the 
Diagram above.  In ID Kant argues that:  
1) The world is an absolute (not a comparative) whole, meaning that it is a whole that 
is not a part of a larger one;  
2)  A successive series is, however, always part of a larger one; therefore, a world-
whole could never be constituted as a diachronic totality, because when 
conceptualized as such it could not be conceptualized as absolutely complete:   
Accordingly, there is no series of successive things except one which is part 
of another series.  It follows that, for this reason, comprehensive completeness 
or absolute totality seems to have been banished altogether here.236  
 
When conceptualized as a diachronic plurality, the world's substance-parts would not 
be    contemporaneous with each other; instead each part would exist successively to 
the other.  But this result evidently violates (in Kant's mind, anyway) a requirement 
imposed by the concept of a whole:  
For, although the notion of a part could be taken universally, and although all 
the things which are contained under this notion might constitute a single 
thing if they were regarded as posited in the same series, yet it seems to be 
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 In an effort not to rely too heavily on Kant-internal jargon, I have been using 'plurality' 
instead of 'manifold'.  So, under the heading of 'Plurality-Type', would fall two subtypes of manifold, 
diachronic and synchronic.   
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 ID, 2:392.   
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required by the concept of a whole that all these things should be taken 
simultaneously.237  
 
And, later, in the same paragraph Kant states:  
It may, perhaps, be thought that the difficulty which confronts the totality of a 
successive infinite does not apply in the case of a simultaneous infinite, 
because the simultaneity seems expressly to declare that there is a 
combination of all things at the same time.  But if a simultaneous infinite were 
admitted, one would also have to concede the totality of a successive infinite -
- for if the latter is denied, the former is also cancelled.  For a simultaneous 
infinite provides eternity with inexhaustible matter for progressing 
successively through its innumerable parts to infinity.  Yet this series, when 
completed with all its numbers, would be actually given in a simultaneous 
infinite, and, thus, a series which could never be completed by successive 
addition could nevertheless be given as a whole.238  
  
One thing is abundantly clear from these texts.  It is this: that whereas a "successive  
infinite" does not meet the entirety (or absolute completeness) requirement imposed 
by the concept of a world in general, a "simultaneous infinite" does.  In other words, 
a diachronic plurality of substance-parts is not able (according to Kant) to meet the 
entirety requirement, whereas a synchronic plurality is able to meet this requirement.   
A number of issues arise here.  First, assuming Kant's argument is sound, how 
does the issue over whether a strictly temporally defined relational structure meets the 
entirety requirement of the concept of a world in general translate into an issue over 
metaphysical isolation?  Second, from where does Kant derive the concept of a whole 
that mandates that all of a whole's parts must exist at the same time?  Is this concept 
contained in the concept of a world in general?  It would seem that this concept  
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derives from the concept of space, unless there is some other, more basic conceptual 
content here, that, while not itself contained in the concept of space is nevertheless 
intimately linked to that concept.  But what concept could this be?  It is my 
contention that Kant's model of interaction is largely motivated by the intention to 
avert the threat of metaphysical isolation.  My present aim is therefore to show how 
the concern with meeting the entirety requirement is connected to the concern to 
avoid metaphysical isolation.   
Notice that the argument above is stated in largely ontological terms, meaning 
that any or all reference to space and time (and the substance-parts located in these 
relational structures) as representational contents is entirely suppressed.  In this 
argument Kant appears to be treating space and time as if they were real ontological 
structures of the world.  However, as early as ID both space and time are (in Kant's 
view) "subjective and ideal."  The apparent ontological orientation of this argument is 
therefore not intended to contradict the ideality and subjectivity of space and time; 
rather it should be taken to indicate the angle from which Kant is comparing the two 
interpretations of relational structure, one from which each is being assessed for its 
suitability to serve as the internal representation of the world's real relational 
structure.  We will make more use of this observation shortly. 
 
6.6.1   Why Metaphysically Isolated? 
As remarked, the concept of a world in general imposes the entirety (or 
completeness) requirement.  The basic idea is this:  Under an exclusively temporal 
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conceptualization, the relational structure would make it ontologically impossible for 
all the world's substance-parts to coexist: for every currently existing substance-part 
there would (and could) be no contemporary; each substance-part would therefore be 
metaphysically isolated from the other substance-parts.  Indeed, if time were the 
essential relational structure of the world, then absolute completeness would be 
impossible; in which case one (of three) conceptual requirements imposed by the 
concept of a world could not be met.  Assuming that the intensional components of 
the concept of a world are all necessary, it follows that under an exclusively temporal 
conceptualization of the world's relational structure, no world-whole could exist, 
because (under this interpretation) time's necessary successiveness would make it 
impossible for the world's substance-parts to exist all at once.  Under an exclusively 
temporal conceptualization of its relational structure, the world would therefore be 
chronically incomplete, thereby violating one (of three) conceptual requirements 
imposed by the concept of a world in general.   
Why, exactly, would substances be metaphysically isolated?  Substance-parts 
would of course be temporally isolated because each one would be assigned an 
absolutely unique temporal position in either of three (mutually exclusive) tenses -- 
past, present, and future.  And because no part of time can be concurrent with any 
other temporal part (owing to time's necessary successiveness), a substance-part's 
present-tense existence implies that it is not only temporally but also metaphysically 
isolated from all other substance-parts.  Substances whose temporal positions are set 
in the past do not exist; those whose temporal positions are set in the future do not 
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exist; therefore, any substance-part that exists in the present is flanked by substances 
that belong to a domain of nonexistence, either those that have been (but don't 
currently exist) or those that will be (but don't currently exist).   
You might reasonably ask why a plurality of substance-parts cannot exist at 
(or, more precisely, in) the same time? Why, in other words, can't two or more 
substances be assigned the same position in time?  A detailed discussion of this issue 
cannot be given here.  Suffice it to say that (according to Kant) the cognitive 
acknowledgement of several entities as a plurality requires the capacity to count.   
We cognize a multitude successively, we cognize a multitude by adding one 
to one <unum uni addendo multitudinem cognoscimus>, i.e., through 
counting, thus with every number a multitude is present ... For number 
<numeris> is indeed a multitude cognized by counting (by adding one to 
one).239  
 
But Kant thinks, in addition, that there is a dependency relation between the cognitive 
operation of counting (one potato, two potato, three potato...) and the successive 
structure of time:     
No one can define the concept of magnitude in general except by something 
like this:  That it is the determination of a thing through which it can be 
thought how many units are posited in it.  Only this how-many-times is 
grounded on successive repetition, thus on time and the synthesis (of the 
homogeneous) in it.240 
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Thus counting is (in Kant's mind, anyway) a cognitive operation that is intrinsically 
successive; time is therefore the condition under which counting performances are 
possible. 
The ontologically-oriented ID argument reconstructed above (which relies 
exclusively on precritical texts) can be seen to have a critical counterpart in a more 
cognition-oriented first critique context, where a parallel line of reasoning can be 
plausibly constructed in light of Kant's model of counting.  Let x be a material 
composite.  In order to discursively represent x as a material composite, x must be 
represented under the (schematized) category of number.  But for x to be 
mathematizable, x must be representable as a plurality of parts.  According to Kant it 
stands to reason that each of these parts must be counted and so each will demand 
separate representation. 
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be 
represented as such [as a manifold] if the mind did not distinguish the time in 
the succession of impressions on one another; for as contained in one moment 
no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity.241 
 
In order to represent an intuited manifold ('manifold' meaning 'plurality') as 
something242 plurally constituted, each of its several constituents (or "elements")  
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  Indeed it may be more accurate to say:  as one thing plurally constituted:  "Understanding 
is, generally speaking, the faculty of cognitions. These consists in the determinate relation of given 
representations to an object.  An object, however, is that in the concept of which the manifold of a 
given intuition is united" [B 137].  Under Kant's model of cognition, the intentional object of a 
cognitive state is always a whole, or, at any rate, something composite: a complex content.  (For an 
interpretation of Kant's view of the mind along these lines, see Dickerson's Kant on Representation 
and Objectivity.)  According to the Axioms of Intuition, all objects of empirical cognition must be 
mathematizable; that is, they must be subsumable under the categorial concept of number.   
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must receive separate representational billing in my first-personally structured 
intentional awareness.  Counting each (of a plurality of) parts would therefore involve 
cognizing a series of temporally-positioned representational states in which exactly 
one part is the singular referent of each successive state.  But since past times and 
future times do not exist, it follows that the counting performances I made at earlier 
times and the ones I will make at later times do not exist, either.  (And unless there is 
a transtemporal counting-self in whose memory banks these prior counting 
performances are stored, they are entirely lost to me.  But, in the present context, let's 
not focus on the counting but rather on the counted.)  Under an exclusively temporal 
interpretation of the relational structure, there would be no domain of existence where 
the multiple singular referents (generated by my counting performances) could 
accumulate into a mathematizable aggregate because each part (along with my 
counting performance) would pass out of existence the moment its successor was 
counted.  (Think, analogously, of trying to accumulate a pile of dry leaves on the 
surface of moving stream.)  Kant uses reasoning along these lines to argue for the 
necessity of a nonexclusively temporal relational structure (space), one where the 
synchronic accumulation of counted parts is possible.  [Maybe this paragraph is better 
as footnote.]   
We cannot represent any number except through successive enumeration in 
time and then grasping this multiplicity together in the unity of a number.  
This latter, however, cannot happen except by my placing them beside one 
another in space: for they must be conceived as given simultaneously, i.e., as 
taken together in one representation, otherwise this multitude does not 
constitute a magnitude (number); but it is not possible to cognize simultaneity 
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except insofar as, beyond my action of grasping it together, I can apprehend 
(not merely think) the multiplicity as given both forwards and backwards.243 
 
If an exclusively temporal interpretation were imposed on the world's relational 
structure, then concept-users would be forced to assign the world's parts to different 
(unique) temporal positions.  In that case, the world's prospective substance-parts 
would constitute a diachronic (not a synchronic) plurality.  This does not, however, 
imply that these substances would be causally isolated.  We could therefore 
conceptually map cause/effect relations over temporal before/after relations.244  This 
suggestion would certainly not be foreign to Kant, since this is precisely what he does 
in the first critique's Second Analogy.  On this suggestion, interaction would be 
modeled in terms of one-way (not two-way) suffering (explicated as external 
activation).  Although a substance-part whose existence is assigned to a unique 
temporal position could never exist contemporaneously with any other temporal part 
(owing to time's necessary successiveness), one substance could (in Kant's mind, 
anyway) produce an effect in another substance at the moment its existence is 
temporally succeeded by the existence of the causally affected substance.   
We've just seen how two or more substances in an exclusively temporally 
defined relational structure cannot exist as contemporaries but nonetheless can be 
                                                          
 
243
 NF, 18:616-17. 
 
244
 Of course more conditions would be required, one of which is that causal relations are 
norm-governed.  The criterion for objective one-way causal relations is the (counterfactual) 
nonreversability of the (de facto) event sequence.  Kant's famous example is that of a ship flowing 
down river.  Of course we have to build in more conditions here also, one of which is that boat doesn't 
have an out-board motor.  In the absence of any power of self-locomotion, boats must travel in the 
same direction as the body of water in which they are afloat.   
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causally related.  So Kant's beef with an exclusively temporally defined relational 
structure must be due to something else, given that the causal structure would still be 
(unidirectionally) in tact under this conceptualization.  This suggests that it's not 
causal but rather metaphysical isolation that Kant views as the primary threat.  
Metaphysical isolation is the opposite of what Kant repeatedly refers to as 
"coexistence" or "presence."   
The representation of space is nothing imaginary that is related merely to the 
subject (all-embracing), but is rather a condition for representing outer things 
and a means for ordering them.  The order is in accordance with inner form.  
     The omnipresence of space and the eternity of time.  That space is always 
present, i.e., it is itself the condition of all presence, for through it is presence 
cognized.   
     The former means that we cannot intuit anything as present except insofar 
as it is somewhere in space.245 
 
Substances that have comembership in one world are "present" to one another.  In 
this section the aim has been to show how, under an exclusively temporal 
interpretation of the relational structure, a plurality of substances would be 
metaphysically isolated.  In the next section the aim is twofold: first, to show how, 
under an extratemporal interpretation of the relational structure, a plurality of 
substances can be conceptualized as coexisting parts of one whole and, second, to 
clarify the link between this extratemporal interpretation and the concept of 
reciprocal interaction.    
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6.6.2   Interaction and the Representation of Space       
Above it was observed that Kant's prejudice against an exclusively temporal 
interpretation of the relational structure reflects his concern with conceptualizing an 
internal representational correlate for the world's real form.  We have just seen that it 
is a spatial (not exclusively temporal) interpretation of the relational structure that he 
thinks is required.  Only under a spatial interpretation is a plurality of substance-parts 
able to exist at the same time (and so fulfill the entirety requirement).  Space makes it 
possible for a plurality of substance-parts to coexist, to be "present" to each other.  
Time, however, fails in both these respects.  This might be taken to suggest that 
simultaneity relations (among the members of a plurality) are world-constituting 
relations that they are relations in which a plurality of entities must stand in order to 
constitute a world.  But in view of Kant's "space is in us" thesis, the cognition of 
simultaneity relations is not epistemically equivalent to the cognition of a mind-
independent order of spatially coordinated entities.   
Space does, however, play a vitally important role in Kantian epistemology.  
Space is, after all, a "sensible form" (ID) or "sensible form of outer intuition" (CPuR).  
Viewed as such space is the condition under which representational systems such as 
ours can be sensorily affected.  Indeed Kant says externality (to our representational 
systems) is to be explicated in terms of spatiality.  Concept-users' cognition of 
simultaneity relations would therefore appear to amount to the cognition of an 
internal representation of something external.  What would this "something external" 
be?  Kant's answer is fairly explicit in ID:  
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Accordingly, the following question, which can only be solved by the 
understanding, remains untouched, namely:  what is the principle upon which 
this relation of all substances itself rests, and which, when seen intuitively, is 
called space?  The hinge, then, upon which the question about the principle of 
the form of the intelligible world turns in this:  to explain how it is possible 
that a plurality of substances should be in mutual interaction with each other, 
and in this way belong to the same whole, which is called a world.  We are 
not here contemplating the world in respect of its matter, that is to say, in 
respect of the natures of the substances of which it consists, whether they are 
material or immaterial.  We are contemplating the world in respect of its form, 
that is to say, in respect of how, in general, a connection between a plurality 
of substances comes to be, and how a totality between them is brought 
about.246 
 
The picture emerging here is that there are two relational structures, or, at any rate, 
two interpretations of the world's relational structure -- one spatial the other causal -- 
the first being entirely subjective (or "in us"), while the other being an objective 
mind-independent world-constituting relational structure.  (See Diagram below.)  
Notice that under a causal interpretation the relational structure is explicitly 
conceptualized as "mutual interaction," as two-way (not one-way) causation.  
Diagram 6.6.2:  
Relational Structure        Form-Type         Faculty Affiliate              Ontological Status               
Spatial                             Sensible              Sensibility                        Ideal (Subjective) 
Causal (Interaction)        Intelligible          Understanding                  Real  (Objective)  
 
A number of issues arise here.  One issue is over how to conceptualize the relation 
between the relational structure under a spatial interpretation and the relational 
structure under a (two-way) causal interpretation.  In the text (cited above) Kant 
appears to be concerned with explaining one relational structure by reference to the 
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other.  Specifically, Kant appears to be explaining the spatially conceptualized 
relational structure by reference to one that is causally conceptualized.  Since one is 
"in us" the other not, Kant is explaining the appearance or internal representation of 
a spatially interpreted relational structure by reference to a (two-way) causally-
defined relational structure.  Since the relational structure the world really has is a 
causal one, Kant's point seems to be that space is the internal representation of an 
external (two-way) causal structure.247   
In fact the concept of interaction appears to do double duty.  It provides, in 
ontological terms, the conditions under which a real (as opposed to a merely ideal) 
whole is possible; which is to say that it is used to conceptually explicate the 
conditions under which a real world-whole is possible, one in which a plurality of 
substance-parts are actually connected.   
    The connection <nexus> is ideal if I merely think the substances together, 
and real if the substances actually stand in interaction <commercio>.  
     The form of the world is a real connection <nexus realis> because it is a 
real whole <totum reale>.  For if we have a multitude of substances, then 
these must also stand together in connection, otherwise they would be 
isolated.  Isolated substances, however, never constitute a whole <totum>.  If 
the substances are together, thus a whole <totum>, then they must also be a 
real whole <totum reale>.  For were they ideal, then surely they could be 
represented in thought as a whole <totum>, or the representations of them 
would constitute a whole <totum>; but things in themselves would still not 
constitute a whole on this account.248 
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 In a first critique context, the concept of reciprocal interaction undergoes a transition in 
ontological status: whereas in ID its status can plausibly be read as real mind-independent relational 
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categories of the understanding."  Viewed in the latter sense, reciprocal interaction describes the 
relational structure of the phenomenal world, that is, the world as it is represented in human cognitive 
systems.  In ID, however, Kant seems to think that the causal order is really mind-independent.  But I 
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But the concept of interaction appears, in addition, to function along another, more 
epistemic, dimension.  It is used to explicate the (or, at any rate, a) condition under 
which cognitive reference to a world is possible:  
Substances are reckoned to the world, insofar as they stand in real connection 
<in nexu reali> and thus in interaction <commercio>.  The aggregation of the 
substances in which there is no community still does not constitute a world.  
Reciprocal determination, the form of the world as a composite, <compositi>, 
rests on the interaction <commerico>.249 
 
The concept of interaction’s double uses (the ontological and the cognitive) appears 
to merge in the first critique.  In the Third Analogy, Kant seems to think that, by 
using the "[p]rinciple of simultaneity, according to the law of interaction, or 
community," concept-users are in an epistemic position to regard the internal 
representation of space (of simultaneity relations) as an indicant of an external 
(world-constituting) causal structure.   
All substances, insofar as they can be perceived in space as simultaneous, are 
in thoroughgoing interaction.250   
 
*The unity of the world-whole, in which all appearances are to be connected, 
is obviously a mere conclusion from the tacitly assumed principle of the 
community of all substances that are simultaneous:  for, were they isolated, 
they would not as parts constitute a world, and were their connection 
(interaction of the manifold) not already necessary on account of simultaneity, 
then one could not infer from the latter, as a merely ideal relation, to the 
former, as a real one.  Nevertheless we have shown, in its proper place [in the 
Third Analogy], that community is really the ground of the possibility of an 
empirical cognition of coexistence, and that one therefore really only infers 
from the latter back to the former, as its condition.251 
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Kant seems to be giving a set of possibility-conditions for simultaneity relations.  
Since relations of this sort are possible only under a spatial interpretation of the 
relational structure, it would therefore appear that coexistence is also possible only 
under such an interpretation.   
This text requires some careful nuancing.  Kant seems to be saying that 
coexistence is cognitively simulable in human systems because they are capable of 
representing simultaneity relations; he is not, however, saying that coexistence is 
possible only because simultaneity relations are cognitively simulable.   
The connection <nexus> is ideal if I merely think the substances together, and 
real if the substances actually stand in interaction <commercio>.252 
 
Coexistence is supposed to be a property or feature of things in the real world; space 
represents how systems like ours subjectively compute that coexistence.  In view of  
the evident isomorphy between interaction and the representation of space 
(simultaneity relations)—that they both require coexistence—Kant's view seems to be 
(plausibly enough) that the mind's empirical representation of space is a function of 
its aim to represent multiple singular objects under the concept of interaction (= the 
understanding's category of community).  It would therefore appear that the 
representation of multiple entities in space is the system's "sensible" interpretation of 
this "intelligible" causal structure.   
Suppose, however, that the concept of coexistence were to be conceptually  
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analyzed wholly in terms of space.  On this hypothesis, space (simultaneity relations) 
would constitute the analysans, and it would be only in these terms that we could 
meaningfully think coexistence.  Under the current scenario it would therefore be 
impossible for Kant to conceptually engineer other independent and nonspatial terms 
in which coexistence could be thought.  On Kant's model of human representational 
systems, we must of course perceptually compute coexistence in terms of space.  But, 
on my view, the whole point of his model of interaction is to provide a conceptual 
template, one that can explanatorily underwrite the empirical representation of a 
single cross-referable space.  But if this is the point of the model, then the concept of 
coexistence cannot be intensionally analyzed exclusively in spatial terms; rather there 
needs to be other semi-independent253 and nonspatial terms in which to think 
coexistence (ones that refer to a causal structure of a certain type), so that when our 
perceptual systems undertake to represent two or more entities under these terms, the 
sensory result is an empirical representation of space. Only then would it make sense 
to use space (or the empirical representation of it) as a means to epistemically 
triangulate on an external something254 (a real causal structure) and consequently  
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  I use 'semi-independent' because according to Kant the pure categories are mere 
nonreferring thought forms when considered independently of schemata; however, that these schemata 
have different content is owing to the formal content of the correlative category.  So the category 
obviously makes some, even if formal, conceptual contribution on Kant's view; otherwise how could 
you explain the differential in schemata?   
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 In a Copernican context, intra-phenomenal mind-externality is not equivalent to absolute 
mind-independence.  Since externality (to our representational systems) is to be explicated as 
spatiality, intraphenomenal externality is to be explicated in narrower terms, as externality to my first-
personally structured phenomenal awareness, that is, to my individual embodied cognitive system.  The 
basic idea here is that the Third Analogy principle is to be used, in a first-personally structured setting, 
such that in following it I can regard my perceptual contents as referring to an order of entities that 
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make an (a priori) judgment255 about the coexistence of multiple entities.   
What Kant is saying here is therefore similar to what he claimed earlier in ID.  
Kant is (in the Third Analogy) conceptualizing a causal structure as the condition 
under which space (simultaneity relations) are possible.  The causal structure 
hypothesized to explanatorily underwrite (the cognition of) simultaneity relations is 
therefore the same one hypothesized in ID, namely, "real relations" conceptualized in 
terms of two-way (not one-way) interaction.  Finally, it's clear from the text (cited 
above) that Kant thinks that the world's substance-parts do stand under the threat of 
metaphysical isolation:  Were the possibility conditions of the representation of space 
to go unmet, the empirical cognition of coexistence (= the representation of a 
spatially extended all-encompassing physical environment) would not be possible.   
                                                                                                                                                                     
exist synchronically; which is to say that these spatial entities must co-exist in the same domain and so 
be "external" to me.  The Third Analogy principle is therefore one the system uses as a cognitive 
means of contrasting the representation of its own individual subjectivity (computed solely in terms of 
temporally successive states) against its "objective" representation of externality (space).  And this is 
made possible by conceptualizing my phenomenal self as an embodied cognitive system, one that is 
differentially positioned in public space.  However, since my sensible representation of space is 
chronically perspectival (thus always partial), the representation of a world-whole must be 
supplemented with an additional (intellectual) faculty, one that can conceive of space in public 
(nonperspectival) terms, namely, as an "objective" causal structure (see also 11.2-4).  Kant explicates 
objectivity in terms of "necessary universal validity."  See Ginsborg (1990) for an illuminating 
analysis of this claim in the context of her cognitive-oriented interpretation of Kant's third critique.   
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 It is not clear to me whether this judgment expresses an inference.  In the Refutation of 
Idealism (and elsewhere) Kant insists that we have immediate cognition of external (= spatial) entities; 
we do not have to make inferences to their existence (as Descartes says).  In light of this, I tend to 
think that the judgment being made on the basis of the Third Analogy principle is not inferential; 
rather it expresses a more intimate cognitive link between simultaneity relations and the concept of 
interaction, one that is possibly supposed to operate subpersonally, but which concept-users can 
become cognitively aware of in a way analogous to, say, becoming aware of the respiratory functions 
of their autonomic nervous system.  Similarly, you, on the personal level of description, don't have to 
consciously form these judgments (about coexistence); rather your representational system operates 
subpersonally under this (Third Analogy) principle; you can, however, become aware of this cognitive 
operation and its guiding principle and cognitively join in (as you might by voluntarily engaging your 
respiration).  I offer these observations as mere conjecture here.    
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And because Kant explicitly includes reciprocal interaction among these possibility 
conditions, this fact can plausibly be taken as confirmation that he considers a model 
of interaction to be what's necessary to avert the threat of metaphysical isolation.   
 
6.7  Kant's Alternative:  The Model of Interaction 
Prior analyses of Kant's account of suffering has so far generated the 
following list of components:   
a)  the internal agency condition on accident inherence (the inherence condition) 
b)  the uniqueness condition on the exercise of agency   
c)  the external activation requirement 
Recall Kant models effects on accidents, or, more precisely, on accident inherence.  
The inherence condition says that an accident can inhere in a given substance 
provided that the accident is the effect of the substance's internal agency processes.  
The uniqueness condition applies to substances so long as they are conceptualized on 
the model of agents.  It says that there is exactly one agent per substance, that is, a 
single possessor and exerciser of causal power per substance.  The external activation 
requirement says that a substance suffers only if the accident it produces (in itself) is 
one it would not have been able to produce had its internal operations not been 
externally activated to do so by another substance.  Since, under my interpretation, 
suffering (or influence) is explicated in terms of one substance's external activation of 
another's internal agency, and since interaction is reciprocal influence, the emerging 
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model of interaction appears to be one where two (or more) substances, x and y, 
reciprocally activate each other's internal agency. (See 3.5.1 for textual support.)   
In section (4.6) the reciprocal (two-way) causality component of interaction 
was motivated from within the interpretative framework suggested in 4.3.  However 
no further analysis of the this component was offered.  In the following sections, the 
aim is to provide an initial analysis of the two-way causality component of the model 
of interaction.   
 
6.8 The Meat of the Model  
In the extended Herder text (cited above), Kant appears to be asserting the 
external activation requirement but with a different twist:  
An accident thus inheres by its own power, which contains the sufficient inner 
ground of it yet also by external power, thus by an outer ground of inherence 
without which it would not have inhered.  Now properly no substance can 
contain the ground of the accident of the other, if it does not at the same time 
contain the ground of the substantial power and of the existence of the 
other.256 
 
Notice that in this text Kant appears to add something new to his account.  He says: 
"Now properly no substance can contain the ground of the accident of the other, if it 
does not at the same time contain the ground of the substantial power and of the 
existence of the other."  Compared to the Mrongovius transcript's parallel statement, 
this appears to be a somewhat stronger formulation of the condition under which a 
substance "suffers."  In view of the fact that Kant has italicized the entire sentence  
                                                          
256
 LM, Metaphysik Herder, 28:52.   
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(cited above), it's evident he considers it to be of some importance to his account of 
suffering, and, by extension, to his model of interaction.  Getting a better semantic 
grasp on the italicized statement will therefore likely shed light on both.   
Understanding the propositional content of Kant's (italicized) assertion 
depends partially on grasping the lexical terms used, partially on tackling internal 
reference issues.  (Internal reference issues are examined in the next paragraph.)  
With regard to the former, we need to make it more explicit what Kant means when 
he says of a substance that it contains the ground of a substance's "substantial power 
and existence."   
In regard to Kant's use of the terms "substantial power and existence," it has 
already been shown (or, at any rate, plausibly suggested) that Kant conceptualizes 
substances generally on the model of agents, as possessors and exercisers of causal 
powers.  We can therefore hypothesize that Kant's use of 'substantial power' is  
intended to refer to a substance's causal powers.  But Kant says of a substance that it 
contains not only the ground of a substance's (leaving the reference open) "substantial 
power" but also its "existence."  Clarifying what Kant means when he says that a 
substance contains the latter must wait until we have tackled the internal reference 
issues.   
As remarked, getting a better grasp of the content of Kant's (italicized) 
assertion depends partially on ironing out internal reference issues.  There are two 
expressions in the italicized sentence above whose reference is ambiguous, namely, 
the first use of 'it' and the last use of 'other'.  Disambiguating the use of these terms 
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leads to two formulations of Kant's assertion.  Let x and y be different substances and 
let A be an accident.  Then Kant's assertion can be disambiguated as follows:  For 
some accident A inhering in y, x cannot contain the ground of A's inherence in y if:  
1)  x doesn't "at the same time contain the ground of the substantial power and of the 
existence of the other."   
2)  y doesn't "at the same time contain the ground of the substantial power and of the 
existence of the other."   
The referent of 'other' here is not likely the accident inhering in the substance but 
rather another substance.  But which?  The referent of 'other' depends on which 
formulation, of course.  Under (1), 'other' refers most plausibly to y; under (2) 'other' 
refers most plausibly to x.  Under (1) Kant is saying that x cannot be the ground of 
A's inhering in y unless x also contains the ground of y's substantial power and 
existence.  Under (2), Kant is saying that x cannot be the ground of A's inhering in y 
unless y (a different substance) contains the ground of x's substantial power and 
existence.   
Is there a significant difference between these two formulations?  The 
difference between (1) and (2) may be plausibly explicated along the dimension of 
who is dependent on whom for its causal efficacy.  According to (1), because x 
contains the "substantial power and existence" of y, it is ultimately x itself that 
contains the condition under which its own causal efficacy (concerning y) is possible.  
Under (1) y appears therefore to originate no causal contribution:  it owes both its 
causal efficacy and existence to x.  The conditions of x's causal efficacy regarding y 
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are therefore (rather oddly) self-referential -- oddly, because Kant is supposed to be 
constructing a model of interaction.  This suggests ('implies' being too strong here) a 
view of x and y's relation under which y is metaphysically engulfed by x. Notice, 
however, that under (2) it is y (not x) that contains the ground of x's substantial power 
and existence and that y's doing so is the condition under which x can causally 
interact with y.  This point merits emphasis.  Under (2) it is y (or something about y) 
that is the condition under which x's causal efficacy (concerning y) is possible.  
Under (2) the condition of x's causal efficacy (concerning y) is therefore not 
ultimately self-referential; which means that the condition of x's causal efficacy 
(concerning y) does not ultimately derive from itself but rather from a different 
substance, namely, y.    
 
6.9   Which Formulation Should We Accept?  
Under this initial analysis do we have any reason to favor one formulation 
over the other?  The issue over which formulation should be accepted can be 
approached textually by determining whether there is any Herder-internal text 
indicating Kant's preference for one or the other; or, it may be determined by 
reference to other (Kant-internal) texts; or, finally, the issue may be approached (and 
plausibly settled) by hypothesizing implicit assertions or propositional commitments 
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from either of the first two textual approaches.  In this section, I will adopt only the 
first of these approaches.257     
Is there anything internal to the extended Herder text (from which Kant's 
italicized statement is excerpted) that indicates which formulation, (1) or (2), Kant 
intends?  For starters, we can approach this question by examining the context in 
which the italicized statement occurs:     
An accident thus inheres by its own power, which contains the sufficient inner 
ground of it yet also by external power, thus by an outer ground of inherence 
without which it would not have inhered.  Now properly no substance can 
contain the ground of the accident of the other, if it does not at the same time 
contain the ground of the substantial power and of the existence of the other:  
I cannot become the ground of a thought in another if I am not at the same 
time the ground of the power that produces the thoughts: in this manner God 
is the ground   If two substances are in interaction <in commercio>, the two 
depend on a third, so their powers are harmonious with one another: they 
stand in connection and relation, on account of the third substance which is 
the ground of both, and has willed a connection <nexus>.  E.g., the existence 
of the action of another does not depend simply one action and one power.  
Thus all predicates must be produced by one's own power, but since an 
external power is also required externally: then a third must have willed this 
harmony (established harmony <harmonia stabilita>).  This connection 
<nexus> is between created beings, because the two in interaction <in 
commercio> must depend on a third.258 
 
                                                          
257
  The second (and third) approach just listed will be pursued in future research.  In 
"Interaction As Category of the Understanding," (in progress) the aim will be to embed the model of 
interaction in the epistemic context of the first critique.  In this first critique context, the issue is over 
whether the model of interaction (as I have reconstructed it) is conceptually encoded in a category of 
the understanding, specifically, "the category of community" (CAT 3.3).  Suppose it is.  Then (by 
hypothesis) we could expect it to be shown (or, at any rate, plausibly suggested) that if the enterprise 
of the Third Analogy requires the category of community to perform certain epistemic (or cognitive) 
roles, then the issue over whether the model of interaction is conceptually encoded in this category 
could be decided by whether the model is able to perform in the way required of the category of 
community.  If the model of interaction succeeds in performing the epistemic roles assigned to the 
category of community (in the Third Analogy), its success in performing these roles could plausibly be 
taken as further confirmation of the model. 
     
258
 LM, Metaphysik Herder, 28:52.   
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Notice, first, that immediately following the italicized statement previously analyzed, 
Kant hypothesizes the existence of a "third substance," namely God.  Because the 
statement of this hypothesis is also italicized, we can infer Kant considers the 
proposition it expresses to be of some importance to the model of interaction he is 
constructing.  In fact, the hypothesis expressed by the second italicized statement 
constitutes what I have called inference (A) of Kant's explanatory Model.  (An 
analysis of and textual support for the inference structure of Kant's Model has already 
been provided.  For details see chapter 3.)  The inference Kant is describing proceeds 
from a plurality of substances embedded in a relational structure to the hypothesis of 
some third thing (here being referred to as God).  As we have seen, however, it is the 
idea or conception of a whole that is hypothesized. (God is hypothesized also because 
some intentional agent, both smart enough and powerful enough, is necessary to 
engineer and execute the idea of a world-whole.259)  
Analysis of the text above yields the following three main components: 
a)  the first italicized statement 
b)  the second italicized statement  
                                                          
 
259
 The intentional agent hypothesized here must also be good enough (indeed morally 
perfect).  This is because in order for the entirety of nature's products to constitute a world-whole, its 
products must be subordinate to the "absolute final end of nature" (AFE).  Kant argues (in the third 
critique) that the only end that could fit the bill of this description is a morally-specified one, namely, 
the end of being a morally-free agent subject to the categorical imperative.  In the third critique, Kant 
argues that the absolute final end of nature is "the highest good in the world" -- a morally-endorsed 
happiness.  Under the morally-specified AFE, the intention to create a world-whole is to produce one 
where the moral law would be empirically actionable, where morally sanctioned ends could be set, 
staged, and played out in nature.  Any intentional agent hypothesized to be the cause of the world-
whole would therefore have to be smart enough to engineer a conception of it; powerful enough to 
execute that conception, and, finally, good enough to create a world under the guidance of a morally-
specified AFE.   
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c)  Kant's commentary on the first italicized statement (underscored text). 
In (a) Kant offers us with a description of the (two-way) causal structure between two 
or more substances; this description, or conceptualization, is what provides the meat 
of the model of interaction.  Notice, further, that under this description, two or more 
substances x and y are embedded in a two-way causal structure, one where their 
interrelations are of a sort "to depend on a third" (the idea or conception of a whole).  
As just remarked, I think that (b), the second italicized statement, expresses inference 
(A) in Kant's Model.  What we are therefore seeing here is the assignment of a 
functional role to the model of interaction, one that is conceptualized within the 
larger framework of Kant's Model.  Putting the issue over its precise content aside for 
the moment, the model of interaction's function within Kant's Model appears to be 
this:  to provide a conceptualization under which two or more substances, x and y, are 
interrelated in such a way as to require concept-users to hypothesize "some third 
thing" (= idea or conception of a whole).   
The question now is therefore this:  Given this assignment of its functional 
role, what content would the model of interaction have to have in order to succeed in 
fulfilling it?  In other words, which formulation above, (1) or (2), is conceptually 
more suited to providing a description of x and y's causal relations as the basis on 
which to hypothesize an idea or conception of a whole?260   
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   This is certainly the larger interpretative issue to which the model of interaction is 
answerable; however, we won't be in a position to see how the model performs in relation to this issue 
until later, when the model is completed. 
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We can read (c), Kant's commentary on the first italicized statement, in light 
of the question just posed.  Notice (in the underscored text) that when Kant says "[t] 
hus all predicates must be produced by one's own power," he appears to be 
acknowledging (what I have called) the inherence condition.  But Kant also says, "the 
existence of the action of another does not depend simply on one action and one 
power" and further insists that an "external power is also required externally."  Here 
Kant appears to be alluding to (what I have called) the external activation 
requirement.  Taken together, these statements may plausibly be read not merely as 
commentary but as a corrective (against misconstrual).261  Furthermore, it seems 
fairly clear that Kant is directing this corrective at the first (not the second) italicized 
statement (cited above).  We can therefore ask under which formulation of the first 
italicized statement, (1) or (2), would Kant's corrective make more sense?  Whichever 
formulation we think is the more plausible target of Kant's corrective will also be the 
one we should reject as the intended meaning of the first italicized statement.   
What, exactly, is the corrective?  It appears to contain both a positive and a 
negative component:  
Negative component:  "the existence of the action of another [must] not depend 
simply on one action and one power;" instead:  
Positive component:  an "external power is also required externally."262   
                                                          
 
261
  This suggests Kant may have been aware of the ambiguity afflicting the first italicized 
statement.   
 
262
  Text external to the Herder transcript (under analysis) apparently reiterating the 
requirement of an external power:  "But no substance of any kind has the power of determining other 
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The aim now is to bring the analysis of the preceding section to bear on these 
components.  Recall that the (first) italicized statement was disambiguated as follows:  
For some accident A inhering in y, x cannot contain the ground of A's inherence in y 
if:  
1)  x doesn't "at the same time contain the ground of the substantial power and 
of the existence of the other."   
2)  y doesn't "at the same time contain the ground of the substantial power and 
of the existence of the other."   
As remarked, we can understand the difference between (1) and (2) along the 
dimension of who is dependent on whom for its causal efficacy.  It was observed that 
the major difference between the two formulations, when explicated along this 
dimension, was this:  Under (1), since x contains the "substantial power and 
existence" of y, it is ultimately x itself that contains the condition under which its own 
causal efficacy (concerning y) is possible.  This gave us reason to characterize the 
conditions of x's causal efficacy (concerning y) as ultimately self-referential.  Under 
(2), however, the condition of x's causal efficacy (concerning y) is not ultimately self-
referential.  This is because the condition of x's causal efficacy (concerning y) does 
not ultimately derive from itself but rather from a different substance, namely, y.   
Of the two formulations it would appear to be (1) that the negative component 
(of Kant's corrective) is directed at, since under (1) it would be the case that x and y's 
                                                                                                                                                                     
substances, distinct from itself, by means of that which belongs to it internally (as we have proved).  It 
follows from this that it only has this power [of one substance determining others] in virtue of the 
connection, by means of which they are linked together in the idea entertained by the Infinite Being.  It 
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causal interaction is ultimately dependent on one substance, namely, x.  (Not so, 
under (2).)  Under (1), y's causal efficacy (concerning x) is ultimately due to x's 
containing the ground of y's substantial power and existence.  It is a different story 
under formulation (2), however.  Under (2), it isn't the case that x contains the ground 
of its own causal efficacy (concerning y).  On the contrary, it is y that contains the 
ground of x's causal efficacy (concerning y).  So not only does (2) not make the 
mistake expressed in the negative component (of Kant's corrective), it also appears to 
fulfill the requirement expressed in the positive component.  Under (2), x's causal 
efficacy (concerning y) is dependent on a power263 that is both separate and external 
to x (namely, y).  For reasons internal to the extended Herder text, it is therefore 
formulation (2), not (1), that should be accepted as the more plausible interpretation 
of the (first) italicized statement (cited above).   
Given this result, Kant's assertion (in the first italicized statement) is therefore 
to be understood as follows:   
For some accident A inhering in y, x cannot contain the ground of A's 
inherence in y if y doesn't "at the same time contain the ground of the 
substantial power and of the existence of the other [x]."   
 
As remarked, under (2) x's causal efficacy (concerning y) is dependent on a power 
that is both separate and external to x (namely, y).  This is, I take it, what Kant means 
when he says (in the preferred formulation) that y "contains the ground of the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
follows that, whatever determinations and changes are to be found in any of them, they always refer, 
indeed, to what is external" (New Eluc, 1:145-6, underscoring added). 
 
263
  The intention is to state the results in terminology paralleling Kant's (in the positive 
component of his corrective).  In fact, x's causal efficacy is dependent on y, conceptualized as an 
entity, a substance, whose internal structure makes x's causal efficacy (concerning y) possible.   
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substantial power ... of the other."  However, Kant says that y contains both the 
substantial power and the existence of the other, x.  So in what sense does y contain 
the ground of x's existence?  Before answering this question (in the next section), a 
point of clarification is required.  It frequently happens that in order to describe some 
feature of their causal structure, only one of the interactants is mentioned; however, 
in view of Kant's intention to provide a model of reciprocal interaction, it is plausible 
to suppose that he intends whichever structural feature he is describing in relation to 
the one interactant to apply also to the other.  It should therefore be borne in mind 
that the question just posed in relation to x could also be restated in relation to y:  In 
what sense does x contain y's substantial power and existence?  
 
6.10   Interaction and Metaphysical Interdependence 
Let me begin this section by stipulating the following terminology:  
MD:  x is metaphysically dependent on y iff to be what it is x must stand in 
some relation to y.  
 
To assert that x and y are metaphysically interdependent would therefore be to assert:  
MID:  In order to be what each is, x must stand in some relation to y and y, 
reciprocally, must stand in some relation to x.   
 
There are a number of issues that arise here.  First, there are lots of ways a thing can 
be.  Some ways of being are, however, more essential to a thing's identity than others.  
Entities, particularly material ones, are multi-dimensional (literally, from a 
geometrical standpoint).  What MID above implies is that an entity's relations to 
other entities contributes significantly to what it is.  There is a second (and closely 
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related) issue:  Under what substitution instances of x and y would x and y count as 
metaphysically interdependent?  What, in other words, would x and y have to be in 
order for it to be the case that each depends metaphysically on the other?  Further, on 
the assumption that there is some conceptualization under which x and y were 
metaphysically interdependent, it's clear that this relation would require x and y's 
coexistence.  What this means for concept-users is that x's existence could not be 
asserted unless y's was also (and vice versa).   
This section inherits its aim from the previous one, namely, to clarify what 
Kant means when he describes the relation between two interactants, x and y, as 
follows:  
For some accident A inhering in y, x cannot contain the ground of A's 
inherence in y if y doesn't "at the same time contain the ground of the 
substantial power and of the existence of the other [x]"  
  
My present focus is on how x can contain the ground of y's existence (and vice versa).  
I propose (as an interpretative hypothesis) to understand this key feature of the model 
of interaction in terms of metaphysical interdependence:  'x contains the ground of y's 
substantial power and existence' means that, in order to be what it is, y must stand in 
some relation to x; reciprocally, 'y contains the ground of x's substantial power and 
existence' means that, in order to be what it is, x must stand in some relation to y.   
The substitutional instances of x and y stand under certain requirements, some 
deriving from the proposed hypothesis, some independent of it.  First, as substances, 
x and y can clearly not (under the proposed hypothesis) be conceptualized as 
independent stand-alone entities; they must therefore forfeit their metaphysical 
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independence.  (See chapter 2 for an argument motivating this forfeiture.)  Second, 
since it is a structural feature of the model of interaction (indeed the meat of the 
construct) that I am proposing to understand in terms of metaphysical 
interdependence, the relation of interdependence must be understood as a causal one.  
It has already been shown (or, at any rate, plausibly suggested) that Kant thinks 
interaction is a two-way causal relation which (if it occurs) obtains among a plurality 
of substances and, in addition, that he conceptualizes substances on the model of 
agents.  (See 4.3-1.)  Thus, not only should the entities substituted for x and y be 
minimally capable of doing duty as causal interactants, the model of their interaction 
should, in addition, illuminate how x and y may be thought of as metaphysically 
interdependent.    
In light of these requirements, we can now return to the issues raised above.  
What would x and y have to be in order for it to be the case that each depends 
metaphysically on the other?  As remarked, under the proposed interpretation the 
substitutional instances of x and y must be substances conceptualized on the model of 
agents.  To be a substance is essentially to be a causal agent (a possessor and 
exerciser of causal powers).  If x and y are metaphysically interdependent, then that 
interdependency would therefore have to be conceptually explicated along the 
dimension of what each is as a causal agent.  One would therefore expect to find Kant 
advancing a conception of causal agency, one under which a substance could possess 
and exercise its agency only on the assumption of (and in relation to) another 
substance.  And this is, I suggest, what we find.  (At any rate, this is what I argue in 
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the next chapter.)  The aim now is to determine whether Kant has a conception of 
interdependent causal agency (answer seems to be yes) and, if so, how precisely to 
spell out its contribution to the model of interaction.     
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Chapter Seven 
THE NECESSITY OF TRANSCENDENTAL AGENCY 
 
From 1755 on, there are two central questions in Kant's metaphysics.  First, 
how can things (bodies, substances) form one world, not solely in the 
representations of thinking monads, but really and materially, that is, as a 
world constituted by universal physical interaction?  Second, on what 
principles does our knowledge of such a world rest. 
            —Burkhard Tuschling 
 
7.0 Introduction 
As already shown, reciprocal external activation requires internal causal 
systems on the part of all substances party to interaction.  You might think that the 
model of interaction is therefore equivalent to constructing the mirror-image of Kant's 
account of suffering.  After all, didn't we conclude (in 4.5.1) that interaction must, 
minimally, be modeled on two-way (not one-way) suffering?  Yes.  But because the 
account of suffering focuses on the receiver's end (the production of an accident in a 
substance), we therefore have a model of x and y's interaction under which there are 
(so far) only two patients (two sufferers) but no actors.  We have, in other words, a 
model of x and y's interaction under which each is to be the mere receptacle of the 
other's effects, but still no detailed account of how that interaction would be possible.   
As we shall see later, possessing the capacity to suffer (to produce the effects 
of another substance) isn't (in Kant's mind, anyway) sufficient for an entity to be a 
substance.  What else is needed?  As the core of the model of interaction suggests,  
what is needed is a second set of causal powers, one explicated in terms of 
and by reference to what effects a substance can produce externally.  This is, in fact, a 
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condition under which two-way external activation is possible.  But since Kant 
conceptualizes substances on the model of agents, it appears that he must 
acknowledge a corresponding type of externally-directed causal efficacy, one that 
makes it possible for one substance to causally interact with another.   
It would therefore appear that there are two main concerns here.  First, there is 
the issue over whether the model of interaction can function under a single account of 
self-activity, one where only the self-activity involved in a substance's external 
activation is acknowledged.  Since, as we will see shortly, the model cannot work 
under a single conception of this kind, two other related sub-issues arise here, the first 
being a concern over how the additional type of self-activity is to be specified, the 
other being a concern with whether Kant even has a conception of self-activity of the 
required type.  (On my view, the model of interaction demands (of the interactants) a 
type of self-activity that is self-originating; moreover, I think that we can find a 
conception of this type of self-activity in Kant.)  The second main concern is whether 
conceptually convincing links can be established between this other (more original) 
type of self-activity and the model's demand for externally-directed causal efficacy.  
The concern over how these two can be conceptually linked reflects Kant's concern 
with how to engineer (for the model of interaction) a conception of substantial agency 
that is both externally-directed and causally efficacious.   
I have divided the analysis of Kant's model of interaction into two main parts 
in order to coincide with these two main concerns.  In the present chapter, I address 
only the first of these two main concerns, while in sequel I will address the second.   
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7.1 Self-Activity and Substancehood (Revisited) 
The model of interaction trades on a substance-concept according to which, in 
order to count as one an entity must be capable minimally of self-activity.  We might 
formulate this self-activity requirement (SAR) as follows:   
(SAR):  x is a substance only if x is capable of self-activity.  
What sort of self-activity must something is capable of in order to count as a 
substance?  Consider an excerpt from parallel discussion (of interaction) recorded in 
the Mrongovius transcript:   
We can never be merely passive, but rather every passion is at the same time 
action.  The possibility of acting is [a] faculty <facultas>, and of suffering 
receptivity <receptivitas>.  The latter always presupposes the former. Every 
substance is self-active, otherwise it could not be a substance; it can be 
suffering in one relation <respectu>, but can also be active in the same.  A 
merely suffering substance is a contradiction <contradictio>; otherwise it 
could not have any accidents.264 
 
Here Kant explicitly asserts that for something to be a substance it must be capable of 
self-activity.  What does this self-activity consist in?  Here Kant seems to be 
explicating a substance's self-activity in terms of its ability to produce effects 
(accidents) in itself (when externally activated).  But then Kant appears to zero in on 
the receiver's end of the suffering relation in order to target it for a dual 
characterization, one under which a substance's suffering can be characterized as both 
active and passive.  It is therefore an intrasubstantial causal relation that Kant targets 
for this dual characterization.  (See diagram A below.)  
Kant makes this more explicit in a parallel Mrongovius transcript:  
                                                          
264
 LM, Metaphysik Mrongovius, 28:823, underscoring added. 
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Substance acts, insofar as it contains not merely the ground of the accidents, 
but rather also determines the existence of the accidents; or substance, insofar 
as its accidents inhere, is in action, and it acts insofar as it is the ground of the 
actuality of the accidents; that substance suffers (passive) whose accidents 
inhere through another power.  How is this passion possible, since it was said 
earlier that it is active insofar as its accidents inhere?  Every substance is 
active insofar as its accidents inhere, but also passive, insofar as they inhere 
through an external power.265 
 
Here again (but more explicitly) Kant applies the active/passive characterization to a 
substance's self-activity along the same intrasubstantial dimension.  A substance's 
self-activity is being explicated along the dimension of its capacity to produce effects 
in itself.  This capacity is active in that the effects (accidents) produced thereby 
require the exercise of the substance's self-activity; passive in that the exercise of that 
self-activity requires external activation.   
Diagram A:  Active/Passive Dimensions Applied Intrasubstantially 
Interactant        Causal Power           Effect Produced___         Effects Domain         
       y                Passive                      Self-activity (y's)             Internal (to y)           
       y                Active                       Accidents (y's)                 Internal (to y)            
  
One implication of this intrasubstantial mapping is that, within the model of 
interaction, the active/passive dimensions of one interactant's self-activity (as 
explicated above) must have its structural counterpart (mirror-image) in the other 
interactant.   
Kant appears, however, to use the active/passive characterization in a 
somewhat different way than just explicated:     
The relation of a substance to the accidens is mere actio.  Vis. That of 
substances to one another can be either actio or passio; if it is mutua, then it is 
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commercio.  [Translator's paraphrase:  "In other words, if each substance is 
both active and passive with regard to the other, then there is interaction.266 
 
Here it would appear that there is a dimension of a substance's self-activity along 
which its effects are to be conceptualized as ones it can produce externally (=in a 
different substance).  Within the model of interaction the active/passive dimensions 
of a substance's causal relation to a set of effects is therefore mapped not only 
intrasubstantially but also intersubstantially; it is mapped over the causal relation 
between the interactants, x and y, not merely within each interactant.  (See diagram B 
below.)   
Diagram B:  Active/ Passive Dimensions Applied Intersubstantially 
Interactant       Causal Power         Effect Produced___         Effects Domain_   
       y                  Passive                 Self-activity  (y's)             Internal (to y)  
       x                  Active                  Self-Activity (y's)             External (to x) 
 
It would therefore appear that the model of interaction requires two distinct 
applications of the active/passive dimensions of a causal relation, one that applies to a 
substance's infrastructure, the other to the causal relation between two (or more) 
substances.   
Under this new mapping, while the active/passive dimensions themselves do 
not appear to have changed, the identity of the interactant subsumed under each 
dimension has.  In an intersubstantial context, the active dimension of a x's relation to 
a set of effects involves necessary reference to a different substance, y, because (in 
this context) the effects x is to be causally related to are supposed to be ones that 
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occur externally to it (namely, in y).  So in this context, the passive dimension of the 
causal relation (to this same set of effects) isn't one that involves x at all.  In an 
intrasubstantial context the passive dimension is to be explicated in terms of x's 
having been externally triggered into its self-activity; however, in an intersubstantial 
context, where x and y constitute the relata of the causal relation, the passive 
dimension (of this relation) is to be explicated in terms of y's self-activity (not x's).  In 
this new intersubstantial context, the active/passive dimensions of x and y's 
interaction (as it concerns a single set of effects) are therefore not to be staged and 
played out within a single substance.  Rather insofar as a set of effects (say, occurring 
in y) is to be credited to the causal efficacy of the other interactant (x), one substance 
(y) must be referred to under the passive dimension, the other (x) under the active 
dimension.   
 
7.2  Cross-Contextual Comparison of Active/Passive Dimensions of Self-Activity  
In the preceding section, the active/passive dimensions of an interactant's self-
activity were introduced, along with two different contexts, the intrasubstantial and 
the intersubstantial, in which this dual characterization is used.  I explicated Kant's 
use of the terms 'active' and 'passive' in both of these contexts.  In an intrasubstantial 
context, where both these terms apply to one interactant, 'active' refers to an 
interactant's self-activity while 'passive' describes the dependency (of that self-
activity) on external activation.  In an intersubstantial context, the terms 'active' and 
'passive' were applied to different interactants.  There, however, I mainly explicated 
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the difference between 'active' and 'passive' as a difference in the identity of the 
interactant assuming either dimension.  In doing so, I suggested that the difference in 
the use of these terms is mainly a difference in reference.  Here, however, I raise the 
issue over whether the use of these terms cross-contextually requires a corresponding 
alteration in their meaning.   
The aim of the present section is to focus on the active dimension of an 
interactant's self-activity and to subject this focus to a brief cross-contextual 
comparison.  Doing so will, I think, clarify the issue over whether the self-activity 
responsible for producing effects intrasubstantially is conceptually distinguishable 
from the self-activity responsible for producing effects intersubstantially.  This 
comparison consists therefore in selecting one or other of the interactants (say, x) and 
comparing the active dimension of its self-activity in an intrasubstantial context 
against the same dimension in an intersubstantial context.  (See Diagram C below.)  
Shortly, in preparation for the next section, I will set up an analytic framework, one in 
which to formulate the issues surrounding this cross-contextual comparison. 
Diagram C:   Cross-Contextual Comparison of Interactants' Causal Powers  
Causal Context  (x)                          Active             Passive  
Intrasubstantial                                       x                         x 
Intersubstantial                                       x                         y  
  
Causal Context  (y)                          Active             Passive 
Intrasubstantial                                       y                        y       
Intersubstantial                                       y                        x  
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This diagram allows us to compare the interactants, x and y, in a number of ways.  
Notice, first, that comparing x and y within an intrasubstantial context yields only a 
difference in which interactant is playing both roles, active and passive.  But the roles 
themselves are unchanged.  Similarly, comparing x's active dimension (in an 
intersubstantial context) with y's active dimension (in the same context) yields (again) 
only a difference in the identity of the interactant; the active dimension remains 
unaltered.  However, comparing the active dimension of x's self-activity in an 
intrasubstantial context against the same dimension in an intersubstantial context 
does not yield a difference in the identity of the interactant; rather this cross-
contextual comparison yields, I suggest, an interesting difference in conceptual 
content.  Notice that this comparison could be duplicated either in reference to y (see 
Diagram C) or it could be duplicated by comparing the active dimension of x's self-
activity (in an intrasubstantial context) against the active dimension of y's self-
activity (in an intersubstantial context).  (See Diagram D.)   
Diagram D: 
Causal Context (x, y)_____ Active Dimension of Self-Activity 
Intrasubstantial                                   x's 
Intersubstantial                                   y's  
 
A number of issues arise here.  First, and most obviously, is the issue over 
what the difference in conceptual content is.  How does the active dimension of x's 
self-activity (in an intrasubstantial context) differ from the active dimension of x's 
self-activity in an intersubstantial context.  A second issue is whether this difference 
in conceptual content reflects the internal structure of the model of interaction.  Is this 
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difference in conceptual content internally necessitated by some structural feature of 
the model?  If so, what is it?  These key issues will be pursued in next section.   
Let me now introduce an analytical framework, one in light of which the 
issues just stated are to be reformulated and pursued.  Within this framework, the 
issue is whether Kant's concept of self-activity (in respect of its active dimension) is 
cross-contextually univocal or whether it is context-sensitive.  Since our concern is 
with the model of interaction, the issue over whether Kant's use of 'self-activity' is 
univocal will be pursued within the two contexts required by that model, namely, the 
intrasubstantial and the intersubstantial.  If Kant's use of this term is cross-
contextually univocal, then of course its meaning-properties should not be context-
sensitive; we should therefore expect the conceptual content of the active dimension 
of an interactant's self-activity to remain unaltered from one context to the next.  If, 
however, Kant's use of the concept of self-activity is context-sensitive (owing, say, to 
certain demands internal to the model of interaction), then its multiple meanings need 
to be disambiguated.   
Finally, a brief reminder of the larger issue at stake here, namely, whether a 
substance's self-activity (an essential requirement of substancehood) is, ultimately, 
other-dependent.  If it turns out that Kant's concept of self-activity is not univocal but 
instead has multiple meanings and if, in addition, under any of its meanings the 
causal agency of one interactant (x) is possible only in relation to the other (y), then 
(assuming this dependency is reciprocal) each interactant owes what it is (= a 
substance conceptualized on the model of an agent) to the existence of the other 
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interactant.  In that case, the interactants would turn out to be metaphysically 
interdependent.  (See 6.10 for a discussion of that term.)  Since the current aim is to 
understand the substance-concept operative in the model of interaction, it therefore 
needs to be shown how the semantic differences (supposing there are any) in Kant's 
use of the concept of self-activity can be motivated by reference to that model.  This 
is the aim of the next several sections.   
 
7.3 Review:  Two Key Components of the Model of Interaction   
In view of the considerable detail resulting from prior analyses, a brief review 
of the model's key components seems in order here.  Recall that there are two major 
conditions imposed by the model of interaction:  the inherence condition and the 
external activation requirement.  Each of these conditions has already been 
motivated.  (See Diagram below.)  The inherence condition says that an accident A 
inheres in a substance S only if A is the effect of S's internal self-activity.  In order 
for a substance to be able to meet this condition, it must be equipped with internal 
agency; it must have the power to produce effects in itself.  In order for any effects 
(accidents) to show up in x's intrasubstantial domain they must therefore be ones x 
had some hand in producing.   
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Diagram:  
Condition                           Makes Possible                                        Antidote For__________ 
Inherence Condition           Individual Property Ownership267           Metaphysical Engulfment   
External Activation            Externally Referable Effects                   Metaphysical Isolation 
 
As remarked, a substance's capacity to produce effects in itself is not, however, 
sufficient for it to enter into interaction with other substances, as Kant makes clear:  
But no substance of any kind has the power of determining other substances, 
distinct from itself, by means of that which belongs to it internally (as we 
have proved).  It follows from this that it only has this power [of one 
substance determining others] in virtue of the connection, by means of which 
they are linked together in the idea entertained by the Infinite Being.  It 
follows that, whatever determinations and changes are to be found in any of 
them, they always refer, indeed, to what is external.268 
 
If the effects x produces in itself are to count as the effects of its interaction with y, 
then the exercise of x's causal powers (to produce internal effects) must itself be the 
effect of something external to x.  (Again, think of a computer's needing to be 
plugged in in order to perform its internal operations.)   
 
7.4 Assessing the Model's Functionality:  Methodology And Proposal  
In addition to the components just mentioned, the active/passive dimensions 
of self-activity are, as we have seen, basic concepts Kant uses to describe his model 
of interaction.  So far as I know Kant does explicitly introduce other terminology in  
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any of the texts in which the concept of reciprocal interaction is discussed.  But 
because the model of interaction is intended essentially to work in an intersubstantial 
context, showing that it is unable to do so when the terms used to describe it are 
assigned a content deriving exclusively from an intrasubstantial context forces us into 
a dilemma: Either we accept that the model of interaction is internally dysfunctional; 
or we consider the possibility that the basic terms used to describe it may have more 
than one meaning; their meanings may in fact be context-sensitive.269  Since it's 
premature (not to mention self-defeating) to accept the first horn of the dilemma, we 
have reason to explore the second.   
The aim of the present section is therefore to put the model of interaction into 
a state of crisis by assuming a univocal conception of self-activity, one under which 
its active/passive dimensions are to be understood to have only the meanings they do 
in an intrasubstantial context.  (See Diagram D and/or E below.)   
Diagram D: 
Dimension (of Self-Activity)_       Context                                 Model Requirement               
1)  Active                                        Intrasubstantial                    Externally Activated                 
2)  Active                                        Intersubstantial                                  ?   
 
Showing (by reductio) that under a single conception of self-activity the model of 
interaction is unable to function will, in addition, further the aim of isolating the 
additional structural component the model needs in order to work.  Since interactants 
are substances and since, in addition, substances are (according to Kant) essentially 
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self-active entities, it would therefore appear that the model of interaction must derive 
its intrinsic structure by reference to the self-activity of interacting substances; more 
precisely, the model's structure must be conceptualized largely in terms of substances' 
self-activity.  So it appears that we cannot so conveniently abandon the active/passive 
terminology used in conjunction with the concept of self-activity.  As remarked, the 
active/passive dimensions appear to be among the basic conceptual instruments used 
to describe the model's structure.   
It may turn out that we stand to gain more if we assign a sufficient degree of 
conceptual indeterminacy to Kant's concept of self-activity.  Were we to do so, there 
would then be one concept, but multiple (cross-contextual) applications of it.  Under 
this proposal, we would therefore avoid introducing new ad hoc terminology of our 
own into Kant's model of interaction, because we would be able to conceptualize the 
additional structural feature of the model (the one to be surfaced by the reductio to 
follow) in a way that does not require us to abandon these basic conceptual 
instruments Kant uses to describe his model.  We could, for instance, view this 
additional structural component as a distinct subkind of self-activity; in that case, we 
would therefore be required to hypothesize an operative (and probably implicit) 
concept of self-activity, one of a generic sort under which various other concepts of 
self-activity may be subsumed.  Supposing that there is a generic concept of self-
activity, we could then explain any cross-contextual semantic differences (see 7.5) 
that attach to the active/passive dimensions as being due, ultimately, to a difference in 
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the type of self-activity.  This is my proposal.  My present concern is, however, to 
present the reductio mentioned above.   
 
7.5 Current Status of the Model of Interaction:  Functional Paralysis 
Suppose we were to model interaction according to a conceptualization of x 
and y's internal structure where x has only the capacity to produce effects in itself 
(when externally activated by y) and y has only the capacity to produce effects in 
itself (when externally activated by x).  Under such a model effects would be 
produced in x or y's respective intrasubstantial domains and these effects would be 
due to the exercise of their (respective) causal powers.  On the assumption that each 
interactant is endowed only with the power to be affected (to be activated), we would 
have a (rather dysfunctional) model of interaction under which its causal structure 
contains two patients but zero actors.   
It may appear that under the present scenario we could at least acknowledge 
the possibility that effects could show up in x's intrasubstantial domain 
(independently of y) and concede, in addition, that since these effects aren't referable 
to something external to the interactant, interaction does not in fact occur.  Assuming 
(1) only, in fact neither of the two conditions above could be met.  Under a model of 
interaction where both interactants' self-activity is to be explicated exclusively in 
terms of (1) above, neither would be able to produce accidents in itself, because 
(under the current scenario) neither has the power to activate the other's internal self-
activity.  Recall the active/passive dimensions of an interactant's self-activity in an 
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intrasubstantial context.  That self-activity is active in that it is the individual 
interactant performing it, but passive in that its exercise of it requires external 
activation.  Without external activation, the inherence condition would therefore not 
be met and so substances couldn't produce any accidents in themselves; in which case 
we would have no reason to hypothesize that they exist qua substances.  Suppose that 
a substance (say, x) couldn't, by means of its own self-activity, produce accidents in 
itself.  Why couldn't another interactant (say, y) step in on x's behalf, in order to 
produce accidents in x?  Because, under this scenario, we would have a case of 
metaphysical engulfment, not interaction. (See 6.4.)   
As the possessors of causal powers substance are supposed to be capable of 
producing effects.  Since effects are to be modeled on accidents (or, more precisely, 
accident inherence), what's necessarily true of accidents and their relation to 
substances is, by extension, going to be true of effects.  What's true of accidents is 
that they cannot exist in some metaphysical interstice independently of a substance.  
Accidents do have an ontological status; they have reality (or being), but their 
existence is contingent on the existence of another entity -- a substance.  The 
dependency relation between an accident and its substance is the inherence relation.  
Let x and y be the only existing substances and A be an accident.  Suppose A inheres 
neither in x nor in y.  There is no additional ontological domain -- no metaphysical 
interstice -- where A could exist yet not inhere in either substance:  There can be no 
metaphysically free-floating accidents.  Since effects are conceptualized on the model 
of accident inherence, any effect produced by a substance must therefore be one that 
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occurs in some substance or other.  Consequently, it is within a substance's 
intrasubstantial domain that all effects must be staged.   
Under its present formulation the model of interaction acknowledges the 
necessity that each interactant must, minimally, be the receptacle for the other's 
externally produced effects, but this acknowledgement cannot be made without also 
making some conceptual provision for the interactants' external activation.  Leaving 
the model of interaction in its present state would be analogous to formulating a 
counterfactual without specifying the subjunctive condition.  Indeed it may be worse 
than that.  It may be more like trying to conceptualize an entity's dispositional 
properties independently of (and without reference to) any conception of their 
enabling conditions.   
We just acknowledged that in order for any effects (accidents) to be produced 
in a substance's intrasubstantial domain (in order for a given substance to own these 
accidents), those effects have be ones produced in and by the activated substance.  
Granting that there can be no ghost-agents or exercisers (because no other entity can 
exercise y's causal powers but y), it doesn’t follow that y can self-activate the 
exercise of its own internal operations.  Indeed initiating the exercise of its own 
causal powers is one effect that y cannot be responsible for producing.  This is 
corroborated by the analysis in 7.4, where the active/passive dimension of an 
interactant's self-activity (in an intrasubstantial context) was explicated as follows:  it 
is active in the sense that it is the individual interactant performing the internal 
operations, passive in that its doing so requires external activation.  (See Diagram E.)   
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Diagram E: Active/Passive Dimensions in Intrasubstantial Context 
Interactant          Dimension (of Self-Activity)____     How Explicated______ 
      x                      Active                                              Individually performed 
      x                      Passive                                             Externally necessitated 
 
We can motivate this passiveness from within the model of interaction.  It was 
acknowledged that in order for a set of effects to be attributed to the interaction 
relation, those effects must be creditable to something external to the substance in 
which they are produced.  In order to credit the effects y produces in itself (as a 
consequence of its having exercised its causal powers), we must therefore view the 
fact of y's having done so as an effect produced by something external to y, namely, 
x.  (And vice versa.)  But in order to view a set of effects y has produced (in itself) as 
having been caused by something external to y, concept-users would have to suppose 
that it is the exercise of y's causal powers (on this occasion) that is the effect of 
something external to y.  The hypothesis according to which it is the exercise of y's 
causal powers that is due to external influence appears to require, in addition, that y is 
otherwise unable to self-initiate the exercise of its accident-producing self-activity.  
Why else would it be necessary to hypothesize a cause external to y in order to 
explain its internal activation?   
It would appear that the model of interaction is (under the current scenario) 
dysfunctional, because neither interactant would be able to self-initiate the exercise of 
its own causal powers (in order to produce effects in itself).  And even if they could, 
the effects an interactant produced intrasubstantially wouldn't count as ones due to 
interaction unless they could be credited to an external cause.  Since (under the 
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current scenario) neither interactant is able to initiate its internal self-activity and 
since the only self-activity so far acknowledged is of a sort requiring external 
activation by the other interactant, the fact that neither interactant is able to self-
initiate its self-activity means that neither is able to externally activate the other. 
Consequently, the model is (under the current scenario) in a state of functional 
paralysis.   
 
7.5.1 The Root of the Problem  
In this brief (but important) section the aim is, first, to isolate precisely what it 
is (under the current scenario) that puts the model of interaction into crisis and, 
second, to use this diagnostic as a basis on which to specify what additional 
components are needed by the model.  To that end, reconsider Diagram E: 
Diagram E:  Active/Passive Dimensions in Intrasubstantial Context 
Interactant          Dimension (of Self-Activity)____     How Explicated_________ 
      x                      Active                                              Individually performed 
      x                      Passive                                             Externally necessitated 
 
Here the active/passive dimensions attach to one and the same interactant (x).  
Indeed, the active passive dimensions are dimensions of a single thing, namely, x's 
self-activity.  It is therefore the exercise of x's self-activity, the individual 
performance of its internal operations, that this passiveness attaches to.  And since 
this passiveness has been explicated in terms of the need for external activation, x's 
effects-producing self-activity (under the current scenario) would therefore remain 
chronically inert unless otherwise altered (by external activation).  Under the current 
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scenario, the same would, in addition, apply to the other interactant, y.  (See Diagram 
F below.)   
Diagram F:   
Interactant          Dimension (of Self-Activity)       Externally Necessitated? 
       x                       Active                                                       Yes 
       y                       Active                                                       Yes 
 
It appears that we need to diversify each interactant's internal structure.  What the 
model of interaction appears to be lacking is a conception of the active dimension (of 
self-activity) under which the interactant's exercise of it does not require external 
activation.  (See Diagram G below.)  Under this new conception of the active 
dimension, the exercise of an interactant's self-activity is therefore not externally 
necessitated; rather its self-activity is internally originated.  That is, under this new 
conception of the active dimension (of self-activity), the cause of the interactant's 
performances is internal to the performer.   
 Diagram G:  Active Dimensions in Intersubstantial Context 
Interactant          Dimension (of Self-Activity)       Externally Necessitated? 
       x                       Active                                                     Yes 
       y                       Active                                                      No 
 
A new structural component of the model of interaction has just been made explicit.    
It would therefore appear that the active dimension of self-activity has derived new 
conceptual content in an intersubstantial context.   
Before saying more about the new meaning just given to the active dimension 
of self-activity (in an intersubstantial context), I want to follow-up on an earlier issue.  
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It is this:  it appears that, so far as the model's functionality is concerned, the 
assumption that the active/passive terminology used to describe its internal structure 
have only one meaning puts the model, as we have seen, in a state of functional 
paralysis.  But if we allow that these terms are context-sensitive, then their meaning 
(and use) can be suggested by the diverse needs of the model.  What the model 
evidently needs in order to work is a conception of the active dimension (of self-
activity) under which the agent's exercise of it does not depend on being externally 
necessitated.  A conception (of the active dimension) that could deliver the goods 
would therefore have to be one where the cause of the interactant's self-activity 
originated internally; hence, that activity would be (in some sense) self-caused.   
 
7.6 Kant On Freedom  
In the first critique's Second Analogy Kant says: 
Where there is action, consequently activity and force, there is also substance, 
and in this alone must the seat of fruitful source of appearances be sought.270  
 
In the Metaphysik L transcript Kant asserts: "[a]cting and effecting can be assigned 
only to substances.”  In these texts, Kant acknowledges the causal efficacy of 
substances as entities capable of originating action and effects.  But notice that 
neither of these texts acknowledges the internal structure of substances, that is, of 
active/passive dimensions of self-activity within an individual substance.  Nor is there 
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yet any mention of freedom in reference to substances.  But the link between a 
substance and its freedom is the former's independence from external necessitation:  
Nothing is more opposed to freedom in all respects than that the human being 
has a foreign author.271 
 
A substance that is not externally determined to produce something that 
previously did not exist acts freely, and this freedom is opposed to internal or 
external natural necessity.  It acts from the free power of choice insofar as the 
causality of the action lies in its preference and is not passive.  The difficulties 
concern only the first idea of freedom, and it is incomprehensible in the case 
of the necessary being as well as in the case of contingent beings, but from 
different grounds, because the former cannot initiate but the latter cannot first 
initiate.  The first degree of independence is the self-activity of a substance in 
general; the second degree is independence in acting from all external 
determining causes; the third degree is independence from one's own nature.   
     Thus the negative [independence] is genuinely incomprehensible; the 
positive [independence] of motives is comprehensible.272 
 
Kant explicitly links his conception of freedom to "the capacity to produce and effect 
something originarie:"  
Freedom is the capacity to produce and effect something originarie.  But how 
causalitas originaria et facultas originarie efficiendi [original causality and 
an original capacity for efficient causation] obtain in an ente derivativo is not 
to be comprehended at all.273 
 
Kant combines these two characterizations -- of substance as efficient cause and of 
freedom as the absence of external necessitation -- into a single conception of 
freedom as self-determination, a conception where the effect (= the agent's 
performance) is produced by a cause located in, or identical to, the agent itself:  
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Freedom is the capacity to determine oneself to action a priori, not through 
empirical causes.274 
 
Here there is an ambiguity worth pausing to consider.  When you say (of an agent) 
that the cause its action is "located in" it, you could be taken to refer either to the 
passive dimension of self-activity or the active dimension; if the former, then the 
passive self-activity that results from external activation would count as a free action 
because it is activity performed in and by the substance itself.  However, there is a 
Kantian conception of freedom under which this passive sort of self-activity would 
not count as free:  
Transcendental freedom (of substance in general) is absolute spontaneity in 
acting (in distinction from spontaneitas secundum quid, where the subject is 
determined aliunde through causas physice influentes) [=spontaneity relative 
to something else, where the subject is still determined, from another quarter, 
through causes by physical influx].  Practical freedom is the capacity to act 
from mere reason.   
     In the case of freedom, the causality is originaria, although the cause is an 
ens derivatum.  [The causality is original, although the cause is a derivative 
being.]275 
 
An action that is transcendentally free appears to be one whose cause is not to be 
located in the agent and identified with any of its occurent states (say, with an instinct 
or desire).  In more contemporary terms, a transcendentally free action would be one  
whose cause cannot be identified with any item in my motivational set (any desire or 
impulse, or whatever).  In that case the cause of the action would be due to a faculty, 
one that is not to be conceptualized (on pain of category mistake) as a passively 
experienced desiderative state in my motivational set (in the way a desire is).  
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Certainly, it may take these into consideration (in rational self-reflection) but a 
transcendentally free action isn't necessitated by any of the agent's occurent states; 
rather it is one whose execution would consists in (or, at any rate, reflect) the exercise 
of a wholly independent faculty (namely, pure practical reason), one the exercise of 
which cannot be viewed as the effect of anything external to the exercising.   
Under this characterization, a transcendentally free action would seem to be 
one where, for some series of effects e, if e is caused by a transcendentally free action 
A, then A must ('must' of hypothesis) have been the absolute beginning of the series e; 
such an action is therefore not to be viewed itself as an effect within a larger chain of 
effects, but is rather to be viewed as "absolutely spontaneous."  Elsewhere he 
elaborates on the difference between such "absolute" spontaneity and spontaneity 
"under a condition:"   
Spontaneity <spontaneitas> is either absolute or without qualification 
<absoluta vel simpliciter talis>, or qualified in some respect <secundum quid 
talis>. -- Spontaneity in some respect <spontaneitas secundum quid> is when 
something acts spontaneously under a condition.  So, e.g., a body which is 
shot off moves spontaneously, but in some respect <secundum quid>.  This 
spontaneity <spontaneitas> is also called automatic spontaneity <spontaneitas 
automatica>, namely when a machine moves itself according to an inner 
principle, e.g., a watch, a turnspit.  But the spontaneity is not without 
qualification <simpliciter talis> because here the inner principle <principium> 
was determined by an external principle <principium externum>.  The internal 
principle <principium internum> with the watch is the spring, with the 
turnspit, the weight, but the external principle <principium externum> is the 
artist who determines the internal principle <principium internum>.  The 
spontaneity which is without qualification <spontaneitas simpliciter talis> is 
an absolute spontaneity.276 
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Kant uses two examples in this text, one about a "body" that is "shot off," the other 
about a watch.  Both are supposed to illustrate spontaneity under a condition 
(secundum quid).  And these examples are meant to be contrasted with an absolute 
type of spontaneity.  (See Diagram below.)  Consider a billiard ball's motion when 
struck; it (the billiard ball) is that which moves; while its motion was externally 
caused, it continues to move "on its own" (there is no one nudging it, sustaining its 
motion externally).    
Kant's watch example is, I think, more illustrative:  a watch is a machine that 
contains moving parts; these parts move "on their own," when the watch is in 
working order; they do not require something external to maintain their internal 
motion.  So in this sense they are spontaneous because the motion is that of the parts 
themselves; they are the things that are moving; moreover, their continuing to do so 
does not require moment-by-moment intervention from something external to the 
watch; rather it is capable of sustaining its internal motion (for some duration), which 
means that the watch originates, on its own, new movements relative to every 
preceding instant (post-dating its activation). 
Diagram 7.6:  
Degrees of Spontaneity        Origination of Action           External Cause?  
Absolute                                   Without Qualification                      No              
Relative                                    Under a condition                            Yes 
 
The watch is a functional system.  The movements taking place within its 
internal structure can be viewed as effects produced locally (by the system of parts 
within the watch); and since these parts are constitutive of the whole-watch, the fact 
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that the movement of one part is caused locally by another part, and that this occurs 
within a functional system that is constitutive of the watch, makes it possible to 
impute the movements (of any given part) to the watch.  We can, in other words, 
conceptualize the watch as if it were the agent of its own self-activity.  Once the 
watch is constructed and set, the movements of its internal operation may be imputed 
to the 'action' of the watch; the movement of an individual part is an effect that is 
produced by the watch; however, the watch's self-activity did not originate itself; the 
watch had to be engineered and created and then set into motion.  So while any 
movement of its parts that takes place after the watch is set is an effect that the watch 
(if functioning properly) can take credit for causing, the watch cannot take credit for 
initiating the series in which those individual movements occur.  The watch's 
spontaneous self-activity is relative (secundum quid), in the sense that this 
spontaneity occurs within a causal sequence that was activated externally (not self-
originated).   
It's clear Kant intends to apply the absolute/relative spontaneity distinction to 
natural organisms:   
Life is the capacity to initiate a state (of oneself or another) from an inner 
principle.  The first is not a complete life, since that whose state is alterable 
itself always requires something outer as its cause.  Bodies may well have an 
inner principium for affecting one another (e.g., inter-connection), also for 
preserving an externally imparted state, but not for initiating anything on their 
own.  Thus is proven all alteration, all origin of a first beginning, and hence 
freedom.  However the beginning can be comparatively first, namely in 
accordance with mechanical laws, e.g., when a dog ravages some carrion, 
movement begins in him which is not caused by the odor in accordance with 
mechanical laws but through the arousal of desire.  In animals, however, this 
is just as much of an external necessitation as it is in machines; thus they are 
called automata spiritualia.  But in human beings the chain of determining 
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causes is in every case cut off, and thus one also distinguishes what is 
immaterial as a principium of life from what is material.  Among human 
beings the spirit is free and wills the good; the animal is an automaton; now if 
only this spirit would always be efficacious on the animal spirit and not get 
mixed up with the forces of the latter, we would find more proofs of 
freedom.277   
 
In light of this brief analysis, it appears that Kant does have a conception of self-
activity that could meet the demands imposed by the model of interaction; it is to be 
found in the concept of transcendentally free action.  A transcendentally free action is 
one that is not externally necessitated; rather it is self-originated.  I submit we could 
therefore characterize the difference between the active/passive dimensions of self-
activity (as required by the model) in terms of the distinction between absolute and 
relative spontaneity.   
 
7.7  Freedom and the Faculty of Desire 
Within the conceptual framework sketched in the preceding section, Kant 
recognizes that substances may differ in the degree of freedom they are capable of.  
Comparative judgments about the degree of freedom a substance is capable of are 
based on considerations pertaining to its "faculty of desire" (or, in more 
contemporary terminology, its motivational system):    
The faculty for desiring practically or faculty of practical desires <facultas 
appetitionum practicarum> is the power of choice <arbitrium>. The power of 
choice <arbitrium; G: Wilkur> is either sensitive <sensitivum>, which 
represents things to us that are agreeable to the senses, [or] intellectual 
<intellectuale> -- things of which the understanding approves.  But the power 
of choice <arbitrium> is better classified into brute <brutum> and free 
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<liberum>. Brute <brutum> is that which is determined or necessitated by 
stimuli <stimulus>, and free <liberum> that which [is] determined by motives 
<motiva>; animals have the former, human beings the latter, therefore it is 
also called human <humanum>.  A human being can of course be affected by 
stimuli <stimulis>, but not necessitated, for he is independent of the stimuli 
<stimulis>.278 
 
The faculty of desire (or power of choice) does not, however, operate in isolation; 
rather it is a mechanism that operates in conjunction with the substance's 
representational system, or, in Kant's terminology, "the power of representation."  
Kant distinguishes different types of soul (say, that of human and nonhuman animals) 
on the basis of certain differences in their representational systems.  For instance, 
both human and nonhuman 'souls' are according to Kant equipped with the power of 
mental representation; both types of soul possess outer sense.  However, the 
difference between human and nonhuman animals is that while the former possess 
inner sense, the latter does not.   
Accordingly, animals will have all representations of the outer senses; they 
will forgo only those representations which rest on inner sense, on the 
consciousness of oneself, in short, on the concept of an I.  Accordingly they 
will have no understanding and no reason, for all actions of the understanding 
and of reason are possible only insofar as one is conscious of oneself. ...  
     We can attribute to animals an analogue of reason <analogon rationis>, 
which involves connection of representations according to the laws of 
sensibility, from which the same effects follow as from a connection 
according to concepts.  Animals are accordingly different from human souls 
not in degree but rather in species; for however much animal souls increase in 
their sensible faculties of consciousness of their self, inner sense, still cannot 
be attained thereby.  [28:276] ... The consciousness of one's self, the concept 
of the I, does not occur with such beings that have no inner sense; accordingly 
no nonrational can think: I am; from this follows the difference that beings 
that have such a concept of the I possess personality.  
     This is psychological personality, to the extent they can say: I am.  It 
further follows that such beings have freedom, and everything can be imputed 
                                                          
278
 LM, Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29:896. 
 276 
to them; and this is practical personality, which has consequences in 
morality.279 
 
The absence of inner sense (in the case of nonhuman organisms) appears to be 
the key difference Kant uses as the basis for making comparative judgments about the 
degree of freedom each is capable of; it would therefore appear that the degree of 
freedom is a function of the type of soul a substance has.  Nonhuman animals appear 
to be less free than human beings because, in lacking inner sense, they (unlike us) do 
not have the metacognitive capacity for self-reflection, a capacity that would 
otherwise allow them to rationally evaluate and self-regulate their first-order instincts 
and drives.   
Freedom consists in the capacity to act independently of external determining 
grounds in accordance with the intellectual power of choice.  All sensibility is 
subordinated to this.  Hence we conceive of our power of choice as subject to 
hastiness or a series of obscure representations, which are the causes of error.  
The actions that happen in accordance with mere laws of sensibility.  In the 
human being we must distinguish between the animal, i.e., what happens in 
him in accordance with the laws of sensibility, and the spirit, in accordance 
with the laws of reason.  His power of choice as an animal is really always 
determined by stimuli; yet his will is still free insofar as his reason is capable 
of altering these determinations of the power of choice.280 
 
On my view Kant acknowledges that human intraspecific differences in freedom are 
differences in degree because all members (of humankind) are capable transcendental 
freedom; however, interspecific comparisons (say, between humans and nonhuman 
animals) may yield a difference in the type, not degree, of freedom.  Even supposing 
this is correct, it doesn't follow, however, that we can't compare self-activity (of 
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different types) in respect of which is freer.  Of course we can't hold nonhuman 
animals morally responsible as we do human beings, but this acknowledgement 
seems to imply that we do in fact make comparisons between human and nonhuman 
organisms along the dimension of which is freer.   
We make interspecific comparisons using the concept of transcendental 
freedom as an evaluative standard, one in reference to which we can issue judgments 
concerning the self-activity of (normal) human beings as being of a freer type than 
that of nonhuman animals.  In doing so, we reference ourselves (the concept of the 'I') 
in order to establish the normative standard for what is to count as genuine intentional 
agency: 
The greatest degree of freedom in human being is assessed according to the 
degree of the outweighing of the hindrances.  Our standard for determining 
the magnitude of freedom thus rests on the degree of the outweighing of the 
sensible impulses.  But there are beings who have no sensible impulses at all; 
their freedom we cannot assess because we have no standard here, for our 
standard for assessing freedom is derived from the sensible impulses. The 
highest freedom of all would thus be where the freedom is utterly independent 
of all stimuli <stimulis>.281 
 
The point is not that we have a theoretical cognition of our own transcendental 
freedom (Kant certainly does not think that); rather the point is that the concept of 
transcendental freedom (under which we, on aprioristic morally pragmatic grounds, 
refer our own persons) functions as the fixed point relative to which we make 
assessments of the degree (or type) of freedom.  It is plausible to suppose that Kant 
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would use this same standard in order to evaluate the comparative freedom of an 
individual substance's self-activity along the two different active/passive dimensions 
demanded by the model of interaction.   
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Chapter Eight 
THE RECIPROCAL COORDINATION OF CAUSAL POWERS 
 
On the possibility of the commercii of that which is only an object of inner 
sense with that which is only one of outer sense.  In the case of matter, we 
know only the outer immediately, in the case of the soul only the inner.  We 
do not know the commercium among the objects of outer sense originally and 
a priori, and similarly we do not know the commercium among the inner 
powers of the soul.  But the first data of outer cognition already contain 
concepts of commercii, and likewise those of inner cognition. 
          
         —Immanuel Kant, Notes and Fragments 
 
8.0 Introduction  
In the preceding chapter I argued (by reductio) that if the active/passive 
dimensions of self-activity are univocal, then the model of interaction is thrown into a 
state of functional paralysis.  On closer inspection, this functional paralysis was seen 
to be due to the fact that both the active and passive dimensions (of self-activity) 
applied to one and the same thing, namely to the substance's internal performances.  
The active dimension of a substance's internal performances consists in its being the 
individual performer; however, since the passive dimension also attaches to these 
same internal performances, this self-activity must be of a type to require external 
activation.  From this I concluded that, on the assumption that, for two or more 
interactants, x and y, if each is capable only of the active/passive dimensions of self-
activity, then under the current restricted meanings of these terms, neither interactant 
would be able to interact with the other because neither would be able to initiate its 
own self-activity.  Then I used this result to hypothesize that the active/passive 
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dimensions (of self-activity) must have a somewhat different meaning in an 
intersubstantial context if the model of interaction is to be rescued from its current 
state of functional paralysis.  I concluded, in addition, that in order for it to work, 
what the model needs is a conception of self-activity that is not externally 
necessitated but is instead self-originating. 
But the worry over whether interactants can kick-start their own internal 
performances isn't the only concern here.  In addition to the issue over the model's 
paralysis, there is another major issue, one that is closely related to another 
requirement imposed by the model of interaction, namely, external referability:  in 
order for interaction to take place, a set of effects (accidents) produced in one 
interactant (say, y) must be externally referable to another (say, x).  We saw how the 
external activation requirement is motivated by the need for external referability of 
effects.282  Suppose y produces a set of effects (accidents) in itself.  On the 
assumption that y's internal performances were not (and cannot) be self-initiated, the 
fact that y has produced that set of effects can therefore be used to hypothesize a 
cause that is external to y.   
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 The informational dimension of our representational systems (sensibility) is modeled on 
the passive dimension of self-activity, because to be informed by something external means being 
passively affected by something.  But the picture you find in Kant is that cognitive operations must be 
stimulated into action.  Here, again is the idea that to regard certain internal states (of a cognitive 
subject) to count as representational states, they have to be cognitive effects, ones produced externally 
to that system; they have to be effects for which it is necessary to hypothesize an external cause for the 
fact of their occurrence (in this case the running of the cognitive operations).  So these cognitive 
effects have to be externally referable; which is to say that they have to be effects the system can 
produce only when activated to do so by something external to it.  This confirms self-activity of the 
first type in an epistemological context.  
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And here's where the other issue comes in:  how can a set of effects y 
produces in itself (upon activation) be externally referred (to x) if x has only the one 
capacity, namely, to produce effects in itself? (See Diagram below.) 
Diagram 8.0: 
Interactant       Self-Activity             Causal Efficacy                                        Effects Domain  
x                      Active/Passive           Able to produce accidents in itself          Internal  
y                      Active/Passive           Able to produce accidents in itself          Internal  
 
If interaction is going to be possible it would therefore appear that each interactant 
has to be imputed with causal powers that are causally efficacious in regards to other 
interactants; but for that to be the case, these causal powers (or, more precisely, the 
exercise of them) has to be directed at a domain that is external to the interactant.   
A number of issues arise here.  First, on the assumption that a set of 
externally-directed causal powers are needed in order for the model of interaction to 
work, the issue arises over whether these causal powers can be identified with the 
ones already acknowledged by that model.  Can, in other words, the causal powers 
the interactant uses to produce effects (accidents) in itself do double duty as the 
causal powers that produce effects in other interactants, or is it necessary to 
hypothesize a second set of causal powers, ones whose exercise is to be externally 
directed?  Another issue that arises here is whether there is any significant relation 
between these externally-directed causal powers and the model's requirement for a 
nonreactive (self-originative) type of self-activity.  Is there any important conceptual 
link to be made here, one that can be seen as internally necessitated by the model?   
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The basic point that I want to emphasize here, however, is this:  The new form 
of self-activity (whether or not it turns out to be of a freer type) is one where in order 
to exercise it, an effects domain that is external to the agent must first be 
hypothesized.  And since Kant models effects on accident inherence, the need to 
hypothesize an external effects domain is equivalent to hypothesizing the existence of 
another substance (interactant), one that can produce the other's effects (in itself) 
when externally activated.  It would therefore appear that, under this model, other 
substances (suitably affectable) are the condition under which an individual substance 
would be capable of this other type of (externally-directed) self-activity, because it is 
the correlative affective capacities of other substances that make it possible for this 
type of self-activity to have any externally-directed causal efficacy.       
 
8.1 Does It Have to Be a Second Set of Causal Powers? 
Functionally, the model needs two or more interactants that are capable of 
producing effects (accidents) in themselves (upon activation) and of producing effects 
in other substances.  So the issue is whether both of these two functions can be 
performed by one conception of self-activity.  The model of interaction will not likely 
work under a conception of substance according to which each is recognized as 
having only one all-purpose form of self-activity.   
As remarked, Kant conceptualizes the relation between a substance and its 
accidents in terms of self-activity; a set of accidents is produced in and by the 
substance itself and this is what puts that substance into an ownership relation to a set 
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of accidents.  In the absence of this dimension of self-activity, the model of 
interaction would be such that, for two or more substances, x and y, neither would 
have any properties (in themselves) that the other could take credit for causing; each 
would be a propertyless (accidentless) entity (supposing this is even possible) in the 
absence of any internally-directed self-activity.  So if a set of accidents A are going to 
be viewed as the effects produced by an external cause (say, x), the conditions under 
which A belongs to y cannot be conceptually negated.   
There seems to be another distinction implicitly operative here.  It is this:  we 
can distinguish different types (or dimensions) of self-activity, not by a numerical 
difference in the self or agent who performs the activity but rather by the kind of 
causal powers used to produce certain types of effects.  You could argue, for instance, 
that the causal powers needed to produce effects internally would likely be of 
different kind than those required to produce effects externally.  The causal powers 
used to produce certain intellectual effects (say, to construct blueprints for a 
skyscraper) are largely cognitive and rely on the exercise the agent's discursive 
thinking; however, the causal powers used to actionalize that plan in empirical reality 
would be of a different type, ones relying on various physical materials, mechanical 
devices, manual labor, etc.   
Moreover, a substance's internally-directed self-activity is externally 
necessitated, whereas the new externally-directed self-activity that we are proposing 
is self-originating; it would therefore appear that these must be two different types of 
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self-activity, because the internally-directed self-activity is essentially reactive, 
whereas the externally-directed self-activity is free (or, at any rate, freer).   
Textually, however, the situation is somewhat complicated.  Just because self-
activity is internally-directed (aims at producing effects internally) does not mean it 
must be externally necessitated (and therefore essentially reactive), as Kant's division 
suggests:    
Division.  All duties are either external: toward other human beings, or 
internal: namely not toward other human beings (which thus cannot be 
demanded or required of other human beings).  Both are either passive or 
active.  Passive [crossed out: external] duties are those through the power of 
choice of another. Active:  without regarding them as determined through the 
power of choice of another.  Active external duties are free duties, passive 
ones are coercible duties toward humans.  Active internal duty is duty toward 
oneself.  Passive internal duty is duty toward the universal legislator.  All our 
duties regarding God are passive.  If I abstract from these, then duties of 
indebtedness, of merit, and of decency still remain. Moral decency is what is 
in accord with the dignity of a rational being. Toward God we have none but 
passive duties, not just moral but also physical (we cannot have an effect on 
God).  Our active obligations toward other human beings are meritorious, 
toward ourselves, however, owed but not coercible duties.  Thus the latter are 
duties owed toward others.283  
 
As this text suggests, there may be internally-directed dimensions of self-activity that 
are absolutely passive, requiring external activation; there may be, in addition, 
internally-directed dimensions that are active, ones that are self-originating.  Notice 
also that, under the above division, there may also be externally-directed dimensions 
of self-activity that are free as well.  (See Diagram 8.1 below.)  And it may be that 
among the various types (or dimensions) of self-activity, some types are freer than 
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others; for instance, an externally-directed yet self-originating dimension of self-
activity may be as free as or (maybe) freer than other internally-directed dimensions.   
Diagram 8.1:  
Concept of                     Active/Passive             Effects Domain               Free? 
1)  Self-Activity             Passive                          Internal                           No 
2)  Self-Activity             Active                           External                          Yes 
 
Yet, however many dimensions of self-activity a substance has, if interaction is to be 
possible, each interactant's self-activity would have to have at least one dimension 
that is exclusively functionally devoted to producing accidents (effects) in itself only 
upon activation.  Since if this same activity were sometimes able to self-initiate, 
sometimes not, how would we distinguish cases where we are justified in 
hypothesizing an external cause for a set of effects (accidents) from cases where we 
are not?   
Epistemically, we couldn't unless we knew there was some stable norm-
governed pattern according to which the self-activity was sometimes self-initiated, 
other times not.  But that is equivalent to acknowledging that there is some 
determinable subtype of self-activity that occurs only under certain specified 
conditions; and whichever subtype it is that requires external activation, this same 
subtype of self-activity cannot also be of the type that generally doesn't stand under 
this condition (because requiring external activation is, by definition, essential to that 
subtype).   
Whether or not the internally-directed self-activity and the externally-directed 
self-activity constitute numerically different types of self-activity, it seems fairly clear 
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that, in order for it to function, the model of interaction would require a second 
conception of (externally-directed and self-originating) self-activity.  Since the model 
of interaction clearly requires the two dimensions or aspects of self-activity that 
we've been discussing, it appears that an individual substance will be required (under 
this model) to have an internal structure that combines these various dimensions of 
coordinated self-activity, some being essentially reactive (to other substances), others 
being more free.    
 
8.2 Two Types of Self-Activity: A Fly As Physical Substrate, A Fly As Agent   
In light of the model's evident demand for a multidimensional conception of 
substance, I want to make one final observation here.  This second conception may 
require us to correspondingly revamp the referent of 'self' in our use of 'self-activity'.  
It may be that under this second conception of self-activity, 'self' refers to something 
significantly different from the referent this term denotes under the other conception; 
it may be that the referent of 'self' under a conception of self-activity which is 
internally-directed yet externally necessitated differs conceptually from the referent 
of 'self' under a conception of self-activity which is externally-directed yet self-
originating.  It may be that (of the two) the latter is the closer approximate to genuine 
agency.  Under this second type of self-activity, the referent of 'self' would therefore 
be viewed as more closely approximating the model of an agent.   
To make this more intuitive, consider the following illustration.  Neither a 
diamond nor a piece of quartz can be digested by a frog, whereas a fly can.  Being 
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vulnerable to a frog's digestive processes isn't, however, distinctive of a fly, of what a 
fly is.  The fly's reactive agency (of being frog-digestible) is a causal disposition it 
shares with many other insects of very different sorts.  In order to determine, 
however, what is distinctive of a fly, in order to conceptually explicate what a fly is, 
some reference to what it is able to do in a domain that is external (to the region of 
space enclosed by its body) is required.  Indeed the fly's native vulnerability to a 
frog's digestive capacities may be a consequence of its structural fragility and this, in 
turn, may be a condition under which the fly is capable of whizzing around in its 
environment, a clear advantage in fleeing larger predators.  But the whizzing around, 
leading a fly's life, is something the fly is doing in a way that is characteristic of it; 
whereas being digested by a frog, supposing there is some (reactive) self-activity 
operative in the fly's passively undergoing digestion by the frog, isn't an action in 
quite the same sense.   
Undergoing digestion (by the frog) may require coordinated activity on the 
part of the fly, and this activity may be described in terms of certain (norm-governed) 
physiological processes, ones whose functioning is necessary to effect the fly's 
internal decomposition.  But even supposing that these processes are being performed 
by the relevant physiological entities in the fly's body and that, in addition, they 
exhibit a teleological character (to effect the fly's decomposition); self-activity of this 
sort is subpersonal (or, since a fly isn't a person, sub-intentional) relative to the fly 
considered as a substance in its own right.  Consequently the referent of 'self' in the 
fly's physiological self-activity may be goal-directed, but it isn't a singular entity, like 
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the whole-fly is; rather 'self' refers to the vast multitude of very unflylike entities that 
jointly constitute the physical substrate of the fly.  By contrast, the fly's whizzing 
around in the swamp, leading a fly's life, represents a different type of self-activity, 
one where the referent of 'self' is here conceptualized as a singular entity on the 
model of an intentional agent.   
 
8.3 Which is the Freer Type of Self-Activity? 
As already suggested, one issue that arises in our analysis of the model of 
interaction is whether the internally/externally directed dimensions of self-activity 
differ in the degree of freedom.  Another related textual issue is whether there is any 
Kant-internal support for the idea that either type of self-activity is freer than the 
other type?  Is there any textual evidence showing that Kant acknowledges a 
difference in degree of freedom in reference to the model of interaction?  (I consider 
this textual question below.)  Even supposing that there isn't much in the way of 
explicit textual evidence, the basis for a comparative assessment of this kind may still 
be plausibly derived from the internal conceptual demands of the model of 
interaction, for which considerable textual support has already been given.    
In the texts I've examined, Kant does not explicitly distinguish the externally-
activated and self-originating dimension of self-activity as being of a freer sort than 
the internally-directed and externally-activated dimension.  There is no explicit and 
parallel articulation in Kant in these terms.  But neither does Kant explicitly 
distinguish these two dimensions of self-activity (not, at any rate, to the degree they 
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have been made explicit in the model of interaction as it has so far been presented).  I 
submit, however, that we can plausibly extrapolate on the issue here by briefly re-
introducing the conceptual framework (of 5.6) for which there is more explicit Kant-
internal textual support, one that Kant uses to make comparative judgments about a 
substance's freedom.  We may then consider the model of interaction in light of this 
conceptual framework and make some reasonably plausible assessment of which of 
the two dimensions of self-activity (the internally or the externally-directed) is the 
closer approximate to free agency.   
To that end, consider a parallel discussion (on suffering and interaction) in the 
Metaphysik L transcript where Kant says:  
"A faculty that is sufficient for all sorts of things is an aptitude <habitus>; G: 
Fertigkeit>. With this one has to distinguish:  effecting, acting, and doing.  
Acting (<agere; G: handeln>) can contain everything possible, relative to the 
consequence <rationatum> of the action.  Action <actio> is when a real 
consequence arises out of it.  Doing (<facere; G: tun>) means acting from 
freedom; a deed <factum> is always attributed only to an acting substance.284   
 
Here Kant says that "[d]oing means acting from freedom; a deed ... is always 
attributed to an acting substance."  Does Kant mean to imply here that actions don't 
count as deeds and consequently aren't attributable to substances?  Or, if that 
conclusion isn't warranted (in light of the watch example above), then supposing we 
could still acknowledge the causal efficacy of any self-activity classified as 'acting' (a 
plausible assumption), then maybe we can take Kant's point to be that this type of 
self-activity is nonetheless a degenerate form of something else.  In that case, the  
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question is 'A degenerate form of what?'  
Since a contrast is apparently being made here between three related 
categories -- effecting, acting, and free doings -- we can explicate this contrast in light 
of our brief survey of Kant's conceptions of freedom.  I submit that we can plausibly 
explicate the difference in terms of the distinction between absolute and relative 
spontaneity.  We can view free doings as a class of self-activity that is freer than 
acting (or 'mere actio'), while acknowledging that both types of self-activity are 
causally efficacious.  On this hypothesis, transcendentally free self-activity would be 
the normative standard (the chevron of freedom, as it were) in reference to which all 
other forms (or dimensions) of self-activity are to be evaluated as more or less 
approximative.  Acting would therefore be a degenerate case of self-activity in 
comparison to 'free doings' because the latter would be viewed as the closer 
approximate to full-blown intentional agency, the paradigm of which is to be found in 
Kant's concept of transcendental freedom, a type of absolutely spontaneous (self-
originated) self-activity.   
In light of this analysis, we can interpret a Kantian text in which the structural 
core of the model of interaction is explicitly described:   
The relation of a substance to the accidens is mere actio.  Vis. That of 
substances to one another can be either actio or passio; if it is mutua, then it is 
commercio.  [Translator's paraphrase:  "In other words, if each substance is 
both active and passive with regard to the other, then there is interaction.285  
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Notice Kant's use of 'mere actio' here.  In terms of the analysis just given (of the text 
cited above), it seems reasonable to consider that Kant's use of 'mere actio' may be 
intended to suggest a degenerate form of self-activity.  Operating on this assumption 
the question is, then, how, in what terms, are we to understand the degeneracy of this 
self-activity.  To that end, the first task is to clarify the meaning of 'mere actio'.   
It seems plausible to think that a cross-contextual comparison is being made, 
one where the internally-directed self-activity is regarded as missing something that 
its externally-directed self-activity possesses.  What could that be?  On the 
assumption that the comparison is cross-contextual, the term 'mere actio' would be 
intended as a description of the substance's causal efficacy in producing accidents in 
itself.  But since (in the context of interaction) this internally-directed self-activity is 
externally necessitated, it would make sense to describe it as 'mere actio' in 
comparison to another (freer) category of self-activity (that of free doings, for 
example).  In that case, the 'mere' in 'mere actio' would be referring to the 
comparative degeneracy of the internally-directed self-activity because, while it is 
externally necessitated, the externally-directed self-activity (which is self-originating) 
is not.  In light of this, we can plausibly speculate that (of the two) the externally-
directed self-activity would more closely approximate free doings.   
 
8.4 Interactions and Transcendental Agency 
A model of interdependent agency includes (but is not limited to) a model of 
interdependent causal efficacy.  A model of the latter sort is one under which the 
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causal efficacy of an individual's self-activity depends on the existence of other 
substances (and their having correlative affective capacities).  (I discuss this more in 
6.5.)  A model of the former sort is one under which the very exercise of an 
individual's causal powers is dependent on its causal relations with other substances; 
indeed, as we have seen, interaction itself has been (partly) modeled in just such 
terms.  Under the model of interaction, only the internally-directed externally 
activated self-activity (what Kant calls suffering) is dependent in this way.  So does 
that mean that only this internally-directed type of self-activity is interdependent on 
other substances?  Does that mean that only this internally-directed (externally 
necessitated) type of activity counts as 'interdependent agency'?  To think so would 
be, I suggest, a mistake.   
Let me explain.  It is true that, under my suggestion, we have conceptualized 
the externally-directed type of self-activity as being of a freer sort than the internally-
directed.  This is due to the fact that externally-directed self-activity has been 
modeled after transcendentally free action; in that case, it couldn't be up to other 
substances whether an individual substance exercised those causal powers that it does 
when it performs a transcendentally free action, right?  A transcendentally free action 
is one, by definition, where the exercise of the individual's causal powers is 
absolutely spontaneous; the individual's exercise of its own causal powers is not the 
effect of something that is external to exerciser.  As regards transcendentally free 
action, there is a causal loop between exerciser and exercising; yes, the exerciser is 
the cause of the exercising, but the exercising is the always the effect of the self-
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exercising exerciser.  In light of this, it seems to follow that every individual 
substance could, as it were, transcendentally kick-start the exercise of its own 
externally-directed causal powers wholly independently of other substances.  And 
since the interactant's externally-directed self-activity is modeled on transcendentally 
free activity (in order to rescue the model from functional paralysis), it seems to 
follow (rather ironically) that all interactants are free of any dependency on their 
fellows in regards to their externally-directed self-activity.  And this result would 
(rather seriously) embarrass my characterization of the interactants as interdependent.  
But transcendental agency (absolute spontaneity) doesn’t operate in a 
vacuum; the exercise of it (transcendental agency) may not be subject to external 
necessitation, but if it is to have intraphenomenal causal efficacy (as Kant thinks it 
must be for moral reasons), then there is going to have to be some link between an 
individual's transcendental agency and the causal efficacy of its externally-directed 
self-activity.  If the effectiveness (or efficacy) of an individual's exercise of 
transcendental agency is to be appraised exclusively in terms of the effects it produces 
subjectively, namely, its having been (subjectively) exercised by the agent himself, if 
this is the only effect to be credited to transcendental agency, then we have not 
succeeded in rescuing the model of interaction from functional paralysis; since if 
transcendental agency can only be subjectively effective, then a set of effects 
produced in one interactant could not be credited to the causal efficacy of another 
external to it .  (See 5.3 for a discussion on this requirement.)  However free the 
individual's exercise of its transcendental agency may be, its effects would, as it were, 
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bounce off the inner walls of its intrasubstantial domain; they would be confined to 
this domain and consequently not extend to another substance.  Much of the 
motivation, however, for conceptualizing a substance's self-activity under Kant's 
notion of transcendental agency is to make it possible for there to be a dimension of it 
that is self-originating (not in need of external necessitation) so that one interactant 
can be causally efficacious in relation to another.   
If the notion of a transcendentally free action is going to do any work in the 
model of interaction, it appears that there must be some link between the exercise of 
it and the exercise of externally-directed causal powers; since the causal efficacy of 
the latter does depend on the existence of other substances, it would appear that, 
while the subjective exercise of transcendental agency may not be externally 
dependent on other substances, its causal efficacy in the phenomenal world is.   
 
8.5 Return to the Core of the Model:  Dual Orientation of Causal Efficacy  
So far our analysis of the model of interaction has suggested the need for two 
types of self-activity.  (See Diagram below.)  We have already discussed at length the 
conception of an internally-directed yet externally activated type of self-activity.  
However if the model is to work a second type of self-activity must be introduced, 
one that is intimately linked to the interactant's causal efficacy in relation to other 
substances.  As remarked, the model requires another conception of self-activity, one 
under which a substance may produce effects in a domain that is external to it.  To 
 295 
that end, the model of interaction would appear to require a type of self-activity that 
is both nonreactive and externally-directed.   
Diagram 8.5:  
Interactants            Orientation of Causal Efficacy             Self-Activity__________ 
x                             Externally-directed                               Self-Originating 
y                             Internally-directed                                Externally Necessitated  
 
My present aim is to bring these two structural features of the model of interaction to 
bear on what I've suggested is the structural core of the model:  
Core Structural Component:  For some accident A inhering in y, x cannot 
contain the ground of A's inherence in y if y doesn't "at the same time contain 
the ground of the substantial power and of the existence of the other [x]."   
 
It is within this structural core that the relation between the two types (or dimensions) 
of self-activity must be conceptually explicated.  It would appear that x's externally-
directed and self-originating causal powers may contain the ground of some accident 
(A) inhering in y only on the condition that y possesses some internally-directed and 
externally activated causal powers.  It's seems clear that in order for x to have any 
causal efficacy (concerning y), y must have a corresponding set of internally-directed 
causal powers, ones that can be externally activated by x; but (again) in order for this 
to be possible, x must be capable of a type of self-activity that is externally-directed.  
(The same would also be true of y.)  In that case, it would appear that the condition 
under which x's causal powers can be externally efficacious is that (1) there exists (in 
addition to x) some other substance, y, and (2) y possesses a correlative set of 
affective capacities, one that is coordinated to (and harmonious with) x's externally-
directed causal powers.   
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It should be clear enough why, when represented under the model of 
interaction (as it has so far been constructed), two or more entities, x and y, would 
have to coexist.  As remarked, substances are conceptualized essentially as self-active 
entities; each interactant can possess its externally-directed self-activity only on the 
condition of the other's internally-directed and externally activated causal powers; 
moreover, it would appear that the internally-directed self-activity, owing to its need 
to be externally activated, would not be possible either unless another substance 
existed in order to activate it.  And since a substance's ownership of accidents is 
owing to its capacity to produce effects in itself and, moreover, since (in Kant's mind) 
it seems incoherent to hypothesize an entirely accidentless (or propertyless) substance 
(see 4.4), it would appear that being a substance (at all) depends on its having (at least 
some) accidents.  In which case it would appear that neither type of self-activity (the 
internally nor the externally-directed) may be exercised independently of the other 
interactant.286   
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 Here I do not want argue the issue over whether Kant, like Descartes, acknowledges some 
(possibly internally-directed) dimension of purely mental self-activity whose causal efficacy (say, to 
produce thoughts) is absolutely independent of other substances.  I do not think Kant does.  Suffice to 
say that the first critique's Refutation of Idealism, which targets "problematic idealism" (Kant's term 
for Cartesian dualism), argues that space (or, at any rate, spatially extended matter, conceptualized as 
"the permanent") is a necessary condition of having a first-personally and temporally-structured  
intentional awareness; outer sense is the prior condition of inner sense.  But it's not merely the 
representation of space (as an a priori subject matter) but the representation of my cognitive 
embodiment in space, as the domain where cognitive reference is to be staged, that provides the ground 
for my system's mental simulation of an internal (= subjective) exclusively diachronic order of 
relations (= time). For Kant the system's cognitive embodiment means that its cognition is embedded 
in a semantic network that is ultimately parasitic on phenomenal reality.  If the system's intentional 
states are object-referring, then they are states of empirical cognition.  Kant does appear to 
acknowledge non-referring cognitive states, however.  Cognitive states that are non-referring (or, at 
any rate, do not refer to an object) are cognitions of the a priori formal architecture and/or the a priori 
subpersonal processes governing object-referring (= empirical) cognition.   
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The model of interaction is one under which the causal efficacy of an 
individual's self-activity presupposes some reference to, or hypothesis of, an 
environment, one that is essentially constituted by the individual's causal relations 
with other substances.  It is therefore in virtue of a causal structure (explicated under 
the model of interaction) that an individual substance may possess an externally-
directed type of causal efficacy.  As remarked, self-activity of this type would likely 
be as free as but probably freer than the internally-directed and externally activated 
type.  Because (under the model) the second type must be self-originating, it should 
more closely approximate intentional agency; in that case, this second type of self-
activity could plausibly be viewed to represent activity that is more expressive of the 
substance (of what it is) than that of an essentially more reactive sort.  Consequently, 
we could plausibly hypothesize that the set of causal powers used by this second 
(externally-directed) type of self-activity would be as (but probably more) essential to 
that substance (to what it is).287 And since the exercise of either dimension of its self-
activity appears to require reference to the other interactant, it appears that each 
requires the other's existence in order to be a self-active entity; which is to say 
(assuming SAR288) that each is the condition under which the other may so much as 
be a substance.289   
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 I base this inference on the fact that Kant defines substancehood in terms of self-activity.  
Activity that is more expressive of self, which is more constitutive of the agent's "free doings," is to be 
viewed as more closely approximating genuine agency.   
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  SAR = self-activity requirement imposed on substancehood.  See 6.3 and 7.1 for details.    
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Let me make this somewhat more intuitive by returning to the fly illustration 
(see 6.3).  Determining what sorts of causal powers the fly has requires cognitive 
reference to other substances and to the sorts of affective capacities they have been 
endowed with; conversely, empirically determining the ways in which one substance 
is affected by another requires some sort of agreement between their individual kind-
defining causal systems.  And how, it may be asked, would synthetic conceptual 
explication even be possible if it weren't the case that the fly (and the other 
substances present to it) had causal systems that were entirely out of sync?  The fact 
that the fly's causal powers can (and must) be conceptually explicated by reference to 
something external to it -- the fact that there is actually a semantic route for saying 
what a fly is able to do and that this route means making reference to other entities 
that exist beyond the region of space enclosed within the fly's body -- this fact 
reasonably supports the hypothesis of a sort of empirical semantic network, one that 
underlies fly-specific semantics.  Such a network would explain how it is possible to 
explicate what a fly is in terms of what it can do to/on/in/with other entities (and, 
reciprocally, what can be done to/on/in/with it. 
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  Propositions 12 and 13 (of New Elucidations) strongly suggests that Kant's pre-Critical 
substance model is one under which substances are relationally constituted.  Kant's argument in the 
final section of New Elucidation claims that the degree of metaphysical involvement any two 
substances must have is pretty intimate -- so intimate that involvement in a relational structure is a 
necessary condition of a individual substance's demoralized intentional awareness.  Support for this 
characterization of the required degree of metaphysical intersubstantial intimacy can be found by 
considering the thrust of Kant's argument in the final sections of New Elucidation, one that bears a 
striking similarity to the argument given later in the first critique's Third Analogy.  Kant claims that an 
individual substance (conceived on the model of a Leibnizian monad, as a subject of intentional 
awareness) could not exist as an independent stand-alone substance and also experience alteration or 
change; in that case, such a substance could not experience any change or alteration in its internal 
states and therefore could not have a subjective experience of time.   
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8.6 Teleologically-Explicated Interactive Structures:  An Intuitive Presentation  
As we have already seen, Kant conceptualizes substances on the model of 
agents (as self-active entities).  The aim now is to determine whether there is a 
conceptual link between the need for an external effects-domain and a certain type of 
self-activity.  Is there a type of self-activity the exercise of which requires 
hypothesizing a domain of effects that is external to the substance that exercised it 
(answer seems to be yes)?  Under what conceptualization would an interactant be 
required to produce effects in a domain that was external to it?  This is equivalent to 
asking under what conceptualization of self-activity would it be necessary to 
hypothesize a second interactant in order to make the first's causal efficacy possible?  
What would we have to hypothesize about substances in order to make the model of 
interaction capable of accommodating the demand that each interactant have a 
domain of effects that is external to it?     
Think of an automobile engine.  An engine can produce certain effects -- 
vehicular locomotion -- but these effects are not produced in the engine as such.  
True, motion among the parts does occur (cylinders, crankshafts, etc), but these 
motions are the mechanical means to the engine's producing the effects it was 
engineered to produce, namely, vehicular motion.  For that to be possible, however, 
the engine has to be embedded in a larger entity (a car); moreover, the effects the 
engine is to produce (when encased in the car) must be explicated in a domain of 
existence that is external to both the engine (and the car).  (Motion in the car is not 
the effect an engine is designed to produce).  Embedded in the car, the engine's causal 
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powers must be ones explicated in terms of what effects it (the engine) can produce in 
a domain of existence that is external to it (the car), namely, in terms of its intended 
function to provide forward drive in ambient space, in the larger environment.  (This 
requires, in addition, the full magazine of natural laws derived from Newtonian 
physics: a terrestrial surface, gravitational attraction, inertia, surface traction, etc.)  
Producing motion is the distinctive causal power an engine (properly car-encased), 
and this effect is one it can produce only on the presupposition of a domain of 
existence that is external to it, one in which it can affect other things (drive shaft, 
wheels, etc.)  
Now consider a natural organism, say, a monkey.  We would, first and 
foremost, like to know what counts as the monkey's environment.  Monkey semantics 
require that anything conceptualized as a monkey produce monkeylike effects, ones 
that are staged and played out in a domain of existence that is recognizable as the 
environment of a monkey.  Lots of events occur within a monkey's body, many of 
which can be captured in nomic statements of organic biology specific to monkeys, 
others shared by human physiology; however, the effects produced in this domain 
aren't the ones we should refer to in order to explicate the causal powers of a monkey; 
monkey guts are very unmonkeylike.  The entities performing these organic processes 
are not themselves monkeys.  The physical environment internal to a monkey, the 
one enclosed within its "epithelial envelope," isn't the appropriate domain to think of 
as the one where the monkey's life is to be staged and played out.   
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If the space that is enclosed inside a monkey's body isn't an environment 
appropriate to a monkey, the only alternative is to conceptualize its environment by 
reference to the ambient space, the region of space outside to the monkey's body.  It 
is in this ambient space that a monkey lives its life as a monkey (not as aggregate of 
physiological processes).  As remarked, however, effects are to be modeled on 
accident inherence and accidents are produced in and by some substance or other.  
Consequently, it is not ambient space as such but other substances coexisting in 
space, which jointly constitute the monkey's environment, that appears to constitute 
the appropriate domain in which it can exercise its causal powers.    
Let's return to the engine example.  The space enclosed by the engine is 
already filled with a multitude of parts (ones not at all like the engine), ones that are 
interrelated so as to make the engine's distinctive causal powers possible.  So the 
space enclosed by the engine constitutes an internal environment (its intrasubstantial 
domain) that is already devoted to meeting the possibility-conditions of the engine's 
causal powers.  (See Diagram below.) And because the space enclosed within the 
engine contains the conditions under which the engine (as engine) is possible, it 
cannot also be the environment in which engine-attributable effects are to be staged 
and played out.  Analogously, a monkey is a material composite.  A monkey's body is 
composed of a multitude of entities, ones whose causal powers are interrelated so as 
to make the whole-monkey's causal powers possible.  So since the space enclosed in a 
monkey's body is "filled" with a plurality of entities nomically combined and 
interrelated so as to make possible a monkey (as a monkey, not an aggregate of 
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monkey guts), this domain does not seem to be the appropriate place for a monkey to 
exercise its distinctive causal agency.290   
The causal agency of a monkey, the causal powers that can be conceptualized 
as that which a material composite, as a monkey, would be capable of exercising 
must be explicated from its spatial boundaries on out -- or, in more technical 
terminology, from its "epithelial envelope" on out -- by what effects it produce in its 
environment.  Maybe more can be made of the point that the external environment 
begins from the region of space extended from the surface of your body on out.  
Things done with the body, bodily behaviors, will be the minimal unit of intentional 
action (insofar as it is bodily).  The body is the instrument (and the condition of) an 
agent's causal efficacy; therefore, performances made with the body are constitutive 
of an embodied agent's externally-directed self-activity.  This further suggests that the 
domain in which embodied intentional agency is to be staged and enacted is one that 
is external to the bounded region of space enclosed within the embodied substance-
agent.    
When you conceptualize a material composite, such as a monkey, on the 
model of an agent, you subsume the entire composite entity under that concept; in 
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 The goal-directedness of the whole-monkey which would involve the use of its body as an 
instrument of its causal efficacy in service to some goal, would presumably require that the goal be one 
directed at a domain external to the region of space enclosed by its body.  Does that follow?  No.  We 
can imagine a motivationally dysfunctional monkey, one that was exclusively concerned with the 
surface of its body, or with its interior, one that didn't acknowledge the world that extended from the 
surface of its body on out.  But this (rather autistic) monkey-type would not be what we call a normal 
monkey (except in appearance).  (In fact there are studies that show if infant monkeys do not receive a 
certain amount of attention and acknowledgment before a certain age, they do not develop an interest 
in others of their kind; an appear take little interest in the environment external to them.)  This implies, 
I think, that there is a normative conception of a monkey's ends (of a monkey's goal-directedness), one 
that is operative in our semantics concerning monkey kind.  
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which case it is the monkey as a whole-organism that is subsumed; consequently, the 
causal powers of a monkey must be conceptually explicated in reference to a domain 
that it makes sense to view as the environment of a monkey (monkey's don't swing on 
neural synapses!), one where effects can be attributed to an physical composite of this 
sort.  And since (in Kant's mind, anyway) the building blocks or basic units of an 
environment are substances, this means that a monkey's causal agency has to be 
explicated by reference to other substances and their correlative affective capacities.  
What we think something is depends a lot on what we think it can do.  What a 
monkey can do depends on to whom it can do it. The monkey's causal agency 
depends on the existence of other entities that can be causally affected by a monkey.  
Thus a monkey's agenthood is (semantically) interdependent on the correlative 
affective capacities of other entities; furthermore, since an entity counts as a 
substance iff it is an agent, a monkey's very substancehood appears to depend on the 
possibility of interaction with other substances.   
 
8.6.1 The Hierarchic Coordination of Causal Powers   
It would appear that there are a number of conditions required for goal-
enactment, a major one being that the interactant's causal powers are coordinated.291  
First, a substance's causal powers have to be such that its efficacy is geared to the 
external environment.  As remarked, this seems to mean that the externally-directed 
causal efficacy (say, of a monkey) presupposes the existence of other entities that 
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 Kant sometimes uses 'coordinated', other times he describes causal powers as 'harmonized'.   
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have correlative affective capacities (see section above).  Second, since the exercise 
of its causal powers appears to be goal-directed, the monkey's causal powers have to 
be geared to its specific goal-directedness.  (A substance that was directed to attain a 
goal for which it did not have the requisite causal efficacy would presumably be 
deemed dysfunctional.)  As remarked, interaction seems to imply the necessity for 
coordinated goal-directednesses between the monkey and other members of its 
environment, ones that exist on the appropriate semantic level of description as the 
whole-monkey.    
In order for the monkey's causal powers to be geared to its level-appropriate 
environment, a monkey must have a physical substrate that is geared to its particular 
goal-directedness.  The set of physical parts that constitute a monkey are supposed to 
make the monkey possible, where here 'making it possible' means 'making the causal 
powers characteristic of a monkey possible'.  Consequently, the causal substrate of a 
monkey (one consisting of a multitude of very unmonkeylike entities, each of which 
has distinctive causal powers of its own) must be coordinated so as to make the 
causal powers of a monkey possible.  Not only do the various causal powers of each 
of the monkey parts have to be coordinated vis-à-vis each other (so as to make a 
whole-monkey possible); they, in addition, must be coordinated for the sake of the 
monkey's own goal-directedness.   
What we think something is depends a lot on what we think it can do.  And a 
monkey's causal powers, as suggested, cannot be explicated by reference to the 
region of space enclosed within its body; instead, what it can do (qua monkey) must 
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be explicated by reference to a domain that exists beyond that boundary (in relation to 
other entities).  A monkey's physical substrate must therefore be coordinated with the 
environment which is external to the whole-monkey; otherwise, the type of causal 
powers it would make possible would not be those characteristic of a monkey; which 
is to say that this causal coordination (of physical substrate to superstrate) must 
therefore be conceptualized in reference to the environment conceived for the whole-
monkey.  (See Diagram below.) 
Diagram 8.6:  Axis of Interactive Structure     
                          
 
 
                                                  Externally-Directed Exercise Of Causal Powers 
                                                                    
 
 
This suggests that there is both a horizontal and a vertical dimension to the 
coordination required by interactive structures.  The monkey's (externally-directed) 
causal powers must be geared to its environment; and the monkey's physical substrate 
must, in turn, be geared to making the monkey's goal-directedness actionable, so that 
the goals it is supposed to pursue in its environment are ones for which it possesses 
the relevant causal efficacy.  And this, according to Kant, suggests "objective 
material purposiveness."  It suggests a teleological link between the parts of a 
monkey (and their causal powers) and the larger structured whole of which the 
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whole-monkey is itself a part.  It's as if the vast number of (very unmonkeylike) 
entities, ones which make a monkey's causal powers (its physical substrate) possible, 
were aiming at composing the sort of entity that could function in the larger 
(environmental) whole of which the monkey is itself a part.  And in view of the fact 
that the monkey is a part of a larger (environmental) whole, it's as if the parts of a 
monkey were aiming ultimately at composing this larger (environmental) whole and 
that the composition of a monkey was the proximal means292 to realizing this (higher, 
more distal) end.   
   Interestingly, the resulting teleologically-enhanced conceptualization of 
interactive causal structure is strikingly similar to how Kant explicates the internal 
structure of natural organisms in the third critique.  In the third critique (§66), Kant 
formulates his principle of natural organization in terms explicitly teleological terms, 
namely, as a system of reciprocal means/end relationships:   
An organized product of nature is that in which everything is an end and 
reciprocally a means as well.293  
 
When conceptualized on the model of intentional agents, substances would have 
ends—aims, interests, goals—and therefore could be viewed as interacting with other 
substances in a way that was guided by their particular species-defining goal-
directedness.  A substance would treat other substances as a means to the realization 
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 Discussions of practical reasoning usually distinguish between two broad types of means, 
instrumental and constitutive.  In the present case, the aim of composing a whole-monkey appears to 
be a constitutive means in view of the fact that it is a component part of a larger (environmental) 
whole.   
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of its own individual ends; reciprocally, these other substances would treat it as 
means to the realization of their own ends.   
In such a product of nature each part is conceived as if it exists only through 
all the others, thus as if existing for the sake of the others and on account of 
the whole, i.e., as an instrument (organ), which is, however, not sufficient (for 
it could also be an instrument of art, and thus represented as possible at all 
only as an end); rather it must be thought of as an organ that produces the 
other parts (consequently each produces the others reciprocally), which cannot 
be the case in any instrument of art, but only of nature, which provides all the 
matter for instruments (even those of art):  only then and on that account can 
such a product, as an organized and self-organizing being, be called a natural 
end.294  
 
The preceding discussion suggests that the model of interaction is one where a 
substance's involvement in an interactive structure amounts its involvement in a type 
of teleological structure, specifically, a matrix of means/end relations in which a 
plurality of distinct (and embodied) substances are united by their coordinated (and 
goal-directed) causal powers.  It seems that the concept we have to use in order to 
make use of this additional dimension (of goal-directedness) is that of an end.295   
It would appear therefore that the exercise of a substance's causal powers 
would have to be reciprocally coordinated; otherwise its causal powers would be 
causally out of sync with the existing affective capacities of other substances.  Given 
that a plurality of finite substances (say, x and y) could not have pre-arranged the 
agreement of their own causal powers (a premise Kant would accept), the datum of 
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 In Concerning the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy (1788), Kant writes: 
“Ends have a direct relation to reason, whether this is that of another or our own.  But if we are to 
place them in the reason of another, then we must at least base this on our own as an analogue:  
because otherwise this cannot be represented at all” (8:182). This quotation appears in the CPJ , 
endnote 20, p. 391).  
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their interaction can only be made intelligible to reason if it supposes that, in view of 
their mutual dependency, there must ('must' of hypothesis) be some whole-object that 
the interactants (x, y) are supposed to compose; in which case, these interactants must 
('must' of a hypothetical practical imperative) be coordinated for the sake of 
composing this implicit whole-object.  Under this hypothesis, x and y are viewed 
reciprocally as the means to each other's causal efficacy, and this reciprocal 
coordination is to be viewed, in turn, as the means to composing this whole-object.  
But if that's so, then the rational explanation of x and y's mutual coordination must 
lie in the fact that these interactants were supposed to compose this whole-object, 
which would imply that the latter prescribes itself as the target (or scopus) of 
composition.296   
In Chapters 2, 4 and 5, we have seen how reciprocal interaction is linked  
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 This suggests, I think, that interactive structure supervenes on teleological structure; in 
other words, from the standpoint of reason (not the understanding), teleological structure is 
explanatorily prior to (thus functions as the causal substrate for) efficient causal structures.  I submit 
that the model of interaction, conceptually encoded in the a priori category of community, is the basic 
bare-bones structure, the mere scaffolding of a goal-directed system; it represents a reciprocal structure 
made up of efficient causal relations; but the feature of reciprocal causality cannot be explained in 
terms of efficient causality.  The basic idea (which I acknowledge is speculative) is that purposiveness 
is (or, at any rate, provides) the schema under which the category of community (= the concept of 
reciprocal interaction) can be applied to empirical-phenomenal reality.  In other words, the model of 
interaction doesn't explain how it derives the defining feature of its own internal structure (reciprocal 
causality); it represents only a mechanical substrate.  Because, as a categorial concept, reciprocal 
interaction represents the understanding's conceptualization of interactive structures (namely, as a two-
way structure of efficient causality), it does not include the concept of an end, the concept that is 
supposed to explain causal reciprocity (the coordination of causal powers).  Rational systematicity, 
which derives from the concept of teleology, is the business of reason (not the understanding).  
Therefore, the teleological dimension of interactive structure cannot be included as part of the 
conceptual content of the understanding's conceptualization of interactive structure.  This could help to 
explain why, in the third critique (§80), Kant thought it necessary to postulate the "subordination" of 
mechanistic explanations to teleological ones in order to explain the global systematicity in virtue of 
which nature may be conceptualized as one (thoroughly organized) world-whole.   
 309 
explanatorily to Kant's physicoteleology, that is, to an intentional explanatory 
framework (see also 10.6); moreover, in Chapter 6 we saw how Kant's model of 
reciprocal interaction is motivated by his mereocosmology (his alternative to 
metaphysical engulfment and isolation).  As we shall see (in the remaining chapters), 
the philosophical significance of natural organisms (in the third critique, anyway) 
seems to be that they (as whole-objects) exhibit an interesting and, as it turns out, 
cognitively serviceable ambiguity.  As wholes, each organism is both a one and a 
many -- a singular entity and a set of parts.  As singular entities, natural organisms are 
to be conceptualized on the model of agents (and, for this reason, prescribe 
themselves as targets of composition); as a set of parts, organisms model interactive 
structure in their own composition (in propria persona).  These two 
conceptualizations of a whole-object are explanatorily united within Kant's use of the 
concept of a "natural end" (and within the larger framework of his physicoteleology).  
In the next two chapters, the aim is to textually substantiate these claims.  In the final 
chapter, the aim is to re-activate and apply the mereocosmic interpretative framework 
(presented in chapter 2) to the Kant-internal data marshaled from the various 
chapters.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 310 
Chapter Nine 
CONCEPTUALIZING NATURAL ENDS 
 
9.1 Introduction 
In the second half of the third critique, where Kant provides an analysis of the 
"teleological judgment of reflection," an interest in natural organization 
predominates.  In CPJ §64, Kant defines (or, at any rate, explicates) the concept of a 
natural end and explicitly subsumes the "special class" of natural product—namely, 
"organized beings"—under this concept.  In §66, Kant formulates a general principle, 
stated in teleological terms, clearly intended as a guide for concept-users intending to 
apply the concept of a natural end empirically.  Natural organisms appear to be the 
only empirical phenomena that can meet the requirements of §66's principle.297  In 
section §67, Kant argues that the concept of a natural end (and the teleological 
judgment that employs it) is to be regarded as an "internal principle" of natural 
science.  Taken together, these sections strongly suggest that Kant's interest in natural 
organisms and his interest in conceptualizing natural ends are linked under a larger 
explanatory concern.  In §65, you find these two interests explicitly linked under this 
larger explanatory concern.   
In §65, Kant is facing an explanatory crisis.  A recalcitrant class of natural 
phenomena (organized beings) pose a threat to the fulfillment of reason's 
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   In fact, under my view, what we find in section §66 is a crisis of in the application of the 
concept of that principle.  But this issue is the focus of another chapter.    
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representational imperative, namely, to "cognize the necessity" in all of nature's 
forms.  Organized beings cannot (in Kant's mind, anyway) be adequately explained in 
mechanistic terms.  Consequently, because Kant acknowledges that there are only 
two general sorts of explanatory norm at reason's disposal -- mechanistic and 
teleological -- organized beings are natural phenomena of a sort that must be 
explained teleologically if reason is going to succeed in cognizing the necessity in 
their forms.  However, because organized beings are products of nature (and therefore 
not literally artefactual products), the trick is to engineer a concept that allows 
concept-users to explain these phenomena teleologically without also conceptualizing 
them literally as products of art.  Hence the aim is to engineer the concept of a 
natural end.    
Is there something that is characteristic of natural organisms that makes them 
especially amenable to teleological explanation?  If so, what is that internal structure 
and in virtue of what do they possess it?  The answer is 'yes' and furthermore the 
special feature attaching to natural organisms which makes them suitable for 
teleological explanation is that they are material wholes of a special sort.  According 
to Kant natural organisms are material wholes with uniquely systematized (and norm-
governed) infrastructures.   
An organized product of nature is that in which everything is an end and 
reciprocally a means as well.298   
 
In such a product of nature [organized beings] each part is conceived as if it 
exists only through all the others, thus [each part is conceived] as if existing 
for the sake of the others and on account of the whole, i.e., [each part is 
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conceived] as an instrument (organ), which is, however, not sufficient [for 
something to count as a natural end] (for it could also be an instrument of art, 
and thus represented as possible at all only as an end); rather it must be 
thought of as an organ that produces the other parts (consequently each 
produces the others reciprocally), which cannot be the case in any instrument 
of art, but only of nature, which provides all the matter for instruments (even 
those of art): only then and on that account can such a product, as an 
organized and self-organizing being, be called a natural end.299   
 
Natural organisms are material wholes whose parts are functionally interdependent.  
In what follows, I offer an interpretation in which Kant's interest in natural organisms 
is taken to reflect an acknowledgement that these phenomena are uniquely capable of 
meeting the conceptual requirements imposed by Kant's model of reciprocal 
interaction.300  I submit that Kant uses this model as a conceptual template under 
which certain eligible natural phenomena (organized beings) are to be subsumed so 
that they can be explained in the terms provided by Kant's Model.  As already 
remarked, this Model is of a type that explains phenomena in intentional (or 
teleological) terms.  So within this explanatory framework phenomena are to be 
explained as the end-products of intentional causation (by "remote analogy" with 
products of art).  And insofar as the concept of a natural end uses the concept of an 
'end' concept-users cannot apply the former independently of the latter.   
In light of reason's explanatory emergency, Kant is engineering a conceptual 
content specifically for the teleological judgment of nature's products as natural ends.  
In §65 Kant states two conditions under which concept-users are entitled to subsume 
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  And since I hold that the Model of reciprocal interaction is encoded in the category of 
community, subsumptions under the former are equivalent to subsumptions under the latter. 
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natural products under the concept of a natural end.  The first condition, as we will 
see shortly, contains two subrequirements -- the first being (what I have called) part-
on-whole dependency (whole priority), the second being (what I will here refer to as) 
a naturalizing condition.  Both of these subrequirements jointly constitute the 
conceptual content Kant has engineered for the concept of a natural end.  When 
cognitively subsumed under the first subrequirement (part-on-whole dependency), an 
object is represented as an end, that is, as the effect of intentional production.  The 
second subrequirement, however, is supposed to function as a naturalizing constraint 
on the first by mandating that any object subsumed under the concept of a natural end 
not compromise its ontological status as a product of nature.  For products of nature 
are to be understood only by "remote analogy" to products of art.  Here Kant appears 
to have made it a part of the intensional content of the natural end concept to 
conceptually negate all reference to a rational agent, one at any rate that would be (in 
a sense to be explained later) causally "external" to the natural phenomena 
represented under this concept.   
I said that (in §65) there are two conditions under which the concept of a 
natural end may be applied.  The first has just been sketched.  The first condition 
expresses the representational content Kant has engineered for the concept of a 
natural end; moreover, this content determines the sort of necessity that is to be 
represented in the phenomena subsumable to it.  Concept-users are therefore under 
the requirement to represent a phenomenon in conformity with this content whenever 
they would represent it as a natural end; which is to say that when they represent a 
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material body as a natural end, it must be representable as the effect of intentional 
causation.  And here is where the second condition comes in.  The second condition 
plays a somewhat different role from the first.  It doesn't specify the sort of necessity 
to be cognized in certain phenomena (natural organisms); rather the role played by 
the second condition is to provide a prior conceptualization of these phenomena, one 
that makes it possible to explain them in the terms imposed by the first condition.  In 
other words, the second condition works in tandem with the first by conceptualizing a 
set of natural phenomena in a way that makes them explanatorily amenable to Kant's 
Model.   
I submit that this prior conceptualization should be specified as that of a 
relational structure, one explicated under the concept of reciprocal interaction.  As we 
have already seen, it is (in Kant's mind, anyway) only under the description of a 
plurality of material substances as standing in relations of reciprocal interaction that 
concept-users would be compelled to posit an idea or conception of a whole as the 
ground of their interrelations.  On the assumption that concept-users are forced to 
explain natural organisms in intentional terms, where that involves positing an idea or 
conception of a whole as the condition of their possibility, it would therefore 
ultimately be due to a prior application of the model of interaction to these 
phenomena that an intentional explanation of them is possible.  With the aid of this 
prior conceptualization, these natural phenomena could be subsumed under the 
concept of a natural end, thereby allowing reason to cognize the (teleological) 
necessity in their forms and consequently avert its explanatory crisis.   
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9.2 Reason’s Explanatory Emergency (In Sections §§64-67)  
The background explanatory concern driving sections §§64-67 can plausibly 
be reconstructed in the following way:  (1) Reason’s imperative is to represent nature 
as a domain of causal necessity (i.e., causal nexus).  To that end, there are two 
versions according to which nature can be represented as a causal nexus:  as a system 
of effective causes or a system of final causes.  (2) In order to represent nature as a 
causal nexus, reason must "cognize the necessity" in all of nature's forms.  Cognizing 
the necessity in a given natural form can be achieved in either of two ways, according 
to two different explanatory norms -- mechanistic explanation (MEs) and teleological 
explanation (TEs).  (These explanatory norms correspond to effective causes and 
final causes respectively.)  (3) But (huh-oh) natural organisms constitute a "special 
class of natural product" in that they cannot be adequately explained in mechanistic 
terms.  (4) So, if reason is going to succeed in cognizing the necessity in all of 
nature's products, including organized beings, and then it must resort to the 
teleological explanation of some natural forms.   
According to Kant reason wants to be able consider the entirety of nature as a 
domain of causal necessity.  In the CPJ Kant writes:     
Since reason must be able to cognize the necessity in every form of a natural 
product if it would understand the cognitions connected with its generation, 
the contingency of their form with respect to all empirical laws of nature in 
relation to reason is itself a ground for regarding their causality as if it were 
possible only through reason.301 
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A causal nexus is a domain of causal necessity in which all natural phenomena are 
causally necessitated by antecedent determinants in accordance with certain natural 
laws.  The existence of any given phenomena is causally necessitated by the existence 
of some other phenomena which has brought it about in a way that can be understood 
or explained by reference to and in terms of the laws governing a given domain.  
According to Kant, empirical reality is a domain governed entirely by mechanical 
laws.  "All generation is mechanical"-- this is the principle of mechanism that 
governs all natural phenomena.  All products of nature (and the processes governing 
their generation) must therefore be explained under a mechanistic explanatory norm.   
However, organized beings constitute a "special" class of natural phenomena 
whose structural organization and generation cannot be explained by reference to 
mechanical laws.  Since the existence and/or occurrence of such natural phenomena 
as organized beings cannot be explained in terms of the mechanical laws of nature, 
we cannot regard such phenomena as causally necessitated because the only 
recognized form of causal necessity is (so far) the one conceptualized in mechanistic 
terms.  And since natural organisms are not explainable under a mechanistic 
explanatory norm, it would appear concept-users face a dilemma:  either they must 
deny that these phenomena actually exist in nature; or they must include such 
phenomena at the cost of violating reason's mandate to "cognize the necessity" in all 
of nature's forms.  Clearly, the first horn of this dilemma is not a real option; no one 
would deny that natural organisms are in fact products of nature.  So unless there is 
some other explanatory norm that can be applied to natural organisms, it would 
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appear that reason's mandate to cognize the necessity in all of nature's forms must 
remain in unfulfilled.   
 
9.2.1  Natural Organisms Exemplify Normative Standards of Composition 
In the third critique, Kant views organized beings as natural systems, ones that 
can be made "intelligible" only from the standpoint of reason.  When we make a 
judgment from this standpoint, we make use of the concept of a natural end, a 
concept which "leads reason into an order of things entirely different from that of a 
mere mechanism of nature" (CPJ, 5:376-7).302  Kant's bird wing example illustrates 
what is involved in the exercise of teleological judgment:  
[O]bjective purposiveness, as a principle of the possibility of the things of 
nature, is so far from being necessarily connected with the concept of the 
latter that it is rather precisely that to which one refers above all in order to 
prove the contingency of it (of nature) and of its form.  For if one adduces, 
e.g., the structure of a bird's wing, the hollowness of its bones, the placement 
of its wings for movement and of its tail for steering, etc., one says that given 
the mere nexus effectivus in nature, without the help of a special kind of 
causality, namely that of ends, (nexus finalis), this is all in the highest degree 
contingent: i.e., that nature, considered as a mere mechanism, could have 
formed itself in a thousand different ways without hitting precisely upon the 
unity in accordance with such a rule, and that it is therefore only outside the 
concept of nature, not within it, that one could have even the least ground a 
priori for hoping to find such a principle.303 
 
Natural organisms appear to be things of a sort, which demand certain specific parts;  
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 On this point Kant states:  "A teleological judgment compares the concept of a product of 
nature as it is with one of what it ought to be.  Here the judging of its possibility is grounded in a 
concept (of the end) that precedes it a priori.  There is no difficulty in representing the possibility of 
products of art in such a way.  But to think of a product of nature that there something that it ought to 
be and then to judge and then to judge whether it really is so already presupposes a principle that could 
not be drawn from experience (which teaches only what things are)" (CPJ, FI, 20:240).    
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a bird's wing can't be combined in any old way.  There is a limited range of 
combinations that can intelligibly be regarded to constitute a bird's wing.  Any given 
combination of parts which is to be regarded as the combination of a bird's wing must 
meet certain semantic norms, ones that rule out (as unintelligible) a multitude of other 
combinations (as unwing-like).  The bird's wing is made up of certain kinds of parts, 
as opposed to others.  The acknowledgement of this narrowed range of compositional 
possibilities expresses a general semantic fact about natural organisms:  that they are 
made up of parts and that their particular part-ontologies reflect normative species-
specific standards of combinatorial correctness (and incorrectness).  These normative 
standards appear to be a defining feature of natural organisms.   
Operating under a purely mechanistic explanatory standpoint. A purely 
mechanistic standpoint on all of nature's phenomena appears to conceptually negate 
any basis for acknowledging the normativity attaching to the internal structure of a 
bird's wing.  (Indeed, from an exclusively mechanistic standpoint, standards of 
compositional correctness, as they apply to material composites, are not 
acknowledgeable.)  From a mechanistic standpoint, the structure of a bird's wing is 
just one among millions of other different (but equally possible) physical 
configurations.  In which case, the one that has actually occurred—the one that is 
exemplified in the bird's wing -- is totally contingent relative to these others possible 
configurations.  From a purely mechanistic standpoint, reason is therefore unable to 
view the actual configuration of a bird's wing as a necessitated phenomenon.  As 
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remarked, this result is unacceptable to reason, which must "cognize the necessity" in 
all of nature's products, including their particular "forms" (or physical composition).    
Under a mechanistic conception of matter, there would appear to be no 
nonarbitrary qualitative or quantitative distinctions.  Any particular scheme of 
numerical division that is applied to bleached matter is entirely underdetermined, 
which means that any which is actually applied is totally contingent and the 
corresponding part-ontology (under that division scheme) would therefore be entirely 
arbitrary.  With regard to spatiomaterial continua (= homogeneous extended matter), 
were you to posit a scheme of division for some quantity of matter (say, O), O would 
be divided up according to that division scheme into n-many actual material parts.  
Since under this conception of matter, any part-ontology is entirely arbitrary, it seems 
to follow that any whole-ontology would be also be arbitrary.  Because these parts 
would be homogeneous any material composite made up of these parts would be one 
that is arbitrarily composed, it having no greater ontological claim to objecthood than 
any of its (separable) parts.  And if there were multiple Os, multiple material 
composites, the parts of one O would be entirely swappable with those of another O*, 
because there would be no qualitative basis (other than spatial position) to distinguish 
this O from that O*.   
According to Kant it is because of the cognition of the normativity concerning 
natural organisms' internal composition that we perceive the inadequacy of the 
understanding's mechanistic explanation concerning such phenomena.   
[O]bjective purposiveness, as a principle of the possibility of the things of 
nature, is so far from being necessarily connected with the concept of the 
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latter that it is rather precisely that to which one refers above all in order to 
prove the contingency of it (of nature) and of its form.304 
 
Because natural organisms are understood to be natural systems and may be viewed 
as such only from a teleological standpoint on nature, (a standpoint that is reason's 
not the understanding's), these phenomena appear to induce a perception of 
contingency (on the part of the understanding) concerning their forms.   
How does a purely mechanistic conception of matter lead to a violation of 
reason's mandate to represent nature as a causal nexus?  According to the norms of 
mechanistic explanation, any material configuration is as good as any other; but in the 
case of natural organisms, not only is it not the case that any configuration of parts 
possible; natural organisms require specific kinds of parts and these are not 
swappable with the parts of other natural organisms; moreover, these parts must be 
ordered in very particular ways.  Under a mechanistic conception of matter, the 
normative composition of organisms would (contrary to fact) be unthinkable.305  
According to Kant, were we not to empirically apply the concept of a natural end to 
organized beings (and to nature in general), we could not represent these phenomena 
because (for us) natural organization consists in a type of systematicity, one that can 
be "made intelligible" only in teleological terms, as a system of ends.306   
                                                          
304
 CPJ, §61, 5:360. 
 
305
   It is interesting to speculate whether Kant thinks that, under a bleached conception of 
matter, nature would be wholly without any norms governing its phenomena, or whether purely 
homogeneous matter could by itself ground a mechanistic conception of nature, one in which 
determinate material things exist and stand in causal relations to other material bodies.   
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 In the third critique Kant states: "To judge objective purposiveness we always require the 
concept of an end, and [if that purposiveness is not to be an external one (utility),but an internal one], 
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9.2.2 Motivating the Concept of a Natural End  
The condition of conceptualizing a given material body as a natural end is 
that its parts stand in certain teleological relations.  However, since (on my view) this 
concept's intensional content is engineered by Kant in response to reason's 
explanatory crisis, the question may still be posed as to how this crisis puts pressure 
on Kant to engineer the natural end concept in a way that mandates a body's parts 
stand in relations of this sort. Getting a clearer grasp of what motivated Kant to 
engineer the concept of a natural end in the way that he does will give us, in turn, a 
clearer grasp of what its prior application condition is.  
Reason has determined a means for cognizing the necessity of a particularly 
recalcitrant class of natural phenomena -- natural organisms.  The cognitive means of  
realizing its imperative in relation to this "special class" of natural product is given in  
the teleological judgment.  A cognitive judgment of this kind makes use of the 
concept of a natural end.  Having acknowledged this, however, it must be 
emphasized that for any natural product to be represented under the concept of a 
natural end, it must first be represented under the general concept of an end.   
Now if we consider a material whole, as far as its form is concerned, as a 
product of the parts and of their forces and their capacity to combine by 
themselves (including as parts other materials that they add to themselves) we 
                                                                                                                                                                     
we require the concept of an internal end, which contains the ground of the internal possibility of the 
object.  Now as an end in general is that the concept of which can be regarded as the ground of the 
possibility of the object itself, thus in order to represent an objective purposiveness in a thing the 
concept of what sort of thing it is supposed to be must come first; and the agreement of the manifold 
in the thing with this concept (which supplies the rule for the combination of the manifold in it) is the 
qualitative perfection of a thing.  Quantitative perfection, as the completeness of any thing in its 
own kind, is entirely distinct from this, and is a mere concept of magnitude (totality), in which what 
the thing is supposed to be is thought of as already determined and it is only asked whether 
everything that is requisite for it exists” (CPJ, 5:227-8, underscoring added). 
 322 
represent a mechanical kind of generation.  But from this there arises no 
concept of a whole as an end, whose internal possibility presupposes 
throughout the idea of a whole on which even the constitution and mode of 
action of the parts depends, which is just how we must represent an organized 
body.307 
 
The intensional content Kant engineers for the concept of a natural end spells out the 
terms in which we must grasp the sort of necessity to be cognized in regard to the 
phenomena of natural organisms.  When the whole-organism is identified as a (final) 
end, its component parts are thereby conceptualized as so many (constitutive) means 
toward its composition.  By prescribing themselves as targets of composition, 
organisms, as natural systems, model teleological structure in propria persona and 
consequently make themselves amenable to rational explanation.   
If viewing a whole-organism as a natural end means (or, at any rate, involves) 
viewing it as a target (or scopus) of composition, then according to Kant concept- 
users must also explain the whole-organism's form and existence by reference to a 
prior idea or conception of it (see 10.8).  Part-on-whole dependency is the defining 
feature a material composite must have in order for concept-users to represent it  
under the concept of an 'end'.  The basic idea expressed in the thesis of part-on-whole 
dependency is that, for any material body that exhibits it, the representation of its 
parts is conceptually dependent on a prior idea of a whole.  In 2.5 we saw that part-
on-whole dependency is the trademark (or, at any rate, the mereological expression) 
of rational systematicity; moreover, according to Kant this sort mereological structure 
requires a special sort of explanation, namely, that of final causality.  Part-on-whole 
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dependency is therefore not what explains but rather what constitutes objective 
purposiveness.  It is in terms of final causality (of appearing to have been made) that 
an organism's various parts can be viewed as a system of means/end relationships, all 
of which subserve a highest-order system-goal (namely, that of composing the whole-
organism).  Reason is therefore able to "cognize the necessity" in natural organisms 
only insofar as it can view them as modeling rational systematicity in propria 
persona.   
 
9.3 Analysis of §65'S First Condition  
In §65, Kant gives us two conditions under which a given material body can 
be viewed as a natural end.  Here is the first one:  
Now for a thing as a natural end it is requisite, first, that its parts (as far as 
their existence and their form are concerned) are possible only through their 
relation to the whole.  For the thing itself is an end, and is thus comprehended 
under a concept or an idea that must determine a priori everything that is to 
be contained in it.  But insofar as a thing is conceived of as possible only in 
this way it is merely a work of art, i.e., the product of a rational cause distinct 
from the matter (the parts), the causality of which (in the production and 
combination of the parts) is determined though nature outside it).308   
   
In the next paragraph Kant offers a shorter restatement of the first condition in the 
context of presenting a second condition:   
But if a thing, as a natural product, is nevertheless to contain in itself and its 
internal possibility a relation to ends, i.e., is to be possible only as a natural 
end and without the causality of the concepts of a rational being outside it, 
then it is required, second, that its parts be combined into a whole by being 
reciprocally the cause and the effect of their form.309  
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Notice that the second citation expresses a conditional.  Notice, further, that §65's 
first condition is being stated again but this time it is reinstated more concisely as the 
antecedent of a conditional.  Although Kant has lapsed into a de re orientation, he is 
clearly imposing conditions on concept-users' judgments, saying that in order to 
represent some product of nature O under the concept of natural end, they must on the 
one hand think of O's form and existence as being of a sort explainable only in 
teleological terms, using the concept of an end; on the other hand because O is a 
product of nature, O's status as a natural product must not be compromised by 
explaining its form in (what appear to be) the same terms used to explain products of 
art.   
Notice that there appears to be two subrequirements.  The first (of two) 
conditions stated in §65 appears to be as follows:  (1) In order to subsume a given 
natural product O under the concept of a natural end, concept-users are subject to two 
subrequirements:  (a) to view O's form and existence as one whose "internal 
possibility" presupposes an 'end' and (b) to do so in a way that does not compromise 
O's status as a product of nature.  (I defer discussion of (b) until later.)  When Kant 
asserts (a) he is asserting the same claim as when he says "[f]or the thing itself is an 
end, and is thus comprehended under a concept or an idea that must determine a 
priori everything that is to be contained in it."  Here it is clear that Kant is asserting 
the thesis of part-on-whole dependency (or whole priority).   
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9.4  Analysis of Section's §65'S Second Condition 
The aim now is to analyze the second (of two) conditions given in §65.  The 
text below expresses §65's second condition for representing an object as a natural 
end.  Notice that both the first and the second conditions are embedded in a larger 
conditional: 
But if a thing, as a natural product, is nevertheless to contain in itself and its 
internal possibility a relation to ends, i.e., is to be possible only as a natural 
end and without the causality of the concepts of a rational being outside it, 
then it is required, second, that its parts be combined into a whole by being 
reciprocally the cause and the effect of their form.310   
 
Kant is asserting a conditional proposition in which the first condition occupies the 
position of the antecedent while the second condition is in the position of consequent.  
We might reasonably suppose from this that the structure of the conditional would 
determine the logical role the second condition plays in relation to the first.  On the 
suggestion that we should acknowledge the structure of the conditional (expressed in 
the citation above) as playing some significant role in how §65's two conditions 
should be understood, our objective would be to figure out what the conditional says 
as a whole.  This implies that whatever the consequent asserts, it operates as a 
(necessary) condition under which concept-users can subsume a given natural product 
under the concept of a natural end.   
I have already given an analysis of the antecedent of the conditional.  Now the 
aim is to provide an analysis of its consequent (excerpted below):  
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[I]t is required, second, that its [the thing's] parts be combined into a whole by 
[something's] being reciprocally the cause and the effect of their form. 311 
 
Kant says that "it is required, second, that its [the thing's] parts be combined into a 
whole by being reciprocally the cause and the effect of their form."  Here the referent 
of 'their form' appears to be "its parts," where 'its' refers to the thing, as a natural 
product.  We start off with the idea that the thing's parts "be combined into a whole 
by being reciprocally the cause and the effect of their form."  So the desired end-
result is that the thing's parts be combined into a whole.  And the text which begins 
"by being ... " is meant as a locution indicating the process or action or means by 
which that result is to be obtained.  Now the question is this:  In "being reciprocally 
the cause and the effect of their form" what exactly is the means by which a thing's 
parts are combined into a whole?  Answer:  A set of parts constitutes a whole by 
means of something, which which Kant describes as "reciprocally the cause and the 
effect of their form?"   
But what is this something?  The text is ambiguous.  We can disambiguate 
two different interpretations of §65's second condition: 
Gloss a)  the whole's being reciprocally the cause and the effect of their form 
Gloss b)  the parts' being reciprocally the cause and the effect of their form 
In order to get clear about what Kant's second condition is, it is necessary to consider 
each of these.  Under gloss (a), Kant's second condition mandates that in order to 
cognitively recognize O as a natural end, O must be combined into a whole "by [the 
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whole's] being the cause and the effect of their form."  Under gloss (a) there is some 
redundancy insofar as it reasserts the condition of whole priority (Kant's first 
condition) by mandating that the whole is the cause of the parts' form.  But there's 
more.  It also states that the whole is reciprocally the effect of the parts' form.  How 
should be construe the parts' causality of the whole? One way to understand gloss (a) 
is to read it as imposing both whole priority and part priority as the means by which a 
thing's parts are combined into a whole.  (This counts, in fact, as a gloss on a gloss.)   
The thesis of part priority asserts that the whole is the sum of its parts -- 
different sum; different whole.  When considered as a sum of actual parts (a mere 
aggregate) a whole is entirely ontologically derivative of the parts.  But the parts of a 
whole are not conceptually dependent on a prior conception of a whole for their 
identity and interrelations.  Under this discursive representation of a whole (as sum of 
actual parts), the parts are contingent in two ways already discussed:  first the 
division of any whole (considered as sum of parts) depends on a scheme of numerical 
division; and since (in the case of homogeneous matter), the application of any 
determinate scheme of division is arbitrary, so is the resulting part-ontology.  Second, 
on the assumption of a given scheme of division, the parts of a given material whole 
are entirely swappable with (and therefore separable from) the parts of any other 
contingently formed aggregate.  No part is indispensable to any material whole 
(considered from a purely mechanistic point of view).  On the contrary, every part 
belonging to a given material whole is "external" to every other, meaning that the 
composite they form is entirely decomposable.   
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One incoherent package?  This reading of gloss (a) doesn't appear to work, 
however.  This is because the theses of whole and part priority logically cancel each 
other out.  In part priority, the parts are not conceptually dependent on a prior 
conception of a whole for their identities; or, at any rate, the identity each part does 
have (under a given scheme of division) is one it can retain independently of the 
whole it was originally a part of.  This is not the case with part-on-whole dependency.  
So you couldn't have a single whole O whose parts were such that they are both 
conceptually dependent on the whole (of which they are parts) and not so dependent.  
But Kant's first condition (in §65) makes the judgment of O as a natural end depend 
on O's exhibiting part-on-whole dependency; in that case O's parts must presuppose a 
prior conception or idea of a whole as a condition of their form and existence.  So, in 
mandating part-on-whole dependency as a condition under which a natural product 
can be viewed as a natural end, how can Kant consistently add a second condition 
that appears to combine a reaffirmation of part-on-whole dependency together with a 
thesis asserting that a thing's parts need not presuppose a prior conception of a 
whole?  Under reading (a) Kant appears to mandate both whole and part priority 
together into one incoherent package.   
One could further point out that because part priority implies Axioms of 
Intuition-style mathematizable aggregation and is affiliated with mechanistic 
explanation, it could hardly possess the conceptual resources needed to represent 
natural phenomena as ends.  The reason is that in §65 Kant is supposed to be giving 
us conditions under which we can recognize natural phenomena to be eligible for 
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teleological explanation, an explanatory norm that he explicitly contrasts with 
mechanistic explanation.   
According to Kant part priority could never be sufficient for the generation of 
a whole in which the parts depend for their identity and individuation (their parthood) 
on a prior conception of the whole.  As remarked, under the thesis of part priority 
wholes are mere aggregates that implies that the parts are "external" to each other.   
For this concept [of a natural end] leads reason into an order of things entirely 
different from that of a mere mechanism of nature, which will here no longer 
satisfy us.  An idea has to ground the possibility of the product of nature.  
However, since this is an absolute unity of the representation, while matter is 
a multitude of things, which by itself can provide no determinate unity of 
composition, if that unity of the idea is to even serve as the determining 
ground a priori of a natural law of the causality of such a form of the 
composite, then the end of nature must extend to everything that lies in its 
product.312  
 
In the case of aggregated matter the parts are not necessarily united.  And because its 
parts are not "internally" related, an aggregated material composite does not exhibit 
any necessary unity in its internal composition; therefore it is not one for which it is 
necessary to hypothesize an idea or conception of the whole.  But if reason is to be 
able to cognize the necessity in all of nature's products, then a body's internal 
composition must exhibit a causal structure, one that can be interpreted as a system of 
mean/end relations.  For this to be possible, however, material bodies must be things 
of a sort that generally exhibit part-on-whole dependency, since this appears to be (in 
Kant's mind, anyway) the condition under which natural products are eligible to be 
explained teleologically.  What this suggests is that the role to be played by §65's 
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second condition is this: it must make it possible for material wholes to be things of a 
sort to require the hypothesis of an idea or conception of a whole, one that is capable 
of determining beforehand what the parts of a material whole are supposed to be and, 
in addition, able to make it possible for these parts to be viewed as necessarily 
unified.   
So far I have not shown categorically that gloss (a) is incorrect.  I have shown 
only that gloss (a) is incoherent under an interpretation in which it is seen to contain 
both the theses of whole priority and part priority.  I have suggested that since §65's 
second condition is to be interpreted in light of reason's interest in cognizing the 
necessity in nature's forms and since the material wholes that are generated merely by 
a process of combination-as-aggregation (part priority) aren't ones in which there is 
any necessity to cognize, we have reason to reject gloss (a).  But maybe there are 
other interpretations.  Be that as it may, I think a prima facie case has been made 
against gloss (a)'s plausibility as an interpretative hypothesis.  But we will see, in 
addition, that gloss (a) offers us no real insight into why (or how) §65's second 
condition can play the role that Kant intends for it, whereas gloss (b) does.   
 
9.5 Reciprocal Interaction As an Implicit Conception of a Body's Composition 
Above I said that whatever interpretation is given the second condition 
imposed on the judgment of natural ends, it must square with other nearby texts.  
Below I cite the second condition in context:   
But if a thing, as a natural product, is nevertheless to contain in itself and its 
internal possibility a relation to ends, i.e., is to be possible only as a natural 
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end and without the causality of the concepts of a rational being outside it, 
then it is required, second, that its parts be combined into a whole by being 
reciprocally the cause and the effect of their form.  For in this way alone is it 
possible in turn for the idea of the whole conversely (reciprocally) to 
determine the form and combination of all the parts: not as a cause - for then it 
would be a product of art - but as a ground for the cognition of the systemic 
unity of the form and the conjunction of all the manifold that is contained in 
the given material for someone who judges it.313 
 
Here Kant appears to be saying that the second condition plays a supportive role to 
whole priority.  Notice that however we interpret the second condition, the reading 
given to it must be consistent with the importance that Kant assigns to it.  The second 
condition in §65 appears to be the sole condition ("in this way alone is it possible in 
turn ...") to make it possible for "the idea of the whole conversely (reciprocally) to 
determine the form and combination of all the parts."   
It isn't clear from the immediate context what is meant by "the idea of the 
whole conversely (reciprocally) to determine the form and combination of all the 
parts ... ".  Here Kant seems to be explicitly acknowledging a bidirectional causal 
structure in which the participating relata are a (set of) parts on the one hand and a  
whole on the other such that the parts determine the whole and the whole, 
reciprocally, determines the parts.  So, we have the following pair of causal relations:  
 1)  the parts are determined by the whole  
 2)  the whole is determined by the parts          
I am aware that in the citation above Kant states that it is "the idea of the whole 
conversely (reciprocally) to determine the form and combination of all the parts ... " 
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(italics added).  Rather than take it for granted, I have begun with a simpler 
formulation in order to put us in a position to motivate this additional nuance.  
Assume (1) expresses the thesis of whole priority.  (Doing so, of course, entails that it 
is the idea or conception of the whole which acts as the determiner of the parts.)  
What is (2) asserting?  And how can we square (2) with the rejection of part priority 
as a condition under which the judgment of natural ends is possible?  Above I argued 
that gloss (a) constitutes an incoherent package including both whole and part 
priority.  Since the second condition is embedded in conditional proposition 
(specifically as the consequent), it was understood as a condition under which the 
antecedent is possible; since, moreover, the antecedent expresses the 
semantic/cognitive content of the judgment of O as a natural end -- how concept-
users have to conceptualize O when representing O as a natural end -- the second 
condition (by occupying the position of consequent) was accordingly regarded as the 
prior condition of forming conceptual content of this precise sort.   
However, above I argued that part priority cannot be combined with whole 
priority into a single package (for purely logical reasons), and, in addition, I argued 
that part priority does not have the conceptual resources to ground cognitions of 
necessary material unity.  And since the broader issue being addressed in §65 is how 
reason can successfully negotiate its explanatory crisis, the need to fulfill its mandate 
to "cognize the necessity" in all of nature's forms, the fact that part priority fails to 
serve reason's interest here would be a good reason to think that (2) does not express 
the thesis of part priority.  Well, if not the thesis of part priority, what does (2) assert?   
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We begin by introducing the following new causal relation: 
 3)  the parts are determined by the other parts  
Let O be a product of nature.  Then, in the case where O is a natural organism, Kant's 
claim is that O's parts will be interrelated in a way so as to make it necessary for 
concept-users (who are interested in explaining O's form) to posit a prior idea or 
conception of a whole.  Since the objective referent of that idea is the organism itself, 
let us call the idea posited by judgers who are interested in explaining O's form, O's 
ideal counterpart ('ideal' meaning 'mental').  The basic idea here is that it is owing to 
the parts and their interrelations that the material whole they jointly compose is one 
for which judgers are, in the interest of explaining O's form, explanatorily required to 
posit an underlying idea as a ground.  And since it is only on the presupposition of 
O's ideal counterpart that O's whole priority can be acknowledged, (3) appears to be 
the condition under which concept-users can subsume O under the concept of a 
natural end:  
For a body, therefore, which is to be judged as a natural end in itself and in 
accordance with its internal possibility, it is required that its parts reciprocally 
produce each other, as far as both their form and their combination is 
concerned, and thus produce a whole out of their own causality, the concept 
of which [=of the whole], conversely, is in turn the cause (in a being that 
would possess the causality according to concepts appropriate to such a 
product) of it in accordance with a principle; consequently the connection of 
efficient causes could at the same time be judged as an effect through final 
causes.314   
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Notice, first, how Kant is referring to reciprocal causal relations but that the relata of 
these causal relations are not a set of parts on the one hand and the whole on the 
other.  Kant is not reiterating the condition of whole priority.  Notice what Kant is 
saying:  that the relation between two parts, x and y, are such that x is a condition of 
y's form and y is, reciprocally, the condition of x's.  The determiner of the part's form 
is another part; the thing whose form is being determined by a part is another part.  
Kant is imposing the condition of reciprocal causal interaction among the parts.  The 
second thing to see is that this text bears relevantly on the two interpretations offered 
in the preceding section for §65's second condition:  Not only is this text another nail 
in the coffin for gloss (a), it is fairly explicit textual support for gloss (b):  that it is by 
means of the parts' being reciprocally the cause and the effect of their form that the 
parts are combined into a whole.   
Third, notice that Kant at first is focused on the norm under which we can 
make a judgment of a certain sort, on the conditions under which concept-users can 
instate a certain sort of conceptualization (that of a natural end).  When Kant says 
"[f]or a body, therefore, which is to be judged as a natural end in itself ... " (italics 
added), he seems to be saying something along the general lines of:  A rule for all you 
concept-users:  To judge O as an F, it is required that you judge O as a G.  In a 
regressive argument (what Kant usually gives when he's performing in the role as 
transcendental philosopher), the concept of G would be a condition under which F's 
can be conceptualized (or cognized) at all.  In light of this general methodological 
fact, we could take Kant to be laying down subsumptive law by imposing normative 
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constraints on F-subsumptions:  he's saying that F-subsumptions are ones concept-
users are cognitively entitled to only if they have made prior G-subsumptions:  the 
conceptual condition of cognitively taking O as an F is first taking O as a G.  (This is 
conceptual, not necessarily epistemic, priority, however.)   
For Kant concepts are normativity-bearing entities and requiredness is a 
conceptually normative notion.  So the only way for two entities, x and y, to stand in 
a requirement relation is if they are subsumed under two concepts that stand in a 
requirement relation.  Or to adapt the case more precisely to the present context, the 
only way for one thing x to be under any requirement to be conceptualized in multiple 
ways (e.g., as a natural product plus as an 'end' thus: as a natural end) is if x is 
initially given a conceptualization C such that C stands in a requirement relation to 
another conceptualization C*.  In that case when x is subsumed under C, x is thereby 
subsumed under C* and consequently stands under any additional requirements 
imposed by the latter.  Notice here, however, that the relata of the requirement-
relation are the concepts C and C*, not x directly.  Notice also that it is because of 
some initial subsumption (under C) that x can be under any requirement to meet 
another conceptual requirement.315   
Above notice that later on in the same sentence Kant switches to a de re 
orientation, asserting what has to be the case with the body's parts and their 
interrelations.  Kant might be excused this lapse in referring directly to the body's 
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parts and their interrelations because it is after all the world of spatially extended 
bodies that concept-users' cognitive judgments are intentionally directed at: it is to 
material bodies (the intentional objects of perceptual states) that concept-users direct 
their conceptualizations.  So since in the present context Kant appears to be 
articulating a rule concept-users are required to follow in order to empirically instate 
the concept of a natural end and since, in addition, this amounts to saying that there is 
some other concept C which must be instated as a prior condition of using the natural 
end concept, we should therefore ask what concept Kant is referring to indirectly 
when he refers to a body's parts and their required interrelations directly?   
I'm suggesting that just because Kant lapses into a de re orientation in 
referring directly to the body's parts and their required interrelations, we don't have to 
interpret this as his departure from the intention to specify the conceptual conditions 
for empirically applying the natural end concept.  We should instead take the 
description Kant gives of the body's parts and their interrelations to express a 
conceptual norm that in the present context is implicit and in that light take the 
description given of the parts' interrelations as a prescription expressing that same 
implicit conceptual norm, whatever it is.  Because when Kant says that interrelations 
of a certain sort among a body's parts are a requirement for applying the concept of a 
natural end to that material body, his acknowledgement of the requiredness should be 
understood not as a causal relation between the material body and the subsumption of 
concept-users but rather as a discursive relation between the natural end concept and 
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some other concept, one whose intensional content presumably expresses those 
required interrelations.   
I submit, as an interpretative hypothesis, that we specify this implicit concept 
(of a body's internal composition) as the concept of reciprocal interaction.  Under the 
suggested hypothesis, we should expect Kant's model of interaction to be importantly 
linked to the issue over how a material composite must be represented so as to make 
it possible to apply the concept of a natural end to it.  In Chapter 5, I have already 
shown how Kant's use of the concept of reciprocal interaction is linked to his 
physicoteleology, that is, to an intentional explanatory framework.  There, I noted 
that interactive structure seems to be of a sort to require us to hypothesize a prior 
conception of a whole in order to explain its occurrence.  In Chapter 10, the aim is 
provide further textual evidence for the conceptual linkages among reciprocal 
interaction, the concept of a natural end, and Kant's physicoteleology.   
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Chapter Ten 
CONFIRMING THE MODEL'S IMPLICITNESS (IN THE THIRD 
CRITIQUE) 
 
 
10.0 Introduction     
According to Kant concept-users (of §65) are entitled to apply the concept of 
a natural end under certain conditions, one of which involves a prior representation 
of a body's parts and their interrelations.  In §65 Kant appears to think that the 
interrelations among a body's parts need to be of a certain sort in order to induce 
concept-users to posit a conception of a whole as a presupposition of the body's 
material unity.   
[I]t is required that its parts reciprocally produce each other, as far as both 
their form and their combination is concerned, and thus produce a whole out 
of their own causality, the concept of which, conversely, is in turn the cause 
(in a being that would possess the causality according to concepts appropriate 
to such a product) of it in accordance with a principle. . . .316 
 
Under this prior conceptualization, it is supposed to be possible for a body's parts to 
exhibit part-on-whole dependency (whole priority) and consequently make the 
concept of a natural end applicable to it; which is to say that under this same 
conceptualization, it is supposed to be possible for reason to "cognize the necessity" 
in the body's form.  In the last chapter the issue over how to specify this prior 
conceptualization (of the parts and their interrelations) was raised and provisionally 
settled.  I suggested that the concept implicit in section §65 is the concept of 
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reciprocal interaction.  In the present chapter the aim is to textually support this 
suggestion.    
A point of clarification is in order here.  I have already shown (or, at any rate, 
plausibly suggested) that the model of interaction is motivated by explanatory 
concerns and that, in addition, it is an integral part of (indeed indispensable to) a 
larger intentional explanatory framework, one I have referred to as Kant's Model.  So 
if (as I claim) the model of interaction were implicit in certain sections analyzed in 
Kant's third critique, then the larger explanatory framework of which it is an integral 
component would also be implicated thereby.  (Hence the ambiguity in the use of 
'model' in the title of this chapter.)  In that case, we could also reasonably expect to 
find evidence of the Model's implicitness in the sections analyzed.     
The interpretative hypothesis being advanced is that Kant's Model is implicit 
in certain key sections of the third critique (Analytic of Teleological Judgment).  
Interpretative hypotheses should have predictable (and specifiable) consequences, 
ones that make its confirmation possible.  So the aim should not be to import a 
conceptually foreign construct into the third critique and graft it into uncongenial 
adipose tissue; rather, the aim should be to show how various texts (in that work) can 
be illuminated by reading them in light of Kant's Model.  I think the metaphor of an 
organ transplant is a useful construct under which to conceptualize the aim of the 
present chapter.  In the absence or failure of a vital organ (say, a heart or kidney) a 
human organism cannot sustain its proper functioning.  A donor organ (preferably 
from a blood relative) is therefore transplanted to the host organism in order to 
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sustain the host's continued functioning.  However, in order to perform its functions, 
the transplanted organ must be connected to its host in various appropriate ways.  In 
this chapter the aim is to provide the appropriate connections between the Model and 
(certain sections of) Kant's third critique.       
If (as I claim) the Model is implicit in the third critique, then we should expect 
to find certain confirmation points in Kant's text.  Confirmation can take various 
forms, however.  One form it can take is as an explicit statement in the third critique 
where Kant asserts (or at any rate openly commits himself to) the Model in its 
entirety.  I don't think confirmation of this explicit sort is available, however.  (If 
textual data of this sort were available, I wouldn't be arguing that Kant's Model is 
implicit!)  Another (fairly compelling) form the Model's confirmation may take is 
that it is in fact implied or required by what Kant explicitly says.  Admittedly, this is 
not as straightforward as it sounds, however, since what Kant (or anyone) explicitly 
says -- the actual words used -- can in many cases be variously interpreted.  Textual 
confirmation may also be derived by noting how, under the assumption of the 
Model's implicitness, we are provided with a useful angle on what Kant's motivation 
is and are consequently able to adopt a general framework in which to grasp the many 
details of the text, details that might otherwise appear unrelated. Working under this 
assumption may, in addition, allow us to realize valued maxims of interpretation (the 
principle of charity, for example) by allowing us to "fill in" certain holes in Kant's 
argumentation and consequently dismiss certain (perceived) non sequiturs.  The basic 
idea is that Kant's argument (in and across the relevant sections) should appear to 
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work better when read in light of the Model.  Or, at the very least, what Kant says 
should appear more like a cohesive argument when read in that light.    
 
10.1  A Summary of the Confirmation Points  
The aim of this brief section is to specify and summarize a number of confirmation 
points.  Then, in the sections that follow, the aim will be to provide more detailed 
textual analyses and documentation for each of them.  The statement of the 
confirmation points is as follows:  
First, it can observed that an inference is indeed being made (in §65) from a 
material body's parts and their interrelations to the (idea or conception of) a whole: 
[I]t is required that its parts reciprocally produce each other, as far as both 
their form and their combination is concerned, and thus produce a whole out 
of their own causality, the concept of which, conversely, is in turn the cause 
(in a being that would possess the causality according to concepts appropriate 
to such a product) of it in accordance with a principle.317  
 
Analysis of this (and other supplementary) texts show that an inference is made that 
is strikingly similar to the one in Kant's Model, namely, inference (A).  Since this is 
the case, the implication is that, in order for concept-users to apply the concept of a 
natural end, they must make an inference to an idea or conception of a whole on the 
basis of an acknowledged Datum.  Recall that in the Model the datum inference (A) 
proceeds from is described as a plurality of substances embedded in a relational 
structure, one explicated in terms of reciprocal interaction.  So, if (in §65) concept-
users are required to hypothesize some idea or conception of a whole on the basis of a 
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(organic) body's parts and their interrelations, we could plausibly expect that the 
concept implicitly supporting such an inference is one under which those parts are 
being conceptualized in terms essentially the same as the Model's.  And this is, I 
suggest, what we find.   
Second, when conceptualized under this implicit concept, the interrelations 
among a body's parts have to be ones of a sort to jointly constitute a material whole.  
So the concept under which a body's parts (and their interrelations) are being 
conceptualized (in §65) must be one that (in Kant's mind, anyway) expresses the 
conditions of wholehood.  It has been shown that Kant defines (or, at any rate, 
explicates) the ontological concept of a whole in terms of reciprocal interaction.  
Furthermore, when conceptualized under this implicit concept, the interrelations 
among a body's parts have to be ones of a sort that force concept-users to 
acknowledge some prior idea or conception of a whole as the condition under which 
the body's parts can be thought of as parts.  So the concept implicit in §65 must be 
one under which a body's parts (and their interrelations) would exhibit (what I have 
called) part-on-whole dependency (whole priority).  It has already been shown how 
(in Kant's mind, anyway) a plurality of things embedded in a relational structure, one 
that is explicated in terms of reciprocal interaction, can require the presupposition of 
an idea or conception of a whole.  Thus both of these interpretative desiderata can be 
met if we specify the implicit conceptualization of the body's parts (and their 
interrelations) within the explanatory framework of Kant's Model, specifically in the 
context of inference (A).   
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Third, recall that reason must be able to "cognize the necessity" in all of 
nature's products if it is to succeed in representing nature as a domain of causal 
necessity (causal nexus).  However, reason has at its disposal only two explanatory 
norms, one mechanistic (efficient causality), the other teleological (final causality).  
Natural organisms are a special class of natural product that resists mechanistic 
explanation; instead they must be explained teleologically, that is, using the concept 
of a natural end.  The concept-users (of §65) are therefore under pressure to apply the 
concept of a natural end to organisms in order to avert (their) reason from an 
explanatory crisis.  On the hypothesis that Kant's Model is implicit in this section, 
concept-users (of §65), who are interested in applying the concept of a natural end, 
are able to do so within the explanatory framework Kant's Model, one in which 
body's parts and their interrelations may be conceptualized as the effect of intentional 
causation.  Within this explanatory framework, the compositional infrastructure [or: 
causal infrastructure or: causal structure?] of an organic body may be 
reconceptualized (or reinterpreted) in teleological terms, i.e., as a system of reciprocal 
means/end relations.  Since it is (in Kant's mind, anyway) only within this intentional 
explanatory framework that a natural organism can be seen to exhibit any causal 
structure in its internal composition, it is therefore only on the hypothesis of the 
Model's implicitness that natural organisms could present their internal structures to 
reason as having any causal necessity for it to cognize.  Averting the explanatory 
crisis (of §65) appears therefore to depend on the interpretative hypothesis that Kant's 
Model is implicit in that section (and in others related to it).   
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Fourth, section §65 can be plausibly read as having inherited its account of the 
internal structure of an (organized) body from Kant's tree analyses in §64.  The 
concept whose application conditions are being determined in §65 is therefore the 
same concept under analysis in §64, namely, the concept of a natural end.  In §64, 
Kant essentially does two things:  first he defines the concept of a natural end; 
second, he attempts to vindicate the definiens of the concept of a natural end with an 
"elucidation," of this concept.  Kant's elucidation consists first in taking the class of 
natural organisms to be the object-class that instantiates the concept of a natural end.  
Next, he proceeds to analyze a representative from this class (a tree) with the aim of 
showing that it exhibits a causal structure that is the same as (or, at any rate, 
isomorphic to) the one referred to in the content imputed to the natural end concept.  
Kant's tree analysis yields the conception of an organism's internal composition as a 
reciprocal causal structure, one that is strikingly similar to the one used in Kant's 
Model.     
 
10.2 Reciprocal Interaction and the Conditions of Real Wholehood 
The concept of reciprocal interaction has a history in Kant's work beginning 
early in the precritical period in such texts as New Elucidation (New Eluc), Only 
Possible Argument for the Existence of God (OPA), and Kant's Inaugural 
Dissertation (ID).  But Kant continues to use this concept in critical period, most 
notably in the Critique of Pure Reason (CPuR), where it is explicitly acknowledged 
as a "category of the understanding" and, finally, in Opus Postumum (OP).  Although 
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it undergoes various formulations and is put to various uses over the course of its 
long career, at no point does Kant abandon the concept of reciprocal interaction, let 
alone renounce it.   
The construct of reciprocal interaction can present an impressive resume of 
diverse philosophical appointments in Kant's work, a fact that suggests its theoretic 
multidimensionality.  Over the course of its history in Kant's work, reciprocal 
interaction (RI) has been used in the following ways: (a) RI is the core of Kant's 
account of "transeunt causation" (i.e., "the system of physical influence") (New Eluc, 
ID); (b) Given (a) RI is used as a basis on which to propose an alternative to other 
competing accounts of the metaphysics of causality (e.g., Descartes' occasionalism, 
Leibniz's preestablished harmony) (New Eluc, ID); (c) RI is used (in the first critique) 
to articulate the conceptual content of "the category of community" (where it appears 
most prominently in the Metaphysical Deduction, Schematism, and the Third 
Analogy); (d)  RI is used (in the Third Analogy) as a epistemic basis on which to 
distinguish between representational states that merely reflect the modifications of a 
cognitive subject's mind from those which have "objective validity;" (e) RI is used 
(also in the Third Analogy) as a conceptual template for composition relations; (f) RI 
is used (in Kant's lectures on Metaphysics) to define (or at any rate explicate) the 
concept of a whole (as opposed to a mere aggregate); (g)  RI is used (in New Eluc, 
OPA, ID) to explain natural phenomena, one which appeals to God's "idea" or a 
"divine schema."318   
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In the present context, we are interested in (e).  Kant's uses the concept of 
reciprocal interaction as the basis on which to distinguish between a plurality of 
substances under two different conceptualizations, one under which it qualifies only 
as a mere aggregate, the other under which it qualifies as a whole.319  According to 
Kant the difference between a mere aggregate and a whole is that in the latter case 
(but not in the former) the parts (substances) stand in relations of reciprocal 
interaction.  
     The unity of the manifold is threefold: composite <compositum>, quantum, 
and whole <totum>.  Composite <compositum> is unity insofar as it is 
composite, whole <totum>, when this composition is complete, and quantum 
means this unity in relation to still other unities.  The world is composite 
<compositum> because it has a multitude of substances, and whole <totum> 
because all of these stand in interaction <commercio>.320    
 
The connection of substances constitutes what is essential in the concept of 
the world.  Reciprocal interaction is in the whole, and here a substance is 
acting <agens>; and so there must be a reciprocal interaction with every 
whole.321 
 
God and the world therefore constitute no whole, because there is no 
interaction <commercium>, not a reciprocal but rather only a one-sided 
action; on the other hand the members of a political state constitute a whole 
because reciprocal interaction is there; but the members do not constitute a 
whole with the regent because there the action is only one-sided.   
Accordingly all substances in the world stand in interaction <commerico>, 
and thereby constitute a whole.  An aggregate is still not a whole; here only 
many things <plura> that stand in no reciprocal connection are thought.322 
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Substances are reckoned to the world, insofar as they stand in real connection 
<in nexu reali> and thus in interaction <commercio>.  The aggregation of the 
substances in which there is no community still does not constitute a world.  
Reciprocal determination, the form of the world as a composite, <compositi>, 
rests on the interaction <commerico>.323 
 
When concept-users subsume a multitude of material things (a manifold) under the 
concept of reciprocal interaction, they are working under the regulative principle to 
represent those things as a plurality of substances that compose a single whole (as 
opposed to a mere aggregate).  So for Kant that in virtue of which a material whole is 
a whole at all (on any scale, whether nano, micro, macro, or cosmic) appears to 
consist in a plurality of substances forming a certain sort of relational structure.  
More specifically, this relational structure is a causal structure in which the relata 
mutually influence each other.   
The parts of a real composite <compositi realis> are in interaction 
<commercio>, and all substances, insofar as they stand in interaction 
<commercio>, constitute a real composite <compositum reale>.  Interaction 
<commercium> is reciprocal influence <influxus mutuus>, for how else is the 
interaction <commercium> of different substances possible than by one 
determining something in the other, for the substances have an effect in each 
other, e.g., with a body all parts are in interaction <commercio>; what is not 
in interaction <commercio> does not belong to it.  [Passage continues as:  The 
connection of the highest cause with its effects <causatis> connects nothing, 
is no interaction <commercium>. The cause accordingly does not belong to 
the effects <causatis>.324 
 
Notice that Kant says, "what is not in interaction <commercio> does not belong to it 
[i.e., the composite or whole]."  A key idea here is that something can count as a part 
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of a given whole only if it stands in certain causal relations to other things.  Kant 
seems to be saying that for something to count as a part, it has to be embedded in a 
causally interpreted relational structure.   
    The connection <nexus> is ideal if I merely think the substances together, 
and real if the substances actually stand in interaction <commercio>.  
The form of the world is a real connection <nexus realis> because it is a real 
whole <totum reale>.  For if we have a multitude of substances, then these 
must also stand together in connection, otherwise they would be isolated.  
Isolated substances, however, never constitute a whole <totum>.  If the 
substances are together, thus a whole <totum>, then they must also be a real 
whole <totum reale>.  For were they ideal, then surely they could be 
represented in thought as a whole <totum>, or the representations of them 
would constitute a whole <totum>; but things in themselves would still not 
constitute a whole on this account.325 
 
The key idea to be extracted from it here is Kant's claim that the difference 
between a plurality of stand-alone substances that do not compose a whole versus a 
plurality of substances that do is this:  wholes are cases where a plurality of 
substances are interconnected; and here we see Kant explicitly conceptualizing that 
whole-constituting interconnection in terms reciprocal interaction.  Thus according to 
Kant a plurality of substances constitutes a whole (as opposed to a mere aggregate) 
because they are embedded in a two-way causal structure.   
One of my major interpretative claims is that Kant is (in §65) appealing to an 
implicit conceptualization of a set of parts and their interrelations.  If concept-users 
are going to be entitled to apply the concept of a natural end to a material body, its 
parts (and their interrelations) must conform to this implicit conceptualization.  As an 
interpretative hypothesis, I suggested we should specify this implicit 
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conceptualization as the concept of reciprocal interaction.  Additionally, I said that 
the conceptualization of these interrelations must meet a number of requirements.  
One of them was that because the natural end concept is intended for use in the 
explanation of natural organisms (which are material wholes of a special sort) the 
conceptualization of the parts' interrelations has to be such that when they obtain, a 
whole is thereby produced.  We have just seen that (in Kant's mind, anyway) the 
concept of reciprocal interaction expresses the conditions of real wholehood.  My 
interpretative hypothesis appears therefore to meet the wholehood requirement.  
Further confirmation on this point is, however, to be derived below. 
 
10.3 Agency In Situ:  Situated Embodied Agency  
As remarked, reciprocal interaction is the conceptual substrate (or, at any rate, 
what conceptually underwrites) the representation of space.  Encoded in the category 
of community, reciprocal interaction constitutes part of the mind's deep-structure in 
that it specifically determines the representation of structured wholes, ones whose 
parts are to be thought of as synchronic (existing concurrently).  The aim of the 
present section is to present some textual support for the idea that substances are (for 
Kant) conceived on the model of "nodes" within a causal structure, namely, of 
reciprocal interaction.  The basic idea is that spatial substances are individuated in 
situ and this takes the form of there being individual interactants among others (in 
space).   
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Is embeddedness in a whole a condition of substancehood?  As remarked, 
Kant's view of substances is that they are, essentially, possessors (and exercisers) of 
causal powers.326 
We can never be merely passive, but rather every passion is at the same time 
action.  The possibility of acting is [a] faculty <facultas>, and of suffering 
receptivity <receptivitas>.  The latter always presupposes the former.  Every 
substance is self-active, otherwise it could not be a substance; it can be 
suffering in one relation <respectu>, but can also be active in the same.  A 
merely suffering substance is a contradiction <contradictio>; otherwise it 
could not have any accidents.327 
 
Kant's says that a substance is, essentially, an active entity, one that exerts an 
"influence" in an environment "outside itself:"  
Transeunt action <actio traniens>, when I make something actually outside 
me, is twofold:  the action <actio> (actuare means to make actual) of a 
substance or accident outside itself <substantiae vel accidentia extra se> -- 
the first, when I make actual a substance actually outside me, is called 
creation <creatio> -- if I make actual accidents outside of me, then if it is 
determined, it is called influence <influxus>.328  
 
Elsewhere Kant is on record as saying that it is within a common whole that a 
plurality of substance-parts "reciprocally determine each other."    
The world is a whole of substances, which are in reciprocal connection, and 
thereby constitute a unity, a whole; a whole of contingent substances, in that 
they reciprocally determine each other, thus that one limits the other.329  
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Taking this text with the one preceding it, we can view the one whole jointly 
composed by the multitude of substance-parts as an one common environment in 
which one substance can be "outside" another substance; yet, because every 
substance-part belongs to the same whole, each one is able to exercise its own 
distinctive causal capacities in relation to other substances.  Elsewhere Kant 
conceptualizes the substance-parts jointly constituting a single whole as causal 
agents.  
The connection of substances constitutes what is essential in the concept of 
the world.  Reciprocal interaction is in the whole, and here a substance is 
acting <agens>; and so there must be a reciprocal interaction with every 
whole.330 
 
Influence -- the power one substance has to determine another substance 
outside itself -- appears to be something a substance can have by being a member in 
the right sort of causal structure, one in which it is a part of a larger structured whole.  
Admittedly these don't show that embeddedness is a necessary condition of causal 
efficacy; yet neither do they disconfirm the thesis that embeddedness is a condition of 
substance's causal efficacy.  This brief review of selected texts isn't intended to argue 
the interpretative issue conclusively.  Elsewhere considerable textual evidence has 
already been given to show (or, at any rate, plausibly suggest) that Kant  
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conceptualizes substances generally on the model of agents and that he views the 
possession and exercise of a (finite) substance's causal powers to depend on its 
embeddedness in a relational structure with other substances.331   
Under my interpretation, the causal structure of a real whole (explicated under 
the model of interaction) is indeed the metaphysical condition under which an entity 
can meet the conditions of causal agency (thus also substancehood).  The model of 
interaction (on my view) requires a substance concept according to which an 
individual substance's causal agency is interdependent on the complementary causal 
powers of other substances.  The aim of the next section is to locate additional text in 
the third critique further confirming Kant's use (implicit or explicit) of the model of 
interaction.   
 
10.4 Natural Organisms Model Interactive Structure In Propria Persona 
In section §64, Kant defines (or, at any rate, illustrates) the concept of a 
natural end by empirical example, that is, by considering real natural phenomena that 
(he thinks, anyway) fall into the extensional class of this concept.  (The definition of 
'natural end' is stated below.)  Kant appears to be trying to legitimatize the intensional 
content he has imputed to the concept of a natural end by considering three tree 
examples.  In doing so, the content he assigns to this concept is supposed to be 
"exhibited" in these examples.  But these examples can be in a position to 
semantically anchor the concept of a natural end only if Kant's de re analyses of a 
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tree yield correspondingly legitimate semantic facts about the content of 'tree'.  In 
other words, if (under Kant's analyses) trees are the sort of thing he says—if trees do 
in fact model a causal structure of the sort referred to by the concept of a natural end -
- then the implication seems to be (in Kant's mind, anyway) that the concept of a tree 
must have a content that is subsumable to the one assigned to the concept of a natural 
end, thereby securing for the latter an empirically valid object-class.  In that case the 
concept of a natural end would be empirically applicable because its definiens would 
have obtained empirical semantic anchoring indirectly by means of Kant's tree 
analyses.   
Suppose Kant's tree analyses are correct.  Concept-users intending to 
empirically apply the concept of a tree would be constrained by the conceptual 
requirements imposed by the concept of a natural end; which is to say that what they 
were allowed to cognitively recognize as the referent of 'tree' would be partially 
determined by the concept of a natural end.  Concept-users would therefore be under 
the requirement to conceptualize trees as instances (or individual modelers) of a 
causal structure of the type referred to in the natural end concept.  It should be noted 
that because trees are (in Kant's mind) representatives of a larger class of natural 
phenomena, namely, "organized beings," Kant's tree analyses are intended to apply 
generally to this entire object-class.  If Kant's tree analyses are generalizable, then the 
causal structure trees exhibit would therefore be true of every kind of natural 
organism.    
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Kant's presents three short discussions about trees, and it is clear that he 
intends each of the three tree examples to be instantiations of the concept of a natural 
end as defined below: 
NE:  x is a natural end iff x is both a cause and effect of itself.   
In §64, Kant presents three tree discussions.   They are as follows. 
(1) Intraspecific Biological Self-replication.  Members of a given species of organism 
are capable of reproduction (within the species); they can make copies of themselves.  
Here the substitution instance of x is a natural organism of kind K. Ks can breed other 
Ks.  One or more individuals of kind K can be the offspring (effect) of other 
individuals, say, parents of kind K* (the cause).  And since, in the case of natural 
organisms, the offspring produced are generally entities of the same sort as the 
parents, K = K*.  So this is supposed to be a case where the kind (of organism) is 
reproducing itself and so is both cause and effect.     
(2)  Ontogenetic Development.  Individual members of an organic natural kind, such 
as a tree, are capable of individual growth or self-development.  A tree can causally 
generate parts of itself: an acorn, under the right enabling conditions, will develop 
into an oak tree.   
(3)  Hybrid Example.  Here a tree is considered as a whole-organism instantiating a 
reciprocal causal structure between it and its constituent parts.  This example seems 
to incorporate the first two.  In scholastic terms, the first case seems to be a case of 
"transeunt causation," while the second case seems to be a case of "immanent 
causation."  Transeunt causation is causation between two or more individual 
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substances (of the same kind or not); however, immanent causation is causation that 
occurs in one and the same substance.   
It appears that in Kant's first example, (i.e., biological reproduction) one 
substance (of kind K) is producing another individual substance (of the same value of 
K), in which case you have intersubstantial causation; in Kant's second example, you 
have one and the same individual substance causally bringing about its own 
individual biological development (i.e., growth), which makes it a case of 
intrasubstantial (or immanent) causation.  However, in §64's third tree example, both 
intersubstantial and intrasubstantial causation are incorporated into a single 
conceptualization of the tree as an organic whole.  It is a semantic fact about 'trees' 
that we recognize trees as organic wholes, and that we recognize a tree (of one 
species or other) as both a composite entity and a singular individual.  In his third 
example, Kant seems to be conceptualizing the tree's compositional structure in the 
same (or, at any rate, similar) terms in which he conceptualizes a world-whole, 
namely, as reciprocal causal structure.  It would therefore appear that natural 
organisms model interactive structure in propria persona.   
My present focus is on (3).  In Kant's third example the tree is conceptualized 
as a whole-organism made up of parts.  As we saw earlier, Kant uses the concept of  
reciprocal interaction to explicate the ontological concept of a whole.  How, then, is 
the tree to be conceptualized as a whole-organism unless under the concept of 
reciprocal interaction?  For a tree to be possible as a whole-organism its parts must 
therefore be conceptualized as members embedded in a reciprocal causal structure, 
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one explicated under the model of interaction.  If the tree's parts are to be 
conceptualized in this way, wouldn't we also have to conceptualize each of its parts as 
a substance in its own right?  For under the model of interaction, the interactants are 
substances (possessing complementary causal powers).  So we should expect to find 
some emphasis in the text on the individual substancehood of the tree's parts and their 
causal relations to each other.  And this is, I suggest, what we find in §64.    
Here Kant states:  
[O]ne part of this creature also generates itself in such a way that the 
preservation of the one is reciprocally dependent on the preservation of the 
other.  An eye from the leaf of one tree grafted into the twig of another brings 
forth a growth of its own kind in an alien stock, and similarly a scion attached 
to another trunk.  Hence one can regard every twig or leaf of one tree as 
merely grafted or inoculated into it, hence as a tree existing in itself, which 
only depends on the other and nourishes itself parasitically.  At the same time, 
the leaves are certainly products of the tree, yet they preserve it in turn, for 
repeated defoliation would kill it, and its growth depends upon their effect on 
the stem.332 
 
Without the twig and the leaf, the tree could not survive; so the twig and the leaf 
sustain the tree's existence.  Here the twig and the leaf act as cause and the tree is the 
effect.  Alternately, a tree, considered as a whole sustains the existence of the leaf and 
twig.  Thus, in nourishing the twig and the leaf a tree is the effect of itself.  But this 
follows only on condition that the twig and the leaf are parts of the same individual 
tree.  (See diagram below.)      
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Diagram 10.4:  The Tree's Reciprocal Causal Structure  
Cause                                     Effect_________ 
1)  twig/leaf (parts)                tree (whole)  
2)  tree (whole)                      twig/leaf (parts) 
3)  twig (part)                        leaf (part) 
 
The causal relations among (1)-(3) appear to be reciprocal along three different 
dimensions.  The parts appear to causally determine the whole; the whole, alternately, 
appears to determine the parts.  Finally, (3) is a case in which the parts themselves are 
causally interacting with other parts.   
Notice that Kant seems to be at pains to point out that every twig or leaf of a 
tree can be regarded as a tree existing in itself (as a potential tree-to-be or a tree in its 
own right):    
Hence one can regard every twig or leaf of one tree as merely grafted or 
inoculated into it, hence as a tree existing in itself, which only depends on the 
other and nourishes itself parasitically.333  
 
Here I read Kant as stressing that every twig or leaf is potentially an individual tree in 
its own right (in spite of its parasitic relation to its host tree).   Kant appears to be 
emphasizing not the twig's ontological derivativeness but rather its (potential) 
substancehood.  But why would Kant want to do this?  Shouldn't Kant be stressing 
that the twig and the leaf are derivative entities whose existence depends on the tree 
of which they are parts?  Because it is only as parts (of the same whole-tree) that they 
can stand in a causal relation to it.  Or shouldn't Kant be emphasizing that the whole-
tree, as a material composite, is itself an ontologically derivative entity whose 
                                                          
333
 CPJ, §64, underscoring added. 
 358 
existence is dependent on its parts.  If so, why instead is Kant emphasizing (as he 
appears to be doing) the twig and leaf's individual substancehood?   
In the immediate context (of §64) there is no answer to this question.  In view 
of this fact, we seem to come up short, since (in §64) Kant has not given a clear 
statement of (2).  That is, Kant hasn't clearly articulated how a tree's relation to its 
parts could be viewed as a causal relation.  But that is what he must show (of his third 
Hybrid example) if he intends to assert that it instantiates the analysans of 'natural 
end':  x is a natural end iff x is both a cause and an effect of itself.  Kant must show 
how the whole-tree can be the cause of the twig and the leaf (and in what sense it is a 
cause).  But if in addition to regarding the tree as a (material) substance, Kant also 
regards "every twig and leaf" as individual substances in their own right, this implies 
that his conceptualization of a whole-organism is one according to which it is a single 
substance that is constituted by a plurality of individual substances.   
To summarize the results obtained so far, the tree (in §64) is being 
conceptualized as all of the following:   
(a)  The tree is an individual material substance in its own right; therefore:  
(b) The tree is both a singular individual and a composite entity; it is one  
      whole-object made up of a plurality of parts: therefore:  
(c)  Under Kant's analysis of the ontological concept of a whole, the tree's 
parts must themselves be substances in their own right, ones embedded in a 
reciprocal causal structure. 
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So the situation appears to be this:  the tree can be ontologically decomposed into a 
plurality of constituents, each of which is a substance (at least potentially) in its own 
right.  But the tree is not merely the sum of those parts; it is more than the sum, since 
the tree itself counts as one substance in its own right (existing concurrently and in 
connection with these other substances which constitute it).  Metaphysically, there is 
the tree plus the plurality of different kinds of substances that constitute it.  These 
substance-parts can be acknowledged along side the tree in the sense of being 
countable substances in their own right.  Finally, notice that all of these other 
substances exist in the tree (as its parts); they stand in a composition-relation to the 
tree.  But for that to be so, the causal structure in which they are embedded would, I 
suggest, have to be conceptualized under the model of interaction.  For, as we have 
seen, it is the model of interaction that provides the terms in which Kant explicates 
the ontological concept of a whole.    
 
10.5 Analysis of Kant's Definition of the Concept of a Natural End  
As remarked, Kant defines (or, at any rate, explicates) the concept of a natural 
end as follows:  
 NE:  x is a natural end iff x is both the cause and effect of itself. 
How, in what terms, should Kant's definition be understood?  For starters, we might 
keep in mind that it is the class of natural organisms that the concept of a natural end 
(and thus its definiens) is intended to apply.  Take a monkey, for instance.  Since it is 
a natural organism, a monkey therefore counts as a natural end.  Let x = a monkey.  
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Then a monkey is a natural end iff the monkey is both the cause and the effect of 
itself.  What are we asserting when we assert that a monkey is both the cause and 
effect of itself? I consider two possibilities.   
First, the monkey's self-causation might be thought to consist (absurdly) in its 
being a self-assembler.  That is, the monkey brought itself into being by putting itself 
together (rather like Humpty Dumpty).  The monkey is a material composite, 
composed of physical parts.  These physical constituters were put together by the 
monkey himself.  Problem is, under a Kantian (Second Analogy) model of causality, 
all causes must temporally precede their effects.  That being so, in order for the 
monkey to bring about its own physical constitution, part-by-part, his existence 
would have had to precede the conditions under which he, as a physical being, is 
possible.  As a material composite, a monkey's existence is ontologically derivative 
of the existence of its parts; it therefore could not have been around to execute (let 
alone engineer) its own construction prior to their existence.   
If the monkey's literal self-assembly is absurd, what alternative content could 
be imputed to Kant's definition of a natural end, one that makes some sense out of its 
claim that the monkey is both cause and effect of itself?  We might begin by 
acknowledging that there is more than one way to think about a monkey.  Let us 
distinguish between two ways of thinking about monkeys, generally.  We could refer 
to a monkey under the description of its internal composition (monkey guts) or we 
could refer to the monkey as a singular individual, a substance in its own right (as an 
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entity that swings in trees, eats bananas, etc.).  There are therefore two 
nonsynonymous (semantic) contents concerning the monkey: 
(1)  one referring to the monkey (i.e., the whole-organism)   
(2)  one referring to a plurality of substance-parts (embedded in a causal 
structure).  
Suppose we were to use these two nonsynonymous (but co-referring) monkey-
descriptions as the terms in which to explicate Kant's definition of a natural end.  
Then we may be able to make sense of how the monkey may be both the cause and 
the effect itself.  We just saw how because its existence is a physical one, the whole-
monkey, as a material composite, cannot exist independently of its physical 
constituters.  The monkey, considered as a material whole, is therefore the effect of a 
plurality of parts.  Makes sense.  But how is the monkey also a cause of itself?  The 
whole-monkey is the cause of itself in the sense that it is that in virtue of which a set 
of parts may be monkey-constituting.  (See Diagram below.)   
Diagram 10.5a: 
   
Cause                                 Effect_________    Causality Type__     ___    Faculty Affiliate_  
Whole-monkey                 monkey parts         Final (Teleological)             Reason  
Monkey composition       whole-monkey        Efficient (Mechanical)        Understanding 
 
It is in virtue of the monkey (considered as a whole-organism) that there is, 
ontologically, anything (of a monkey-ish sort) for a set of physical parts to constitute.  
The whole-monkey is the prior condition under which a plurality of parts can be 
conceptualized as the parts of a monkey (as opposed to some other type of organism).  
Referring to a plurality of entities as monkey guts requires, however, that concept-
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users first understand what a monkey is.  A monkey prescribes itself as the final end 
(or target) of composition.   
Under Kant's conception of substance the identity of a substance depends 
largely on what it can do, on what its causal powers are.334  Since the internal 
composition of a whole-organism must be conceptualized under the model of 
interaction, its parts must be conceptualized as substances in their own right, 
embedded in a reciprocal causal structure.  Identifying and individuating the 
multitude of substances contained in a whole-organism therefore depends largely on 
knowing what they can do.  But knowing what the multitude of substance-parts 
contained in an organism can do will require concept-users to know a priori (= in 
advance) what sort of whole-organism their interrelated causal powers are supposed 
to make possible.  Concept-users must therefore have some idea of what sort of 
whole-organism it is that these substance-parts are supposed constitute before they 
can cognitively grasp what these entities are.   
But that is not all they need.  Concept-users need, in addition, to have some 
idea of what this whole-organism's causal powers are.  Take our monkey.  A 
monkey's causal powers are to be conceptually explicated by what it can do, by what 
effects it can produce, in a natural environment external to the region of space 
enclosed within its physical body.  The region of space enclosed within its body 
contains the (subpersonal) conditions under which these externally explicated 
monkey powers are possible at all.  It is therefore in reference to these monkey-
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defining powers that a multitude of (very unmonkeylike) entities (monkey guts) must 
be understood.  Concept-users are therefore required to have some prior conception 
of what causal powers are definitive of a monkey before they can be in a position to 
identify and individuate the substance-parts that make those causal powers possible.   
Suppose we grant that we must (and do) have a conception of the whole-
monkey, one whose empirical semantic content is nonsynonymous with the 
conception of monkey composition (monkey guts).  What conceptually convincing 
links, if any, unite (1) and (2) above? We might ask how (in Kant's mind, anyway) 
these two nonsynonymous contents can be explanatorily related.  That is we might 
ask how the conception of the whole-monkey is in a position to causally determine a 
set of parts so as to be monkey-constituting.  Within what conceptual framework may 
a multitude of (very unmonkeylike) entities causally to add up to, make possible, a 
monkey?  And what makes it possible for the whole-monkey to cause all of its 
physical constituters to be the parts of a monkey?   
Kant's answer is that concept-users have to view the whole-monkey as the 
effect, or end-product, of intentional causation.  As we saw above, the individual 
monkey isn't capable of any literal self-assembly (not from scratch, at any rate).  So if  
the whole-monkey is going to exert any causal efficacy over its own constitution it 
must do so under an "ideal" conceptualization.  Concept-users would therefore be 
required to hypothesize an ideal counterpart for the whole-monkey, that is, an idea or 
conception of it and, in addition, to view it as embedded within the larger explanatory 
framework of Kant's Model.  What this means is that the whole-monkey must be 
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viewed as an "end," indeed as a final end -- as the target (or scopus) of composition 
relative to which a multitude of subsidiary means were engineered (and executed) for 
the sake of realizing that final end.  Under the "ideal" conceptualization of the whole-
monkey (as a final end) concept-users are therefore able to view a multitude of very 
unmonkeylike entities (monkey guts) as the means taken to fulfill the end of making a 
whole-monkey.  Considered as the effect of intentional causation, the whole-
monkey's internal composition could therefore be viewed as the effect of (the idea of) 
the whole-monkey.   
It therefore appears we have come up with an alternative content to impute to 
Kant's definition of a natural end.  The monkey can be both the cause and effect of 
itself in the following sense. The whole-monkey, being a material composite, cannot 
exist independently of its physical parts; rather its existence depends on that of its 
physical constituters.  So in this sense the monkey is the mereological effect of its 
parts.  But the direction of causation is not one-way, however.  For that those 
physical constituters are monkey (as opposed to nonmonkey)-constituting is owing to 
the fact that they were created under the guidance of an idea or conception of the 
whole-monkey.  In view of this, the actual parts would be determined by the whole-
monkey in that they owe their very identities as substance-parts to intentional 
processes guided by a prior idea of it.  Notice, finally, that accepting this construal of 
Kant's definition of a natural end (as stated in §64) depends, however, on accepting 
the hypothesis that Kant's explanatory Model is implicit in that section.  The whole-
monkey can double as both the cause and the effect -- the explanans and the 
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explanandum -- within the explanatory structure of Kant's Model because, being of 
the intentional type, the Model allows concept-users to view the whole-monkey under 
an "ideal" (here meaning 'mental') conceptualization, where as such it is able to 
function as the prior determinant of a monkey's internal composition.      
In section §77, there is some fairly strong textual support for thinking that 
(what I'm calling) Kant's explanatory Model is operative in the third critique:  
In accordance with the constitution of our understanding, by contrast, a real 
whole of nature is to be regarded as the effect of the concurrent moving forces 
of the parts.  Thus if we would not represent the possibility of the whole as 
depending upon the parts, as is appropriate for our discursive understanding, 
but would rather, after the model of the intuitive (archetypical) understanding, 
represent the possibility of the parts (as far as their constitution and their 
combination is concerned) as depending on the whole, then given the very 
same special characteristic of our understanding [= discursivity], this cannot 
come about by the whole being the ground of the possibility of the connection 
of the parts (which would be a contradiction in the discursive kind of 
cognition), but only by the representation of a whole containing the ground of 
the possibility of its form and of the connection of parts that belong to that. 
But now since the whole would in that case be an effect (product) the 
representation of which would be regarded as the cause of its possibility, but 
the product of a cause whose determining ground is merely the representation 
of its effect is called an end, it follows that it is merely a consequence of the 
particular constitution of our understanding that we represent products of 
nature as possible only in accordance with another kind of causality than that 
of the natural laws of matter, namely only in accordance with that of ends and 
final causes, and that this principle does not pertain to the possibility of such 
things themselves (even considered as phenomena) in accordance with this 
sort of generation, but pertains only to the judging of them that is possible for 
our understanding.335 
 
Various points to be made concerning this dense text.  For present purposes notice 
that, in addition to the third critique texts already cited, the underscored portion of 
this §77 text indicates that an hypothesis is being made that is strikingly similar to 
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what I have referred to as inference (A) in Kant's explanatory Model, the inference to 
an ideal counterpart.  Here the understanding appears to impose constraints on how a 
material whole can be explained; these constraints are essentially the ones presented 
in the Axioms of Intuition; the idea is that all material composites are mathematizable 
and that all material wholes are dependent on the existence of their countable parts 
(this is what makes it possible for a material whole to be a "discrete quantum.")   
Diagram 10.5b:  
 
Faculty Affiliate_______ Mode of Construction               Type Of Whole______________  
Understanding                  Parts-to-whole                           Aggregates (Mereological Sums) 
Reason                             Whole-to-parts                           Systemic Wholes (Natural Systems) 
 
The construction of an material whole always consists generally in endowing it with a 
part structure; furthermore this merelogically-conceived sort of cognitive construction 
can proceed in either of two distinct directions:  it can proceed from the parts up -- 
that is, from the parts to the concrete constructed whole, in which case you have a 
mere aggregation of parts (as opposed to a system); or it can proceed from the whole 
downwards to a determination (specification) of the parts.  The former, a condition 
under which phenomenal objects are mathematizable, is in fact an a priori rule 
derived from the Axioms of Intuition (and is valid for all categorially-determined 
constructions performed by the understanding), whereas the latter procedure (which 
represents what I call part-on-whole dependency) is distinctive of intentional 
causation, (and is affiliated with reason, not with the understanding).  
Under the latter procedure, the production of a set of parts is guided by a prior 
idea or conception of the whole to be produced.  If the object being cognitively 
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constructed is understood to be guided by a prior conception of what it is supposed to 
be (even where this is grasped in hyperabstract terms), then the interrelations among 
the whole's parts can (in this practical context) be viewed to reflect a means-end 
structure (in light of the higher-order end targeted for actualization).   
Individual organisms are systemic wholes, whose parts are united under 
certain functional relationships all of which subserve a single (apical) system-goal 
(generally, embodied by the whole-organism).  As functional systems, organisms 
embody (in propria persona) interactive causal structure.  As causal structures, they 
represent a hybrid of two types of causality -- mechanical (physical efficient) 
causality and teleological (final causality).  Organisms consist of a multitude of parts 
all of which stand in mechanical (= efficient) causal relations; as a functional system, 
however, organisms are conceptualized as a set of parts integrated under a shared 
system-goal.   
As remarked, each of these two types of causality is affiliated with different 
faculties of cognition; efficient causality is affiliated with the understanding; 
teleological causality is affiliated with reason.  What's the relation between the two 
types of explanatory norm?  In the third critique Kant says (in §80) that mechanical 
explications (MEs) are to be "subordinate" to teleological explanations (TEs).  When 
conceptualized as a natural end, the whole-organism (a monkey, say) is viewed as the 
end for the sake of whose composition a multitude of (very unmonkeylike) entities 
are supposed to enter into interactive causal relations.  Thus an organism, when 
conceptualized as a natural end, prescribes itself as a target (or scopus) of material 
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composition.  As a natural end, the whole-monkey directs efficient causal relations so 
as to ensure the mechanical success (or realization) of its own composition.     
 
10.6 Hypothesizing a Prior Conception Of the Whole From Interactive Structure  
 
In the preceding chapter I claimed that the concept of a natural end has been 
engineered so that concept-users' empirical application of it had to meet two 
conditions.  The first condition contained two subrequirements, one of which was that 
the natural product had to exhibit part-on-whole dependency (or whole priority).  
(The second subrequirement has not yet been discussed.)  I said, in addition, that any 
natural product that could possibly exhibit part-on-whole dependency would have to 
be one that met a second condition, namely, that the interrelations among a set of 
parts have to be ones of a sort to require concept-users to hypothesize some prior idea 
or conception of a whole as the condition under which those interrelations can be 
thought (cognized, made intelligible) at all.   
But under what conceptualization of a body's parts and their interrelations 
would concept-users be induced to hypothesize a idea or conception of a whole?   
Neither in §65 nor in any other section of the Analytic of Teleological 
Judgment does Kant explicitly identify this conceptualization.  But, as observed 
earlier, Kant's apparent silence (in these texts, anyway) on the issue of what this key 
conceptualization is need not prevent us from specifying it ourselves.  Rather my 
suggestion was that with the use of Kant-internal materials we can plausibly specify 
this key conceptualization of a body's parts and their interrelations as the concept of 
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reciprocal interaction and view the latter concept as one whose implementation is 
implicit in §65 (and related sections).  The aim now is therefore to provide some 
textual support for this suggestion.  For starters, we might approach the task of 
confirming the concept of interaction's implicitness (in §65) by stipulating what 
counts as confirmation.  Suppose we could derive certain requirements from Kant's 
texts, ones that require this implicit conceptualization of a body's parts and their 
interrelations to do a particular job.  Then if it could be shown (or, at any rate, 
plausibly suggested) that the model of interaction can perform these jobs, we could 
take this as (at least partial) confirmation of its implicit implementation in the third 
critique.   
So far, the job assigned to this key conceptualization is that it be one under 
which a body's internal structure is represented in a way so as to require concept-
users to hypothesize an idea or conception of a whole as the prior condition of the 
body's composition.  Kant says (in §65) that in order to represent a material body 
under the concept of a natural end, the body's parts and their interrelations stand 
under a certain requirement:   
[I]t is required that its parts reciprocally produce each other, as far as both 
their form and their combination is concerned, and thus produce a whole out 
of their own causality, the concept of which, conversely, is in turn the cause 
(in a being that would possess the causality according to concepts appropriate 
to such a product) of it in accordance with a principle.336 
 
For a body, therefore, which is to be judged as a natural end in itself and in 
accordance with its internal possibility, it is required that its parts reciprocally 
produce each other, as far as both their form and their combination is 
concerned, and thus produce a whole out of their own causality, the concept 
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of which [=of the whole], conversely, is in turn the cause (in a being that 
would possess the causality according to concepts appropriate to such a 
product) of it in accordance with a principle; consequently the connection of 
efficient causes could at the same time be judged as an effect through final 
causes.337 
 
These are highly compressed Kantian texts.  Textual analysis, however, yields four 
key ideas and an implicit structure in which they are united.  The four key ideas are as 
follows.  First, there is the idea, already mentioned above, that the body's parts are to 
stand in reciprocal causal relations.  Second, there's the idea that these same parts 
"thus produce a whole out of their own causality."  Notice that this second idea 
coincides with the second component of the natural end concept, that in order for 
some material body to be represented as a natural end, it must be represented as an 
end minus "the causality of the concepts of a rational being outside it," i.e., it must 
not be represented as a product of art.  Third, there is Kant's claim that the 
interrelations of a body's parts are a sort to induce concept-users to hypothesize an 
idea or conception of the whole (what I have referred to as an ideal counterpart).  
Fourth, this ideal counterpart "is in turn the cause (in a being that would possess the 
causality according to concepts appropriate to such a product) of it in accordance 
with a principle."   
Immediately following these texts (cited above) Kant writes:  
In such a product of nature each part is conceived as if it exists only through 
all the others, thus as if existing for the sake of the others and on account of 
the whole, i.e., as an instrument (organ), which is, however, not sufficient (for 
it could also be an instrument of art, and thus represented as possible at all 
only as an end); rather it must be thought of as an organ that produces the 
                                                          
337
 CPJ, §65, 5:373-4. 
 
 371 
other parts (consequently each produces the others reciprocally), which cannot 
be the case in any instrument of art, but only of nature, which provides all the 
matter for instruments (even those of art):  only then and on that account can 
such a product, as an organized and self-organizing being, be called a natural 
end.338 
 
And in the very next section (§66) Kant uses this teleological conceptualization of a 
body's composition to define (or, at any rate, explicate) the concept of an 'organized 
product of nature':  
An organized product of nature is that in which everything is an end and 
reciprocally a means as well.339 
 
Kant seems (rather abruptly) to redescribe a body's causal infrastructure in 
teleological terms, as a system of reciprocal means/end relations.340  Here it's 
interesting to note that, in §64, where Kant's aim is to define (or, at any rate, 
illustrate) the concept of a natural end by the use of his tree example, there is no  
explicit conceptualization of an organic body's (or the tree's) internal structure in  
teleological terms.  This contributes to the abruptness (in §65) of Kant's redescription  
of an organic body's internal structure as a system of means/end relations. 
Above I said that in addition to these four ideas, there is an implicit structure  
                                                          
338
 Ibid., §65, 5:374.   
 
339
 Ibid., §66.   
 
340
 In OP, Kant is somewhat more explicit: "For, the possibility of an organic body (that is, a 
body each of whose parts is there for the sake of the other, or which is so formed that the possibility of 
the parts and the form of their inner relations emerge only from its concept—a body which is thus only 
possible through purposes, which presupposes an immaterial principle which forms this substance 
either mediately or immediately) produces a teleological principle of the continuation of kinds and 
individuals [which] can be thought as all-governing and everlasting with respect to species [breaks 
off]” (OP, underscoring added).  
 
 
 372 
that unites them.  It is this: these items are united within the structure of a intentional 
explanation.  I submit that it is within the explanatory framework of Kant's Model 
that these key components derive their inferential linkages:   
(1)  It is because of the parts' embeddedness in two-way causal structure that a 
material whole is thereby generated; 
(2)  The material whole which is thus generated is one that the parts produce "out of 
their own causality," thus implying that the whole generated by the parts is in some 
sense internally (not externally) generated;  
(3)  The material whole that is thus (internally) generated appears to induce concept-
users into hypothesizing an ideal counterpart for it.   
(4)  This ideal counterpart is, in turn, supposed to explain the material whole's 
internal composition.  It is in light of this idea or conception of a whole that a body's 
parts and their interrelations are to be reconceptualized (in teleological terms) as a 
system of mean/end relations.   
I want to make a number of observations in reference to (1)-(4).  First, notice 
that it is largely because of (1) that concept-users are lead (in (3)) to posit an ideal 
conception in the first place.  A lot appears therefore to hang on the inference from 
(1) to (3).  As remarked, the conceptualization of a body's parts and their 
interrelations must be one requiring the hypothesizing of an idea or conception of a 
whole, and it appears to be a causal structure of a two-way sort that (in Kant's mind, 
anyway) is capable of requiring concept-users to do this.   
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But what, exactly, is the inference? Appealing only to the §65 text, Kant 
seems to be arguing something along the following lines:  
There exists a plurality of substances embedded in a (two-way) causal structure. 
There must be some idea or conception of a whole in virtue of which they do so.   
 
By itself, this inference is invalid.  Two questions arise here.  We might ask, first, 
why a plurality of substances embedded in a (two-way) causal structure would induce 
concept-users to hypothesize anything at all, in this case an idea or conception of a 
whole as a condition under which these entities can interact at all?  Second, we might 
ask why it is a prior idea or conception of a whole that concept-users are required to 
hypothesize here.  Since the second question is fairly easy, I'll answer it first.  In 
order for this inference to made at all, this two-way causal structure (here limiting 
myself to this description) must perform a second job: it must answer to the 
conditions of wholehood, meaning that the interrelations among a body's parts have 
to be such as to compose a whole; otherwise, how could it be necessary for concept-
users to hypothesize an idea or conception of a whole?  In the preceding section, we 
confirmed that Kant uses the concept of a two-way causal structure, namely that of 
reciprocal interaction, to explicate the ontological concept of a whole.   
Now I return to the first question just posed.  On the assumption that Kant 
intends the inference above to be valid, we must therefore assume under the principle 
of charity that there are other operative premises that are implicit in the present 
context.  As it stands, we need some reason why concept-users are required to 
hypothesize an ideal counterpart in the first place.   
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In a preceding chapter it was shown how, under the model of interaction, a 
plurality of substance could be the basis on which to hypothesize an idea or 
conception of a whole.  Notice that the inference above resembles (what I have 
called) inference (A) in Kant's explanatory Model.  From within the explanatory 
framework of Kant's Model, concept-users have the model of interaction at their 
disposal, one that (in Kant's mind, anyway) induces them to hypothesize an idea or 
conception of a whole as the prior condition under which a plurality of substances can 
causally interact.  I'm suggesting is that if we suppose that Kant's explanatory Model 
is implicit ( in §65), then we can also suppose that his model of interaction is likewise 
implicit.  When embedded within the framework of Kant's Model, the inference 
above would appear as follows:  
There exists a plurality of substances embedded in a (two-way) causal structure.   
(Implicit application of the model of interaction; therefore:  
(Implicit assumption of Kant's larger explanatory Model.)______________________ 
There must be some prior idea or conception of a whole in virtue of which they do so.   
 
Under the suggested hypothesis, we could at least view the concept-users (of §65), 
who are interested in empirically applying the concept of a natural end, to be making 
an inference of the above (assisted) sort.  We would therefore be able to make more 
sense of Kant's claims in that section (than could otherwise be made of them) even if 
were not granted that his nonsequiter is entirely addressed under this interpretative 
hypothesis.   
Notice that (in (4)) the reconceptualization of a body's parts and their 
interrelations would be one under which those parts are necessarily unified within a 
system of reciprocal means/end relations.  Indeed, since a plurality of parts are 
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intentionally made under the guidance of a normative conception of the whole (an 
ideal counterpart), this conception determines what sorts of parts they are supposed to 
be.  The body's parts will therefore be ones whose identity and individuation is 
possible only by reference to that prior conception.  The whole produced under the 
explanation given in (4) would therefore exhibit part-on-whole dependency (whole 
priority).  When a set of parts (and their interrelations) are said to be part-on-whole 
dependent, those parts are thought of as conceptually dependent on some prior idea of 
a whole as the condition under which they can be identified and individuated as the 
parts they are.   
Recall (from the preceding chapter) that reason faces an explanatory crisis 
concerning natural organisms.  Reason must "cognize the necessity" in all of nature's 
products and the only way it can meet this representational imperative in the case of 
natural organisms is to explain these phenomena in teleological terms, i.e., as the 
effects of intentional production.  But in order to explain these natural phenomena in 
teleological terms, concept-users must be able to apply the concept of a natural end.  
Concept-users are entitled to apply this concept, however, only to natural phenomena 
that exhibit "objective purposiveness" (meaning: 'appearing to be made-on-purpose' 
or 'designed').  As remarked in the preceding chapter, "objective purposiveness" is, on 
my view, to be explicated in terms of part-on-whole dependency.  Moreover, part-on-
whole dependency was acknowledged as one (of two) major intensional contents 
engineered for the natural end concept:  to view x as a natural end is to view x as a 
product of intentional production (on "remote analogy" with products of art).  (In the 
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final section of this chapter, we shall see how the definition given to the concept of a 
natural end (in §64) is possible only within the larger explanatory framework of 
Kant's Model.)   
Another requirement appears therefore to have surfaced here.  It is this:  the 
conceptualization of a body's parts and their interrelations must be, first, a (two-way) 
causal structure and, in addition, one capable of functioning within a larger 
intentional explanatory framework.  As the basis on which to hypothesize an idea or 
conception of a whole, a (two-way) causal structure (among the body's parts) appears 
to make it possible for concept-users to view a body as the effect of intentional 
production.  In doing so, this two-way causal structure functions to assist reason out 
of its explanatory crisis concerning natural organisms by making it possible to 
"cognize the necessity" in these phenomena.  It has already been shown (or, at any 
rate, plausibly suggested) how the model of interaction may be viewed to function 
within the larger explanatory framework of Kant's Model.  It has, in addition, already 
been shown that Kant's explanatory Model is of an intentional (or teleological) type.  
So being required to perform within a larger explanatory framework of an intentional 
sort would therefore pose no problem for the model of interaction.   
On the hypothesis, where not only the model of interaction's implicitness is 
acknowledged but also that of the larger explanatory framework of which it is 
integral part, we can explain (or, at any rate, excuse) Kant's abrupt redescription of a 
body's composition in teleological terms.  We can do so because Kant's explanatory 
Model works under dual directions of inference.  Recall that in addition to inference 
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(A), Kant's Model contains another inference (B), the inference from the idea or 
conception of the whole to the datum (i.e., a plurality of substances embedded in a 
two-way causal structure).  Under inference (B), the explicanda may be 
reconceptualized in teleological terms.   
Once the hypothesis of a prior idea or conception of the whole is made, the 
parts are reconceptualized as a system of constitutive means to the final end of 
composing whatever whole was intended, namely, one embodied by the whole-
organism.  It is in only in reference to the conception of the whole-organism that a 
plurality of parts can be individuated and so derives their particular identities as a 
parts.  The only way the whole-organism could exist prior to its physical composition 
is under an "ideal" conceptualization of it, where it is the final end (the target of 
composition) relative to which a set of parts may be viewed as a set of means 
subordinated to it.  But under an "ideal" conceptualization, the whole-organism 
would be something mental—an idea—and therefore could exist only in the mind of 
some intentional agent, one capable of submitting its productive powers to the 
guidance of concepts.  It is therefore only within the intentional explanatory 
framework of Kant's Model, that a prior conception of a whole could be in a position 
to causally determine the identity and individuation of a body's parts.  Thus only 
within the explanatory framework of Kant's Model would a body's parts and their 
interrelations be able to exhibit part-on-whole dependency.   
On the hypothesis that Kant's explanatory Model is implicit (in §65), concept-
users would, in addition, have the model of interaction at their cognitive disposal.  
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They would have, in other words, a conceptualization of a two-way causal structure 
in which to conceptualize a body's parts and their interrelations, one that induced 
them to hypothesize a prior idea or conception of a whole.  Moreover, in view of the 
dual inference structure of Kant's Model, concept-users would also have at their 
disposal the cognitive means of reconceptualizing a body's parts and their 
interrelations in teleological terms, as a system of reciprocal means/end relations, one 
in which every constitutive means (part) is indispensable and so necessarily unified 
with all the other means (parts) under a single final end, one embodied by the whole-
organism.  Under inference (B) the teleological redescription of the body's parts and 
their interrelations would therefore exhibit final causality.  On the hypothesis that 
Kant's explanatory Model is implicit, concept-users (of §65) would have cognitive 
access to a conceptualization of the body's parts and their interrelations, one under 
which those parts would display part-on-whole dependency and thus necessary unity.  
And since, within the framework of Kant's Model, there would be causal necessity in 
the organic body's composition that reason could cognize, it would appear that on the 
hypothesis of the Model's implicitness, concept-users could be taken to have the 
conceptual resources needed to apply the concept of a natural end and thereby be able 
to assist (their) reason in averting its explanatory crisis (concerning natural 
organisms). 
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Chapter Eleven 
THE HIERARCHIC COORDINATION OF INTERACTIVE STRUCTURE 
 
The connection of substances constitutes what is essential in the concept of 
the world.  Reciprocal interaction is in the whole, and here a substance is 
acting <agens>; and so there must be a reciprocal interaction with every 
whole. 
  —Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics   
 
11.0 Introduction 
The aim of this final chapter is not a mechanical (let alone rudderless) audit of 
the preceding chapter discussions.  Rather, the aim is to view the analyses of the 
preceding chapters as hard-won Kant-internal data, which can subsequently be used 
for further higher-order theorizing.  Expressed metaphorically, the previous chapters 
are so many rungs on a ladder which, when climbed, should allow the reader to 
ascend to a more elevated vista, one from which he can command a clearer view of 
how Kant's third critique fits into Kant's larger architectonic project.  Said less 
metaphorically, I have the specific aim in mind to use the data and analyses presented 
in the previous chapters as the basis for constructing a multi-grade model of 
interaction, one in which multiple levels (of interactive structure) are recursively 
coordinated.  This interpretative undertaking is to be done primarily in light of 
Chapter 2, which presents the superstructure under which all the chapters (including 
the present one) are to be subsumed.   
In Chapter 2, I presented a model of rational systematicity according under 
which an ineliminable mereological dimension was acknowledged.  Moreover, I 
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argued that Kant's uber-principle (as presented in the Appendix) was to be interpreted 
largely in light of this mereological dimension, so that the content of what it 
prescribes would amount to an intellectual imperative under which theoretical reason 
was to maximize mereological structure.341  Recall in the Appendix (second part) 
Kant says that the transcendental ideas must have a transcendental deduction, one that 
consists in showing how they could function as "necessary maxims of reason."  Here 
I suggested that the three types of t-ideas could be viewed as necessary maxims only 
in relation to a superordinate principle (which I identified as the uber-principle stated 
at A645/B673).  The basic idea is that reason is under the general mandate to 
maximize systematicity (explicated as the maximization of mereological structure) 
and that the functions of the transcendental ideas can be explicated in light of this 
general mandate.   
But since my reading of the third critique belongs generally to the cognition-
oriented type, specifically, one which draws largely on material from the first 
critique's Dialectic, I suggested that we further specify the uber-principle (of A645) 
by reading it in light of Kant's ID analysis of the concept of a world in general.  
Doing this meant viewing the three types of transcendental ideas as three 
nonredundant types of cognitive end, whose directive content and systematic use  
could be explicated by reference to theoretical reason's highest-order objective, 
namely, to represent the world.  (See Diagram below.)  In this context, where by  
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 381 
'world' we mean an absolute whole, the directive content assigned to each t-idea was 
determined by the tripartite division of labor according to which the representation of 
a world consists in the representation of parts (substances), form (relational structure) 
and ever-larger (comparative) wholes.   
Diagram 2.8d:  
T-Idea          Object-Oriented Directive Content____________________________________ 
Self               Represent the world's parts on the model of individual agent-substances    
World          Connect the world's singular parts in structural complexes (causal structures) 
God              Connect all possible structural complexes under the idea of a world-whole 
 
It is in the context of theoretical reason's highest order end to represent a world-whole 
that the use or functional value of the t-ideas can be seen as object-oriented.  Their 
use counts as object-oriented not in the sense that the t-ideas are to be used to know 
so-called "transcendent" objects, that is, to designate mind-independent entities, ones 
that fall outside the limits of experiential cognition; rather the t-ideas' object-
orientedness consists in providing the system with an internal guide for the cognitive 
construction of a world-whole.  That is, the object-orientedness of the t-ideas does not 
consist in their theoretical intentionality, where that is conceptualized or assessed 
under the norms of truth (establishing reference relations, say) but instead on the 
model of practical intentionality, where the intensional object of each t-idea 
prescribes a corresponding goal for cognitive realization -- a target, if you will, 
toward which the empirical use of the understanding is to be directed.  And since 
these targets are pursued in the service of reason's highest-order end to represent a 
phenomenal world-whole, the use of the t-ideas in this context seems to count as 
legitimately object-oriented (and thus also as legitimately cognitive).   
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Here I suggested that the transcendental ideas can be viewed as a system of 
higher-order cognitive functions, ones that guide our representational systems in 
respect of three distinguishable levels of object-oriented representation.   
(1)  the level of individual objects (on the model of whole-entities) 
(2)  the level of individual structural complexes (ones made up of objects) 
(3)  the level of structural complexes (made up of other structural complexes) and so 
on.  
The basic idea is simple enough.  I read the imperative to systematicity as the 
maximization of mereological structure (of a certain sort).  Reason's job is therefore 
to guide the understanding's materials under the direction of the t-ideas, so as to 
construct objects on each of the three levels above.  (I discuss the division of 
representational labor between reason and the understanding in 11.1.)  
In this final chapter my focus is on the cosmological ideas.  Hence I am 
concerned with how the cosmological ideas further reason's need to construct 
structural complexes (level (2).  In a cosmological context, reason pursues the 
unconditioned via its mereologically-oriented regressive syntheses.  The aim, then, is 
to explicate in more detail the use or function of the transcendental ideas in this 
context.  As I will try to show, reason's (mereologically-oriented) regressive 
syntheses are necessarily recursive (because they are performed on extended matter, 
which is infinitely divisible and extendable).  Consequently, reason's pursuit of the 
unconditioned (which is never completed, only approximated) amounts to the 
construction of a hierarchy of whole-objects, one that can never be completed.  The 
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aim is therefore to show how the specific functions of the transcendental ideas can be 
plausibly explicated in reference to a hierarchy of structured wholes.  Since, as we 
have seen, Kant explicates the concept of a world-whole in terms of reciprocal 
interaction, a hierarchy of whole-objects turns out to consist in a multi-grade system 
of interactive structure.   
Next, the aim is to use this as the basis to explicate the philosophical 
significance of the third critique's interest in natural organisms.  Natural teleology 
forms the basis for Kant's third-critique model of a systematized nature, one under 
which it is conceptualized as a thoroughly organized world-whole.342  I submit that 
the cognitive significance of Kant's interest in natural organisms (and his principle of 
organization)343 is that they represent (in his mind, anyway) an empirically given 
subject matter (and thus an amenable object-oriented format) in reference to which 
reason can execute its regressive syntheses in its pursuit of the unconditioned.  
Because organisms must be computed as natural systems, they represent phenomena 
in reference to which reason must explanatorily introduce ends (= final causality) into 
nature; consequently, reason is able to perform its (mereologically-oriented) 
regressive syntheses on these amenable natural phenomena and thereby maximize 
intraphenomenal systematicity.  
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 See CPJ §§67-68 for Kant's discussion of this claim.  Most commentators (Guyer and 
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11.1  Filling The Gap: Finding Cognitive Employment For Reason's 
Transcendental Ideas   
 
As remarked, reason operates with a set of transcendental ideas, ones that are 
to have a prescriptive use in our representational life.  So the question may be raised 
as to what, which faculty, is subject to these prescriptions.  Does reason prescribe 
these to itself?  If so, that would suggest a type of circularity in the sort of answer we 
give about their functional role in our cognitive systems.  Let me explain.  Most 
commentators acknowledge that Kant is attempting to "isolate" reason's particular 
contribution to our representational life.  That being so if we say that reason's 
contribution consists in its bringing a set of ideas (of self, world, and God) to the 
table and, in addition, point out that these ideas are prescriptive for our cognitive 
systems, then unless we have conceptualized some separate representational field of 
play, one which is not identical to reason (or its ideas) and yet also stands subject to 
its prescriptions, we have not really explicated the use of these ideas; rather we've 
only acknowledged the fact of their being prescribed (and who the prescriber is).   
Reason presupposes those conditions of the understanding which are first 
applied to experience, and seeks the unity of these conditions in accordance 
with ideas that go much further than experience can reach.  The affinity of the 
manifold, without detriment to its variety, under a principle of unity, concerns 
not merely the things, but even more the mere properties and powers of 
things.344 
 
Kant seems to recognize this in his remarks about the so-called "transitive" relation 
between reason and the understanding.  The understanding operates on (or is 
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normative for) sensibility; sensibility is conceptually determined by the categories of 
the understanding; and the understanding is, in turn, guided by reason and its ideas.  
That is, just as the understanding guides sensibility, reason guides the understanding.   
"The understanding constitutes an object for reason, just as sensibility does 
for the understanding.  To make systematic the unity of all possible empirical 
actions of the understanding is a business of reason, just as the understanding 
connects the manifold of appearances through concepts and brings it under 
empirical laws.345 
 
The distinction between Analytic and the Dialectic maps the distinction between two 
cognitive faculties, namely, the understanding and reason.  (See Diagram below.) 
Diagram 11.1 
 
Faculty                           First Critique             Affiliated Concepts          _____________                
Understanding               Analytic                     The Categories and Principles (Analogies)  
Reason                           Dialectic                    The Ideas of Pure Reason (Trans. Ideas) 
 
It seems pretty clear that, in Kant's mind anyway, the domain in or at which reason is 
to stage the performance of its regressive syntheses is that of empirical-phenomenal 
reality.  The categories of the understanding are hyperabstract conceptual norms, ones 
that operate subpersonally in order to make first-personally structured object-oriented 
phenomenal consciousness possible.  It therefore stands to reason that, if to perform a 
regressive syntheses, the categories must be used, then such performances would 
have an undeniable cognitive significance; which is to say regressive syntheses must 
be intentionally directed at the things that show up in our representational field. 
Many commentators explicate the functional role of the t-ideas in reference to 
the Gap in performance between the faculties of the understanding and reason.  That 
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is, they acknowledge that the t-ideas are prescriptive (for the understanding) and they 
hypothesize (not without textual warrant, I might add) that there must be some 
dimension to our representational life, one that Kant acknowledges as important and 
yet also one for which he thinks the understanding (and its "materials") are, by 
themselves, inadequate.  The basic idea is that there must be some part of or 
dimension to our representational life, one which is undeniable and necessary and at 
the same time one which would not be possible were it not for the guidance of the 
transcendental ideas.   
A basic problem with Kant's position, then, centers on the issue of whether the 
general demand for systematic unity of knowledge (as well as the correlated 
assumption that nature conforms to this demand) is really necessary for the 
proper employment of the understanding (and so necessary for the possibility 
of experience), or whether it simply "adds" something to this experience 
(namely its ability to be systematically unified in scientific theory).346   
 
What vitally important part of our representational life, if any, would be missing 
without these (rather unusual) content-bearing entities?  Allison (2000), Grier 
(2001)347, Neiman (1994), Brandt (1989) for instance, all appear to explicate the 
function of the t-ideas (or, more generally, of regulative principles) in reference to the 
Gap between reason and the understanding.  Reinhard Brandt (1989) offers a 
somewhat more explicit statement about what the performance Gap consists in:  
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 Grier writes: "Yet if we are to understand Kant's attempt to assign a positive function to 
the three transcendental ideas under consideration in the earlier portions of the Dialectic (i.e., to justify 
the use of these ideas in relation to the knowledge given thought he real use of the understanding), then 
we must first get clear about the kind of necessity that attaches to our thinking these ideas in the first 
place" (295).  
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The principle of the division of transcendental logic into Analytic and 
Dialectic, into a logic of truth and a logic of illusion, derives from a certain 
flaw of the ideas; namely, that they become dialectic through a certain use of 
the judgment (A643).  With this basic division a central idea of the whole 
theory of knowledge is properly set forth.  Partial knowledge of nature is 
possible through the understanding, without requiring knowledge of the whole 
and the unconditional; but in this way the whole and unconditional is 
(mis)understood as a thematizable object of knowledge itself, not as idea. As 
idea, the whole is indispensable for systematic experience, but that means: for 
human experience in general, which cannot but comprehend partial elements 
of it in the frame of unity and specification.  The ideas and transcendental 
principles of reason are indispensable for a unified, self-conscious experience: 
but this fact is distorted past recognition under the pressure of the division of 
the text.348 
 
And Neiman, who seems to have a similar view, articulates the Gap between reason 
and the understanding in metaphorical terms:     
The organization of the material provided by understanding requires 
principles of selection and choice, notions of relevance and appropriateness.  
None of these can fittingly be called items of knowledge:  they are derived 
neither from experience nor from the conditions of its possibility.  Yet it is 
certain that they are basic to our construction of knowledge.  One might think 
of the faculties of sensibility and understanding as functioning like a movie 
camera without an editor, blindly recording the passing show, or of 
understanding as capable of forming sentences not paragraphs.  These 
metaphors are not wholly satisfactory.  Kant, as we saw, gives no description 
of a creature lacking reason but not understanding, perhaps because he 
believed no real description of such experience to be possible.  The difficulty 
of such description only serves to emphasize the depth of the structure that 
reason's principles give to the products of the understanding.349 
 
A view of the Gap between reason and the understanding is also to be found in 
Michelle Grier's important work on the Dialectic of the first critique: 
Put simply, although reason has an interest in securing systematic unity of 
already obtained theoretical knowledge, such knowledge is only obtained in 
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the first place in accordance with reason's ideal of such completed systematic 
unity.  In this sense, there is a relation of mutual dependence between the 
goals or interests of reason and the theoretical activities of the understanding.  
If this is correct, then Kant's general view is that the assumption that nature is 
systematically unified is always and already implicit in the theoretical 
undertakings of the understanding. Hence what will count as knowledge will 
ultimately be determined (at least in part) by whether it accords with this 
transcendental assumption of pure reason.350 
  
Both Neiman and Grier acknowledge and play up the prescriptive role of the t-ideas 
and both explicate their functional role in reference to the relation between reason 
and the understanding.  Both commentators offer comparatively more extended 
analyses of the positive account of the transcendental ideas and both acknowledge 
that these ideas perform some function within the framework of reason's pursuit of 
the unconditioned.   
In light of Kant's remarks about the prescriptive content, both Grier and 
Neiman model the use of the t-ideas on practical (not theoretical) reason; which is to 
say that both view the t-ideas to possess (what I will call) directive import (see 2.4 for 
details).  Grier states:   
Yet if we are to understand Kant's attempt to assign a positive function to the 
three transcendental ideas under consideration in the earlier portions of the 
Dialectic (i.e., to justify the use of these ideas in relation to the knowledge 
given though the real use of the understanding), then we must first get clear 
about the kind of necessity that attaches to our thinking these ideas in the first 
place.351 
 
The analyses of Neiman's and Grier's play up the directive import of the t-ideas and  
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do so within the context of reason's pursuit of the unconditioned.  But Neiman's 
account operates at a fairly high level of abstraction so that, while she is explicit 
about the teleological character of regulative principles (namely, that they function as 
"ends of reason"), her account is underdeveloped in that it does not, so far as I can 
tell, bring this analysis specifically to bear on the three types of transcendental idea 
(of self, world, and God); nor does her account show how these rather special sorts of 
content-bearing entities, when functioning as ends, operate as a system.   
It would appear that grasping what this performance Gap (between reason and 
the understanding) is the key to explicating their functional role within our cognitive 
systems.  However since Kant does not himself say much about this Gap, specifying 
it with any kind of conceptual precision (or textual certainty) does not seem to be an 
option.  In view of this, it seems to make more sense to explicate the transcendental 
ideas in reference to what Kant says about regressive syntheses (about which he has 
comparatively more to say) than to try to speculate about what this Gap is in order to 
construct a model of what the functional roles of the t-ideas are.  I submit that a more 
fruitful approach to explicating the "necessity" or functional role of the t-ideas is, 
first, to proceed by linking this enterprise to reason's pursuit of the unconditioned (as 
Neiman and Grier seem to do) and, second, to further specify this context as one in 
which reason pursues this aim via its mereologically-oriented regressive syntheses.    
According to this approach, reason's (mereologically-oriented) regressive 
syntheses provide an object-oriented representational format, one that implicates the 
involvement of both the understanding and reason.  Kant is explicit in claiming that 
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reason's pursuit of the unconditioned is importantly linked to the understanding and 
its categories.  Kant himself  this explicit when he says that  
we see very well that the proper principle of reason in general (in its logical 
use) is to find the unconditioned for conditioned cognitions of the 
understanding, with which its unity will be completed.352 
 
The misuse of the t-ideas evidently occurs when reason's pursuit of the unconditioned 
leads it into the search for a "transcendent" entity (be it a transcendental self, an 
absolute boundary of the world, or God).  However, in 2.2 we saw how reason's 
speculative interest in the t-ideas could be put to an acceptable (intraphenomenal) 
use.  Reason's use of the t-ideas is acceptable so long as these content-bearing entities 
are used to maximize  intraphenomenal systematicity, not however for the purposes 
of establishing reference relations to a set of mind-independent (extra-phenomenal) 
objects.   
Now a transcendental concept of reason always goes to the absolute totality in 
the synthesis of conditions, and never ends except with the absolutely 
unconditioned, i.e., what is unconditioned in every relation.  For pure reason 
leaves to the understanding everything that relates directly to objects of 
intuition or rather to their synthesis in imagination.  It reserves for itself only 
the absolute totality in the use of concepts, and seeks to carry out the synthetic 
unity, which is thought in the categories, all the way to the absolutely 
unconditioned.  We can therefore call this the unity of reason in appearances, 
just as that which the category expresses can be called the unity of 
understanding.353 
 
In 2.7 I modeled reason's use of the transcendental ideas on a functional architecture 
of the mind, one that subserved reason's highest-order end of representing a world- 
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whole.  Within this interpretative framework, I submit we can view reason's 
supervisory role vis-à-vis the understanding as follows.  We start by explicating the 
term "transcendent" as a whole-object that can never be fully presented within the 
perimeters of a first-personally structured experiential cognition.354   
According to Kant our representational systems implement space as an 
internal (phenomenal) representation of an external order of relations (see 3.2-5).  
Spatiality is (for us) the particular way our systems semantically compute externality 
(to our systems).  If space is "in us," then it must be a particularly foundational type 
of representational content -- a phenomenal domain of existence in which we 
"coordinate" represented entities.  One significant object that a human 
representational system coordinates in space is itself.  The system computes the 
cognitive reference (of its perceptual episodes) under a self-model in which it 
simulates its own embeddedness in a spatial environment.  This self-model is 
therefore itself a construct of empirical-phenomena reality, one that operates within 
that simulation.  Under this self-model, the system computes the perspectivalness (of 
its perceptual contents) as a fundamental corollary of its model of an individual (= 
first-personally structured) representational system; which is to say that the system 
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achieves its aim of representing an external reality in part from the standpoint of an 
embodied cognitive system.355   
Under this analysis, reason can be viewed as freeing up the understanding in 
its empirical use by guiding the latter in the construction of ever-larger structured 
wholes, ones that cannot present themselves (not, at any rate, as complete whole-
objects) in the chronically-perspectival perceptual episodes of embodied cognitive 
systems.   
[W]e must first note that it is only from the understanding that pure 
transcendental concepts can arise, that reason really cannot generate any 
concept at all, but can at most only free a concept of the understanding from 
the unavoidable limitations of a possible experience, and thus seek to extend it 
beyond the boundaries of the empirical, through still in connection with it [the 
empirical]. This happens when for a given conditioned reason demands an 
absolute totality on the side of the conditions (under which the understanding 
subjects all appearances to synthetic unity), thereby making the category into 
a transcendental idea, in order to give absolute completeness to the empirical 
synthesis through its progress toward the unconditioned (which is never met 
with in experience, but only in the idea).356 
   
On this view, the understanding's needs to be guided by reason could be interpreted 
as the need for our object-oriented perceptual systems to be cognitively supplemented 
by a detached (God's-eye view) of the world; which is to say that the perceptual 
inputs (of embodied cognitive systems) would be recognized as always needing to be  
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rationally contextualized within the representation of a larger world.  (Such a 
contextualizing representation could not itself be perceptual.)  The objects of 
perceptual reference would (under this scenario) be thought of holistically as parts of 
a much larger structure of spatial entities (ones that are not currently being 
perceptually represented) but are nonetheless conceptualized as belonging to one 
environmental whole.  
To illustrate, you are sitting there reading a manuscript, physically located in a 
room or office, one which is part of a larger structural complex, which is part of 
larger region (neighborhood, city, state), which is part of larger geographical region 
of physical space (North America, western hemisphere, earth) which is part of larger 
heliocentric planetary system, which is part of galaxy, and so on.  None of these 
larger environmental structures are ever objects of empirical acquaintance (certainly, 
not completely, at any rate), because our experience of every such whole-object is 
chronically perspectival and so necessarily partial.  You nevertheless take your 
perceptual experiences to be intentional; you think of them under the recognition that 
they stand in an experience-of relation to these larger objects.  The flipside of viewing 
your phenomenal self as an embodied cognitive system means viewing the on-going 
imputs of your perceptual systems as being always-partial experiences of objects, 
ones that are conceptually (or semantically) linked to others (of ever-greater 
magnitude) under the (contextualizing) representation of an all-inclusive world-
whole.357   
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11.2  Adapting Objecthood To the Spatial Nature of Our Representational 
Systems   
 
In MFNS Kant distinguishes between the empirical representation of space 
and absolute space as an idea of pure reason.  The empirical representation of space 
is evidently object-oriented and is always the representation of "comparative 
wholes"—that is, determinate spatial entities, ones, which form determinate structural 
complexes.  The empirical representation of space is therefore always the 
representation of particular things in space, whereas the idea of absolute space 
appears to function as the system's means for intellectually contextualizing—or, 
literally, "containing" or "encompassing"—the objects that are presented in its 
empirical representation of space.  The spatial entities, the ones front-loaded in our 
perceptual fields, would presumably be the objects of perceptual reference.   
Of course the objects presented to me in my perceptual field at any one time 
are never exhaustive of the world's inventory.  When you (or your reason) consider 
these objects spatially, as bounded regions of (matter-filled) space, your reason must 
view every determinate region of space as a part of one absolute space.358  From the 
standpoint of reason (which is the intellectual faculty capable of thinking ideas), all 
bounded regions of space must be necessarily unified so as to form one absolutely 
complete whole-Space.   
Space and time, as subjective forms, not as objects of the intuition of the a 
priori given manifold in appearance, are not derivative cognitions 
(repraesentatio derivata) but given originally in representation 
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(repraesentatio primaria); they are thought as the unconditional synthetic 
unity of the manifold, and their complex as an infinite whole, in which 
perceptions (empirical representations with consciousness) are thought of as 
in a system -- that is coordinated and subordinated according to the principles 
of the possibility of experience.359  
 
However according to Kant space is "nothing in itself" a claim he uses to support his 
claim that is  ideal and subjective.360    
Space is not a sensible object, and, to that extent, has no reality -- that is, 
nothing existent -- but, rather, contains merely the formal element of intuition 
that our own principle of thought posits synthetically.  It is nothing outside my 
representation, but something merely subjective -- a mere intuition, without 
[being] an object different from my representation.  The ideality of space, as 
the mere form of an intuition, also makes it the case that we can attribute a 
priori certain properties that carry with their synthetic a priori propositions -- 
e.g., three dimensions to an object that, in itself, is nothing.  Space is not 
intuited but is an intuition.361 
 
Commentators often focus on the epistemic dimensions of Kant's ideality thesis 
concerning space and time (that they are "in us").  What is not often given sufficient 
emphasis, however, is the cognitive instrumentality of space, that is, how space 
functions (in our cognitive systems) as an internal representation of an external order 
of relations.  For us, spatiality is how our (embodied) cognitive systems compute  
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externality to itself.362  Space is therefore the internal means that our representational 
systems use in order to accomplish the aim of purporting.  So space is therefore not 
what is to be purported; rather it is a representation that the cognitive system sets up 
in order to accomplish its purporting.   
Space is an intuition; not something which is intuited.363 
This perception thus represents (staying for now only with outer intuitions) 
something real in space.  For, first, perception is the representation of a 
reality, just as space is the representation of a mere possibility of coexistence.  
Second, this reality is represented before outer sense, i.e., in space.  Third, 
space is nothing other than a mere representation, hence, only what is 
represented* in it can count as real, conversely, what is given in it, i.e., 
represented through perception, is also real in it. . . .*"One must note well this 
paradoxical but correct proposition, that nothing is in space except what is 
represented in it.  For space itself is nothing other than representation; 
consequently, what is in it must be contained in representation, and nothing at 
all is in space except insofar as it is really represented in it.364 
 
If space isn't the representatum and is instead what the mind uses in order to 
accomplish acts of cognitive reference, then the cognitive simulation of this external 
domain of existence is what the mind sets up in the service of its object-oriented 
representation.   
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The complex of all outer sense-objects, according to its formal principle, is 
space as one intuition, which is merely subjective (appearance); that of the 
inner sense-objects and of thought, is time: whereby both qualitative and 
quantitative relations and the unity of space are encountered. 
     Space and time are not entia per se but mere forms of sensible  
representation.365 
Human representational systems have to operate under a model of objecthood that is 
adapted to their internal representation of an external order of relations (= space). The 
system's representation of relations between two or more entities isn't an end in itself; 
the end is to represent objects.  How do you cognitively introduce objects into a 
spatial representational field that consists essentially in a system of sheer relations?  
If space is "nothing in itself" and, in addition, if this claim is to be explicated to mean 
that there would be no empirical representation of space if there were nothing being 
represented in it, then it seems that the empirical representation of space will largely 
depend on the mereological structures of the spatial entities that are represented in it.   
In light of Kant's insistence that the empirical representation of space (in 
cognitive contexts, anyway) is equivalent to the representation of things-in-space, 
superposition, (where one larger region of space overlaps a smaller) could be taken to 
have an ontological counterpart.  Since the world reason is interested in representing 
is a systemic whole and since, in addition, it must operate under a conception of 
objecthood that is adapted to the spatial nature of our representational fields (in which 
externality is computed as spatiality), the representation of singular objects must  
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therefore consist in the representation of whole-objects.  Structural complexity (of a 
spatial sort) could be conceptualized as mereological relations among spatial things.  
Such complexity could be taken to reflect a system of  structured wholes, where what 
something is must be computed formally366 as one composite entity being made up of 
subsidiary composite entities.   
 
11.3  Reciprocal Interaction As the Conceptual Substrate of Space367   
In Chapter 3, we saw the world's form—the relational structure in which its 
parts are connected—under two different descriptions, one "sensible," the other 
"intelligible" (or intellectual).  There, we see reciprocal interaction (as causal 
structure) explanatorily underwriting the cognitive representation of the world's 
spatial structure.  Space (being "nothing in itself") cannot function as the ground of 
the connection among multiple substances; rather, it is reciprocal interaction that 
grounds the connection among a set of coexistent entities.  (See 3.1-3.4 for details.)  I 
suggested that in a "critical" context, reciprocal interaction is elevated to the status of 
an a priori category of the understanding.  In this first critique context, Kant's interest 
in reciprocal interaction appears to be in using it as a conceptual substrate for the 
"sensible" representation of space (see 3.5).   
If the intellect cannot think space, that is, if the intellect's attempting to think  
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 More precisely, the "categorial" substrate (as in the categories of the understanding).  I 
derived the helpful term "conceptual substrate" from a magnificent work in cognitive linguistics, 
namely, Ronald Langacker's Foundations of Cognitive Grammar (1987).    
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space, which is a "sensible" representational content, is analogous to the visual 
system's (unsuccessful) attempt to represent either an auditory input (sound) or a 
gustatory sensation (flavor) or a tactile input (softness), then it would appear that 
there has to be some rationally intelligible link between the sensible representation of 
space (and spatial representation of objects) on the one hand and some thinkable 
content on the other, one which is (in some way) cognitively affiliated with space.  
This conceptual content makes it possible for the intellect to think a structure that is 
representationally coeval with spatial structure.368  In other words, there has to be 
some conceptual means in terms of which reason or the intellect can convert or 
reconfigure the representation of space so that a given intentional content, one that is 
presented to me sensibly, can nevertheless be computed intellectually.   
It is under the subtype of relational category, specifically, the category of 
community (= reciprocal interaction, CAT 3.3) that we find a thinkable (discursively 
representable) structure that is subsequently to be linked to the intuitive 
representation of space.369  It would therefore appear that the empirical representation 
of space requires something like a general conceptual substrate.   
Space is not intuited as object, and is not a sense-object for an aggregate of 
perception for the sake of the possibility of experience.  For the formal unity 
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 The result is a sort of representational simulcast, one in which the objects showing up in 
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the Third Analogy principle.   
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in the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, in which the manifold is not 
given in combination, but made by the understanding, is the principle of the 
possibility of empirical representations with consciousness for a system of 
representations in the unity of experience.  All experience is problematic; it 
becomes assertoric through perception as an aggregate.  It is never apodictic, 
however.370 
 
Notice that Kant refers to a formal structure, or formal unity of the manifold of 
intuition, which is made by the understanding and which is "the principle of the 
possibility of empirical representations with consciousness for a system of 
representations in the unity of experience."  When Kant says that the synthesis is 
"made by the understanding," he of course is referring to a norm-governed 
subpersonal condition of intentional awareness.    
Elsewhere Kant is somewhat more explicit:  
The material out of which experience is originally woven is not the perception 
(empirical representation with consciousness) of some object—that is, not that 
which sense receives as material—but that which the understanding makes out 
of the formal element of sensible intuition.  So it is not from receptivity but 
from the spontaneity of the subject (thus, from the (formal) principle of 
composition, that is, from that which the understanding makes out of this 
simple material—hence autonomously, not heteronomously) that the 
aggregate of perceptions becomes a system, which, according to the principle 
of identity, is only one—that is, contains absolute (unconditional) unity in 
itself.371 
 
What is this formal element or formal structure?372  Kant tells us that the categorial  
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formal aspect of the world consists in their connection <nexu> and indeed in a real connection <nexu 
reali>.  The world is thus a real whole <totum reale>, not ideal <ideale>" (LM, Metaphysik L2, 
28:581). See also LM, Metaphysik Dohna, 28:657. 
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concept of community (= the concept of reciprocal interaction) is the concept the 
understanding uses to represent wholes (as opposed to series).  According to Kant in 
order to make a disjunctive judgment, concept-users have to presuppose a subtype of 
the category of "relation," namely, the category of community (CAT 3.3 on Kant's list 
of categories).  Only instances of the category of community are capable of being the 
intentional object of a disjunctive judgment.  At B113 Kant writes: 
Now a similar connection is thought of in an entirety of things, since one is 
not subordinated, as effect, under another, as the cause of its existence, but is 
rather coordinated with the other simultaneously and reciprocally as cause 
with regard to its determinations (e.g., in a body, the parts of which 
reciprocally attract yet also repel each other), which is an entirely different 
kind of connection from that which is to be found in the mere relation of 
cause to effect (of ground to consequence), in which the consequence does not 
reciprocally determine the ground and therefore does not constitute a whole 
with the latter (as the world-creator with the world).  The understanding 
follows the same procedure when it represents the divided sphere of a concept 
as when it thinks of a thing as divisible, and just as in the first case the 
members of the division exclude each other and yet are connected in one 
sphere, so in the latter case the parts are represented as ones to which 
existence (as substances) pertains to each exclusively of the others, and which 
are yet connected in one whole.373 
 
Viewed in context Kant is attempting to offer a compelling interpretation of the 
categorial concept of community that will square his analysis of the logical content of 
the disjunctive judgment.374  More specifically, the context in which this citation 
occurs in the text is one in which Kant is contrasting the second relational category 
(the category of cause and effect) with the third relational category.   
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Here Kant is contrasting the different way a manifold is represented under 
these two different relational categories.  An intuited manifold represented under 
relational category of cause and effect (which is not reciprocal causation) is 
conceptualized as a series; whereas a manifold represented under the relational 
category of community is conceptualized as a whole, "an entirety of things," such that 
one thing is "coordinated with the other simultaneously and reciprocally."  So, in the 
most general terms, the difference between the second and third relational categories 
(of cause and effect and of community) appears to be a basic difference in how 
intuited manifolds are to be conceptualized—as either a series or a whole (where the 
'or' is exclusive).   
The recent analyses of Beatrice Longuenesse's may bring some illumination 
here.  Longuenesse's general view of the Analogies is evidently cognition-oriented:  
Thus Kant's Analogies of Experience should be understood as being 
essentially an explanation of how we relate representations of objects in 
general: an explanation of intentionality (the directedness of representations, 
their property of being representations of something), and as a result, a theory 
of what makes it possible to apply concepts such as those of causal connection 
and causal interaction to the objects of an empirical science of nature.375 
 
In the context of her cognition-oriented view, it is Longuenesse's analyses of the 
Third Analogy that allows us to triangulate on the cognitive function of disjunctive 
judgments (= ones that employ the concept of reciprocal interaction):  
I intend to show that Kant's argument in the Third Analogy is meant to lay out 
just those acts of synthesis by way of which things are individuated in space 
and time.  According to Kant, those acts of synthesis are acts by means of 
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which things are represented as being in relations of universal causal 
interaction.  Only insofar as they are so individuated can they also be thought 
under concepts of natural kinds (namely, under a universal scale of genera and 
species) ordered according to the form of discursive judgment and a system of 
such judgments.376 
 
From her analysis of Kant's argument in the Third Analogy, Longuenesse concludes:    
If this is correct, objects are thus individuated in space and time by their 
reciprocal interaction, and concepts of objects thus individuated are concepts 
of relational properties.  But this means that the empirical-cognitive use of the 
form of disjunctive judgment, by means of which we think objects in nature as 
falling under a unified scale of genera and species, is mediated by that of the 
form of hypothetical judgment, by means of which we individuate objects by 
determining their universal interaction in one space and one time.377 
 
Longuenesse's (somewhat controversial) claim is that disjunctive judgments are 
"mediated" by hypothetical judgments.  I am not sure she is right.  However the aim 
here is not to offer a detailed analysis of Longuenesse's view.  Suffice it to say, that 
Longuenesse acknowledges disjunctive judgments to serve an important cognitive 
function, one that is certainly object-oriented in that it is on the basis of these 
judgments that objects can be individuated in space and ordered systematically.   
 
11.4 The Explanatory Structure of Reason's Regressive Syntheses 
Reason is under the imperative to pursue the unconditioned and it does this by 
performing regressive syntheses.  For present purposes, the basic idea seems to be 
that, in performing a regressive synthesis, concept-users undertake to think a rational  
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relation between one object understood as the conditioned and another object (or set 
of objects) understood as the underwriting conditions for the former; in other words, 
the former is regarded as a given datum whereas the latter is regarded as a set of 
existence (or possibility) conditions.  (See Diagram below.) 
Diagram 11.4 
Regressive Synthesis_____    Computed As_____________________________________               
"A Given Conditioned"          An empirical datum ("a given whole of intuition") 
"The Conditions"                    A set of possibility conditions (a set of underwriting parts 
 
Kant says that regressive syntheses can be performed only within a sequential 
structure, a series.  The basic point seems to be that the rational relation between the 
conditioned and a set of conditions is that of a given datum and a set of existence (or 
possibility) conditions. Kant provides a formal conceptualization of how regressive 
syntheses are supposed to work:  
Thus one necessarily thinks of the fully elapsed time up to the present 
moment as also given (even if not as determinable by us).  But as the future, 
since it is not a condition for attaining to the present, it is a matter of complete 
indifference for comprehending the present what we want to hold about future 
time, whether it stops somewhere or runs on to infinity.  Let there be a series 
m, n, o, in which n is given as conditioned in respect of m, but at the same 
time as the condition of o, and the series ascends from the conditioned n to m 
(l, k, j, etc.); then I must presuppose the first series in order to regard n as 
given, and n is possible in accordance with reason (with the totality of 
conditions) only b means of that series; but its possibility does not rest on the 
subsequent series o, p, q, r, which therefore cannot be regarded as given but 
only as dabilis [= capable of being given].378 
 
Kant implies that reason's search for a set of conditions for a given conditioned is an 
enterprise that involves the categories (and thus the understanding).  Since the 
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activity of the understanding is involved in reason's performance of regressive 
syntheses and since, in addition, these regressive syntheses are supposed to work 
under the guidance of the transcendental ideas, it seems plausible to think that it is the 
understanding's activity (its use of the categories) that is to be directed by the ideas of 
pure reason.379    
Kant seems to think, however, that not all categories are suited to regressive 
syntheses which are modeled as a sequential structure.  Specifically, Kant targets the 
relational categories, that of substance (CAT 3.1) and of community (CAT 3.3, of 
reciprocal interaction): 
Thus, first, the transcendental ideas will really be nothing except categories 
extended to the conditioned, and the former may be brought into a table 
ordered according to the headings of the latter.  Second, however, not all 
categories will work here, but only those in which the synthesis constitutes a 
series, and indeed a series of conditions subordinated (not coordinated) one to 
another for any conditioned.  Absolute totality is demanded by reason only 
insofar as reason is concerned with the ascending series of conditions for a 
given condition, hence not when dealing with the descending line of 
consequences, nor with the aggregate of coordinated conditions for these 
consequences.380 
 
Kant seems to privilege the category of (one-way) causality (CAT 3.2) as the one that 
is most suited to regressive syntheses (see B442).381  Kant's point here seems to be 
                                                          
379
   On the interaction between reason and the understanding, Kant writes:  "If, therefore, 
pure reason also deals with objects, yet it has no immediate reference to them and their intuition, but 
deals only with the understanding and its judgments, which apply directly to the senses and their 
intuition, in order to determine their objects.  The unity of reason is therefore not the unity of a 
possible experience, but is essentially different from that, which is the unity of understanding" (CPuR, 
A307). 
 
380
 CPuR, A410.   
 
381
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For accidents (insofar as they inhere in a single substance) are coordinated with one another, and do 
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that regressive syntheses appear to apply only to causal sequences and, consequently, 
appears to commit us to modeling such syntheses on successive (one-way) causal 
sequences.  This is a problem.  Since, if this were true, regressive syntheses could 
therefore be performed only within a diachronic (not a synchronic) format; which is 
to say that reason would apparently be confined in staging its regressive syntheses to 
the domain of inner sense (whose phenomena are necessarily temporally successive) 
because, as we have seen in the preceding section, the spatial phenomena of outer 
sense, which are necessarily represented under the category of community (= 
reciprocal interaction), "are not subordinated to one another" as items in a series but 
are rather co-ordinated.   
Since reason appears to direct its regressive syntheses to (outer) empirical-
phenomenal reality, the task is to show how Kant's rather formal conceptualization of 
how regressive syntheses are supposed to work (one which evidently is modeled on 
causal sequences) can nevertheless be staged within a representational format where 
the objects are not subordinated but rather coordinated in space.  I submit that reason 
can reconfigure this sequentiality in compositional terms, namely, by representing 
(outer) empirical-phenomenal as a  hierarchical system of structured wholes.   
Space and time, as subjective forms, not as objects of the intuition of the a 
priori given manifold in appearance, are not derivative cognitions 
(repraesentatio derivata) but given originally in representation 
(repraesentatio primaria); they are thought as the unconditional synthetic 
unity of the manifold, and their complex as an infinite whole, in which 
perceptions (empirical representations with consciousness) are thought of as 
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and have no exponents of a series, since they are not subordinated to one another as conditions of their 
possibility, which one could very well have said about spaces, whose boundaries were never 
determined in themselves, but always through another space” (CPuR, B441-2).  
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in a system -- that is coordinated and subordinated according to the principles 
of the possibility of experience.382 
 
11.5  Adapting the Serial Nature of Regressive Syntheses to the Spatial Nature 
Our Representational Systems   
 
Kant says that the unconditioned can never be exemplified in empirical-
phenomenal reality. It follows that the regressive syntheses that reason performs in 
the service of this pursuit can never be completed, only increasingly approximated.  
Moreover, since reason's pursuit of the unconditioned is supposed to subserve the 
interests of rational systematicity, it would therefore appear that that the linkages 
between the individual regressive syntheses are to be rationally intelligible; which is 
to say that that the reason's pursuit of the unconditioned is not to result in an 
aggregate of otherwise unconnected regressive syntheses (which would amount to an 
aggregate of unconnected whole-entities); rather the intention is to link these 
regressive syntheses together systematically.383   
We can plausibly explicate the sequential dimension of reason's performance 
of regressive syntheses in the following way:  A given conditioned would initially be 
acknowledged, one for which a set of conditions would then be determined.  Then, 
since the unconditioned is never empirically fulfilled but rather only progressively 
approximated, reason is under the imperative postulate a second given conditioned, 
one which it undertakes to pursue a set of conditions for by starting with a prior given 
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conditioned; in this way, reason incorporates the first conditioned object into the set 
of conditions it determines for a second one and so on.  It would therefore appear that 
the performances of a regressive synthesis not only has an internal structure which is 
sequential (in that it is supposed to be explicated in causal terms), it would also 
appear that multiple regressive syntheses are supposed to be recursively linked, so 
that reason is able to connect these in the formation of causal structures with 
increasingly greater scalar properties.    
Notice here that, under this analysis, there is an interesting semantic 
ambiguity attaching to any entity on which reason would perform its regressive 
syntheses.  Any whole-object that underwent one would have to be simultaneously 
conceptualized as both a given conditioned (= that for which a set of prior conditions 
must be given) as well as membering among a set of conditions which are to be 
directed at another given conditioned.   
Diagram 11.5:  
Regressive Syntheses     Whole-Object                             Computed As        Explanatory Role        
A given conditioned       That which is to be composed    Singular Entity      Superstrate 
A set of conditions         That which composes                  Set of parts            Substrate 
 
Since reason's regressive syntheses is object-oriented (in its aims) and since, in 
addition, empirical-phenomenal reality is the domain in which it is to stage its pursuit 
of the unconditioned and since, finally, the phenomenal world is (for us) necessarily 
spatial, it seems to follow that if the sequential nature of regressive syntheses is to be 
preserved, that sequentiality (as just explicated) must be possible in a context where 
the items to be presented are not diachronic but rather synchronic wholes.  I submit 
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that the sequential nature of reason's regressive syntheses can be adapted to the 
spatial nature of our representational systems by being recomputed under a model of 
recursive composition, one where a given object is dually characterized as both a 
whole (in relation to a set of parts) and a part in relation to a larger whole-object.   
 
11.6 Reason's Mereologically-Oriented Regressive Syntheses 
If reason performs its regressive syntheses in the service of its highest-order 
end, namely, that of object-oriented representation, we should expect that the model 
of regressive syntheses (as they are performed under the direction the cosmological 
ideas) may plausibly be constructed in light of that cognitive directive. 
Kant says that the cosmological ideas are special in that together they form a 
system of "world concepts" (see CPuR, A645).   
Above I have called the ideas with which we are now concerned 
"cosmological ideas," partly because by "world" is understood the sum total 
of all appearances, and our ideas are also directed only toward the 
unconditional among appearances, but partly too because in the transcendental 
sense the word "world" signifies the absolute totality of the sum total of 
existing things, and we are directing our attention only to the completeness of 
the synthesis (though properly only in the regress toward its conditions).  
Considering, moreover, that taken collectively these ideas are all transcendent 
and, even though they do not overstep the object, namely appearances, in 
kind, but have to do only with the sensible world (not with noumena), they 
nevertheless carry the synthesis to a degree that transcends all possible 
experience; thus in my opinion one can quite appropriately call them 
collectively world-concepts.384 
 
In the Antinomy of Pure Reason, specifically Sections 7-9, Kant appears to be 
"instituting" the regressive syntheses, where this seems to mean setting up the rules 
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under which such operations are to be performed.385  Kant clearly has in mind to 
institute a mereologically-oriented form of regressive synthesis.   
Thus of the division of matter (of a body) that is given within certain 
boundaries, it must be said that it goes to infinity.  For this matter is given in 
empirical intuition as a whole, and consequently, with all its possible parts.  
Now since the condition of this whole is its part, and the condition of this part 
is a part made of parts, etc., and in this regress of decomposition an 
unconditioned (indivisible) member of the series of conditions is never 
encountered, not only is there nowhere an empirical ground to stop the 
division, but the further members of the continuing division are themselves 
empirically given prior to this ongoing division, i.e., the division goes to 
infinity.386 
 
It appears to be reason's aim to set up an conceptual apparatus where it can perform 
its regressive syntheses in the context of outer sense, where spatial boundaries are to 
be successively introduced in order to represent a ordered system of structured 
wholes.  It must do this because the unconditioned (= the absolute boundary of the 
world) can never be encountered in empirical-phenomenal reality.   
Thus the idea of pure reason will only prescribe a rule to the regressive 
synthesis in the series, a rule in accordance with which it proceeds from the 
conditioned, by means of all the conditions subordinated one to another, to the 
unconditioned, even though the latter will never be reached.  For the 
absolutely unconditioned is not encountered in experience at all.387 
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Thus the unconditioned takes the form of a world that has no determinate absolute 
boundary.  Reason is nevertheless under the imperative to pursue the unconditioned 
and to do so by reiterating its mereologically-oriented regressive syntheses with every 
whole-object it introduces.388   
In the case of physical matter, we start off with "a given whole in intuition," 
namely, the material body.  Reason views the material body as "a given conditioned" 
for which it seeks a set of conditions in its pursuit of the unconditioned.  This consists 
in following the rule of a progressive division of physical parts (to infinity).389 
If the whole has been empirically given, then it is possible to go back to 
infinity in the series of inner conditions.  But if that whole is not given, but 
rather is first to be given only through an empirical regress, then I can say 
only that it is possible to progress to still higher conditions in the series to 
infinity.  In the first [material body] case I could say:  There are always more 
members there, and empirically given, than I reach through the regress (of 
decomposition); but in the second [series of ancestors] case I can say only:  I 
can always go still further in the regress, because no member is empirically 
given as absolutely unconditioned, and thus a higher member may be admitted 
as possible and hence the inquiry after it may be admitted as necessary.390 
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For every bounded region of space we could make the same claim, namely, that "it is 
always necessary to inquire after more of them [more parts of space], because no 
experience is bounded absolutely."  Every particular bounded region of space 
presupposes a larger (ambient) spatial whole in which it may be so bounded, and so 
on.  It would appear that with regard to the cosmological ideas (namely, those 
operating in the first and second antinomies) reason appears to be interested in the 
possibility of representing whole-objects (in our representational field).   
Kant appears to be concerned with linking reason's regressive syntheses with  
furthering the end of attaining "the complete concept of the object."   
Now in order to determine the sense of this rule of pure reason appropriately, 
it must first be noted that it cannot say what the object is, but only how the 
empirical regress is to be instituted so as to attain the complete concept of the 
object.  For if the former were the case, then it would be a constitutive 
principle, the likes of which is never possible on the basis of pure reason.391   
 
However, in sections 7-9 (of the Antinomy of Pure Reason), Kant's overall aim seems 
to be to conceptualize the formal requirements (ones that do not commit reason to any 
determinate empirical ontology) for "instituting" a recursive system of mereological 
structure in space as a homogeneous continuous quanta.  The necessity of the 
recursive mereological construction appears to be due to certain a priori features of  
our representational systems, namely, that we represent (outer) phenomenal reality in 
space.392 
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intuited within its boundaries is such a whole, whose parts in every decomposition are in turn spaces, 
and it is therefore divisible to infinity.  From this there also follows quite naturally the second 
 413 
Diagram 11.6:   
Horizontal vector (Hv) -----------------------> 
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   \|/ 
Vertical vector (Vv) 
 
Let me make a number of preliminary observations concerning this hierarchy.  First 
and foremost, it is a compositional hierarchy, one that the difference between higher 
and lower levels (superclass and subclass, genera and species) is one that is to be 
explicated in mereological terms.  Notice, under its current representation, the 
compositional hierarchy exhibits two "vectors," namely the horizontal and the 
vertical.  Entities positioned higher along the vertical vector (Vv) will be structured 
wholes with greater scalar properties than those positioned on lower levels.  Second, 
notice that the world-whole is, under this model, a recursive system of structured 
wholes.  This suggests, of course, that a relation of nestedness among a sum of 
structured wholes (rather like a set of Chinese boxes).   
                                                                                                                                                                     
application, to an external appearances enclosed within its boundaries (a body).  Its division is 
grounded on the divisibility of space, which constitutes the possibility of the body as an extended 
whole.  The latter is thus divisible to infinity, without, however, therefore consisting of infinitely many 
parts" (CPuR, A525/B553).   
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I submit that regressive syntheses performed under the guidance of the 
cosmological ideas, take either of two related forms, namely, as recursive 
compositional analyses or recursive construction of structured wholes.  Reason's 
pursuit of the unconditioned consequently proceeds either by a process of recursive 
decomposition, in which case it introduces divisions into a given bounded region, 
thereby successively generating more parts; or it proceeds oppositely by a process of 
recursive construction.  In the former case, reason attempts to ground a given 
bounded region by reference to some set of underwriting parts, ones that it can 
therefore view as a set of conditions for that particular bounded region.  In the later 
case, reason aims to expand its current spatial boundary to some larger structured 
whole, and it does so under the aim of computing the whole it constructs as an object, 
one in which a set of subsidiary parts are (necessarily) unified.   
 
11.6.1  The Cognitive Significance of Mereologically-Oriented Regressive 
Syntheses 
 
The notion of a boundary (specifically, a bounded region of space) is a 
necessary condition of object-oriented representation.  This suggests that Kant's 
criteria for objecthood must be adjusted to certain a priori features of our 
representational systems, namely, space (and time).  And since every region of space 
is divisible, it would seem that every spatial entity must, of necessity, be composite 
(insofar as it is spatial) and singular (insofar as it is an entity or thing).  In other 
words, given the a priori constraints imposed by the nature of our representational 
field (that externality is explicated in terms of spatiality), it therefore seems that the 
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conditions of objecthood must be explicated accordingly.  In 11.2 we saw that the 
rule for what is to count as a singular object (for us, anyway) would involve 
computing what shows up in our representational field as integrated wholes of one 
kind or another.393  
In my research on Kant, I have found he acknowledges (at least) three 
possible ways to conceptualize a whole. (See Diagram below.)   
Diagram 11.7:  Three Conceptualizations of a Whole 
Faculty Affiliate               Operative Concept                               Conception of a Whole____   
1)  Sensible Intuition        Space (As Continuous Quantum)        A bounded region of space 
2)  Understanding             Matter (As Discrete Quantum)            A mereological sum of parts  
3)  Reason                         End (As System-Goal)                        A systemic whole  
 
Under a mereologically-oriented model of regressive synthesis, it would make sense 
for reason to be concerned with introducing boundaries into spatiomaterial continua, 
because Kant thinks that a material body's individuality is to be explicated in such 
terms.394  Since any boundary introduced into the homogeneous spatiomaterial 
continua is (from the standpoint of the principle of sufficient reason) entirely 
contingent, reason must repeatedly ground the determinate bounded regions of space 
                                                          
393
 There is evidently linguistic data in support of this claim.  According to Friederike 
Moltmann (1987): "The semantic 'count status' of the nouns in question is obvious also from the way a 
question such as How many things are there? Is answered.  Generally, only entities that are integrated 
wholes are counted, not sums or parts of such entities which themselves lack integrity.  However, what 
kinds of integrated wholes are counted is left unspecified; it depends entirely on the type of entity 
itself.  ¶Thus nouns like entity, unit, thing, piece, and part do not fail to impose integrity, but rather 
impose implicit integrity conditions, which have to be provided by the nonlinguistic context.  
¶There is one additional condition imposed by these nouns.  They generally do not require just that the 
entities be integrated wholes in the relevant situation, but rather that they be essential integrated 
wholes.  For one cannot refer to a quantity of wood that forms an accidental integrated whole (by 
being connected in space and time) as the entity, the thing, the piece, or a part.  Given this, the noun 
thing, for example, will carry the following lexical condition: ¶ (36) Semantic condition on thing:  For 
an entity x and a situation s, if [thing]s (x) = 1, then x is an essential integrated whole in s" (Moltmann, 
23).  
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it introduces by reference to a prior set of conditions.  In view of the fact that all 
material objects are composite entities, reason's object-oriented concerns could 
plausibly be seen to be, first, with the installation of spatial boundaries (in 
experience) and, second, with rationally stabilizing these boundaries by reference to a 
set of underwriting parts, ones which are supposed to compose a given whole-
object.395  
However reason cannot begin to represent whole-objects (let alone determine 
at set of conditions under which they are possible) unless it can represent a set of 
parts under a conception of what something (an object) is supposed to be.  To be able 
to do this however, reason would have to have some ontological conception of 
completeness (or, in Kant's terminology, "perfection") according to which it could 
determine where one material object ends and another begins.  In fact, judgments of 
perfection, which are inherently normative, are (in the third critique) assimilated to 
"teleological judgments of reflection" because they presuppose the teleological 
concept of an end.396  Reason cannot however perform its mereologically-oriented 
regressive syntheses unless and until it is able to phenomenally apply the distinction 
                                                                                                                                                                     
394
  You can, for instance, find Kant doing so in the Amphiboly.  
 
395
 Kant writes: "If I divide a whole that is given in intuition, then I go from a conditioned to 
the conditions of its possibility.  The division of the parts (subdivisio or decompositio) is a regress in 
the series of these conditions.  The absolute totality of this series would be given only when and if the 
regress could attain to simple parts.  But if each of the parts in a continuously progressing 
decomposition is once again divisible, then the division, i.e., the regress from conditioned to its 
condition, goes in infinitum; for the conditions (the parts) are contained in the conditioned itself, and 
since this conditioned is given as a whole in an intuition enclosed within its boundaries, the conditions 
all given along with it” (CPuR, A524/B552).  
 
396
 For Kant's discussion of this linkage see the CPJ’s First Introduction (20:226-29). See also 
CPJ §10 and §16 for further explicit support on this linkage.  
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between a set of conditions and what a set of conditions are conditions for; which is 
to say reason's pursuit of the unconditioned appears in effect to be dead-in-the-water 
unless it is able to phenomenally apply the normative distinction between that which 
composes and that which is supposed to be composed.  Suffice it to say, 
homogeneous spatiomaterial continua cannot ground this normative distinction.397 
We will return to this important issue shortly.   
 
11.6.2  Ends As The Supersensible Grounds of Material Unity  
Empirical intuition is an explanatory datum.  The issue is over how to ground 
the fact that we do have intuitional success.  The issue here is therefore not epistemic 
but explanatory, in that the concern is over how we can explain the objects that 
appear in our representational field.  We succeed in intuiting singular individuals; 
therefore we must ('must' of hypothesis) succeed in completely intuiting material 
composites.  Or, at any rate, what intuitional success implies is rather normative, that 
we have some cognitive line on what counts as a complete physical object -- a basis 
for deciding where an object begins and ends, where its boundaries are to be set.  
                                                          
 
397
 Kant seems to confirm this in the third critique: "For this concept [of a natural end] leads 
reason into an order of things entirely different from that of a mere mechanism of nature, which will 
here no longer satisfy us.  An idea has to ground the possibility of  the product of nature.  However, 
since this is an absolute unity of the representation, while matter is a multitude of things, which by 
itself can provide no determinate unity of composition, if that unity of the idea is to even serve as the 
determining ground a priori of a natural law of the causality of such a form of the composite, then the 
end of nature must extend to everything that lies in its product.  For once we have related such an 
effect  in the whole to a supersensible determining ground beyond the blind mechanism of nature, we 
must also judge it entirely in accordance with this principle; and there is no ground for assuming that 
the form of such a thing is only partially dependent on the latter, for in such a case, in which 
heterogeneous principles are jumbled together, no secure rule for judging would remain at all" [CPJ, 
§66, 5:377, underscoring added). 
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Judgments of this type would depend, of course, on the type of object under 
consideration, whether artefactual or natural.  This implies that we know, or have 
some cognitive criteria for judging, when an object is complete, when it requires no 
additional parts in order to be what it is supposed to be; alternatively, we know when 
an object fails to have enough parts.   
A case in point—the exotic "glass frog."  The glass frog is a semi-transparent 
organism, one whose internal composition can be viewed by an external observer.  
Like any other, the glass frog's heart, kidneys, brain, etc., are all situated within the 
bounded region of space enclosed by its body; therein the frog's internal composition 
is articulated into a multitude of parts.  Now suppose that you conceptually negated 
the idea of a whole-frog.  That is, suppose you negated that conceptualization in 
virtue of which the frog is one entity, namely, as an agent.  Presumably, what you 
would have left is the frog's physical substrate (frog guts).  Or would you?   
It seems that (under the current scenario) concept-users would still be able to 
observe the parts (grasped merely as spatially demarcated entities), but they wouldn't 
know what they added up to or what their functions were (or whether they even had 
functions).  Many organisms are morphologically similar, so even if you knew that 
you had all the parts, you still wouldn't know what they were the parts for (to say 
nothing of what they did or what their function is).  And even if you knew you had all 
the relevant parts plus you knew what their functions were, this information would 
still semantically underspecify the kind of frog and probably underspecify the species 
of natural kind (meaning you might not be able to conclude from this information 
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alone that the parts were frog parts).  Merely counting the number of parts wouldn't 
imply that they were the parts of a frog (let alone a glass frog).   
Taking the route of the understanding (namely, of generating a mereological 
sum from a set of parts) would underspecify the material object under analysis.  
Again, if you don't know that the thing (whose parts are being considered) is 
supposed to be a frog (under normal semantic grasp of that term), on what basis (on 
what principled grounds) would you add or subtract parts?  But none of these 
considerations really gets to the heart of the issue here, which is that when you 
conceptually negate the whole-frog (qua agent), you conceptually negate the very 
reason (or ground) for its material composition.   
What's so special about a frog (or, for that matter, any natural organism) that 
makes it the single thing that a vast number of other entities are supposed to make 
possible?  What is it about the whole-frog that makes it the entity that ought to be 
physically constituted (and thus made possible) by a plurality of other entities?   
These questions have a distinctively normative feel.  We don't dispute the 
empirical datum that it is the frog that a set of other entities (frog guts) are "supposed 
to" compose.  While it is true of all of the frog's physical components that they exist 
concurrently with the frog and that each is, from a metaphysical standpoint, a 
countable substance in its own right, there is nevertheless the acknowledgement that 
the whole-frog is the physical object that nature intended for composition.  It is the 
whole-frog that is metaphysically out front.  As the singular object that a multitude of 
other entities are supposed to compose, these other entities are understood to exist for 
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the sake of its possibility.  Any explanatory interest reason has in the frog's 
composition therefore seems parasitic on a prior acknowledgement of the whole-
frog's genuine status as a singular (phenomenal) object.  It is as if nature is indicating 
to reason what it is supposed to acknowledge as a singular object -- as a node of 
interactive structure.  Consequently, in light of the fact that the whole-frog seems to 
be the primary object of representational interest, reason's interest in it would (indeed 
should) be to stabilize its boundary.  
Under the scenario set up above, the descriptor ('the guts of a frog') would not 
have the same meaning it does for the concept-users in the scenario as it does for us, 
because the former do not have the concept of a whole-frog qua agent (thus as 
singular entity).  But that's not all they lack.  These concept-users lack the normative 
basis for thinking of the whole-frog as that for the sake of which a multitude of other 
(very unfroglike) entities are supposed to exist and, in addition, enter into 
composition relations, ones that (for Kant) are to explicated under the model of 
interaction.  My present point is this: it seems that these concept-users would not be 
able to conceptualize the difference between the frog's physical substrate (frog guts) 
and the corresponding superstrate (the whole-frog as agent).  And since concept-
users could not conceptualize the difference between the whole-frog and its physical 
substrate, they could not conceptualize the difference between "a given conditioned" 
and "the set of conditions."  But this distinction is internal to reason's pursuit of the 
unconditioned (via its mereologically-oriented regressive syntheses) and therefore 
crucial to the success of its object-oriented aims. 
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Reason's motivation for pursuing such connections is to maximize 
systematicity.  Under my analysis, Kant's notion of rational systematicity exhibits an 
(underemphasized and underdeveloped) mereological dimension.  And since to 
perform a mereologically-oriented regressive syntheses is, first, to relate one entity to 
certain others as a given conditioned to a set of conditions and, second, to do so under 
the aim of mereological construction, it seems to follow that if reason's enterprise 
presupposes some (implicit) mereological structure in the world, it must be of the sort 
that is rationally intelligible.  I have explicitly characterized mereological dimension 
of rational systematicity in terms of (what I call) part-on-whole dependency (see 2.5 
for details).  Under this model of rational systematicity, a set of parts are defined by 
reference to a prior idea or conception of a whole.  Moreover, this dependency (of the 
parts on the idea of a whole) is according to Kant one that can be grasped only by 
analogy to human intentional causation, namely, in our production of artifacts (see 
2.8 for details).   
In the third critique Kant analyzes the concept of perfection into two main 
components, namely, the concept of "what a thing is supposed to be" and the concept 
of an end.  Elsewhere, in his transcendental definition of an 'end', Kant makes clear 
that an end provides the ground for "what an object is supposed to be:"   
Now as an end in general is that the concept of which can be regarded as the 
ground of the possibility of the object itself, thus in order to represent an 
objective purposiveness in a thing the concept of what sort of thing it is 
supposed to be must come first; and the agreement of the manifold in the 
thing with this concept (which supplies the rule for the combination of the 
manifold in it) is the qualitative perfection of a thing.  Quantitative 
perfection, as the completeness of any thing in its own kind, is entirely 
distinct from this, and is a mere concept of magnitude (totality), in which 
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what the thing is supposed to be is thought of as already determined and it is 
only asked whether everything that is requisite for it exists.398 
 
The basic idea here is that judgments of perfection operate on the basis of an end, 
where an end is, in turn, determined by reference to a given whole of intuition.  In the 
case of outer empirical-phenomenal reality, a given whole will be a material body.  It 
is the whole object that is identified as the end and thus the whole-object is the target 
of composition.  The whole object (whatever it is) constitutes the end or target of 
composition and thus provides the kind-specific conception of completeness.  The 
whole-object embodies in propria persona a conception of what something is 
supposed to be, namely, in its being a whole of the sort that it is.  Considered as an 
end, the whole-object is therefore normative for its own composition: it prescribes 
itself as the target of composition; which is to say that the parts, such as they are, can 
be viewed as so many necessary means toward the realization of a common (final) 
end, namely, of composing that particular sort of whole-object.   
To judge objective purposiveness we always require the concept of an end, 
and [if that purposiveness is not to be an external one (utility),but an internal 
one], we require the concept of an internal end, which contains the ground of 
the internal possibility of the object.  Now as an end in general is that the 
concept of which can be regarded as the ground of the possibility of the object 
itself, thus in order to represent an objective purposiveness in a thing the 
concept of what sort of thing it is supposed to be must come first; and the 
agreement of the manifold in the thing with this concept (which supplies the 
rule for the combination of the manifold in it) is the qualitative perfection of a 
thing.  Quantitative perfection, as the completeness of any thing in its own 
kind, is entirely distinct from this, and is a mere concept of magnitude 
(totality), in which what the thing is supposed to be is thought of as already 
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 CPJ, §15, 5:227-28.  
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determined and it is only asked whether everything that is requisite for it 
exists.399 
 
Viewed as an (relative) final end, a whole-object is conceptualized as something that 
prescribes itself as the target of composition.  That object must be a structured whole 
(of the right kind), one where the parts depend on some (prior conception of) the 
whole.  In executing its task of specifying a set of conditions for an empirically given 
conditioned, it appears that reason must perform a (mereologically-oriented) 
regressive synthesis on an object, such that its synthesis aims as grounding the 
object's composition.  It seems to follow, then, that performing a regressive synthesis 
on an object amounts, first, to targeting an empirically given structured whole as 
given conditioned and, second, going about specifying a set of parts (under some 
model of their interconnection) as the conditions under which that whole is possible.   
 
11.7  How A Hierarchic System of Structured Wholes Furthers Reason's Interest 
in Object-Oriented Representation  
 
Since space (or a space) is never itself the object to be represented, the 
presentation of a bounded region of space (to the subject) is a sort of necessary means 
or by-product of the system's attempt to represent a singular object, namely, one that 
"fills" a bounded region of space.  Since every bounded region of (matter-filled) 
space presupposes a larger region in which it is to be bounded, reason's object-
orientedness would seem to mean computing these ever-larger spaces as ever-larger 
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 CPJ, 5:227-8. 
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whole-objects, ones that reason could determine a set of prior conditions for.  In other 
words, the system must be able to compute these ever-larger spaces as cases of 
object-oriented representation.   
Why would reason be motivated to continually reiterate the presupposition of 
a larger whole-object?  As we have seen, reason is under the imperative to pursue the 
unconditioned (via its mereologically-oriented regressive syntheses) and to do so 
under a conception of the unconditioned according to which the world-whole has no 
determinate boundary.  Thus without continually reinstating the presupposition of a 
larger (implicit) whole-object, reason could not continue its pursuit of the 
unconditioned because there would be no whole in reference to which a current set of 
whole-entities could be conceptualized as underwriting parts (i.e., as a set of 
conditions for a given conditioned).  Reason's pursuit of the unconditioned would 
therefore (under this scenario) come to a definite halt, because it would not be able to 
convert a given conditioned (for which it had already determined a set of conditions) 
as an item itself membering in a set of conditions, ones that were directed at 
underwriting a whole-object of greater magnitude and so on.   
Since reason must acknowledge that the world-whole has no determinate 
spatial boundary, its pursuit of the unconditioned (via mereologically-oriented 
regressive syntheses) can proceed to infinity; which is to say that there is no 
determinate whole-object that reason can identify as the world and subsequently 
consider its highest-order cognitive function (of representing the world) to be 
fulfilled.  There is always an ever-larger whole-object to be represented, one that 
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incorporates all the rest so far encountered.  In order to pursue its object-oriented goal 
(of representing the world-whole) to the next level, reason must therefore repeatedly 
presuppose the existence of an ever-larger whole-object, one that comprises a set of 
underwriting parts and, in addition, prescribes itself as the target of composition.  In 
doing so, reason provides itself with an intentional object for its object-oriented 
representation and subsequently can link this object systematically with a plurality of 
other entities by viewing them in part/whole relations under a hierarchical system of 
structured wholes.      
A number of issues arise here.  For one thing, how (on what basis) does 
reason think there exists an ever-larger whole-object to be composed, one that 
prescribes itself as the target of composition.  This issue is easily discharged, 
however.  Reason's highest-order end (to represent a world-whole) is one that it 
undertakes in the context of transcendental idealism (not realism); which is to say 
that, the representation a world-whole is to be conceptualized as a system of cognitive 
directives, not content-bearers that designate mind-independent (extra-phenomenal) 
objects, whose objective reference relations reason is supposed to justify and 
establish.  Reason can (and must) hypothesize an ever-larger whole-object because it 
is under the internal imperative to do so (for the sake of its highest-order end).  
Reason does not however have to square its intellectual imperatives (or its use of any 
t-idea) with a mind-independent reality for two reasons; first, because the t-ideas 
(when modeled as directives) have a directive of fit that is characteristic of practical 
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(not theoretical) reason.  Directives inform us of what ought to be, not what is.  
According to Kant, however, experience informs us only of what is.   
Second, reason's use of the t-ideas can be made to serve its "speculative" 
interests, provided that the latter are redefined intraphenomenally.  In 2.3, we saw 
that reason's speculative interests (its interests in the cosmological ideas) could be 
made to serve its practical and architectonic interests.  In the present chapter, the aim 
has been to provide a detailed model of how the t-ideas (with special focus on the 
cosmological ideas) could be made to subserve reason's architectonic interests.  
Under my analysis, the t-ideas are supposed to work intraphenomenally as guides for 
the empirical use of the understanding (see 2.1 and 11.1).       
 
11.8 The World-Whole As A Multi-Level System of Interactive Structure   
In the present chapter, I have argued that reason's pursuit of the unconditioned 
takes the form of its performing a certain type of mereologically-oriented regressive 
synthesis and, in addition, have interpreted reason's interest in doing so in terms of its 
interest in object-oriented representation.  And since the phenomenal objects to which 
reason intentionally directs these regressive syntheses are spatially presented, a 
mereologically-oriented regressive synthesis consists in viewing a whole-object as "a 
given conditioned" and a set of underwriting parts as a set of prior conditions.  Here 
reason's interest counts as object-oriented because it aims (via regressive syntheses) 
to rationally ground the determinate bounded regions of space it introduces into 
spatiomaterial continua and, in addition, because a material object's individuality is 
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explicated in just such terms.  Moreover, since (according to Kant) the unconditioned 
can never be "encountered" in experience, it follows that reason's pursuit of it can 
never be completed, only approximated; in which case, reason's mereologically-
oriented regressive syntheses take the form of constructing whole-objects of ever-
larger magnitude and relating these in a system of structured wholes.   
Over the course of its long career, the concept of reciprocal interaction has 
had various uses.  In 11.3 we saw how interaction (encoded in the category of 
community) functioned as the conceptual substrate for the object-oriented empirical 
representation of space; moreover, we saw (in Chapter 3, 4 and 10) how Kant uses 
the concept of reciprocal interaction to explicate the ontological conception of a 
whole.  In Chapter 6, I showed how reciprocal interaction was motivated by two 
opposing metaphysical concerns, that of engulfment and isolation, both of which 
conceptually negated the causal connectedness that Kant thinks is necessary for a 
plurality of existing entities to count as one world rather than a plurality of uni-
membered metaphysically isolate worlds.  There, we saw (in Chapter 6) how 
reciprocal interaction is used as a general conceptual template for the world's real (as 
opposed to ideal)400 causal structure, one in virtue of which a multitude of substances 
can be conceptualized as members of one world.401   
Here I propose that we consider these Kant-internal data in light of the 
interpretative framework proposed in Chapter 2, where theoretical reason's highest-
                                                          
400
 In a first critique context, this terminology is retained but the meaning of these terms is 
altered.  "Ideal' refers to the subjective forms of intuition (space and time) whereas 'real' refers to the 
conceptual (= categorial) conditions of experiential cognition.   
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order aim is viewed as the representation of a world-whole.  When we do so, it seems 
plausible to see Kant as using the construct of reciprocal interaction to explicate 
composition relations in terms of (a special type of) causal relation.402  (In Chapters 7 
and 8, I developed this model in considerable detail.)   
According to Kant reason is under the imperative to realize its uber-principle, 
namely, to maximize systematicity (see 2.7).  Since, under my analysis, the 
imperative to maximize systematicity is to be given its content both in light of Kant's 
analysis of the concept of a world and the mereological dimension of his account of 
rational systematicity, reason's interest in maximizing systematicity would seem to 
consist in an interest in maximizing mereological structure (of a certain sort).  In light 
of the various uses to which Kant has put the construct of reciprocal interaction, it 
seems plausible to think that reason's interest in maximizing mereological structure 
would have to involve an interest in maximizing interactive structure.  (See Diagram 
below.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
401
 In the CPuR this is most explicit in the Third Analogy. 
 
402
 I discuss the point briefly in Chapter 6. 
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Diagram 11.8: A Multi-Level Explanatory Framework   
 
                                                               (macro-interaction) 
                                       
                                                                          ______External Environment 
      Structured Whole_____                                                                 
      (Target of Comp.) 
 
                                                                        
        Composition______                                            Internal Environment 
       (Physical Substrate)                                              
                                                               (micro-interaction) 
 
The model of interaction, encoded in the category of community (CAT 3.3), would 
therefore appear to function within Kant's thought as the single conceptual template 
used to conceptualize whole-objects on any scale; that is, the model of interaction is 
the single model under which Kant conceptualizes intraphenomenal object-oriented 
structural complexity.   
One can think about wholes in either of two ways, namely, as a one or as a 
many; as a singular entity or a set of parts linked within a causal structure.  Of the 
two, interactive structure (consisting of multiple substances embedded in a causal 
structure) seems reasonably assimilated to the latter (compositional) meaning of the 
term 'whole'.  In which case, the other conceptualization of a whole, namely, that of a 
singular entity, is the one under which interactive structures are to be cognitively 
subsumed.  In order to construct a multi-grade hierarchy of structured wholes, it 
would appear that what is needed is a suitable conceptual framework, one that 
explanatorily unites a physical substrate to its superstrate.  In the next section the aim 
is to argue that the functional value of Kant's physicoteleology (which incorporates 
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final causality) can be explicated in terms of how it provides an explanatory bridge 
between members and models of interactive structure.  
Diagram 11.8B:  
Hierarchy             Interactive Structure                Computed As_____  
H-Axis                   Members-of                           Agent-Substances 
V-Axis                   Models-of                              Physical Substrate  
 
11.9  The Psychological Transcendental Idea As Interface Mechanism  
I have argued that reason's highest-order cognitive end is to represent a world-
whole and that it does so on three distinct levels (see 11.0).   
(1)  the level of individual objects (on the model of whole-entities) 
(2)  the level of individual structural complexes (ones made up of objects) 
(3)  the level of structural complexes (made up of other structural complexes) and so 
on. 
In order to accomplish its highest-order end, reason follows a system of directives, 
ones that correspond to the three types of transcendental ideas (self, world, God).   
Diagram 11.9: 
T-Idea          Object-Oriented Directive Content__________________________________ 
Self               Represent the world's parts on the model of individual agent-substances    
World           Connect the world's singular parts in structural complexes (causal structures) 
God              Connect all possible structural complexes under the idea of a world-whole 
 
In order to represent a world-whole, reason has to generate structural complexes, ones 
composed of agent-substances (embedded in interactive structures).  The procedure 
appears to be one in which reason starts by representing nodes and then combines 
these to form structural complexes.  An important question arises here.  Under my 
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analysis, reason's pursuit of the unconditioned (via its mereologically-oriented 
regressive syntheses) is one it undertakes in order to realize its highest-order 
objective to represent a world-whole.  In that case, the conditions of the former apply 
to the latter.  In 11.0 we saw that reason's pursuit of the unconditioned can never be 
completed (only approximated) and takes the form of constructing a hierarchic 
system of structured wholes. 
As we have seen, nodes of interactive structure must be conceptualized on the 
model of agent-substances; moreover, reason must combine multiple nodes for the 
sake of generating structural complexes.  But as we saw in 11.0, reason's motivation 
for performing (mereologically-oriented) regressive syntheses in its pursuit of the 
unconditioned is object-oriented.  Via its mereologically-oriented regressive 
syntheses, reason's pursuit of the unconditioned amounts to its continually reinstating 
the presupposition of an ever-larger whole-object, one that comprises all prior ones.   
And here we can take note of an interesting (and somewhat complicated) 
recursive pattern.  Since its pursuit of mereologically-oriented regressive syntheses 
can never be completed (only approximated), reason must conceptualize this larger 
whole-object itself as a node, and then embed it in an interactive structure on a higher 
level.  It must do so for two reasons.  First, reason is motivated to do so because, 
being under the imperative to represent a world-whole, it must generate successively 
higher levels of structural complexity.  And since objecthood is defined in 
mereological terms (according to which objects are wholes) and since, in addition, the 
generation of structural complexity subserves reason's interest in object-oriented 
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representation, interactive structure must (somehow) be cognitively subsumed under 
the conception of a ever-larger whole-object.  In other words, structural complexity is 
not an end in itself but rather the cognitive means taken to represent ever-larger 
whole-objects.   
One can think about wholes in either of two ways, namely, as a one or as a 
many; as a singular entity or a set of parts linked within a causal structure.  Of the 
two, we saw that interactive structure (being constituted by multiple substances) 
seems plausibly assimilated to the latter (compositional) meaning of the term 'whole'.  
In which case, the other conceptualization of a whole, namely, that of a singular 
entity, is the one under which interactive structures are to be cognitively subsumed.   
Since reason is always under the directive to construct an ever-larger whole-
object and since, in addition, its interest in structural complexity is as a means to that 
cognitive end, it would seem that reason's interest in structural complexity is to be 
taken (by reason itself) to reflect its interest in representing the internal composition 
of an ever-larger whole-object.   
In light of its directives, it would appear that reason's generation of structural 
complexity is to be viewed as its aiming at the construction of an ever-larger whole-
object.  This means that the ever-larger whole-objects that reason constructs must, in 
each case, be able to fit into an ever-larger structural complex in which that whole-
object is itself a node; which is to say that a node must be conceptualized as a whole 
in the sense of being a singular object, one that is itself a part of an ever-larger 
whole-object.  And since a whole's structural complexity is to be explicated as causal 
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structure (specifically, interactive structure), nodes must be conceptualized under the 
model of interaction.  Under that model, nodes do not exist in a causal vacuum.  
Rather they must be conceptualized as interdependent causal agents.   
As we have seen in Chapters 7 and 8, an interactive structure consists of 
multiple substances whose (externally and internally-directed) causal powers have 
been reciprocally coordinated or harmonized.  Let x and y be two substances.  Then, 
x's externally-directed causal powers are efficacious (in regards to y) only on the 
condition that y has a correlative set of affective capacities, ones that produce effects 
(in y) which correspond to x's (externally-directed) causal powers.403  Moreover, in 
8.5-6 I argued that, of the two, it is the externally-directed causal powers that are 
more expressive of a (material) substance's agency.  And since Kant models 
substances on agents, this conclusion implies that x and y are mutually dependent on 
the other for their substancehood.  For present purposes, the point is that interactive 
structure (= the reciprocal coordination of causal powers) appears to be that in virtue 
of which multiple substances can have any (externally-directed) causal efficacy.  This 
implies, I think, that there can be no causally isolated agent-substances; where there 
is one, there must be others with which it can causally interact (see 8.5).   
If this is so, then for every larger whole-object reason constructs there must be 
some (implicit) higher-level interactive structure into which it must fit, one in 
reference to which the whole-object's causal powers are to be semantically 
explicated.  For it is on this level that the exercise of a substance's (externally-
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directed) causal powers are to be staged and played out (see 8.6); however, it may do 
so, as we have seen, only if there are other substances suited to interact with it.  
Notice how, under the model of interaction (specifically how agent-substances are 
metaphysical interdependent) reason is driven to hypothesize the existence of 
multiple coordinated entities on any given level of interactive structure.   
Now if reason's interest in structural complexity is as a means to the end of 
constructing ever-larger whole-objects and since, in addition, every whole-object's 
internal composition is to be explicated as interactive structure, it seems that a 
hierarchical system of whole-objects would entail a multi-level system of interactive 
structure.  As remarked, reason's interest in such a system reflects its highest-order 
aim to represent a world-whole.  Moreover, in view of the fact that every level of 
interactive structure is to be computed (by reason itself) as the internal composition 
of an ever-larger whole-object (one it is aiming to represent), it would appear that 
every interactive structure would necessarily belong to some whole-object and, for 
this reason, all interactive structures would therefore belong to the same world-whole.        
In 2.5 I argued that rational systematicity (explicated as a certain type of 
mereological structure) is goal-directed and so presupposes the concept of an end (see 
2.5).  Moreover, I have indicated that the characteristic of rational systematicity (in its 
mereological dimension) is that of part-on-whole dependency.  In Chapter 5, I drew 
attention to Kant's use of reciprocal interaction as the basis for concept-users to make 
a certain sort of explanatory inference, one which proceeds from a plurality of entities 
embedded in interactive structure to the presupposition of the idea or conception of a 
 435 
larger whole.  (I called this inference (A)).  We saw Kant using this same sort of 
inferential structure in the third critique (see 10.6), specifically in the context of his 
intentional explanation of natural teleology (= organisms as natural systems).  
According to Kant, an explanatory inference of this sort could be made, however, 
only on the presupposition of physicoteleology, because ends are inherently rational 
and "natural ends" cannot be causally credited to human beings or to the activity of 
material nature but only to a supreme intelligence (God). (See 2.8 for a discussion of 
the functional value of physicoteleology.)   
Interactive structures are made up of coordinated substances, but they 
themselves are not substances.  So they themselves cannot exercise (since they do not 
possess) causal powers.  Only substances (conceptualized on the model of agents) can 
possess and exercise causal powers.  This poses a problem for reason.  For if the 
model of interaction is an all-purpose conceptual template, one under which the 
world's structural complexity is to be explicated -- if, in other words, this model 
conceptually prescribes the terms under which two or more entities may be thought of 
as individual nodes of a causal structure (and so parts of one world-whole) -- then it 
would appear that a multitude of interactive structures (qua structures) could not be 
connected in one world.  For interactive structures (qua structure) are not themselves 
causal interactants.   
Let me make this problem somewhat more intuitive.  Consider, once again, 
the exotic "glass frog."  The glass frog is a semi-transparent organism, one whose 
internal composition can be viewed by an external observer.  Suppose you were to 
 436 
conceptually negate the idea of the whole-frog, considered as a singular entity, an 
agent-substance.  What would remain?  A multitude of (very unfroglike) entities, 
none of which have the causal powers of a whole-frog (since they are supposed to 
make those very powers physically possible).404  So none of these entities by 
themselves (or as a collective of frog guts) can interact with the external environment 
in the way a whole-frog can.  The whole-frog's business is transacted on the 
semantically relevant level of description, one which is distinct from that of its 
neurophysiological substrate.  When you conceptually negate the idea of whole-frog 
(conceptualized under the idea of an agent), you therefore semantically erase the 
frog's substancehood and, in doing so, negate the means to uplink its physical 
substrate to the frog's external environment; in other words, you conceptually negate 
the means to connect interactive structures on lower levels (those belonging to the 
frog's composition) to higher-level ones.   
What reason needs, I suggest, is an interface mechanism, one that (as it were) 
puts an agential face on interactive structure.  Let me explain.  The function of an 
interface mechanism would be to link multiple interactive structures together; which 
is to say that it should make it possible to link lower-level interactive structures to 
higher-level whole-objects and (by this object-oriented means) connect interactive 
structures on lower levels to higher ones.  And since, under the model of interaction, 
the nodes of interactive structures are agent-substances, it would appear that an 
interface mechanism must make it possible for reason to convert its representation of 
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structural complexity into the representation of a singular object (a node of causal 
structure).   
In order for reason to uplink lower-level interactive structures to higher-level 
ones, it must first cognitively subsume a lower-level interactive structure under the 
conception of a ever-larger whole-object, one conceptualized as a singular object.  
But in order to do this, reason must be able to view this whole-object as an end, one 
that prescribes itself as the target of composition.  I submit that it is the psychological 
t-idea of an agent that functions as an interface mechanism, and that it does so by 
conceptually mediating reason's cognitive subsumption of interactive structures under 
the concept of a whole-object.   
In order to see that a thing is possible only as an end, i.e., that the causality of 
its origin must be sought not in the mechanism of nature, but in a cause whose 
productive capacity is determined by concepts, it is necessary that its form not 
be possible in accordance with mere natural laws, i.e., ones that can be 
cognized by us through the understanding, applied to objects of the senses, 
alone; rather even empirical cognition of their cause and effect presupposes 
concepts of reason.405 
 
In 2.7 I argued that the I/self/agent idea (an idea of reason) provided the in terms in 
which to compute singular cognition.  More precisely, I argued that since singular 
objects could not be conceptualized under the concept of a metaphysically simple 
entity, there had to be a surrogate formula under which to compute singular objects.  
The concept of a substance prescribes simplicity (to all members of its extension) as a 
discursive route to computing their singularity or individuality.  I suggested, however, 
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that reason could acknowledge the compositeness of every whole-object in empirical-
phenomenal reality (which is necessary spatial), while viewing singular objects under 
a surrogate formula of singularity understood as necessary unity.  But the 
psychological t-idea of an agent cannot accomplish the conversion of structural 
complexity into the representation of a singular object single-handedly; rather, it 
relies on final causality, an intentional explanatory framework derived from Kant's 
physicoteleology.   
And it is precisely at this juncture that Kant's concept of a natural end may be 
functionally introduced.  The ground of a material composite's necessary unity is the 
concept of an natural end, namely, the concept of a whole-object that prescribes itself 
as the target of composition (see 10.4-5).   
A teleological judgment compares the concept of a product of nature as it is 
with one of what it ought to be.  Here the judging of its possibility is grounded 
in a concept (of the end) that precedes it a priori.  There is no difficulty in 
representing the possibility of products of art in such a way.  But to think of a 
product of nature that there is something that it ought to be and then to judge 
whether it really is so already presupposes a principle that could not be drawn 
from experience (which teaches only what things are).406 
 
Here (in 2.7) I suggested that from the standpoint of practical reason we (as rational 
agents) are entitled to view our phenomenal selves (that is, our physical bodies) as 
singular objects because these are our instruments of causal efficacy and therefore 
moral enactment.  When we view ourselves (as natural organisms) under the 
psychological t-idea of an agent (as morality categorically demands) we must view 
our embodied selves as natural systems able to meet the conditions of agenthood -- 
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namely,  singularity.  To that end, we must view our bodies as one whole-object, as 
an end-in-itself for the sake of whose necessary unity a set of underwriting conditions 
must be provided.   
 
11.10  Conclusion:  The Cognitive Significance of Natural Organisms (Natural 
Teleology) 
 
The cognitive significance of natural organisms is that they constitute a class 
of natural phenomena whose members exhibit an interesting (and cognitively useful) 
ambiguity, one that corresponds to the two conceptualizations of a whole: on the one 
hand they are material composites; on the other they are singular entities, ones which 
exhibit causal agency.  Since we are ourselves natural organisms, ones who are also 
self-aware (as pure moral consciousnesses), Kant thinks that we can (and indeed 
must) think of ourselves under the psychological t-idea of a agent and thus view our 
physical bodies as natural ends.  It is therefore on the basis of this necessary a priori 
postulate (of our own causal agency) that we can apply the psychological t-idea in our 
own case.   
Even the organism is contained in the consciousness of oneself.  The subject 
makes its own form in accordance with a priori purposes.407 
 
Since according to Kant the world was ultimately created for us (as a domain in  
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which to stage our moral enactment408) and since, in addition, we are (as rational 
agents) unique in that we are the only species of natural organism capable of moral 
agency, it seems entirely contingent that there would be a vast multitude of 
nonhuman species of organism.  Frogs, flies, and bacterial flagella are not capable of 
moral enactment; they are not capable of pursuing a morally-endorsed happiness.  
The world doesn't exist for them.  So why are they here?  According to Kant, nature's 
mereocosmic structure is to be modeled on the internal structure of individual 
organisms (see §§67-8).  Under that model, however, every component part of nature 
would be "indispensible" and therefore necessary (see §66).  In light of Kant's 
specification of nature's absolute final end (that it was created for us), it seems 
reasonable to ask whether there is some purpose that the vast numbers of nonhuman 
organisms are supposed to serve, one that is teleologically linked to the ends of 
human reason?    
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 See §§82-84 of the third critique.  Kant's reasoning in these sections is more complicated 
than it is being represented here.  In these sections, Kant seems to be acknowledging that nature must 
have an absolute final end (AFE).  If nature is to constitute a system of ends, there must be an absolute 
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subserving the AFE.    
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One (rather obvious) response to this question would be to point out that other 
organisms (as well as inorganic natural kinds) serve the moral interests of practical 
reason.409  Human beings survive by consuming plants and animals; our bodies would 
die without oxygen.  Our political, legal, and religious institutions require edifices for 
their operation. We rely on nature's raw inorganic materials to pave our roads and 
erect our skyscrapers.  Nature must therefore generally be the sort of place where 
human ends are actionable.  To be able to pursue our ends (whether moral or 
immoral) in the world, we must be able to interact causally with the things that are in 
it; consequently the world's natural kinds, both organic and inorganic, must be made 
amenable to such human interaction.   
The above response explicates the purposiveness of nonhuman organisms in 
relation to practical reason's interest in moral enactment.  But I hope to have made 
plausible a response a different sort, one that recognizes the interests of theoretical 
reason.  As we have seen, in performing its (mereologically-oriented) regressive 
syntheses, reason introduces boundaries into spatiomaterial continua for the sake of 
its object-oriented representation and, in addition, subsequently attempts to stabilize 
these boundaries by thinking means-end relationships between a set of underwriting 
parts and a given whole-object, one that prescribes itself as the target of composition.  
Under this analysis, reason's mereologically-oriented regressive syntheses would 
therefore seem to consist in thinking teleological connections among the vast 
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numbers of natural kinds.  In light of reason's highest-order end to represent a 
mereocosmic whole, nature's inclusion of natural organisms (and the coordinated 
natural systems in which they interact) appears to us as a kind of cognitive 
purposiveness in that it furthers reason's interest in object-oriented representation. 
In the terms of the preceding analysis (see 11.9), it's as if something has made 
it possible for reason to implement an interface mechanism (as represented by the 
psychological t-idea) in the service of its aim to represent a the world as one whole.  
As remarked, natural organisms constitute a very special class of natural product in 
that they can be viewed as a one and as a many, as a singular object and as a set of 
interacting parts.  It is owing to this semantic ambiguity (of being singular objects 
that prescribe their own composition) that reason is empirically presented with an 
amenable object-oriented format in which it can cognitively subsume lower-level 
interactive structures under higher-level ones.  Reason's being able to do so consists 
in its being able to represent interactive structure as the physical substrate of a 
(higher-level) singular object, the latter being one that reason is, in turn, interested to 
represent as a node of interactive structure.  As we have seen, reason must be able to 
convert the representation of interactive structure into the representation of a singular 
object.  It may do so, however, under an alternative formula according to which a 
singular object is a whole-object.   
In order to accomplish its representation of a material composite as a singular 
object (under this alternative formula), reason must also rely on final causality.  That 
is, in order to view a material composite as one whole-object, reason must be able to 
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take an explanatory angle on that composite entity, one where it views the whole-
object as the effect of prior combinatorial processes.  Without an alternative formula 
for singular objects, however, such combinatorial processes would be entirely 
unguided.  For there would be no single target of composition, not, at any rate, one in 
reference to which a set of underwriting parts is supposed to be viewed as physical 
substrate.  The alternative formula (for singular objects) must therefore be such that, 
when a material composite is subsumed under it, the former is viewed as one single 
thing that prescribes itself as the target of composition.  It is, I suggest, by being 
represented under the psychological t-idea of an agent that a material composite can 
(and indeed must) be represented as one whole-object; that it must be so represented 
is owing to the fact that, when it (the material composite) is subsumed under the 
psychological t-idea, it conceptually inherits the characterization of being an end-in-
itself as a consequence of this subsumption.410   
In 2.9 I noted that Kant seems to have a largely implicit view of the semantics 
concerning the term 'natural organism'.  Kant's view of the meaning of the term 
'organism' seems to be that we, as concept-users, are not able to cognitively compute 
its semantic value independently of some vital reference to the subjective structures  
of our own rational  agency.411  We, as embodied natural systems, are able to put 
ourselves under the perspective of being agents (thanks to our pure moral 
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consciousness).  And from the fact that we can take this agential angle on our 
phenomenal selves we are able to derive both an understanding of and the basis for 
singular cognition.412  But Kant insists that the agential angle is not itself derived 
from the experience of a phenomenal self; rather it is in virtue of this agential angle, 
which is conceptually prior, that we can represent our physical bodies (which are 
necessarily composite) as a single phenomenal self.413   
I submit (as Kant's view) that this agential angle both expresses the 
psychological t-idea of pure reason and, in addition, provides the semantic model in 
terms of which singular objecthood is to be generally understood.  It is within this 
interpretative framework that I wish now to state the cognitive significance of natural 
organisms.  It is this:  The cognitive significance of natural organisms is, I suggest, 
that they appear to us as intraphenomenal objects (or representata), which are of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
411
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Korsgaard's (1996) "Personal Identity and The Unity of Agency:  A Kantian Response To Parfit."     
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incalculable number and diversity, and which are  generally amenable to (indeed 
semantically necessitate) the empirical use of reason's psychological t-idea of an 
agent.414   
When we acknowledge the vast multitude of nonhuman organisms in light of 
reason's cognitive need for systematicity, we perceive how suited nature is to that 
need.  It seems to us as if something (outside nature)415 has aimed to make it 
intraphenomenally possible for us to generalize (by analogy) our conception of 
agenthood416 to countless other entities in nature and, by that means, has made it 
possible for (our) reason to represent countless nodes of interactive structure.  Here it 
is as if nature is indicating to us what we, as cognitive systems, are supposed to 
regard as singular objects.  Since the causal powers of every node must be 
reciprocally coordinated with those of other nodes, it seems, in addition, as if 
organisms (and their encompassing environments) constitute natural systems, ones 
that are especially amenable to the understanding's category of community (see 11.3).  
Here it is as if nature is assisting our cognitive systems in the construction of ever-
greater levels of structural complexity.  And through the use of an interface 
mechanism (see 11.9), these natural systems can be hierarchically-ordered, thereby 
allowing reason to construct a multi-grade system of interactive structure, one in 
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which multiple whole-objects are simultaneously coordinated and subordinated to 
one another.417   
As we have seen, when a material composite is viewed under the 
psychological t-idea, it conceptually inherits the conceptualization as an end-in-itself, 
or, in Kant's terminology, it is to be viewed as a natural end.  Since organisms are 
natural products, not human artifacts, the intentional cause cannot be human (or  
anything in nature).  So viewing a suitable material composite under the concept of a 
natural end requires the postulation of an extra-phenomenal418 ground, which, in turn, 
implicates Kant's physicoteleology.  In the third critique Kant makes the dependency 
of organisms on final causality explicit.  In referring to an organism, Kant says that  
there is some intentional ground of its existence (as a contingent natural 
being), and this thought is difficult to separate from the concept of an 
organized being: for once we have had to base its internal possibility in a 
causality of final causes and an idea that underlies this, we also cannot 
conceive of the existence of this product otherwise than as an end.  For the 
represented effect, the representation of which is at the same time the 
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 Or, equivalently, our self-referent model of substancehood as represented in the 
psychological t-idea of the self.   
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 In OP, Kant writes: "Space and time, as subjective forms, not as objects of the intuition of 
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thought at all" (OP, 22:504, underscoring added). 
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determining ground of its production in an intelligently acting cause, is called 
an end.419 
 
Later, in OP, Kant appears to maintain a similar view of the dependency relation 
between an organism's composition and final causality:  
There is no spontaneity in the organization of matter but only receptivity from 
an immaterial principle of the formation of matter into bodies, which indicates 
[geht auf] the universe, and contains a thoroughgoing relation of means to 
ends. An understanding (which, however, is not a world-soul) [is] the 
principle of the system, not a principle of aggregation.420   
 
Operating under the hypothesis that nature consists in an (implicit) hierarchy of ever-
larger structured wholes, one in which each successive whole-object conforms to a 
prior idea of it, would according to Kant be equivalent to viewing nature as a system 
of ends.421 In the Appendix to the Dialectic (of the first critique), Kant states:  
The highest formal unity that alone rests on concepts of reason is the 
purposive unity of things; and the speculative interests of reason makes it 
necessary to regard every ordinance in the world as if it had sprouted from the 
intention of a highest reason.  Such a principle, namely, opens up for our 
reason as applied to the field of experience, entirely new prospects for 
connecting up things in the world in accordance with teleological laws, and 
thereby attaining to the greatest systematic unity among them.  The 
presupposition of a supreme intelligence, as the sole cause of the world-
whole, can therefore always be useful to reason and never harmful to it.422 
 
In view of the world's global teleological structure, it would therefore seem necessary  
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to postulate a suitable cause, one that is both external and rational—"external" 
because it must not itself be positioned within phenomenal nature's hierarchy of 
structured wholes and "rational" because it must be capable of intentional causation 
(= producing effects under the guidence of concepts).423   
For although God's understanding, which cognizes everything intuitively, the 
whole is a whole fundamentally only insofar as it consists of every particular; 
for this, consequently, divine providence is also completely universal, in the 
sense that it includes every individual in its plan; but it would be perverse of 
us and contrary to discursive reason if we too tried to rise from the particular 
directly to the universal and survey the whole.  The nature of our reason lays 
on us the duty of first reflecting on general laws and then, as far as possible, 
of grasping every individual and then every species under them, and in such a 
way of forming some sketch of the whole, which is to be sure very defective, 
but nevertheless sufficient for our needs.424   
 
It would appear that reason's object-oriented enterprise of constructing a 
mereocosmic system of whole-objects presupposes a holistic standpoint on nature, 
one according to which the experiencer views himself as the rational consumer of a 
superior someone's (God's) practical intentionality (see 2.9 for details).  Under this 
scenario, reason could view the world-whole as being entirely subject to a system of  
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still be several such wholes in which an interaction <commercium> is to be met. -- Thus the oneness of 
the world does not follow from its concept.  But the oneness can be demonstrated from another 
ground, which is the following: if all things except one exist so that they all depend on the one, then it 
must follow that all existing substances except one are connected, and all together constitute a whole 
because they depend on one.  It would thus follow from the communal [cause] and from a highest 
cause that there is only one single world, which will be demonstrated in the following.  Thus in no 
way does the oneness of the world flow from its concept” (LM, Metaphysik L, 28:197, underscoring 
added). 
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 Immanuel Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, ed. and trans. Alan Wood and George Di 
Giovanni , (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 28:1115.  
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hypothetical compositional imperatives.  Such a system would consist in viewing 
higher and lower whole-objects as existing concurrently in one world as well as being 
recursively subordinated to each other.  Lower-level whole-objects would be 
subordinate to higher-levels ones and their subordination could be modeled  
teleologically, namely, as a set of means that were intended to subserve a higher- 
order compositional end, one that is represented by an ever-larger whole-object.  By 
such means, reason is consequently able to realize its object-oriented aim of 
representing the world as one necessarily unified structured super-object.   
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